



**UNIVERSIDADE DE BRASÍLIA
INSTITUTO DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS
PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS**

**SECURITIZAÇÃO DA IDENTIDADE E CONFLITOS ÉTNICOS:
ANTECEDENTES À GUERRA DA BÓSNIA (1992-1995)**

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**BRASÍLIA
2017**

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Securitização da Identidade e Conflitos Étnicos: antecedentes à Guerra da Bósnia (1992-1995)

Dissertação apresentada ao Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de Brasília como parte dos requisitos para obtenção do título de Mestre em Relações Internacionais.

Área de concentração: Política Internacional e Comparada.

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Brasília
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Dedico esta dissertação à minha primeira professora, minha avó Neusa, que me ensinou as primeiras palavras.

AGRADECIMENTOS

Agradeço, inicialmente, à minha mãe, Ana Lucia, por todo o apoio incondicional que me deu estes últimos dois anos, sem os quais essa dissertação não seria possível. Agradeço também minha irmã, Luciana, e ao meu cunhado, Stephan, por terem proporcionado um espaço tranquilo para a realização dessa dissertação. Também estendo meus agradecimentos à minha família. Especialmente, agradeço ao meu namorado, Renato pelo apoio fundamental que me deu esse período, por vezes solitário. Às vezes me motivando e às vezes me distraíndo e, acima de tudo, me amparando nos momentos de necessidade. São pessoas que, sem dúvidas, foram fundamentais para a elaboração da presente dissertação.

Outra pessoa fundamental a qual agradeço é minha orientadora, Vânia, a qual me auxiliou com seu apoio acadêmico e motivacional, quando necessário. Suas considerações foram primordiais ao longo do trabalho. Também agradeço aos demais docentes do curso de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de Brasília pelo conhecimento adquirido pelo caminho.

Gostaria também de agradecer aos meus colegas de turma, Isabela, Fernanda, Rafael, Evaristo, Bruna, Carol, Pedro, Tiago, Thiago, Sumaia, Dandara, Philipp e Luísa e aos membros honorários, Matheus e Solene, não apenas pelas valorosas discussões acadêmicas mas também pelos momentos de descontração e divertimento. Foram momentos igualmente imprescindíveis. Estendo os agradecimentos aos membros do CEGRI, os quais auxiliaram na presente dissertação com importantes feedbacks (também com distrações necessárias). Finalmente, agradeço ao amigo Vinícius “monstro” pela solicitude e comentários descontraídos quando lia os meus manuscritos.

Enfim, agradeço a todos que auxiliaram, de algum modo, minha estada em Brasília e minha jornada até a conclusão deste trabalho.

Muito Obrigada!

RESUMO

A guerra na república da Bósnia-Herzegovina eclodiu em abril de 1992, opondo os seus diferentes grupos nacionais. O presente trabalho tem como problema central compreender o processo pelo qual a identidade nacional foi instrumentalizada tendo, como decorrência, o conflito. Para tanto, defende-se a hipótese de que a violência étnica não é um fenômeno espontâneo resultantes de ódios ancestrais. Ao contrário: a violência decorrente da guerra na Bósnia-Herzegovina seria resultado de interesses políticos, que usaram o discurso de uma nação atemporal e a-histórica para justificar projetos de Estado e de poder excludentes. Objetiva-se compreender, portanto, como o nacionalismo tornou-se um discurso viável na política iugoslava e, especialmente, como foram aceitos por uma determinada audiência, acostumada à coexistência dos anos comunistas. Para tanto, adotar-se-á o *Security Framing*, uma ferramenta teórico-metodológica que tem como objetivo compreender como a realidade é ressignificada por atores estratégicos com finalidades políticas claras.

Palavras-chave: *Security Framing*; Guerra na Bósnia; Iugoslávia; Identidade étnico-nacional. Securitização.

ABSTRACT

The war in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out in April 1992, opposing its different national groups. The present work has as its central problem to understand the process by which national identity was instrumentalized, resulting in the conflict. To that end, we put forth the hypothesis that ethnic violence is not a spontaneous phenomenon resulting from ancient hatreds. On the opposite: the violence resulting from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the result of political interests, which used the timeless nation speech to justify its racist and excluding State project. The goal is to understand, therefore, how nationalism became a viable political discourse in Yugoslavia and, especially, how a particular audience, accustomed to the coexistence of the Communist years, accepted it. To do so, the *Security Framing* will be adopted as a theoretical-methodological tool, which aims to understand how the reality is ressignified.

Keywords: *Security Framing*; War in Bosnia; Yugoslavia; National Identity; Securitization.

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LISTA DE SIGLAS E ABREVIATURAS

AVNOJ	Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije – Conselho Antifascista para a Libertação dos povos da Iugoslávia
BiH	Bósnia-Herzegovina
JNA	Jugoslavenska narodna armija – Exército Nacional Iugoslavo
LCI	Liga dos Comunistas da Iugoslávia
NDH	Nezavisna Država Hrvatska – Estado Independente Croata
OTAN	Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte
OZNa	Odjeljenje za zaštitu naroda – Departamento para a Defesa do Povo
PAD	Partido da Ação Democrática
PC	Partido Comunista
PDS	Partido Democrata Sérvio
PRS	Partido Radical Sérvio
PSS	Partido Socialista da Sérvia
SANU	Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti – Academia Sérvia de Ciências e Artes
VMRO	Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija – Organização Revolucionária Interna Macedônia

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INTRODUÇÃO

Desde sua emergência, nos séculos XVII e XIX, o nacionalismo tornou-se um importante fenômeno na política internacional. Com o fim da Guerra Fria, o tema reemergiu na agenda global com a eclosão de conflitos cujas motivações eram, em especial, nacionalistas ou étnicas (CHATTEERJEE, 2000, p. 227). Dentre esses estava a Guerra da Bósnia (1992-1995), que ganhou o imaginário coletivo ao ser transmitida em tempo real para diferentes partes do globo.

Previamente uma república iugoslava, a declaração de independência da Bósnia, em março de 1991, foi sucedida por um conflito que duraria três anos e meio. Definida por Samantha Power (2004, p. 291) como um microcosmo etnicamente misto, a república era composta por eslavos muçulmanos (43,5% da população), servo-bósnios (31,2%) e bósnios-croatas (17,4%).¹ A eclosão do conflito opôs esses grupos em uma violenta guerra civil, na qual atuaram milícias paramilitares e exércitos étnico-nacionais.² Estudos recentes estimam que o número de vítimas fatais foi de aproximadamente 104.732, dos quais 65% eram eslavos muçulmanos (ZWIERZCHOWSKI; TABEAU, 2010, pp. 17-18). A guerra também gerou 2,5 milhões de refugiados e deslocados internos (UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 1995). Esses números foram decorrentes do tipo de violência empregada, a *limpeza étnica*, a qual caracteriza-se pelo uso de ações coordenadas de violência com o propósito de expulsar populações civis de um determinado território. A partir de critérios predominantemente étnicos, o seu propósito era homogeneizar a população, expulsando elementos considerados indesejados (cf. SHAW, 2015, p. 67). Contudo, apesar das violências vistas chocarem a opinião pública, as ações adotadas pela comunidade internacional não foram suficientes para impedir o seu escalonamento, resultando em massacres como o de Srebrenica³. Somente quando o risco de novos massacres em enclaves muçulmanos tornou-se iminente, em

¹ Dados oficiais do censo da Bósnia-Herzegovina (1991).

² Forças bósnios-muçulmanas e bósnio-croatas enfrentaram-se por territórios na região da Herzegovina entre outubro de 1992 e fevereiro de 1994. Somente com um acordo entre as partes é que as forças se uniram para combater servo-bósnios (cf. RAMET, 2006, pp. 433-439).

³ Ocorrido em Julho de 1995, o massacre de Srebrenica é considerado o maior massacre ocorrido em solo europeu no pós Segunda Guerra Mundial. Estima-se que 7.000 homens e meninos foram assassinados por forças servo-bósnias lideradas pelo general Ratko Mladic apenas nesse episódio. Os sobreviventes, em sua maioria mulheres e idosos, foram forçados a migrar para outros enclaves de maioria muçulmana.

agosto de 1995, é que a comunidade internacional agiu, intervindo militarmente⁴ e forçando um acordo⁵ entre as partes (cf. POWER, 2004, pp. 497-502; RAMET, 2006, 465-466, 471-475).

Exige análise acurada perceber como a não-intervenção foi continuamente justificada por atores internacionais: constantemente negou-se a responsabilidade em agir frente às violências perpetradas, optando por visões a-históricas desses morticínios. O principal argumento utilizado neste contexto foi o de que a violência observada seria resultado de “ódios ancestrais” ou “antagonismos históricos” e, portanto, não facilmente solucionada por intervenção externa. É esta argumentação que Hirschman (*apud* POWER, 2004, pp. 524-528 e pp. 574-575) chamou de *justificativa de futilidade para a inação*, constantemente utilizado pelo governo de Bill Clinton frente às violências observadas durante a guerra (cf. SELLS, 1997, pp. 23-24). O argumento de futilidade é expresso em um discurso proferido pelo presidente americano em 1994, quando afirma que “[a]té que esses povos se cansem de matarem uns aos outros (...) coisas ruins vão continuar acontecendo” (CLINTON, 1994 *apud* SELLS, 1997, p. 41. Nossa tradução).

Como consequência, naturalizou-se rivalidades que *não* seriam ancestrais ou tampouco tenderiam inevitavelmente para a violência, como posto pelo então presidente americano e outros líderes internacionais. Em realidade, defendemos a hipótese de que tais sectarismos são decorrentes de interesses políticos que objetivamente se apropriaram do discurso nacionalista, manipulando-o com a finalidade de justificar projetos de Estado e de poder excludentes. São, portanto, esses interesses, assim como as lideranças que os difundiram, os principais responsáveis pela violações decorrentes. A pergunta a qual pretende-se responder é, então, como os discursos nacionalistas radicalizados foram instrumentalizados, tendo, como decorrência, a guerra na Bósnia (1992-1995).

Com o objetivo de estudar como a violência tornou-se uma ferramenta política viável e o papel desses líderes políticos na manipulação de identidades coletivas, a presente dissertação analisará discursos sérvios e servo-bósnios, principais agressores no conflito bósnio. Para tanto, propõe-se compreendê-los por meio do *Security Framing*, elaborado por Vânia Carvalho Pinto (2014), uma variação da teoria de Securitização. A aplicação do modelo teórico tem como propósito fornecer uma ferramenta analítica que auxilie a compreensão do conflito e seus antecedentes. Nesse contexto, o discurso nacionalista radicalizado será entendido enquanto um

⁴ Por meio da operação Força Deliberada, sob comando da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN)

⁵ O Acordo de Dayton, assinado em dezembro de 1995, criou uma estrutura federal para o estado bósnio, que foi dividido em duas entidades administrativas: A federação croata-bosníaca, ocupando 51% do território, e a República Srpska, sob comando sérvio, ficou com 49% do território.

discurso securitizador, cuja finalidade foi justificar medidas extremas que, no caso, incorreu na perpetração de crimes de guerra durante o conflito na Bósnia.⁶

O nacionalismo nas Relações Internacionais.

Nacionalismos, tais quais defendidos por Eric Hobsbawn (2008 [1990]) e Benedict Anderson (2008 [1983]), não são *apriorísticos*. Ao contrário, são fenômenos modernos, construídos e difundidos nos três últimos séculos, e foram simultâneos ao objeto que pretendem naturalizar: o Estado-nação. Os autores apontam a modernidade do fenômeno por meio de sua genealogia: de acordo com Anderson (2008 [1983], p. 30), o nacionalismo é produto de um período cultural⁷ que foi, posteriormente, modulado e adaptado para diferentes contextos sociais, exportando sua visão de história, povo e cultura únicos. Para o autor, a nação é “uma comunidade política imaginada”, sendo o nacionalismo seu constructo ideológico legitimador (ANDERSON, 2008 [1983], p. 32). Semelhantemente, Hobsbawn (2008 [1990], p. 113) aponta o papel do Estado como um dos atores responsáveis por elaborar o nacionalismo através de uma “engenharia social ideológica consciente e deliberada”. Para tanto, apropria-se de sentimentos populares pré-existentes, moldando-os com o propósito de transformá-los em ferramentas políticas de considerável utilidade (HOBSBAWN, 2008 [1990], p.113). Para Jurgen Habermas (2000, p. 302), a identidade nacional foi responsável por proporcionar “(...) o substrato socialmente integrador da identidade política (...)”, procurando-o em elementos compartilhados, como a história, língua e cultura.

Embora originário dos séculos XVIII e XIX, o fenômeno do nacionalismo não ficou restrito àqueles períodos e foi constantemente adotado no século XX para construção de legitimidades políticas e sociais, como foi claramente observado nos anos finais do estado iugoslavo. O objetivo do presente trabalho é, portanto, compreender o processo no qual visões radicais e excludentes de nacionalismos se transformaram em valorosas ferramentas políticas.

⁶ Dentre as principais lideranças condenadas por crimes durante a Guerra da Bósnia estão: Radovan Karadzic, ex-presidente servo-bósnio condenado por genocídio em Srebrenica, crimes contra a humanidade e violação das leis e costumes da guerra (INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 2016); Biljana Plavsic, ex-presidente servo-bósnia condenada por crimes contra a humanidade (INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 2003); e o general servo-bósnio Radislav Krstić, condenado por genocídio por sua participação no massacre de Srebrenica (INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 2001). O presidente sérvio Slobodan Milosevic, apontado como principal promotor da política de limpeza étnica, morreu durante o julgamento, em 11 de março de 2006.

⁷ O nacionalismo, para Anderson (2008 [1983], p. 39 e pp. 279-280), foi fruto das rupturas políticas do final do século XVIII, em que as estruturas de referência, o Estado-dinástico e a comunidade religiosa, foram questionadas. Como consequência, gerou-se a necessidade de criar uma nova narrativa para as identidades recém-estabelecidas.

Igualmente, pretende-se investigar como esses discursos legitimaram extremismos enquanto políticas viáveis e como foram devidamente aceitos por uma pretendida audiência, já nos anos finais do século XX.

Para tanto, o foco dado será o papel do discurso nesse processo e sua aceitabilidade social. Para compreendê-lo, é necessário desconstruir a visão tradicional de que as violências étnicas são resultados de “ódios ancestrais” ou “animosidades históricas”. Pelo contrário, tais discursos de antagonismos foram amplificados e difundidos com objetivos claros, cuja finalidade foi, em geral, justificar projetos Estados excludentes e etnocêntricos. Afinal, no caso em específico, optar por uma visão determinista dos crimes perpetrados durante a guerra da Bósnia é simplificar o debate e, especialmente, favorecer seus orquestradores, uma vez que suas responsabilidades terminam, muitas vezes, minimizadas (cf. POWER, 2004, p. 372). Ao contrário do que se supõe, o que motivou tais violências não foi um ódio antigo, advindo de suas bases sociais e, portanto, insolúvel. Tratá-los deste modo seria negar seu caráter deliberado e, muitas vezes, racional e efetivamente organizado. O estudo propõe, portanto, estudar o processo pelo qual tais discursos excludentes foram alimentados do topo para a base, entendendo o papel das principais lideranças em criar e fomentar rivalidades entre grupos. No contexto estudado, a Guerra da Bósnia, essas rivalidades foram marcadas essencialmente por diferenças étnicas e religiosas.

O trabalho em questão visa contribuir com o debate compreendendo o discurso nacionalista enquanto um discurso securitizador, tal como estabelecido pela Escola de Copenhague, aqui representado pelos escritos de Barry Buzan, Ole Waever e Jaap de Wilde (1997). Dentro dessa corrente teórica, uma percepção de ameaça é socialmente construída com a finalidade de justificar medidas extremas que não seriam adotadas no debate político normal – tendo como consequência, as violências perpetradas na guerra bósnia (cf. BUZAN et al, 1997). Esse processo, contudo, não ocorreu em um vazio estrutural, ausente de significados pré-existentes, mas em consonância com um contexto cultural externo (BALZACQ, 2005, pp. 181-182). Afinal, a securitização é um processo intersubjetivo, no qual a audiência tem um papel primordial: aceitar o discurso, assim como suas medidas extraordinárias. Para tanto, será incorporado elementos da *framing theory* à proposição da Escola de Copenhague, ampliando seu potencial investigativo.

Metodologia

A *Framing Theory* corresponde a um marco teórico-metodológico que permite identificar questões centrais internas aos discursos de proeminentes figuras políticas. Para tanto, o presente estudo seguirá uma abordagem qualitativa. O objetivo será compreender como determinadas representações da realidade foram concebidas por atores estratégicos e, mais importante, como foram aceitas pela pretendida audiência.

Para tanto, estratégias de análise de conteúdo serão adotadas. No caso em questão, os textos analisados serão os discursos de figuras proeminentes da política iugoslava, sérvia e servo-bósnia. O enfoque principal centrou-se na figura de Slobodan Milosevic, que transitou de liderança comunista no início dos anos 1980 para expoente do nacionalismo sérvio nos anos seguintes. Para tanto, foram analisados os conteúdos de vinte e seis discursos proferidos por Milosevic entre 1987 e 1998, utilizando suas traduções para o inglês. Desse total, cinco foram discursos proferidos em assembleias, reuniões partidárias e eventos públicos e vinte e um foram entrevistas, concedidas para mídias locais e estrangeiras. Os discursos foram complementados por revisão bibliográfica, em língua inglesa e portuguesa. O quadro 1 lista os discursos analisados. Ademais, outras lideranças como o líder servo-bósnio Radovan Karadzic e o nacionalista sérvio Vojislav Seselj foram analisadas. Utilizou-se, então, fontes secundárias por meio de revisão bibliográfica, como, por exemplo, a análise dos discursos de Seselj feita por Anthony Oberschall (2006). Ademais, analisou-se o Memorando da Academia Sérvia de Ciências e Artes, de 1986, um texto canônico do nacionalismo sérvio, com significativo impacto nas representações políticas posteriores.

Quadro 1 – Discursos de Slobodan Milosevic analisados (1987–1996).

Data	Local	Contexto
Abr./87	Pristina (Kosovo)	Discurso proferido para a população sérvia em Pristina.
Jun./89	Gazimestan (Kosovo)	Discurso proferido em comemoração aos 600 anos da batalha do Kosovo.
Jul./90	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Discurso proferido durante o encerramento do primeiro congresso do Partido Socialista Sérvio.
Mai./91	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Discurso do presidente à Assembleia Nacional Sérvia.
Ago./91	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista à Sky Television/Belgrade TV: "Presidente sérvio entrevistado nega envolvimento no conflito Croata."
Dez./91	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista à rádio Belgrado: "Milosevic: o plano do enviado da ONU Cyrus Vance para a Croácia não tem um único ponto controverso."

Mai./92	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista à Radio Television Serbia: "Milosevic é entrevistado sobre as pressões enfrentadas e os bons prospectos para o novo Estado iugoslavo."
Jun./92	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista à Rádio Belgrado: "Milosevic: a participação eleitoral foi uma resposta do povo à interferência externa."
Jun./92	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista à Belgrade TV: "Milosevic (fala) sobre intervenção militar, Kosovo, Macedônia e Confederação com a Grécia."
Ago./92	Sem local	Entrevista à Belgrade TV: "Milosevic comenta sobre a Conferência de Londres e a chances de paz para a situação bósnia."
Out./92	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista à Radio Television Serbia/Belgrade TV: "Milosevic (fala) sobre a República Federal, sanções, Croácia, Bósnia, Kosovo e Eleições."
Out./92	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Discurso proferido durante o encerramento do segundo congresso do Partido Socialista Sérvio.
Mar./93	Paris (França)	Entrevista à TV Sérvia: "Mediação internacional: Milosevic, Mitterand, Vance e Owen realizam encontro em Paris para discutir acordo sobre a Bósnia."
Mar./93	Paris (França)	Entrevista ao Canal France-2 TV: "Milosevic entrevistado por TV francesa: A estratégia sérvia não é a exportação da guerra."
Mai./93	Atenas (Grécia)	Entrevista à Rádio Sérvia sobre a conferência de Atenas: "Milosevic avalia os resultados das negociações: Segurança do território servo-bósnio é assegurado."
Mai./93	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista à TV Sérvia: "Assembleia das cinco assembleias: Milosevic elogia o trabalho da sessão conjunta das Assembleias iugoslavas."
Mai./93	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista à TV Sérvia: "Milosevic sobre presença de observadores nas fronteiras: rejeição à presença estrangeira em assuntos domésticos."
Jul./93	Genebra (Suíça)	Entrevista à Rádio Sérvia sobre a conferência de Genebra para a Bósnia-Herzegovina: Abertura da conferência de Genebra: Izetbegovic, Milosevic, Karadzic estão otimistas."
Jul./93	Genebra (Suíça)	Entrevista à TV Sérvia sobre a conferência de Genebra para a Bósnia-Herzegovina: "Milosevic diz que o acordo de Genebra significa que o sacrifício sérvio foi compensando."
Ago./93	Genebra (Suíça)	Entrevista à Rádio Sérvia sobre a Conferência de Genebra para a Bósnia-Herzegovina: "O acordo completo, incluindo os mapas, deve ser aceito."
Set./93	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista à TV Sérvia: "Milosevic e Lorde Owen estão confiantes do encerramento bem sucedido das negociações."
Nov./93	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista à Radio Television Serbia: "Milosevic é entrevistado pelos redatores chefes das mídias de Belgrado sobre todos os aspectos da política."
Nov./93	Genebra (Suíça)	Entrevista à TV sérvia: "Milosevic acredita em avanços positivos nas negociações para a suspensão das sanções impostas à Sérvia."
Dez./93	Genebra (Suíça)	Entrevista à Rádio Sérvia: "Servos e croatas acordam concessões: Milosevic e Tudjman comentam."
1995	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista de Slobodan Milosevic à Revista Times.
Dez./96	Belgrado (Sérvia)	Entrevista de Slobodan Milosevic ao jornal Washington Post.

O trabalho será dividido em quatro capítulos. O primeiro capítulo tem como propósito apresentar a teoria de securitização da Escola de Copenhague e seus elementos constitutivos.

Ademais, também apresentar-se-á sua variação, proposta por Carvalho Pinto (2014), a qual agrega elementos da *framing theory*. Seu objetivo é aumentar o potencial analítico da teoria ao adicionar critérios para a análise das preferências da audiência. Finalmente, o capítulo também apresenta os principais *frames* que atuaram na política iugoslava: o supranacionalismo, que enfatizava a origem eslava compartilhada, e os nacionalismos excludentes, como o sérvio ou o croata, que focaram em marcadores étnico-nacionais exclusivos, como a religião ou diferentes vivências históricas.

O segundo capítulo enfoca na formação e desenvolvimento dos dois Estados Iugoslavos: o Reino dos Sérvios, Croatas e Eslovenos (1918-1941) e à República Socialista Federativa da Iugoslávia (1945-1992). O propósito é compreender as principais dinâmicas políticas que historicamente atuaram nestes Estados e que impactaram o contexto no qual emergiram os discursos nacionalistas radicalizados. Também será analisado o período da Segunda Guerra Mundial e seu impacto nos Balcãs (1941-1945), onde emergiram importantes memórias políticas, que posteriormente foram exploradas por forças rivais.

O terceiro capítulo tem como objetivo identificar os elementos constitutivos do discurso securitizador, tal qual inicialmente previsto pela Escola de Copenhague. Para tanto, serão utilizados os discursos elencados pelo quadro 1, somados à revisão bibliográfica.

Finalmente, o quarto capítulo teve como objetivo analisar as preferências da audiência, compreendendo, assim, a ressonância do discurso proferido. Deste modo, os elementos constitutivos do *Security Framing* foram aplicados ao contexto iugoslavo, com o objetivo de ampliar a capacidade analítica da Teoria de Securitização. Para tanto, foram analisadas diferentes formas de manifestação da vontade popular, dentre as quais destacam-se: o resultado dos censos entre 1948 e 1991;⁸ resultados eleitorais durante a década de 1990; pesquisas de opinião conduzidas antes e durante o conflito; e, por fim, manifestações e referendos. Quando não foi possível obter os documentos originais, optou-se pelo uso de fontes secundárias.

⁸ Nesse período, foram realizados seis censos: em 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981 e 1991.

1. MARCO TEÓRICO: O *SECURITY FRAMING*.

A Segurança Internacional (*International Security Studies* ou ISS) desenvolveu-se enquanto um prolífico campo de estudos no pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial, influenciado por questões decorrentes da Guerra Fria, conforme apontam Barry Buzan e Lene Hansen (2009, pp. 1-2). De acordo com os autores e Buzan et al. (1997, p. 1), os estudos de Segurança Internacional foram marcados predominantemente por preocupações militares e estratégicas, em que o Estado era o principal ator. Com o fim do conflito bipolar e a emergência de novas percepções de ameaças, foram desenvolvidas outras perspectivas com abordagens mais amplas sobre o que constituiriam questões de segurança (BUZAN; HANSEN, 2009). É nesse contexto que surgiu a vertente teórica que ficou conhecida como Escola de Copenhague⁹.

Dentre suas inovações, aponta Buzan (2008, p. 553), estão a de ampliar o debate para além do setor militar, predominante nos estudos de segurança até então e a de negar a objetividade ontológica do que constituiriam questões de segurança. Para tanto, a teoria compreende que uma ameaça seria socialmente construída e aceita para ser bem-sucedida. Desse modo, negar-se-ia a existência de fatores intrínsecos ao objeto percebido enquanto ameaçador. Esse processo intersubjetivo de construção de uma percepção de ameaça é chamado de securitização por Buzan et al (1997). Nas palavras de Buzan (2008, p. 553, nossa tradução), “[s]ecuritização é quando se é bem-sucedido em construir algo enquanto ameaça potencial a um objeto de referência e essa construção é então usada para apoiar medidas extremas em resposta.”


Contudo, discussões teóricas recentes compreendem que restringir a securitização a um processo discursivo limita sua capacidade explicativa. Conforme argumenta Thierry Balzacq (2005, p. 172), o processo de securitização seria melhor compreendido como uma prática estratégico-pragmática, que utiliza de fatores externos ao discurso para mobilizar sua pretendida audiência, aumentando suas chances de sucesso. Enfatiza-se, portanto, seu princípio intersubjetivo em detrimento ao autorreferencial, que sobre determinaria elementos internos ao discurso.

⁹ Essa nomenclatura surgiu no artigo de McSweeney (1996), um crítico da abordagem de Securitização Societal elaborado por Buzan et al. (1997).

1.1 Da Escola de Copenhague ao *Security Framing*

Para a Escola de Copenhague, a securitização é um processo discursivo pelo qual uma percepção de ameaça é socialmente construída. O objetivo final desse processo é o de legitimar a adoção de medidas excepcionais, que não seriam aceitas no debate político regular (cf. BUZAN et al., 1997). Para a teoria, existe um espectro no qual as políticas públicas estão inseridas e a posição de um assunto dentro desse espectro é determinado pelo nível de urgência que ele adquire no debate político. Varia-se entre o não politizado, quando não entra no debate; o politizado, quando o assunto faz parte do debate e há políticas públicas destinadas a ele; e o securitizado, em que o assunto é apresentado em níveis de ameaça e urgência suficientes para permitir ações emergenciais, muitas vezes não respeitando os procedimentos políticos pré-estabelecidos (BUZAN et al., 1997, pp. 23-24). A Figura 1 ilustra o espectro de securitização:

Figura 1. Espectro de Securitização



Fonte: BUZAN et al. (1997, p. 23-24); PEOPLES; VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS (2010, p. 77). Nossa compilação.

A migração de um assunto no espectro, do politizado ao securitizado, é chamado de *movimento securitizador*. Esse movimento ocorre através do *ato de fala* ou *discurso*, em que um objeto é apresentado enquanto ameaça existencial. Para ser eficaz, esse movimento conta com três elementos-chave: um objeto de referência, um ator securitizador e uma audiência (cf. BUZAN et al., 1997). O objeto de referência é aquilo cuja existência está ameaçada e deve ser, portanto, defendido. O ator securitizador constrói a percepção de ameaça, por meio do *discurso*. Finalmente, a audiência é a receptora do *ato de fala*, responsável por aceitá-lo ou recusá-lo, assim como por legitimar as ações extraordinárias propostas (BUZAN et al., 1999, p. 34; WAEVER, 2008, p. 582).

O *discurso* é, portanto, o elemento-chave da teoria, pois liga e dá coerência aos demais conceitos. Por meio dele, afinal, pode-se identificar a declarada ameaça existencial, o objeto de referência e a audiência; as medidas extraordinárias pretendidas geralmente também estão

evidenciadas, embora por vezes não explicitamente. Por fim, o ator securitizador é o responsável por realizar o referido movimento, ao canalizá-lo por meio do *ato de fala*.

Neste ponto, é válido inserir as considerações de Balzacq (2005) e Hansen (2000) à teoria, que a posiciona para além do processo discursivo. Para Hansen (2000, p. 303), a securitização não é apenas um conceito, mas também uma prática social. Objetiva-se, por meio do discurso, ressignificar as percepções dos atores envolvidos sobre a realidade (HANSEN, 2000, p. 306). Por conseguinte, esse processo constrói intersubjetivamente não apenas a ameaça existencial, mas também o objeto de referência e o ator securitizador (HANSEN, 2000, p. 306). Esse processo não ocorre em um vazio estrutural, ausente de significados preexistentes, mas em consonância com um contexto externo (BALZACQ, 2005, pp. 181-182). Torna-se necessário ao discurso ressoar com a realidade em que se insere. Para Balzacq (2005, p. 182, nossa tradução), “[o] repertório semântico da segurança é uma combinação de significado textual – conhecimento do conceito adquirido através da linguagem (escrita ou falada) – e significado cultural – conhecimento histórico adquirido por interações e situações prévias”.

Enfatizando o princípio intersubjetivo da teoria de securitização, Balzacq (2005) aponta o papel primordial que a audiência tem nesse contexto. Afinal, qualquer medida extraordinária proposta só é adotada se sancionada por seu público-alvo. Contudo, a teoria da Escola de Copenhague possui elementos limitados para compreender a preferência da audiência, uma vez que enfoca demasiado nos fatores internos ao processo discursivo e seus elementos constitutivos (BALZACQ, 2005, p. 172). Por conseguinte, a proposta de Vânia Carvalho Pinto (2014, p. 162) de incorporar elementos da chamada *framing theory* à teoria de securitização se faz relevante, uma vez que amplia o potencial investigativo de tais preferências. Sua principal contribuição consiste em elencar critérios que um discurso deve satisfazer para ser aceito (*felicity conditions*), conforme trabalhado na próxima seção.

1.1.1. Contribuições da Framing Theory para a Teoria de Securitização

Concebida inicialmente na sociologia, a *framing theory* surgiu com a finalidade de compreender a organização interna dos movimentos sociais e, em especial, como lideranças engajam e mobilizam seus militantes em prol de um objetivo comum. Para tanto, David Snow, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven Worden e Robert Benford (1986) introduziram e ampliaram o conceito de *Frame*, desenvolvido inicialmente por Erving Goffman (*apud* SNOW et al. 1986, p. 464).

Para a teoria, o *frame* seria um “esquema de interpretações”, o qual permite que indivíduos “localizem, percebam, identifiquem e rotulem” suas experiências (GOFFMAN *apud* BENFORD; SNOW, 2000, p. 614; SNOW et al, 1986. p. 464, nossa tradução). Ademais, o conceito de *framing* corresponde ao processo de ressignificação da realidade, no qual se atribui sentido a eventos, crenças e ideias, com a intenção de obter apoio de uma audiência, mobilizando-a (BENFORD; SNOW, 2000, p. 613).

A *framing theory* é, portanto, um instrumento de pesquisa relevante para as Relações Internacionais já que enfoca no processo pelo qual um ator estratégico se engaja no convencimento de um grupo alvo – a audiência – com a finalidade de mobilizá-la ou de fazê-la aceitar determinadas medidas (CARVALHO PINTO, 2014, pp. 164-165). A *framing theory* confere essa ênfase no processo de convencimento ao ampliar as condições necessárias para que seja bem-sucedido. Assim, a fusão entre securitização e *framing theory* dá origem ao *Security Framing* (CARVALHO PINTO, 2014). Dessa forma, o movimento securitizador, descrito por Buzan et al. (1997), seria um modo de ressignificação da realidade. Seu foco seria o estabelecimento de percepções de ameaça com a finalidade de legitimar medidas extremas de segurança.

São as condições a serem satisfeitas adaptadas da *framing theory* que compõem e ampliam as *felicity conditions*¹⁰, ou ressonância¹¹. O objetivo é facilitar a compreensão de como uma determinada audiência responde ao discurso a ela dirigido. Para tanto, compreende-se como os elementos discursivos associam-se ao contexto em que ele está inserido, em consonância com as preocupações de Balzacq (2005). Em essência, o objetivo desses critérios é compreender quando e por que um discurso é ou não bem-sucedido – uma vez que, quanto mais critérios preencher, mais chances ele terá de ser efetivo. Ao todo, são seis critérios analisados, divididos em duas dimensões, credibilidade e saliência (BENFORD; SNOW, 2000; CARVALHO PINTO, 2014).

De acordo com Carvalho Pinto (2012, cap. 1), a dimensão credibilidade é definida pelo grau de *confiança* que um *frame* inspira em sua audiência pretendida. Divide-se em consistência, credibilidade empírica e credibilidade de seus articuladores (no *Security Framing*, o ator securitizador) (cf. BENFORD; SNOW, 2000, pp. 619-621). Já saliência, definido como o grau de *importância* atribuído ao discurso proferido, é dividida em centralidade,

¹⁰ O conceito de *Felicity Conditions* já existe na Teoria de Securitização, contudo com menos condições a serem satisfeitas. Para mais informações, ver Columba Peoples e Nick Vaughan-Williams (2010).

¹¹ O termo Ressonância é introduzido por Snow e Benford em 1988. Aqui ele será utilizado enquanto sinônimo intercambiável de *Felicity Conditions*.

comensurabilidade experimental e fidelidade narrativa (cf. BENFORD; SNOW, 2000, pp. 621-622; CARVALHO PINTO, 2012, cap. 1). A figura 2 consolida as definições de cada critério:

Figura 2 – Critérios de Ressonância do *Security Framing*

	Dimensão	Critério	Definição
<i>Felicity Conditions</i> (Ressonância)	Credibilidade	Consistência	Congruência entre crenças, afirmações e ações .
		Credibilidade Empírica	Adequação entre discurso e percepção de mundo da audiência.
		Credibilidade do articulador	Legitimidade atribuída ao articulador.
	Saliência	Centralidade	Relevância das questões articuladas para a audiência.
		Comensurabilidade Experimental	Adequação entre discurso e as experiências cotidianas da audiência.
		Fidelidade Narrativa	Adequação entre discurso e as narrativas culturais e mitos da audiência

Fonte: BENFORD; SNOW (2000, pp. 611-639); CARVALHO PINTO (2014, p. 166). Compilação nossa.

Portanto, o *security framing* atende às preocupações de Balzacq (2005) de que a securitização seja compreendida como uma prática estratégico-pragmática, não apenas discursiva. Afinal, para além de focar-se nos fatores internos ao discurso (seus elementos constituintes), ele complementa a teoria da Escola de Copenhague ao investigar elementos externos, os quais constituiriam os critérios de ressonância junto à audiência, analisando suas preferências e o contexto no qual está alocado.

1.1.2. Estudando conflitos étniconacionais: A Securitização da Identidade.

A teoria proposta pela Escola de Copenhague também contribuiu ao campo de Segurança Internacional uma vez que possibilita considerar questões não militares ao objeto de estudo. Conforme identificam Buzan et al. (1997, pp. 7-8), ao menos quatro outros setores são passíveis de securitização: o econômico, ambiental, societal¹² e político, cada qual centrado por um princípio organizacional próprio. Em conflitos étnico-nacionais, como a Guerra da Bósnia (1992-1995), o princípio organizacional que centra o processo de securitização é a identidade de uma ou mais coletividades, sendo, portanto, associado ao setor societal.

Ao colocar a identidade como o princípio central do discurso securitizador, seus demais elementos constitutivos adaptam-se em conformidade: o objeto de referência torna-se uma

¹² O campo societal é definido pelo risco à uma comunidade, geralmente caracterizada por sua identidade coletiva.

comunidade, definida por uma identidade coletiva, compartilhada entre seus membros. O ator securitizador geralmente apresenta-se como o porta-voz legítimo das causas comunitárias, enquanto a ameaça geralmente é imputada a um grupo rival, igualmente caracterizado por sua identidade. Por fim, a audiência geralmente é constituída pelos membros da comunidade cuja identidade foi apresentada como sob ameaça. O propósito, tal qual demais processos securitizadores, é não outro que legitimar medidas extremas, fora do processo político regular (cf. BUZAN et al., 1997, p. 126; WAEVER, 2008, pp. 590-591). O Quadro 2 sintetiza o movimento securitizador quando aplicado ao setor societal:

Quadro 2 – Resumo do movimento securitizador

Elementos textuais	Aplicação
Ator Securitizador:	Porta-voz da coletividade (geralmente Estado ou um Político)
Objeto de Referência:	Comunidade definida por sua Identidade Coletiva
Audiência:	Público-alvo (comunidade definida por sua identidade coletiva)
Ameaça existencial:	Outra comunidade, cuja identidade seja entendida como rival ou nociva
Discurso:	Uma ameaça à sobrevivência de uma comunidade (objeto de referência).
Medida extrema:	O uso da violência preventiva como estratégia de sobrevivência

Fontes: BUZAN et al. (1997, p. 126); WAEVER (2008, pp. 590-591). Nossa compilação.

Conforme Buzan et al. (1997, p. 120), o conceito de identidade coletiva varia com as circunstâncias analisadas, em termos de nacionalidade, raça, religião, etnicidade, etc. Portanto, o propósito da teoria de securitização societal não é reificar seu objeto de estudo, mas estudar o processo pelo qual identidades coletivas são reificadas por atores securitizadores com fins específicos (cf. HANSEN, 2000, pp. 303-304; WAEVER, 2008, p. 583). Afinal, reconhece-se que identidades são processuais e estão em constante modificação. Contudo, é através do processo de securitização que elas se transformam em objetos materiais, construídos em oposição a uma percepção de ameaça, geralmente advinda da identidade de uma outra

coletividade¹³ (cf. BUZAN et al., 1997, p. 119; WAEVER, 2008, p. 581). Este processo é descrito como:

(...) não obstante permanece uma escolha política e pessoal se identificar com uma comunidade ao enfatizar alguns traços em contraste com outros laços históricos ou contemporâneos disponíveis. Ameaças à identidade são então sempre uma questão de *construção* de algo como ameaçador a um “nós” – frequentemente contribuindo para a construção e reprodução desse “nós”. Qualquer “nossa” identidade pode ser construída em muitas formas diferentes, e frequentemente a questão principal que decide se conflitos de segurança vão emergir é se uma ou outra auto-definição vence na sociedade. (BUZAN et al., 1997, p. 120. Nossa tradução).

Esse processo de reificação é, portanto, consequência de uma prática estratégica, em consonância ao defendido por Balzacq (2005, p. 182). A identidade nesse cenário é consequência não apenas dos elementos internos do enunciado (o “falar segurança”), mas também de elementos externos a ele, contingente ao ambiente em que está inserido. Para tanto, propõe-se associar Teoria de Securitização e *Security Framing*, uma vez que funcionam como teorias complementares. A primeira permite identificar os elementos intratextuais necessários, que comporiam a “sintaxe” do discurso, enquanto o segundo a complementa, fornecendo seu conteúdo semântico, necessário para compreender as preferências da audiência.

¹³ Deste processo incorre o silenciamento e a exclusão de outros discursos denunciado por Hansen (2000, p.306). Semelhantemente, o discurso nacionalista, especialmente quando radicalizado, também pressupõe a exclusão de discursos divergentes, como, por exemplo, a obliteração da oposição ou de discursos conciliadores.

2. HISTÓRIA E IDENTIDADE NOS BÁLCÃS

De acordo com Sabrina Ramet (2006, p. 2), os povos eslavos chegaram à região balcânica no século VI, aproximadamente, convertendo-se ao cristianismo entre os séculos VIII e IX. Esses povos organizaram-se em diferentes reinos medievais que, por conta de suas fronteiras porosas, permitiram a sobreposição de territórios e a mobilidade entre os povos (LAMPE, 2000, p. 40). Com a invasão otomana à península balcânica, no século XV, esses reinos desapareceram e seus territórios foram ou incorporados ao domínio turco¹⁴ ou ao Império Habsburgo, último entreposto europeu frente o avanço otomano (BENSON, 2000; LAMPE, 2000; RAMET, 2006). Nesse cenário, os territórios que atualmente correspondem à Croácia e Eslovênia ficam sob o comando do Império Austríaco.

A subordinação dos povos eslavos ao que consideravam domínio externo foi uma realidade até o século XIX, não sem revoltas ou atos de insubordinação. Contudo, foi nesse século que uma nova forma de organização política se consolidou como hegemônica no cenário europeu, o Estado-nação. Concomitantemente, também surgiu o nacionalismo, que uniu fraternidade, poder e território, e cuja finalidade era legitimar a coesão social formada pelo Estado-nação (cf. ANDERSON, 2008 [1983], p. 69; HOBBSAWN, 2008 [1990]).

Essas mudanças impactaram a política na península balcânica, uma vez que organizaram resistências frente ao invasor e legitimaram pretensões de autonomia política, centradas no princípio nacional. Nesse contexto, surgiram diferentes propostas de organização política na península, que variaram em escopo e abrangência: algumas das quais desejavam unificar os povos eslavos do sul sob um único Estado, enquanto outras propunham recortes nacionais menores. Tal qual em outras regiões, o século XIX também foi marcado pela construção de nações nos Bálcãs, ou suas pretensões (cf. HOBBSAWN, 2008 [1990], p.11).

Esse processo, contudo, não ocorreu no vazio. Conforme aponta Lilia Schwarcz (2008, p. 16), uma nação é construída ou imaginada por meio de símbolos que se apropriam da língua, história e/ou cultura comuns para criar uma lógica comunitária. Ademais, sua finalidade é a mobilização e a legitimação de um projeto político por atores estratégicos, que necessitam de apoio popular para serem bem-sucedidos. Neste sentido, nacionalismos podem ser compreendidos como *frames*, uma vez que atuam como “esquemas de interpretação” da realidade que permitem aos indivíduos que “localizem, percebam, identifiquem e rotulem” suas experiências (GOFFMAN *apud* BENFORD, SNOW, 2000, p. 614; SNOW et al, 1986. p. 464,

¹⁴ Regiões que compõem as atuais Bósnia-Herzegovina, Sérvia, Montenegro e Macedônia.

nossa tradução). Nacionalismos, portanto, atuariam como “esquemas de interpretação” da realidade, capazes de unificar experiências individuais a uma comunidade e, em especial, a uma instituição política. Entre as propostas de legitimação criadas dentro deste cenário está o *supranacionalismo iugoslavo*, que enfatizava os laços culturais e linguísticos que uniam os povos eslavos do sul. A essa visão eram contrapostos os *nacionalismos* exclusivos que, frente às similaridades entre os povos, enfatizavam suas diferenças, buscando “marcadores étnicos” em divergências religiosas, históricas, folclóricas, linguísticas ou legendárias, conforme aponta Aleksandar Pavkovic (2000, p. 7).¹⁵

2.1 Formação de identidades nos Bálcãs.

A unificação dos povos eslavos do sul, mesmo entre seus propositores, não foi um projeto único, tampouco coeso. De acordo com Dennison Rusinov (2003) e Pavkovic (2000, p. 4), desde a gênese do projeto comunitarista, no século XIX, havia divergências de como um Estado comum deveria ser politicamente organizado. O centralismo político, historicamente associado aos sérvios, contrapunha-se ao federalismo, associado a croatas e eslovenos. Essa multiplicidade de projetos também refletiu no campo cultural, com a oposição entre o supranacionalismo, que defendia a criação de uma identidade iugoslava unitária, e visões multinacionais, que advogavam pela preservação e respeito das diferenças específicas à cada etnia (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 4, RUSINOV, 2003; WATCHEL, 2003). Em geral, conforme coloca Djokic (2003, p. 4. Tradução Nossa), o “(...) iugoslavismo era um conceito fluido, diferentemente compreendido em tempos diferentes por diferentes nações iugoslavas, líderes e grupos sociais. Não havia uma definição única de quem ou o que era (ou não) iugoslavo”.

Sua origem remonta ao Ilirianismo, um movimento cultural do século XIX que defendia um “direito natural” dos povos eslavos do sul à formação de um Estado unificado e independente. Em sua base estaria a alegada unidade linguística desses povos, uma vez que falariam variantes de um mesmo idioma (RUSINOV, 2003, p. 12). Para o movimento, a aproximação linguística indicaria que croatas, sérvios e eslovenos eram integrantes de um todo maior, compondo uma nação única (CIPEK, 2003, p. 72). Para tanto, Ljudevit Gaj, expoente teórico do movimento iliriano, propunha a adoção de um idioma comum, que seria capaz de se sobrepor a diferenças religiosas e histórias particulares. Embora um acordo entre linguistas

¹⁵ Por exemplo, as diferenças religiosas serviram como principal marcador de diferenças entre sérvios (ortodoxos) e croatas (católicos). Já entre montenegrinos e sérvios, ambos ortodoxos, foram acentuados os diferentes processos históricos na formação de seus Estados nacionais.

sérvios e croatas tenha estabelecido o dialeto *stokavian*¹⁶ como a língua literária padrão, o movimento iliriano não conseguiu fazer uma transição bem-sucedida de um movimento literário para um movimento político (cf. CIPEK, 2003, p. 72; HOBBSAWN, 2008 [1990], p.71; PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 11-12).¹⁷

Um projeto político estruturado de unificação dos eslavos do sul reapareceu em 1860, por meio do Iugoslavismo, promovido pelo bispo esloveno Josip Juraj Strossmayer e por Franjo Racki. Ambos fundaram, em 1866, a Academia Iugoslava de Ciências e Artes, com sede em Zagreb. Novamente, apostou-se na unidade cultural e linguística para justificar uma pretensa integração política (LAMPE, 2000, p. 59). Strossmayer foi, inclusive, o primeiro a utilizar o nome *Iugoslávia* para se referir a um Estado eslavo unificado. Contudo, tanto ele quanto Racki defendiam uma estrutura política (con)federada, com autonomia administrativa e equidade entre os centros de poder (cf. CIPEK, 2003, pp. 72-73; LAMPE, 2000, p. 59). Racki acreditava que a unificação dos povos eslavos poderia ser atingida pelo desenvolvimento de um sistema educacional e pela promoção de um idioma comum. Todavia, essa unificação respeitaria tradições nacionais e suas particularidades uma vez que, apesar de serem membros de uma mesma nação, os povos eslavos possuíam histórias, tradições, religiões e estruturas políticas próprias (CIPEK, 2003, pp. 72-73).

Esse projeto político supranacional competiu com a emergência de nacionalismos particulares, como os nacionalismos sérvios e croatas. Contudo, o supranacionalismo não foi totalmente obliterado e, inclusive, influenciou projetos de unificação política posteriores, como o Reino dos Sérvios, Croatas e Eslovenos (1918-1941)¹⁸ e a República Federal dos Povos da Iugoslávia (1945-1992)¹⁹. O discurso manteve-se relevante inclusive nas décadas finais do século XX, quando foi apropriado por políticos e intelectuais sérvios durante o processo de dissolução da Iugoslávia, nos anos 1980 e 1990, geralmente com finalidades políticas próprias (PAVKOVIC, 1998; 2003; TOAL; MAKSIC, 2013). Entre as principais reinterpretações do iugoslavismo desse período estava o defendido por Dobrica Cosic. Um proeminente escritor

¹⁶ Durante o século XIX, os eslavos do sul, habitantes dos Balcãs falavam três dialetos: o *stokavian*, o *cakavian* e o *kajkavian*. O dialeto *stokavian* era falado por sérvios e, em algumas regiões, por croatas. Já o *kajkavian* era falado nas regiões de Zagreb e Eslovênia. Em contrapartida, o *cakavian* era restrito à algumas regiões da atual Croácia, como o litoral da Dalmácia (cf. BENSON, pp. 3-5; RUSINOV, 2003, pp. 19-20; WACHTEL, 2003, p. 239).

¹⁷ Uma justificativa para o insucesso do Ilirianismo foi a sua incapacidade em mobilizar as massas, uma vez que ficou restrito a um extrato limitado da população croata composta por intelectuais, baixa nobreza e mercadores. O apoio dessas camadas foi uma reação tanto às mudanças administrativas do Império Habsburgo, que ameaçavam a autonomia administrativa da província croata quanto às tentativas de assimilação cultural austríaca (germanização) e húngara (magiarização) (RUSINOV, 2003; pp. 13-14; CIPEK, 2003, p. 72).

¹⁸ Posteriormente renomeado Reino da Iugoslávia, em 1929, com a instituição da Ditadura Real de Aleksandar Karadjordjevic.

¹⁹ Posteriormente renomeada República Socialista Federativa da Iugoslávia, com a Constituição de 1963.

transformado político, Cosic advogava um iugoslavismo federalista em que nações teriam prevalência política, com direito à autodeterminação garantido, se assim o desejassem. Contudo, para Cosic, a Iugoslávia era apenas um meio para garantir a unificação da nação sérvia em um Estado (PAVKOVIC, 1998, p. 515). Sua proposição, portanto, ressoou entre políticos sérvios que deliberadamente utilizaram da retórica iugoslavista para impulsionar seus projetos expansionistas, cujo principal expoente foi Slobodan Milosevic.

Concomitante ao *frame* supranacional, emergiram nos séculos XVIII e XIX *frames* nacionalistas que enfocavam em particularidades das comunidades eslavas para justificar projetos exclusivos. Para tanto, suas lideranças políticas nacionalistas enfatizaram divergências religiosas,²⁰ históricas e linguísticas (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 7).

Dentre eles estava a emergência do nacionalismo sérvio, que foi concomitante à formação de seu Estado independente durante o século XIX.²¹ O principal marcador cultural desse estado era a religião cristã ortodoxa. Porque era a Sérvia era um estado relativamente homogêneo, sem reais riscos de assimilação por uma etnia competitiva ou dominante, o nacionalismo sérvio nasceu externamente orientado e com um forte viés expansionista (RUSINOV, 2003, p. 17). O objetivo era a unificação dos sérvios étnicos em um único Estado, ampliando suas fronteiras e formando a “Grande Sérvia”. Essa política é sintetizada pela máxima de “unir todos os sérvios em um único Estado” (RUSINOV, 2003, p. 17).²²

Apesar de defenderem a unificação dos povos eslavos sob seu domínio político, os principais expoentes do nacionalismo sérvio viam com desconfiança o ideal iugoslavo, interpretado como um disfarce para o nacionalismo croata e o expansionismo católico (RUSINOV, 2003, p. 17). O discurso supranacionalista iugoslavo, portanto, só foi adotado pela elite política sérvia quando serviu de justificativa para seus projetos expansionistas e a promoção de seus interesses nacionais (cf. RUSINOV, 2002, p. 22). Nesse sentido, a unificação dos eslavos do sul só ocorreria sob a tutela sérvia, o único Estado eslavo independente na região, entendido por direito como o centro político de um potencial estado eslavo unificado.

Simultaneamente, emergia o nacionalismo croata. No cerne desse projeto nacional estava a reivindicação de uma alegada continuidade histórica do Reino Medieval Croata dos

²⁰ Entre os eslavos do sul, prevaleciam três religiões: católica (prevalente entre eslovenos e croatas), ortodoxa (sérvios, montenegrinos e macedônios) e a fé islâmica (eslavos habitantes da Bósnia-Herzegovina).

²¹ O principado sérvio obteve autonomia política do Império Turco-Otomano em 1830. Contudo, só se tornou um Estado independente em 1878 (cf. BENSON, 2004, pp. 1-2).

²² O primeiro expoente desta política foi o primeiro ministro sérvio, Ilija Garasanin, que, em 1844, emitiu sua opinião no documento secreto conhecido como Nacertanije. Garasanin defendeu um projeto de país aumentado, englobando, além do reino Sérvio, os territórios do Kosovo, Bósnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedônia, Vojvodina e norte da Albânia (LAMPE, 2000, p. 52) Os habitantes eslavos das regiões seriam respeitados; contudo a Sérvia permaneceria o centro político.

séculos X e XI, subjugado pelos húngaros²³ em 1097. O mito fundacional do nacionalismo croata estava em seu direito histórico e a resistência política frente às políticas assimilacionistas perpetradas por seus algozes. A tentativa de negar um estado croata independente era, portanto, interpretado como uma tentativa de aniquilação de sua identidade nacional (PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 7-8). Logo, o projeto de autonomia croata era apresentado como uma luta milenar não só por autonomia política, mas também pelo seu direito à identidade.

Coexistia também uma variante croata do *frame* iugoslavista, a qual defendia a resolução da “questão croata” dentro de um Estado eslavo (con)federado. Nesse cenário, a nacionalidade gozaria de relativa autonomia política dentro de uma união política supranacional (CIPEK, 2003, pp. 74-76). Apesar de elaborado especialmente por figuras públicas croatas, como o linguista Ljudevit Gaj, o *frame* supranacionalista não gozou de popularidade na política provincial croata no pré-Primeira Guerra (CIPEK, 2003, p. 73). Além disso, embora uma coalizão servo-croata tenha sido hegemônica na assembleia local croata, essa união foi fundada em interesses particulares e não no desejo de estabelecer as bases para uma união eslava.²⁴

Para além dos nacionalismos sérvios e croatas, destaca-se o esloveno, que se desenvolveu pela padronização e disseminação de um idioma único, uma variação do dialeto *Kajkavian* (RUSINOV, 2003, p. 16). Uma característica desse movimento é que, por conta da aproximação política com Viena, a maioria de sua população e políticos apoiava a criação de uma unidade eslava autônoma no interior do Império Habsburgo (VELIKONJA, 2003, p. 84-85). Essa proposta advogava o *trialismo*, em que uma unidade eslava teria equidade de direitos e independência política com seus pares austríacos e húngaros. Essa proposta também teve apoio político entre uma parcela das populações croatas e eslavas muçulmanas.

Já os eslavos muçulmanos habitantes da Bósnia-Herzegovina, por sua vez, apesar de representarem a maioria da população islâmica habitando em território iugoslavo, não tinham um projeto nacionalista próprio (BOUGAREL, 2003, pp. 101-102). Nas décadas que antecederam a Primeira Guerra Mundial, seus líderes comunitários dividiram-se entre lideranças religiosas e uma *intelligentsia* secular. Os primeiros abdicaram de um projeto de construção nacionalista em prol de uma aliança estratégica com autoridades austro-húngaras, motivados pelo desejo de preservação da identidade e das instituições religiosas islâmicas. Em oposição, os últimos optaram por abdicar da religião enquanto um marcador de identidade sem,

²³ Posteriormente incorporado ao Império Habsburgo, no século XVII, junto à coroa húngara.

²⁴ Para os políticos croatas, a coalizão representava uma proteção contra políticas assimilacionistas de Budapeste, assim como uma estratégia de garantir autonomia política dentro da estrutura política do império Habsburgo. Já para os membros sérvios da aliança, ela representaria uma garantia de respeito aos seus direitos enquanto minoria étnica em território austro-húngaro. (cf. PAVKOVIC, 2000, p.13).

contudo, criar um nacionalismo próprio; dessa forma, subordinaram-se aos projetos nacionais sérvios ou croatas. Essa parcela da população não se identificava como “muçulmana”, mas sim como sérvios ou croatas “de fé islâmica” (BORGAREL, 2003, pp. 101-102).

A elite muçulmana na Bósnia-Herzegovina, portanto, adotou a aproximação com os detentores do poder local enquanto estratégia de sobrevivência. Sua finalidade era a manutenção das regalias feudais conquistadas durante os séculos de domínio otomano na região, que lhes garantiam status privilegiado relativamente a outras minorias eslavas (PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 14-15). Como consequência, essa elite era caracterizada por sua resistência a modificações na estrutura política e administrativa provincial, assim como pelo não desenvolvimento de uma ideologia nacionalista exclusiva. Dentro desse contexto, é somente em 1906 que surge sua primeira organização, a Organização Muçulmana Nacional, cuja pretensão era o estabelecimento de uma província bósnia autônoma dentro do Império Austro-Húngaro. Sua motivação era predominantemente política e não havia pretensões de formação de uma identidade nacional própria (PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 18-19).

Somente ao longo do século XX os eslavos muçulmanos adotaram o iugoslavismo. Sua motivação era a proteção contra os nacionalismos e políticas assimilacionistas de seus vizinhos sérvios e croatas, que reivindicavam controle territorial sobre a Bósnia-Herzegovina. De acordo com Radmilla Radic (2003, p. 200), a identidade iugoslava atraía a população eslava muçulmana, pois lhe permitia maior liberdade religiosa, uma vez que a identidade sérvia era intimamente ligada à ortodoxia e o que catolicismo consistia em um marco da identidade croata. Enfim, de acordo com Bourgarel (2003, p. 100. Nossa tradução), “[embora] os bósnios muçulmanos tenham pouco contribuído para a formação da ideia iugoslava, eles provavelmente foram os últimos dentre os povos iugoslavos que sinceramente a sustentaram”.

Uma vez compreendidos os *frames* atuantes na política regional balcânica, cabe perceber como eles foram instrumentalizados durante a formação e deterioração política dos dois Estados Iugoslavos. É importante salientar que, ao longo do século XX, ocorreram mutações e permutações dos ideais supranacionalistas e nacionalistas, que explicam as evoluções na política balcânica. As variações no contexto histórico, doméstico e internacional acarretaram mudanças no discurso hegemônico das elites políticas eslavas, ora favorecendo a cooperação e, portanto, o iugoslavismo, ora favorecendo o isolacionismo político, e, portanto, políticas secessionistas. A política mundial nos anos 1910, especialmente no pós-Primeira Guerra Mundial explica, por exemplo, a formação do primeiro Estado iugoslavo, o Reino dos Sérvios, Croatas e Eslovenos, como será abordado em sequência.

2.2 O Primeiro Estado Iugoslavo (1918-1941)

A eclosão da Primeira Guerra Mundial (1914-1918) promoveu mudanças no mapa europeu. Entre suas consequências, fronteiras foram refeitas e novos Estados nacionais formados na península balcânica. Afinal, um dos motivos para o conflito foi o escalonamento das tensões entre o Império Austro-húngaro e o Reino Sérvio, que reivindicavam controle sobre território peninsular.²⁵ Ademais, com o avanço da Guerra e o enfraquecimento do Império Habsburgo, intensificou-se a disputa territorial. Essa disputa foi agravada pelo Tratado de Londres (1915), que cedia regiões com população eslava à Itália, em troca de apoio contra a Tríplice aliança.²⁶

Apesar de haver negociações entre representantes dos povos eslavos por um Estado comum durante os anos de Guerra (1914-1918),²⁷ a pressão imposta pelo expansionismo italiano diminuiu o poder de barganha de eslovenos e croatas, favorecendo a coroa sérvia (cf. LAMPE, 2000, pp. 110-111). O Reino dos Sérvios, Croatas e Eslovenos foi, então, proclamado em Dezembro de 1918 pelo príncipe regente sérvio Aleksandar Karadjordjevic (cf. BENSON, 2004, p. 26; LAMPE, 2000, p. 110). Os primeiros anos foram marcados por um governo provisório, entre dezembro de 1918 e janeiro de 1921, em que se adotou a constituição sérvia de 1903, com amplos poderes à monarquia, e a instituição de um legislativo não eleito (cf. BENSON, 2004, p. 26; LAMPE, 2000, p. 112). O critério de designação para a câmara foi a composição étnica do pré-guerra, favorecendo a população sérvia, que foi super-representada (BENSON, 2004, p. 26). A eleição de uma Assembleia Constituinte, em novembro de 1920 deu início ao breve período constitucional.

Esse período foi marcado pela instabilidade política, no qual persistiam divergências acerca da organização do Estado Iugoslavo em si: por um lado, políticos sérvios o viam como uma estratégia para a unificação de sua nação, com os demais povos eslavos sob sua tutela. Defendiam, portanto, a política de um Estado unitário (cf. DJOKIC, 2003, p. 138; PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 4, pp. 27-28; RUSINOV, 2003). Em contraposição, croatas e eslovenos viam a

²⁵ Em disputa estavam os territórios habitados por sérvios étnicos e outros eslavos, como a província austríacas da Bósnia-Herzegovina e Croácia.

²⁶ Regiões da Carniola e Ístria, com população eslovena, e parte da Dalmácia, com população croata, seriam cedidas à Itália no pós Guerra, de acordo com o Tratado de Londres.

²⁷ Após a instituição de uma lei marcial interna ao império Habsburgo, em Julho de 1914, proeminentes políticos eslavos formaram um Comitê Iugoslavo, com sede em Londres. Eles negociaram a “Declaração de Corfu”, em julho de 1917, com o governo sérvio no Exílio. O acordo declarava a intenção de criar um estado eslavo independente, sob a dinastia sérvia Karadjordjevic, num regime de monarquia constitucional. Apesar de estabelecer princípios básicos de equidade entre os povos, como liberdade religiosa e o uso de dois alfabetos (cirílico e latino), o acordo não era um acordo juridicamente vinculante, e deixou lacunas quanto à organização administrativa do futuro Estado (BENSON, 2004, pp. 22-23).

unificação como uma política instrumental para a defesa de seus territórios frente à ameaças externas, como a apresentada pela Itália. Eles advogavam uma estrutura estatal federal, com autonomia às províncias, seguindo princípios étnicos e históricos (cf. DJOKIC, 2003, p. 138; PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 4, pp. 27-28; RUSINOV, 2003). Deste modo, o debate central neste período era marcadamente político, referente a organização estatal: opunham-se centralistas (geralmente sérvios, herdeiros da política unionista de Belgrado) e descentralistas (eslavos oriundos de territórios Habsburgo, acostumados com um grau de autonomia política). A vitória do projeto centralista²⁸ e a prevalência política sérvia e de seus interesses no governo levaram lideranças croatas à oposição.

No campo econômico, a situação era igualmente instável (cf. LAMPE, p. 117-120). Com a invasão austríaca, em 1915, a infraestrutura sérvia havia sido destruída e problemas de integração econômica entre os territórios persistiam. Afinal, o governo herdara um território economicamente desagregado, com “(...) com quatro redes ferroviárias diferentes, cinco moedas e seis políticas aduaneiras e sistemas legais, todos datando de antes de 1914.” (LAMPE, 2000, p. 118, nossa tradução). A recuperação econômica desigual agravou rivalidades e gerou ressentimentos. A Sérvia, cuja infraestrutura havia sido devastada pela guerra, teve uma recuperação lenta em oposição à Croácia e Eslovênia, pouco afetadas pelo conflito (cf. LAMPE, 2000, pp. 145-154; PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 25).²⁹

Como consequência, enquanto a Sérvia centralizava o poder político, Eslovênia e Croácia despontavam como centros econômicos. Ademais, composto por uma população majoritariamente agrária e pouco integrada,³⁰ o Reino foi incapaz de promover a unificação da identidade nacional, prevalecendo lealdades locais (BENSON, 2004, pp. 45-46). Agravando esse processo estavam os interesses particulares promovidos por políticos nacionalistas que resistiam ao processo de criação e assimilação à uma identidade iugoslava, temendo a erosão de seu poder político.

²⁸ A Constituição iugoslava foi aprovada simbolicamente em 28 de Junho de 1921, nomeada “Constituição de Vidovdan” em homenagem ao dia de São Vito.

²⁹ Zagreb, cujas redes ferroviárias permaneceram intactas durante os anos de guerra, tornou-se um centro econômico e comercial. Suas exportações para Viena e Budapeste permitiram investimentos em industrialização e empreendimentos locais, independente do Banco Central Iugoslavo (BENSON, 2004, p. 48; LAMPE, 2003, pp. 185-186). De forma semelhante, a Eslovênia foi capaz de patrocinar seu desenvolvimento, atraindo investimentos de países vizinhos, independente dos investimentos de Belgrado. O aumento nas arrecadações de impostos foi canalizado para um sistema de seguridade social local, melhorando a qualidade de vida (BENSON, 2004, p. 48). A Sérvia, em contrapartida, sofreu com sua economia estagnada pela ausência de uma estratégia eficiente de industrialização, mantendo-se dependente de exportações de matérias primas e produtos agrícolas.

³⁰ Em 1931, apenas 6% da população iugoslava habitava centros urbanos com população superior à 50.000 habitantes (BENSON, 2004, p. 50).

A volatilidade política do período foi agravada com a morte de seus principais políticos, o sérvio Nikolas Pasic, em 1926,³¹ e o croata Stejan Radic, em agosto de 1928³² (cf. LAMPE, 2000, p.160-162; DJOKIC, 2003, p. 145-146). A incapacidade de uma solução negociada ao impasse gerado teve como consequência a ditadura real, proclamada pelo rei Aleksandar, em janeiro de 1929. Marcava-se o fim do período constitucional da primeira Iugoslávia.

Para Benson (2004, pp. 46-47) e Ramet (2006, p. 76), a disfuncionalidade do período foi consequência das estratégias políticas conscientemente adotadas, que agravaram as rivalidades étnicas, e não sua origem (BENSON, 2004, pp. 46-47; RAMET, 2006, p. 76). A inoperância do Estado resultou das ações e intransigência dos atores políticos da época. Por um lado, a determinação sérvia em preservar sua hegemonia política foi um elemento desestabilizador. Afinal, desconsiderava os interesses dos demais povos iugoslavos sobre como o Estado deveria ser orientado, gerando ressentimentos que foram canalizados em rivalidades étnicas (BENSON, 2004, p. 46; RAMET, 2006, p. 76). Em contrapartida, a intransigência da oposição também foi responsável pelo agravamento da política iugoslava, uma vez que preferiu ausentar-se do debate político à negociar. Essa ausência funcionou como anuência à política centralista de Pasic, uma vez que governava livre de opositores fortes (BENSON, 2004, p. 46).

2.2.1 A ditadura real de Aleksandar Karadjordjevic

Com o estabelecimento de sua ditadura real, o rei Aleksander estabeleceu como prioridade a superação dos sectarismos que dominavam a política nacional (DJOKIC, 2003, p. 146). Para tanto, ele eliminou, por meio de decretos reais, referências às diferentes etnias e povos do reino. A adoção oficial do nome Iugoslávia foi sua principal política neste contexto. O novo nome enfatizava a origem eslava comum em detrimento do anterior, que destacava os seus diferentes povos constituintes. Símbolos, partidos e associações com motivações étniconacionais também foram proibidos. Ademais, candidatos a deputado deveriam abdicar de suas ligações com organizações étnicas, comprometendo-se a agir em prol do interesse nacional. Políticos nacionalistas, inclusive sérvios, foram perseguidos, presos ou exilados. Finalmente, o ordenamento administrativo foi alterado, estabelecendo nove distritos

³¹ Pasic manteve-se Primeiro Ministro por quase todo o período que serviu à política iugoslava, entre janeiro de 1921 e abril de 1926, com exceção de três meses. Não obstante, o período consecutivo mais longo que passou no cargo durou pouco mais de um ano (cf. BENSON, 2004, p. 46).

³² Radic faleceu decorrente de ferimentos causados por um deputado sérvio, que, em Junho de 1928, atirou contra deputados croatas durante uma sessão da Assembleia. Em represália, o Partido Agrário Croata, sucessor do PARC, retirou-se para Zagreb e declarou nula sua autoridade.

desprovidos de quaisquer ligações históricas ou étnicas, na tentativa de criar novas fidelidades políticas (cf. DJOKIC, 2003, p. 146-149; LAMPE, 2000, p. 165-167).

O principal empecilho para esta política foi a questão religiosa, uma vez que o rei dependia da legitimidade outorgada pela Igreja Ortodoxa. Geraram-se, então, atritos com católicos e muçulmanos, temerosos do estabelecimento de uma Igreja Oficial estatal. Para opositores políticos, o rei transformou-se em símbolo da hegemonia sérvia, agravado pelo centralismo político e o recrudescimento da repressão (BENSON, 2004, p. 53; DJOKIC, 2003, p. 150).

Suas aspirações, contudo, não foram bem sucedidas. Embora reprimidas da vida pública e da política, as identidades e lealdades étnicas sobreviveram e passaram a ser professadas em segredo. Como consequência, organizações secretas com propósitos nacionalistas foram criadas, algumas das quais optaram pelo terrorismo como estratégia política (cf. LAMPE, 2000, pp. 173-175; PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 30). Entre os movimentos emergentes estavam o nacionalista croata *Ustasha*, de orientação fascista, e o grupo terrorista “Organização Revolucionária Interna Macedônia” (VMRO)³³ Agravou-se, portanto, o caráter destabilizador e subversivo da política identitária. Simultaneamente, a tentativa de criar uma identidade iugoslava supranacional malogrou, e o governo foi sustentado unicamente por seu aparato de repressão (BENSON, 2004, p. 54; PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 30).

À crise política, somou-se a econômica, agravada com a depressão da economia mundial, durante a década de 1930. A adoção de medidas liberais, desenhadas com o propósito de obter acesso a crédito estrangeiro e ao mercado europeu falharam, em suas proposições de atenuar a crise (cf. LAMPE, 2000, pp. 171-172). Como consequência das crises política e econômica, o governo do Rei Aleksandar acabou com o seu assassinato, em outubro de 1934.

Com a morte de Aleksandar e a minoridade de seu filho Petar II, iniciou-se o período de regência, sob autoridade do Príncipe Paul. Após eleições parlamentares de maio de 1935 um novo gabinete foi formado sob a liderança de Milan Stojadinovic. Politicamente estável, o gabinete de Stojadinovic foi o que manteve-se mais tempo contínuo no poder, entre junho de 1935 e Fevereiro de 1939. Essa estabilidade foi possível pelo apoio político de lideranças eslovenas e de eslavos muçulmanos, que buscavam benefícios com a aliança (cf. BENSON 2004, p. 63; LAMPE, 2000, p. 178; PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 30).³⁴ Novamente na oposição, o

³³ Optou-se por adotar sigla original, em servo-croata, *Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija*, uma vez que ela é amplamente utilizada na bibliografia secundária.

³⁴ Entre as estratégias do Gabinete para angariar o apoio político esloveno estava a negociação de uma Concordata com a Igreja Católica. Para o líder esloveno Anton Korosec, o acordo com o Vaticano era fundamental pois garantiria equidade confessional aos católicos e proteção contra pressões exercidas pela Igreja Ortodoxa Sérvia.

Partido Agrário Croata estava sob o comando de Vladko Macek, considerado político mais hábil e menos intransigente que seu antecessor.

Em termos econômicos, a política de aproximação com os países do eixo adotada por Stojadinovic foi bem sucedida. Os incentivos financeiros da Alemanha e a regularização das relações comerciais com a Itália fizeram a economia reagir positivamente (cf. LAMPE, 2000, p. 181-183). Entretanto, a desigualdade na recuperação econômica agravou os ressentimentos entre as etnias. Os territórios sérvios e bósnio despontaram economicamente neste período, com desenvolvimento industrial das regiões. Em contraposição, o ritmo desacelerado da recuperação das finanças levou “intelectuais croatas a reunirem evidências na tentativa de provar que os interesses econômicos croatas estavam sendo sacrificados em prol de um Estado unitário imposto a eles” (BENSON, 2004, p. 62, nossa tradução).

O governo de Stojainovic caiu pois foi incapaz de solucionar a “Questão Croata”, temática destabilizadora da política iugoslava (PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 30-31; cf. LAMPE, 2000, p. 194). Seu sucessor, Dragisa Cvetkovic, foi mais habilidoso e após negociações com o com o líder croata Macek chegou a um acordo. Nomeado *Sporazum*, ele foi aprovado pelo parlamento no final de agosto de 1939 e formava uma província croata com limitada, porém ambígua, autonomia política (cf. LAMPE, 2000, pp. 195-196; PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 30-31). O acordo desagradou sérvios e eslavos muçulmanos, uma vez que amplos territórios compostos por suas populações foram cedidos à província croata, sem garantias de que seus direitos, políticos e religiosos, seriam respeitados (cf. LAMPE, 2000, pp. 195-197). De acordo com Ramet (2006, p. 108), o acordo também desagradou nacionalistas croatas, que o viam como capitulação ante ao desejo de um Estado independente. A implementação do acordo nunca foi totalmente concretizada, uma vez que o estado iugoslavo seria extinguido antes de sua efetivação.

A derrocada do Reino iugoslavo ocorreu entre março e abril de 1941. O processo foi iniciado com deposição do gabinete de Cvetkovic após sua aderência ao Pacto Tripartite³⁵, em março de 1945. Em um golpe, orquestrado por militares sérvios, a regência foi dissolvida e o

Apesar de assinada em Julho de 1935, a Concordata nunca foi posta em votação, não sendo outorgada (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 96-97). De modo semelhante, o apoio com os eslavos muçulmanos foi negociado pela retomada de autonomias religiosas, tolhidas pela “Lei da Comunidade Religiosa Islâmica”, de 1930. Entre as autonomias acordadas, estavam o direito à eleição de seu líder religioso e o seu retorno à Sarajevo, após 6 anos sob o domínio direto de Belgrado. A política de tolerância, contudo, não foi estendida à população Albanesa do Kosovo, vítimas de políticas racistas e perseguição durante os anos 1930 (BENSON 2004, p. 67). Não só políticas foram desenhadas para negar aos kosovares o direito à sua cultura e língua, mas também um acordo com foi estabelecido com a Turquia para forçar a migração dessa população. (cf. BENSON, 2004, p. 67; RAMET, 2006; 99-100).

³⁵ Integrando o pacto, o Reino da Iugoslávia aliava-se aos países do Eixo na Segunda Guerra Mundial, o que não foi bem aceito pela opinião pública, especialmente a Sérvia.

rei Petar proclamado monarca. A deposição, contudo, trouxe a Segunda Guerra Mundial aos territórios iugoslavos.

2.3 A Segunda Guerra Mundial em Território Iugoslavo (1941-1945)

O advento da Segunda Guerra Mundial nos Balcãs iniciou com a invasão das forças do Eixo ao território peninsular, em abril de 1941. Na Iugoslávia, o Exército Real não foi suficiente para conter e repelir a invasão e, em questão de semanas, as forças reais capitularam. O governo, liderado pelo recém empossado rei Petar, partiu para o exílio em Londres, onde buscou exercer influência política perante os Aliados.

O território iugoslavo foi então repartido entre países do Eixo (Alemanha, Itália, Bulgária reclamaram pedaços do território) e governos colaboracionistas. Dentre estes estados fantoches estavam o Estado Independente Croata (NDH)³⁶, liderado por Ante Pavelic, o Governo Sérvio sob ocupação, com a liderança de Milan Nedic e o estado Albanês, sob influência italiana. A população local, contudo, não se relegou à passividade, oscilando entre o colaboracionismo e a resistência armada. Dentre os grupos de resistência destacaram-se os Chetniks, milícias paramilitares sérvias, e os Partisans, movimento supranacional de orientação comunista, no qual Josef Broz Tito despontou como figura central.

O período da Segunda Guerra Mundial mostrou-se significativo para os governos posteriores e sua construção de legitimidade. Deram-se diferentes enfoques às atuações dos principais envolvidos no conflito, utilizando-os de acordo com seus interesses e narrativas políticas. À exemplo do Estado Comunista, que ascendeu ao poder no pós guerra e governou o país durante as décadas seguintes. Para a narrativa oficial, o conflito foi descrito como uma “luta de libertação dos povos”, em que um movimento popular espontâneo ter-se-ia rebelado contra o domínio fascista (BENSON, 2004, p. 73). A ascensão do comunismo teria, portanto, forte apoio popular. Contudo, a realidade do conflito mostrou uma face fratricida, resultado de uma violenta guerra civil, com estimados um milhão de mortos (BENSON, 2004, p. 73; RAMET, 2006, pp.160-162). Diferentes grupos opuseram-se pelo controle do território e do Estado iugoslavo, na tentativa de redesenhar suas estruturas institucionais (cf. BENSON, 2004, p. 74). Mais grave, o conflito envolveu tentativas de engenharia social, com base em princípios étnicos, cuja finalidade era garantir a homogeneidade demográfica, ou ao menos a supremacia de uma etnia perante às demais (RAMET, 2006, p. 161). Neste cenário, três atores emergiram

³⁶ Optou-se por adotar sigla original, em croata, *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, uma vez que ela é amplamente utilizada na bibliografia secundária.

como os protagonistas da guerra em território iugoslavo: os Estado Independente Croata, as milícias Chetnicks e os Partisans.

O Estado Independente Croata (NDH)³⁷ e os Chetnicks representaram, respectivamente, movimentos supremacistas croatas e sérvios. Liderado pelo movimento fascista *Ustasha*, o NDH foi fundado em princípios racistas e intolerantes. Tal qual os nazistas alemães, sua retórica baseava-se em conceitos de pureza racial, nos quais os croatas seriam descendentes dos povos góticos e, portanto, ocidentais, enquanto os sérvios seriam orientais, cuja origem remontaria a eslavos e bizantinos (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 37). Como o abismo separando os povos e suas culturas seria intransponível, tornar-se-ia necessário libertar o território de elementos considerados indesejados (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 38; RAMET, 2006, p. 118). Para tanto, desde o início da guerra, uma violenta política de perseguição foi estabelecida. Como consequência, do total de 1,9 milhões de sérvios que viviam no território do NDH, estiveram-se que 120 mil foram deportados para o território sob ocupação alemã; 300 mil fugiram; e 300 mil foram assassinados pelas forças *ustashe* (BENSON, 2004, p. 73-74; RAMET, 2006, p. 114). Os campos de extermínio croatas tornaram-se símbolos desta política de perseguição. Estima-se que entre 50-100 mil pessoas tenham perecido apenas no campo de Jasenovac (RAMET, 2006, p. 117).³⁸

Em contrapartida, as milícias Chetniks eram pequenos bandos formados por membros do Exército Real iugoslavo que, recusando rendição, adotaram técnicas de guerrilha (RAMET, 2006, p. 142). O que caracterizava o movimento não era uma ideologia ou programa político unificado, mas uma tradição sérvia de insurreição contra ocupação estrangeira.³⁹ Não havia, portanto, uma estrutura hierárquica no movimento Chetnik e os bandos atuavam independentemente, inclusive na decisão de suas estratégias de alianças – as quais oscilaram entre a oposição, trégua e cooperação com as forças invasoras (cf. BENSON, 2004, p. 75; RAMET, 2006, p. 143). Seus propósitos eram geralmente reacionários, como o retorno ao Patriarcado sérvio e à ordem social do pré-guerra (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 38).

Inspirados por valores antidemocráticos e antiliberais, muitas milícias tinham como principal objetivo a criação de um Estado sérvio etnicamente homogêneo. Crentes da vitória aliada e da inevitável expulsão do Eixo no longo prazo, essas forças focaram na execução de

³⁷ Proclamado em 10 de abril de 1941, abarcando parcialmente territórios croatas e bósnios.

³⁸ A violência croata chegou a impressionar as forças alemãs, que interferiram para evitar o ritmo de perseguições, pois temiam que a violência poderia favorecer as forças de resistência (RAMET, 2006, p. 120, p. 128).

³⁹ Essa técnica derivava de grupos paramilitares surgidos no século XIX em rebelião ao domínio turco. Algumas milícias mantiveram-se ativas durante os anos entreguerras, com a finalidade de mobilizar a população sérvia em defesa de seu projeto de Estado e nação (BENSON, 2004, p. 43; RAMET, 2006, p. 142).

um plano para o pós-guerra em território croata e bósnio (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 146). A “Grande Sérvia” teria um território expandido, que englobaria a Macedônia, Montenegro, Bósnia-Herzegovina e Voivodina (BENSON, 2004, p. 75; RAMET, 2006, p. 145; PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 39). Para atingir seus fins, uma violenta política de expulsão de minorias foi estabelecida, resultando no massacre de aproximadamente 65 mil de civis croatas e muçulmanos, além da destruição de ao menos 300 vilas e pequenas cidades (RAMET, 2006, p. 146). A violenta política contra civis não sérvios dificultou o recrutamento entre povos eslavos, diminuindo seu potencial de crescimento. Em oposição, seus principais adversários, os Partisans, conseguiam atrair bósnios-muçulmanos e croatas para suas fileiras, fortalecendo-se e ganhando a atenção dos Aliados (BENSON, 2004, pp. 81-82; RAMET, 2006, pp. 149-150).

2.3.1 Os Partisans e a formação da Segunda Iugoslávia

O Partido Comunista Iugoslavo engajou-se na Segunda Guerra Mundial em Junho de 1941, após invasão nazista à União Soviética. Criou-se, então, a “Unidade de Guerrilha para Libertação Nacional Iugoslava”⁴⁰, que atuava por meio de atos de sabotagem em território ocupado, sob a liderança de Josip Broz Tito.

Mesmo vítima de ofensivas militares do Eixo, algumas das quais quase dizimaram as forças Partisans, o movimento conseguiu se reestruturar por sua força de atração entre os diferentes grupos nacionais. Atuando como guerrilhas, e não exércitos, mantinham-se em constante movimento, contando com apoio e reforços dos sobreviventes de massacres *Ustashe* e Chetniks, assim como de retaliações alemãs.⁴¹ Afinal, projetavam-se como um movimento supranacional, composto por patriotas iugoslavos comprometidos com libertação do país frente à ocupação estrangeira (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 39). Seu característico slogan de “fraternidade e união” propagava uma Iugoslávia construída na harmonia e equidade entre as nações, rejeitando visões nacionalistas ou supremacistas (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 39). Como consequência, tornou-se o movimento etnicamente mais variado: ao final de 1944, sérvios compunham 44% dos membros, seguidos por croatas, 30%, eslovenos, 10%, montenegrinos, 5%, macedônios, 2,5% e bósnios-muçulmanos, 2,5% (RAMET, 2006, p. 153).

⁴⁰ Ficaram conhecidos como Partisans, palavra inglesa para “Guerrilha”.

⁴¹ De acordo com o comandante alemão em território ocupado, General Franz Boehme, para cada soldado alemão ferido, 50 sérvios seriam assassinados. Para alemão morto, esse número subiria para 100. Entre os mortos estariam prisioneiros de guerra e, quando necessário, seriam executados civis.

Entre as estratégias adotadas pelos Partisans, organizavam-se os “Comitês de Liberação” nos territórios conquistados, os quais eram coordenados por simpatizantes ou membros locais do movimento, criando as bases para a construção de um Estado Comunista no pós guerra (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 40). Ademais, em novembro de 1942, em Bihac, foi criado o Conselho Antifascista para a Libertação dos povos da Iugoslávia (AVNOJ)⁴². Considerado o parlamento do movimento, foi a instância onde as principais decisões para o pós guerra foram tomadas. Como, por exemplo, durante a 2ª reunião do AVNOJ, em Jajce, no qual o Comitê foi proclamado único governo legítimo, comprometendo-se a instituir uma Federação iugoslava com respeito aos princípios nacionais (RAMET, 2006, p. 157).⁴³

O auxílio técnico e militar do exércitos aliados, tal qual a capitulação italiana, ambos em 1943, fortaleceram o movimento (RAMET, 2006, p. 157). A contrapartida à ajuda veio em maio de 1944, quando Londres forçou um acordo entre Tito e o governo iugoslavo no exílio, sob o comando do político croata Ivan Subasic. Um governo de coalisção foi então estabelecido para o pós Guerra, com o comprometimento de ambas as partes. Os comunistas comprometiam-se com o pluralismo político e com princípios da democracia liberal enquanto os políticos no exílio reconheciam a legitimidade da AVNOJ como governo provisório, até o estabelecimento de eleições para a Assembleia Constituinte (RAMET, 2006, p. 157). O governo provisório foi formado em fevereiro de 1945 com o retorno dos políticos que estavam no exílio, incorporando-os na AVNOJ. Tito assumiu o cargo de Primeiro Ministro.

Os preparativos para o Estado Comunista, contudo, antecederam as eleições para a Assembleia Constituinte, ocorridas em novembro de 1945. Entre tais ações, estava a criação do Departamento para a Defesa do Povo (OZNa)⁴⁴, em maio de 1944. Inicialmente concebido como um serviço de segurança estatal, foi convertido em instrumento de terror e repressão de dissidências e oposição política, sob a liderança do sérvio Aleksandar Rankovic (BENSON, 2004, p. 84). Outro passo fundamental foi o Congresso fundacional dos povos iugoslavos, em agosto de 1945, que pôs fim ao pluralismo político, criando a Frente Popular. Sob o comando direto de Tito, ela centralizou o controle comunista sobre as instituições iugoslavas, tanto estatais quanto civis, sob a justificativa de união e reconstrução do país (BENSON, 2004, p. 86). Proeminentes políticos iugoslavos renunciaram seus postos em represália, boicotando as

⁴² Optou-se por adotar sigla original, em croata, *Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije*, uma vez que ela é amplamente utilizada na bibliografia secundária.

⁴³ Também em Jajce é que montenegrinos e macedônios foram reconhecidos como nações constituintes da Iugoslávia. Com isso, passasse a reconhecer cinco nacionalidades constituintes da Iugoslávia (Sérvia, Croácia, Eslovênia, Montenegro e Macedônia).

⁴⁴ Optou-se por adotar sigla original, em croata, *Odjeljenje za zaštitu naroda*, uma vez que ela é amplamente utilizada na bibliografia secundária.

eleições (RAMET, 2006, p. 168). A Frente Popular assegurou expressiva vitória, obtendo total controle sobre a Assembleia Constituinte. Consequentemente, os comunistas garantiram o monopólio sobre a construção organizacional e institucional do novo estado Iugoslavo (RAMET, 2006, p. 163).

A confirmação da supremacia comunista também desencadeou expurgos políticos. Como consequência, estima-se que entre 100-250 mil pessoas tenham morrido no pós guerra (BENSON, 2004, p. 85). Entre as vítimas, estima-se que estavam 50 mil croatas e 18 mil eslovenos, acusados de serem membros ou colaboradores fascistas (BENSON, 2004, p. 87). Também foram vitimados comerciantes, agricultores enriquecidos e membros da intelligentsia sob a acusação de “inimigos de classe”, eliminando potenciais opositoristas (PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 44)

Apesar dos massacres, o regime comunista consolidou-se por meio da Constituição aprovada em 31 de Janeiro de 1946. Proclamou-se, então, a República Federativa dos Povos da Iugoslávia⁴⁵, composta por 6 unidades federativas: Eslovênia, Croácia, Bósnia-Herzegovina, Sérvia, Montenegro e Macedônia. Essa, contudo, não seria sua única constituição, refletindo consideráveis mudanças na política iugoslava ao longo de seus 50 anos de existência.

2.3.2 *Os fantasmas da Guerra*

A Segunda Guerra Mundial em território iugoslavo deixou uma parcela de ressentimentos entre os diferentes grupos étnicos e nacionais. De tal modo que foram explorados conforme interesses políticos – tanto pelo governo comunista quanto por políticos nacionalistas que emergiram no final dos anos 1980. Afinal, o conflito não foi apenas uma guerra de libertação frente à ocupação estrangeira, mas uma violenta guerra fratricida entre grupos de diferentes ideologias.

Para Pavkovic (2000, pp. 42-43), “[a]s piores perdas foram registradas na Bósnia-Herzegovina e Croácia, onde a população sérvia foi exposta aos massacres sistemáticos pelos *Ustashe* e a população muçulmana, ao massacres *Chetniks*”. Não à toa, servo-croatas, servo-bósnios e bósnios-muçulmanos⁴⁶ passaram a confiar sua segurança ao governo central

⁴⁵ Nossa tradução para *Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia*. Posteriormente Renomeada para “República Socialista Federativa da Iugoslávia” pela Constituição de 1963 (nossa tradução para *Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*).

⁴⁶ As lideranças bósnio-muçulmanas posicionaram-se de modo contraditório durante a guerra (BOUGAREL, 2003, pp. 104-105). Buscando autonomia política para a Bósnia e proteção para a sua população, seus líderes inicialmente buscaram aliança com as forças invasoras, com o propósito de criar um território bósnio sob tutela alemã. Lideranças muçulmanas também juntaram-se ao governo ustasha (BOUGAREL, 2003, p. 104). Contudo, elas

iugoslavo, uma vez que viam-se protegidos de violências e vinganças por motivações nacionalistas (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 43). A dissolução da Iugoslávia e a retomada dessas paixões, na década de 1980, não apenas revitalizou sentimentos de medo e revanche entre as diferentes etnias, suprimidas durante os anos comunista, mas também foram exploradas e exacerbadas conforme o interesse de suas lideranças políticas.

No pós guerra, a vitória Partisan e a derrota das ideologias nazifascistas, e suas cópias locais, proveu ao governo comunista a legitimidade necessária para manter-se no poder por quase meio século (RAMET, 2006, p. 162). A questão da reconciliação nacional, no imediato pós guerra, foi abordada pela glorificação da luta Partisan: forças nacionalistas e excludentes haviam sido derrotadas pela luta de libertação nacional, unificando os povos iugoslavos sob uma mesma ideologia, “fraternidade e união” (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 44). Seguindo princípios marxistas, a luta contra a desigualdade nacional passou a ser combatida por meio da tentativa de supressão da desigualdade socioeconômica entre as entidades federais.

O vocabulário nacionalista, contudo, não desapareceu completamente do cotidiano iugoslavo, tampouco entre os membros do próprio partido. Esses sentimentos foram canalizados para a validação de propostas políticas, assim como para mobilizar apoio popular, conforme as circunstâncias. Mesmo antes dos explosivos anos 1980, o iugoslavismo supranacional de Tito enfrentou questionamentos e adaptou-se à realidade política e às pressões exercidas pelas repúblicas, cujos interesses por vezes divergiam, conforme será visto à seguir.

2.4 O Período Comunista: a Iugoslávia como *conceito vs. estrutura*.

A Iugoslávia do pós guerra construiu sua legitimidade enfatizando o supranacionalismo. Nesta concepção, a federação seria o resultado do pleno exercício ao direito de autodeterminação das suas cinco nações componentes – eslovena, croata, macedônia, montenegrina e sérvia (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 47). Acreditava-se, portanto, que a nova Iugoslávia fora constituída por meio do consenso entre elas em oposição ao Estado anterior, no qual a hegemonia sérvia teria sido imposta às demais. Ademais, de acordo com Dejan Jovic (2003, p. 159), enfatizava-se o caráter comunista do regime, o qual libertaria a sociedade de todas as formas de dominação, inclusive a nacional.

distanciaram-se gradativamente de Zagreb, condenando sua violência e os ataques perpetrados contra sérvios (RADIC, 2003, p. 204). Somente a partir de 1943 foi que as lideranças bósnios-muçulmanas aproximam-se dos Partisans. Sua motivação não se restringiu à proteção contra ataques chetniks, mas teve também um caráter político: os comunistas comprometiam-se com o reconhecimento de uma entidade bósnia autônoma em uma Iugoslávia no pós guerra (BOUGAREL, 2003, p. 104).

Contudo, sobreviviam divergências acerca do exercício deste supranacionalismo e a questão nacional na Iugoslávia reiteradamente esbarrou em questões políticas e econômicas. O Estado, organizado em uma federação, enfrentou dilemas semelhantes ao de seu antecessor: em específico, a pressão entre centralização e descentralização política. Com o poder monopolizado pelo Partido Comunista e suas instituições, essa descentralização consistiria na transferência de responsabilidades administrativas para as Repúblicas e suas lideranças partidárias locais, e não na total abertura política, evitando o esvaziamento do poder partidário (RAMET, 2006, p. 205).

A história do Estado comunista iugoslavo pode ser compreendido, portanto, por meio de suas forças políticas, centrípetas e centrífugas, que perpassaram questões econômicas e nacionais. O partido comunista, portanto, não foi monolítico, como poder-se-ia supor. Ramet (2006, p. 211) divide as lideranças do período entre liberais (“alguém que favorece a redução do controle partidário interno e o relaxamento de seu papel de supervisor societal”) e conservadoras (“alguém que favorece o rígido controle partidário e o fortalecimento de seu papel de supervisor societal”). Essas forças foram representadas nas figuras do esloveno Edvard Kardelj e do sérvio Aleksandar Rankovic, respectivamente, cuja influência deu-se em diferentes contextos políticos.

A oposição entre as correntes também abarcou discussões identitárias, opondo visões supranacionais e nacionais do Estado iugoslavo. De um lado, os supranacionalistas defendiam que o Estado Iugoslavo derivava da união política entre os povos eslavos do sul, conectando o Estado e identidade étnico-nacional (JOVIC, 2003, p. 162). Essa vertente foi representada pela máxima “Fraternidade e União”, cujo principal expoente era Tito. Já a defesa da visão particularista do estado ressurgiu no debate político nos anos 1960, mobilizada por elites locais. Conforme coloca Jovic (2003, p. 167), a retomada desta questão foi motivada não por ódios ancestrais, mas em resposta à crise econômica então enfrentada. Neste contexto, quadros liberais do partido comunista ascenderam aos principais cargos nas Repúblicas, defendendo maior autonomia na condução de suas políticas, especialmente na esfera econômica. Kardelj emergiu como principal ideólogo deste particularismo, no qual Estado Iugoslavo existiria como um arranjo entre suas partes constituintes (cf. JOVIC, 2003, p. 170). Para o esloveno, não eram questões étnicas ou nacionais que uniam as repúblicas, mas sim interesses e necessidades em comum, os quais seriam melhor endereçadas em conjunto (JOVIC, 2003, p. 170).

2.4.1 Anos iniciais: A federação iugoslava (1946-1960)

A Primeira Constituição Iugoslava, aprovada em Janeiro de 1946, apesar de reconhecer a existência de suas seis repúblicas e cinco povos constituintes, era influenciada pelo Estado Soviético e, portanto, fortemente centralizado. Tanto em aspectos políticos quanto econômicos e culturais, o partido detinha o monopólio relativo à reconstrução do Estado, cujas instituições haviam sido destruídas durante a ocupação nazista. Seu propósito, era “transformar uma sociedade predominantemente agrária em um Estado industrial comunista” (BENSON, 2004, p. 90, nossa tradução). Ademais, por meio da questão econômica, esperava-se resolver outro problema: a tensão entre diferentes etnias e nacionalidades (LAMPE, 2003, p. 189). Seguindo o conceito marxista de que desigualdades econômicas despertariam ressentimentos inter-regionais, o plano adotado tinha como propósito harmonizar as relações entre seus povos constituintes por meio do desenvolvimento econômico (RAMET, 2006, p. 263). Para tanto, incentivou-se a industrialização das regiões menos desenvolvidas da federação, por meio de auxílios e investimentos econômicos.

O desenvolvimento do setor industrial iugoslavo, contudo, dependia das boas relações estabelecidas com Moscou, em que os investimentos e matérias primas a baixo custo advinham do bloco soviético (LAMPE, 2003, p. 189). A ruptura entre Iugoslávia e o Cominform⁴⁷, em 1948, portanto, colocou em risco o plano de desenvolvimento econômico iugoslavo, gerando a necessidade de encontrar novos parceiros comerciais.

As consequências da ruptura não se restringiram ao campo econômico. Acusada por Stálin e pelo Cominform de desvio do projeto socialista, a liderança iugoslava viu-se confrontada com problemas de legitimidade. Internamente, com o surgimento de movimentos anticomunistas, e externamente, com a necessidade de distinguir-se do bloco soviético (RAMET, 2006, p. 185). Embora a polícia secreta tenha atuado na perseguição da dissidência interna, o partido comunista iniciou um processo de reestruturação de seu projeto político (RAMET, 2006, p. 183). Surgiram, então, as políticas de auto-gestão e não-alinhamento⁴⁸. Somadas à ideologia de “fraternidade e união”, elas formaram a “tríade de legitimidade” que permeou a política iugoslava nas décadas subsequentes (RAMET, 2006, p. 185).

⁴⁷ Cominform é a sigla para o “Communist Information Bureau”, sob controle soviéticos.

⁴⁸ Externamente orientada, a política de não-alinhamento tinha como objetivo legitimar a recusa iugoslava em submeter-se às exigências de Moscou na política internacional (RAMET, 2006, p. 186). Esse propósito seria atingido por meio do não-alinhamento automático às diretrizes políticas americanas ou soviéticas frente ao confronto “leste-oeste”.

Simultaneamente uma estratégia econômica e política, a auto-gestão previa a reorganização da economia e de suas instituições, em nível federal e nas repúblicas. O objetivo era descentralizar parcialmente a atividade econômica em prol de associações de trabalhadores, dando-lhes prerrogativas administrativas em seus locais de trabalho (RAMET, 2006, p. 185). Seu propósito era, a longo prazo, preparar a sociedade para o desaparecimento do Estado, considerado uma premissa do comunismo marxista. Neste primeiro momento, contudo, ele não apenas mantinha-se presente, mas também controlava o planejamento e coordenação econômica, concentrando a alocação de recursos. Para viabilizar investimentos necessários, Belgrado aproximou-se de Washington, em busca de auxílio econômico.

Este primeiro processo de liberalização econômico e político, contudo, encontrou resistência, institucionalizadas com as “Leis básicas sobre os Conselhos de Trabalhadores”, aprovado em Junho de 1953. As mudanças legislativas foram tão expressivas que considera-se as Leis Básicas a segunda Constituição iugoslava no pós-guerra (RAMET, 2006, p. 192). Seu propósito foi consolidar o distanciamento com o modelo soviético. Para tanto, focou-se na crítica em seu burocratismo, cuja contraposição seria a promoção da “democracia direta” (BENSON, 2004, p. 97). Estabeleceu-se um complexo processo eleitoral, estruturado a partir de assembleias comunais bicamerais espalhadas pelo país. Embora o sufrágio para uma das câmaras fosse universal, os processos de eleição para as assembleias republicanas e federal eram indiretos, escolhidos pelos representantes comunais (BENSON, 2004, pp. 97-98). Como as comunas não constituíam unidades de planejamento político, o poder efetivo ficou centralizado nas elites partidárias locais e nacionais (BENSON, 2004, p 98). Criou-se, então, um sistema clientelista à nível regional.

O discurso de descentralização do processo decisório tampouco resultou na expansão de prerrogativas para as repúblicas. Ao contrário, seus direitos previamente adquiridos foram limitados na nova lei – como, por exemplo, o direito à secessão (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 61). As mudanças foram recebidas com forte oposição croata e macedônia que viam como um retrocesso a rescisão das atribuições das repúblicas, ainda que formais (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 61). O descontentamento com as Leis Básicas fizeram com que surgissem movimentos intrapartidários, desejosos reformas mais ambiciosas, com uma real democratização do Estado e do processo decisório, os quais sofreram forte perseguição e retaliação (RAMET, 2006, p. 195). O período entre 1957 e 1961, portanto, foi marcado por um enrijecimento da disciplina partidária.

Simultaneamente, na esfera cultural, os anos 1950 foram marcados pela tentativa de criar uma cultura e uma consciência iugoslava unificada. Ligada ao princípio de “fraternidade

e união”, o objetivo era criar uma identidade supranacional que transcendesse as identidades nacionais individuais (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 61). Um destes projetos foi o acordo linguístico de Novi Sad de 1954, com o propósito de estabelecer um padrão literário para o idioma servo-croata, tanto em sua variação latina quanto cirílica (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 62). Aparte ao guia ortográfico oficial, resultado do acordo linguístico, a campanha para o estabelecimento de uma cultura e identidade comum não foi bem sucedida. O principal entrave foi a resistência das repúblicas, que acusavam o iugoslavismo de ser um projeto de homogeneização cultural e supressão de suas diferenças étnica e nacionais (cf. PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 62; JOVIC, 2003, p; RAMET, 2004; p).

O final da década de 1950 também marcou um período de desenvolvimento econômico. Contudo, os limites para crescimento eram iminentes. Embora tenha aumentado sua produção e aberto novos postos de trabalho, a produtividade industrial não havia acompanhado os demais indicadores (cf. BENSON, 2004, p. 103-104). A necessidade de lidar com complexas questões econômicas como a inflação, distorção nos preços e ineficiência econômica esbarraram nos limites do planejamento centralizado (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 210).

As diferentes realidades socioeconômicas e a desigualdade entre as repúblicas persistiam e impediam que se atingisse o consenso acerca de um plano econômico centralizado. Neste contexto, as divergências econômicas transformaram-se em disputas entre as repúblicas (RAMET, 2006, p. 210). Por um lado, as repúblicas menos desenvolvidas, como Bósnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro e Macedônia, desejavam maximizar a assistência econômica, favorecendo o planejamento centralizado. Em oposição, as repúblicas mais desenvolvidas, como Croácia e Eslovênia, favoreciam uma economia de mercado, utilizando critérios de lucro para a alocação de investimentos. Para tanto, favoreciam o planejamento local da economia (RAMET, 2006, p. 209).

Como consequência, a pressão econômica no início dos anos 1960 favoreceu demandas reformistas e liberalizantes, em oposição às respostas geradas nos anos anteriores. A primeira reforma, a econômica, entendeu-se entre os anos de 1961 e 1965, e desencadeou um processo que culminou nas reformas constitucionais de 1963 e 1974.

2.4.2 As Reformas Liberais (1960 – 1974)

As reformas na economia iugoslava começaram em 1961, com um projeto de liberalização no comércio exterior, adequando suas tarifas alfandegárias com o propósito de integrar o GATT (cf. BENSON, 2004, p 104; LAMPE, 2003, p 191; RAMET, 2006, p. 267).

Contudo, os resultados não foram os esperados: o aumento nas importações, impactaram a produção nacional e as exportações, resultando em desequilíbrio no balanço de pagamentos (RAMET, 2006, p 267.). Novos e graduais ajustes foram necessários e, ao final do período de reformas, refletiram maior liberalização da economia. Conforme coloca Ramet (2006, p. 213), as reformas tiveram um caráter redistributivo, “fortalecendo o papel das repúblicas (e empresas) às custas do centro (o governo federal (...))”. Entre as principais mudanças, estava a descentralização do investimento econômico, favorecendo bancos regionais em detrimento do Fundo Geral de Investimentos. Conforme Lampe (2003, p. 193), a descentralização econômica, especialmente no setor de investimentos, teve como consequência a regionalização do planejamento econômico. Os bancos regionais, por exemplo, raramente faziam empréstimos fora de suas fronteiras – embora lhes fosse permitido investir em negócios por todo o território federal, em busca de melhores oportunidades de retorno econômico. O relaxamento do controle centralizado, portanto, segmentou ainda mais a comunidade econômica iugoslava, ao invés de uni-la, agravando ressentimentos e politizando a reforma.

A oposição entre norte e sul ultrapassou divergências econômicas, adentrando em questionamentos do sistema político iugoslavo. Utilizando a linguagem de “desestatização”, croatas começaram a pressionar por reformas constitucionais. Apoiado por Macedônia e Eslovênia, eles desejavam maximizar sua autonomia política frente à Federação. Em contraposição estavam aqueles que desejam manter o aparato partidário fortalecido como o centro das decisões político-administrativas. Este grupo contava com liderança sérvia e montenegrina. Seus mentores eram proeminentes membros da LCI, cujas divergências eram predominantemente ideológicas: Kardelj e Bakaric favoreciam a descentralização, enquanto Rankovic personificava o establishment, burocrático e autoritário (BENSON, 2004, p. 108).

A constituição de 1963, assim como as reformas econômicas em andamento, demonstraram os novos rumos do estado iugoslavo em prol de maior liberalização. Conforme coloca Ramet (2006, p. 208), as prerrogativas das repúblicas foram ampliadas e Kosovo ganhou o status de “província autônoma”, tal qual a Voivodina já gozava. Prevaleceu também a visão de Kardelj de que o Estado iugoslavo era um arranjo entre suas partes constituintes ao supranacionalismo de Tito, que supunha o elemento étnico comum em sua formação (cf. JOVIC, 2003). Como resultado, estabeleceu-se quatro idiomas oficiais (servo-croata, servo-croata, esloveno e macedônio). Ademais, os muçulmanos passaram a ser reconhecidos como o

sexto grupo étnico constitutivo do Estado. Até então, a identidade muçulmana era compreendida apenas como particularidade religiosa da etnia sérvia ou croata.⁴⁹

É importante reiterar que a política de descentralização não implicou em enfraquecimento da LCI. O que se defendia era o fortalecimento das repúblicas e, portanto, das elites locais frente às federais. E a queda de Rankovic, em julho de 1966, marcou uma expressiva vitória liberal. Acusado de usar a polícia secreta iugoslava em prol de um projeto político próprio, sua expulsão marcou um revés para os conservadores e a ascensão de uma coalização liberal (cf. BENSON, 2004, pp. 109-111; PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 64-66; RAMET, 2006, pp. 218-219). Contudo, o que eram divergências políticas e econômicas entre repúblicas, adquiriram contornos étnicos e nacionalistas. Para muitos sérvios, a queda de Rankovic marcou a ascensão de políticas hostis, contra as quais não restava um defensor (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 219). Em contrapartida, prevalecia a tendência entre políticos liberais em associar o centralismo com políticas hegemônicas sérvias (cf. PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 64-65).

O período foi marcado pela ascensão não somente de políticas liberais, mas também de ressentimentos nacionais, embora circunscritos em discussões políticas e econômicas (cf. PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 65-68; RAMET, 2006, p. 210 e pp. 227-247). Heróis nacionais foram restituídos e diferenças étnicas acentuadas sem, contudo, o reaparecimento de proposições racistas ou supremacistas. Especialmente pela atuação da velha guarda do LCI impediu o escalonamento das discussões ou a adoção de soluções radicalizadas, tais como a secessão (cf. CIPEK, 2003, p. 81).

Novas reformas políticas prosseguiram até o final da década, tolhendo prerrogativas federais, reduzindo-as à funções administrativas, em prol do poder local (cf. BENSON, 2004, pp. 111-130; LAMPE, 2003, pp. 192-193; RAMET, 2006, pp. 212-222). A tolerância federal perdurou até 1971, quando as tensões nacionalistas ameaçaram implodir na Croácia. Uma das principais beneficiadas pelo processo de liberalização, o final dos anos 1960 ficou conhecido na República como a “Primavera croata”. Argumentos políticos, econômicos e culturais mesclaram-se em suas demandas por autonomia, revitalizando antigos ressentimentos (PAVKOVIC, 2000, pp. 67-68; RAMET, 2006, pp. 228-236). O período anterior foi reinterpretado como manipulação sérvia para explorar e subjugar a população croata. De modo semelhante foi interpretada a tentativa de criar uma cultura iugoslava supranacional e um idioma servo-croata unificado.

⁴⁹ Até o censo de 1953, somente existiam as opções “Sérvio-muçulmano”, “Croata-muçulmano” ou “Iugoslavo”. Somente a partir do censo de 1961 que surge “Muçulmano” como opção étnica (RAMET, 2006, p. 288).

Esse processo de revisionismo começou na sociedade civil por meio de periódicos, associações culturais e acadêmicas (Matica Hrvatska, Sociedade Literária Croata, Uniões estudantis, etc.). Sua justificativa era a percepção de ameaças contra o povo croata, com a “supressão de seu idioma, a obliteração de seu povo e a usurpação de sua terra” (RAMET, 2006, p. 236). O movimento passou a atrair líderes políticos locais quando ganhou o apoio popular (RAMET, 2006, p. 256). Contudo, também atraiu a preocupação de Tito e de outras lideranças federais que agiram quando o movimento passou a oferecer risco de contágio, incitando o nacionalismo nas populações servo-croata⁵⁰ e bósnio-croata⁵¹.

Os anos de 1971 e 1972 foram marcado por expurgos nos quais buscou-se eliminar traços “liberais” e “tecnocratas” da política iugoslava (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 68). Entretanto, o processo de descentralização iniciado na década anterior, não foi revertido. Apenas foram alocados oficiais fiéis a Tito nas instituições federais e republicanas (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 69). Os expurgos, portanto, tiveram como consequência o fortalecimento da disciplina partidária, sem revogar as prerrogativas republicanas.

A Quarta Constituição iugoslava, cujos debates começaram em 1972, refletiu essa tendência. Aprovada em 1974, aumentou as prerrogativas políticas relegadas às repúblicas, cujo direito de autodeterminação foi reconhecido, baseado no princípio de não-intervenção. Na ponta, o Estado iugoslavo ficou limitado ao controle do exército e da política externa, exercidos especialmente pela figura de Tito. Ademais, garantiu às províncias equivalência política com as repúblicas. Por fim, o sistema de presidência coletiva instituído em 1971 foi ampliado. Manteve-se sua composição de nove membros, um de cada república e província autônoma mais Tito. Contudo, a necessidade de consenso para a aprovação de decisões políticas criou um sistema de veto que só poderia ser revogado por Tito, que assumiu o papel de presidente honorário da Iugoslávia (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 69). Após sua morte o título seria extinto e o cargo seria exercido coletivamente. A liderança da presidência seria rotativa, exercida a cada ano por uma unidade federativa. A primeira presidência coletiva foi constituída por Tito entre seus membros mais leais, que cultivavam os vínculos formados durante os anos revolucionários (PAVKOVIC, 2000, p. 70). Esse arranjo, somado aos bons resultados econômicos do período, permitiu que o final dos anos 1970 transcorresse com relativa estabilidade. Haviam, contudo, insatisfações com o desenho constitucional estabelecido em 1974, os quais serão trabalhados a seguir.

⁵⁰ População etnicamente sérvia habitando território croata, especialmente na região da Krajina.

⁵¹ População etnicamente croata, habitando território da República Bósnia.

3. A SECURITIZAÇÃO DA IDENTIDADE SÉRVIA

Os anos 1980 marcaram a reemergência do discurso nacionalista na política iugoslava. Desta vez, contudo, a ausência das lideranças comunistas do pós-guerra, como Tito e Kardelj, fizeram-se sentir. Afinal, a figura de Tito nas décadas anteriores havia servido como mediadora nas tensões internas do partido, tanto em questões político e econômicas, quanto nacionais e republicanas. Foi, por exemplo, a interferência de Tito que possibilitou a retomada da ordem política quando o nacionalismo croata ameaçou a estabilidade do país na década de 1970. Como consequência, o desenho político-institucional da Constituição de 1974 somou-se à morte de Tito, em maio de 1980, como fator de instabilidade. Afinal, as instituições criadas tinham como propósito dar maior autonomia às repúblicas e impedir a centralização do poder político, especialmente em uma única figura. Conforme coloca Jovic (2003, p. 176), “[a] constituição de 1974 prevenia qualquer um de tornar-se um ‘novo Tito’ após a morte de Tito”. Maio de 1980, portanto, consolidou a descentralização iugoslava, dando prevalência às repúblicas em detrimento do poder central. O poder federal passou a ser exercido coletivamente, por meio da junta presidencial – na qual as decisões tinham que ser conjuntas e unânimes.

Contudo, nem todas as Repúblicas iugoslavas se sentiam contempladas nesse novo arranjo institucional. Entre os descontentes estavam representantes da República Sérvia, cujo aumento nas prerrogativas políticas de suas províncias autônomas, Kosovo e Voivodina, era visto como uma afronta à sua independência e soberania. A situação foi agravada a partir de 1981, quando novas revoltas eclodiram no Kosovo. Essas manifestações foram essencialmente motivadas pela demanda da maioria albanesa por reconhecimento do status de República para a região. A situação na província kosovar foi, portanto, a principal motivação para a ascensão do nacionalismo sérvio. Levado às últimas consequências, ele seria responsável pelos acontecimentos na Iugoslávia durante a década seguinte, durante as guerras de secessão.

3.1 Escalonamento nas tensões: a província do Kosovo

A reivindicação pelo status de República para a província do Kosovo era uma demanda antiga de sua majoritária população albanesa. Território incorporado ao Reino da Sérvia durante a primeira guerra balcânica (1912-1913), o Kosovo ainda hoje é considerado o “berço espiritual da nação sérvia”. Afinal, o território é parte da mitologia fundacional do Estado eslavo do sul, o qual seria a continuação do Reino Medieval do Príncipe Lazar, derrotado pelo império Otomano na Batalha do Kosovo, em 1389 (cf. DJOKIC, 2009, p. 218; KASER; HALPERN,

1998, pp. 100-102; SELLS, 2001, p. 181). Portanto, para o nacionalismo sérvio, o Kosovo tem um papel primordial. Como consequência, ao longo do Reino iugoslavo (1918-1941), seu domínio foi marcado pela tentativa de dominar e homogeneizar o território, em detrimento de sua população albanesa, que ocupara a região durante os séculos de dominação Otomana (cf. BENSON, 2004, p. 67; RAMET, 2006; 99-100).

O advento da Segunda Guerra Mundial nos Bálcãs permitiu que o território fosse incorporado ao Estado Albanês,⁵² no qual os eslavos passaram a ser perseguidos – em vingança a opressão sofrida nos anos anteriores. Com a derrota do Eixo, o Kosovo voltou novamente à jurisdição iugoslava. Apesar das demandas locais para que ganhasse um status de República, a região foi incorporada à República Sérvia com status inicial de região autônoma, então com prerrogativas limitadas (cf. RAMET, 2006, pp. 293-294). Durante os anos iniciais, a política foi marcadamente centralizada em Belgrado, sendo os albaneses kosovares sub-representados nos aparatos burocrático-administrativos e nas forças de segurança provinciais, apesar de demograficamente predominantes (RAMET, 2006, p. 293).⁵³ As tensões provinciais foram constantes na região e não foram apaziguadas com a queda de Rankovic, em 1966, muito embora o comando das forças de segurança fosse então restituído a mãos albanesas e novas prerrogativas políticas fossem reconhecidas. Contudo, as principais reivindicações locais, como a transformação do Kosovo em uma República e o reconhecimento dos albaneses como nação constituinte iugoslava, não foram atendidas (RAMET, 2006, p. 296).

Os modestos progressos na política kosovar, contudo, não foram suficientes para apaziguar os ânimos. Albaneses permaneciam insatisfeitos com o que consideravam uma representação político-institucional limitada e os sérvios sentiam-se “demograficamente” ameaçados, sobretudo pela alta taxa de natalidade albanesa, a maior na Europa na década de 1980 (RAMET, 2006, p. 296). À semelhança do que Ramet (2006, p. 312) identificou na Croácia, nenhuma das partes kosovares considerava legítimo o *status quo*, sendo que a liberalização política nos anos 1970 agravou os chauvinismos locais, atingindo o seu ápice nos anos 1980. Agravando a situação estavam as mudanças na composição demográfica da província, aos quais se somaram dois fatores: i) a explosão demográfica da população albanesa, consequência de sua supracitada taxa de natalidade elevada; ii) e o êxodo da população eslava

⁵² Com a capitulação do Reino da Iugoslávia, em 1941, e a fuga do governo para o exílio, o território albanês foi dividido entre os membros do Eixo e Estados aliados. Entre eles estavam o Estado Albanês, sob tutela italiana. O Kosovo estava entre os territórios à ele cedidos.

⁵³ Albaneses compunham 64,9% da população kosovar em 1956. Contudo, mas representavam 13,3% das forças de segurança e 31,3% das forças policiais na província no mesmo ano (RAMET, 2006, p. 294).

que saia do Kosovo em busca de melhores oportunidades. Os quadros 3 e 4 apontam em detalhes as variações na composição demográfica na província do Kosovo:

Quadro 3 – Evolução demográfica no Kosovo, conforme diferenças étnicas e nacionais (1948-1981).

Kosovo							
Nacionalidade		1948	1953	1961	1971	1981	1991
Montenegrinos	Total	28.050	31.343	37.588	31.555	27.028	20.045
	Percentual	3,85%	3,88%	3,90%	2,54%	1,71%	1,03%
Sérvios	Total	171.911	189.869	227.016	228.264	209.498	195.301
	Percentual	23,62%	23,49%	23,55%	18,35%	13,22%	9,99%
Albaneses	Total	498.242	524.559	646.605	916.168	1.226.736	1.607.690
	Percentual	68,46%	64,91%	67,08%	73,67%	77,42%	82,25%
Total		727.820	808.141	963.988	1.243.693	1.584.441	1.954.747

Fontes: YUGOSLAVIA (1991); REPUBLIC OF SERBIA (2013). Nossa compilação.

Quadro 4 – Variação percentual da composição demográfica no Kosovo (1948-1991).⁵⁴

Kosovo						
Entre os anos	1953/1948	1961/1953	1971/1961	1981/1971	1991/1981	1991/1948
Montenegrinos	11,7%	19,9%	-16,1%	-14,3%	-25,8%	-28,5%
Sérvios	10,4%	19,6%	0,5%	-8,2%	-6,8%	13,6%
Albaneses	5,3%	23,3%	41,7%	33,9%	31,1%	222,7%
Total	11,0%	19,3%	29,0%	27,4%	23,4%	168,6%

Fontes: YUGOSLAVIA (1991); REPUBLIC OF SERBIA (2013). Nossa compilação.

Conforme apontam os quadros, o número total e percentual de Albaneses aumentou acima da média provincial entre 1948 e 1991. Entre esses anos, a taxa de crescimento populacional na província foi 168,6%, enquanto entre a população albanesa essa taxa foi de 222,7% (cf. quadro 4). Este aumento também se refletiu no percentual populacional, em que os albaneses passaram a representar 82,25% da população kosovar, em 1991, contra 68,46%, em 1948 (cf. quadro 3).⁵⁵ Esses números podem ser explicados não apenas pelo crescimento da população albanesa em si, mas também pela variação demográfica dos eslavos kosovares (considerando apenas Sérvios e Montenegrinos). Observando o caso sérvio, entre 1948 e 1991, seu crescimento populacional foi abaixo (13,6%) da média kosovar (168,6%). Somado à isso,

⁵⁴ O quadro 4 indica a variação na composição demográfica da província. Ela pode ser positiva, indicando o crescimento populacional, ou negativa, indicando decréscimo populacional. À exemplo o caso montenegrino: entre 1948 e 1991, sua população no Kosovo decresceu 28,5%. Isso implica que haviam 8.005 menos montenegrinos no Kosovo em 1991 quando em comparação com 1948 (cf. quadro 3)

⁵⁵ Em números totais, esta população passou de 727.820 pessoas, em 1948, para 1,6 milhão, em 1991 (cf. quadro 3)

teve-se o decréscimo da população eslava, iniciado durante década de 1960, em que 6.033 montenegrinos deixaram a província (cf. quadro 4). Esse processo foi agravado durante as décadas de 1970 e 1980, no qual sérvios kosovares também começaram a migrar: apenas entre os anos de 1971 e 1981, sua população decresceu 8,2% – estimando-se que aproximadamente 18.766 sérvios étnicos tenham abandonado a província. No mesmo período, 4.527 montenegrinos deixaram o Kosovo, representando um decréscimo populacional de 14,3%.

As revoltas da década de 1980 e o agravamento da crise econômica mantiveram a tendência: durante este período, estima-se que 6.983 montenegrinos e 14.197 sérvios tenham migrado.⁵⁶ A maioria dessa população retornou à Servia central, onde foram recebidos com alarmismo pela mídia local. Autores como Ramet (2006, p. 305) e Anthony Oberschall (2000, pp. 8-11) apontam a importância da mídia para, no primeiro momento, criar histórias de perseguição da população eslava no Kosovo. Elaborou-se, então, um discurso amplamente difundido de atrocidades albanesas para com sérvios e montenegrinos. Mesmo que o êxodo também fosse resultado das precárias condições econômicas da região, esses fatores foram esquecidos em detrimento de um discurso de vitimização sérvia (cf. OBERSCHALL, 2000, pp. 8-11 RAMET, 2006, p. 305). As violências albanesas figuraram, então, como o principal motivo para a imigração em massa eslava, o que foi essencial para o renascimento do nacionalismo sérvio durante a década que se seguiu.

3.2 O “despertar” nacionalista na Sérvia: a securitização da identidade étnico-nacional.

Os relatos de barbárie no Kosovo, somados ao descontentamento com a constituição de 1974 e às crises dos anos 1980 tiveram forte impacto político na Sérvia, retomando o nacionalismo como um discurso legítimo. Conforme aponta Ramet (2006, p. 320), o discurso nacionalista marcou uma profunda mudança na perspectiva sérvia frente à política iugoslava, com as décadas anteriores sendo reinterpretadas como anos de privação e repressão. O marco deste despertar pode ser traçado ao Memorando da Academia Sérvia de Ciências e Artes (SANU)⁵⁷ que, vazado em 1986, foi posteriormente apropriado por políticos sérvios, entre eles Milosevic.

⁵⁶ Como consequência, a população montenegrina, durante a década de 1980, decresceu 25,8% e a sérvia 6,8%. Em contraposição, a população albanesa cresceu 31,1% no mesmo período (cf. quadro 4). Em termos percentuais, albaneses passaram a representar 82,25% da população em 1991, em oposição aos 77,42% da década anterior (acrécimo de 4 pontos percentuais).

⁵⁷ Optou-se por adotar sigla original, em servo-croata, Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, uma vez que ela é amplamente utilizada na bibliografia secundária.

No cerne do discurso estava o argumento de que os sérvios foram vítimas de uma política deliberadamente discriminatória durante os anos comunistas, resultando em atraso econômico e ameaças à segurança de sua população (SANU, 1995 [1986]). Entre os riscos levantados estavam a suposta discriminação da população sérvia na Croácia e o risco de genocídio dos sérvios kosovares, que seria perpetrado por seus concidadãos albaneses (SANU, 1995 [1986], pp. 129-130). A solução proposta pelos intelectuais era, portanto, o fortalecimento das respectivas estruturas nacionais (república sérvia) e federais como melhor estratégia para a defesa de seus interesses (SANU, 1995 [1986], p. 140). Essa proposta culminou no slogan “Sérvia Fortalecida, Iugoslávia fortalecida”, amplamente usada por Milosevic e seus apoiadores em comícios e demonstrações nos anos 1980 (RAMET, 2006, p. 347). Em oposição estaria a política de “Sérvia fraca, Iugoslávia fortalecida” supostamente praticada durante os anos comunistas (SANU, 1995 [1986], p. 120-122). Sua finalidade seria obedecer aos interesses nacionais de Croácia e Eslovênia, representados nas figuras de Tito e Kardelj, respectivamente.⁵⁸

Oberschall (2000, p. 989; 2006, pp. 14-15) nomeou o discurso nacionalista sérvio como um “*frame de crise*”. Trabalhando igualmente com conceito de *frame* de Snow et al (1986), Oberschall (2000, p. 989) definiu-o como “(...) uma estrutura mental que situa e conecta eventos, pessoas e grupos em uma narrativa carregada de significado na qual o mundo social ganha sentido e pode ser comunicado e compartilhado entre indivíduos”. O *frame de crise* derivaria seu sentido de experiências negativas compartilhadas, sendo utilizado na dissolução da Iugoslávia com uma finalidade específica: como estratégia para o convencimento de uma população nacional acerca da necessidade da adoção de medidas extraordinárias, as quais não seriam adotadas na política tradicional. Portanto, o *frame de crise* de Oberschall (2000; 2006) e o *Security Framing* de Carvalho Pinto (2012) equivalem-se estruturalmente e serão utilizados na análise do discurso nacionalista sérvio.

3.2.1 Atores estratégicos: os agentes securitizadores

Entre as características da estrutura do *security framing* está o emissor da mensagem, nomeado *agente securitizador*. Responsável por “*falar segurança*”, é ele quem realiza o

⁵⁸ O discurso nacionalista sérvio, assim como o Memorando (SANU, 1995 [1986]) é marcado por “esquecimentos” e reinterpretções convenientes. No caso do Memorando (SANU, 1995 [1986]), foi omitida a figura de Rankovic, liderança sérvia que teve primazia política durante as primeiras duas décadas da Iugoslávia comunista – inclusive controlando a polícia secreta iugoslava, um forte poder repressor.

movimento securitizador, delineando, por meio do ato de fala, o objeto de referência e a ameaça existencial (cf. BUZAN et al, 1997; CARVALHO PINTO, 2014). Em casos em que a identidade é o princípio organizacional deste movimento, o ator securitizador geralmente apresenta-se como o porta voz legítimo das causas comunitárias (cf. BUZAN et al, 1997; WAEVER, 2008). No caso iugoslavo, este papel foi realizado por lideranças políticas sérvias e sérvio-bósnias, auxiliados por proeminentes intelectuais. Afinal, “(...) líderes manipulam as divisões e tensões, e estão dispostos a arriscarem a eclosão de violência coletiva se isto servir seus propósitos. *Não há link inevitável* entre [identidade] étnica, racial, nacional e religiosa e *violência coletiva*” (OBERSHALL, 2006, p. 7, nossa tradução).

Neste contexto, Slobodan Milosevic foi o líder político mais relevante, tendo ocupado os cargos de presidente da República Sérvia entre 1989 e 1997 e presidente da República Federal da Iugoslávia⁵⁹ de 1997 a 2000. Seu discurso político foi ao encontro das solicitações feitas pela Academia Sérvia de Ciências e Artes (1995 [1986]).⁶⁰ Afinal, como estratégia política, ele adotou o discurso “Sérvia fortalecida, Iugoslávia fortalecida” com a finalidade de ascender e influenciar o poder central (cf. DJILAS, 1993; RAMET, 2006, p. 342). Milosevic incorporou o “político sérvio proativo” solicitado pelo Memorando (1995 [1986]), tornando em política suas reivindicações, tal qual a revisão constitucional para reverter a independência das províncias autônomas na Sérvia.

O discurso de Milosevic foi marcado essencialmente pela instrumentalização do discurso do supranacionalismo iugoslavo, no qual a defesa do Estado federal tinha como propósito garantir sua prevalência sobre a unidade territorial e o controle do governo central (cf. PAVKOVIC, 1998; PAVKOVIC, 2003; TOAL; MAKSIC, 2013). Essa defesa do “supranacionalismo” reservava, portanto, uma finalidade política implícita: o discurso adotado era uma estratégia para garantir a hegemonia sérvia e, mais importante, a hegemonia política de Milosevic no governo federal. Seus planos deram parcialmente certo e, em março de 1989, políticos alinhados a Belgrado passaram a ocupar os cargos de lideranças provinciais e da república montenegrina, concedendo-lhe controle sobre quatro votos na presidência coletiva (cf. RAMET, 2006, pp. 350-354). Milosevic também adotou uma retórica democrática e

⁵⁹ A República Federal da Iugoslávia substituiu a República Socialista Federativa da Iugoslávia em 1992. Em 2003, é renomeada para Sérvia e Montenegro. Finalmente, em 2006 é desmembrada, dando origem a dois estados independentes.

⁶⁰ Milosevic, à época do vazamento do Memorando, em 1986, era membro da burocracia da Liga Comunista e ainda não havia despontado como proeminente político da causa sérvia. Sua reação, portanto, seguiu as principais lideranças partidárias, criticando e condenando-o. Somente no ano seguinte, em abril de 1987, é que Milosevic adotou a retórica de defesa da sérvia e dos sérvios como estratégia política (cf. DJILAS, 1993, p. 86-87; PAVKOVIC, 2003, p. 255; RAMET, 2006, pp. 342- 343)

pacifista com a finalidade de legitimar-se politicamente frente ao Ocidente e, em especial, aos Estados Unidos. Contudo, uma análise acurada de suas ações contestam suas declarações políticas – apontando-o como principal financiador do nacionalismo nas repúblicas e províncias onde tinha interesses políticos (cf. RAMET, 2006, pp. 345-355). Ainda mais relevante, outras lideranças na política iugoslava assumiram o papel de radicalização do discurso nacional, optando pela xenofobia e chauvinismo, o que permitiu a Milosevic um discurso menos agressivo e mais “legalista”.

Entre as principais lideranças que assumiram esse papel estão o nacionalista Vojislav Seselj e os servo-bósnios Radovan Karadzic e Biljana Plavsic. Seselj foi líder do Partido Radical Sérvio (PRS) e de milícias paramilitares que atuaram nos conflitos da Croácia e Bósnia-Herzegovina. Assim como outras lideranças que ganharam destaque no final dos anos 1980, Seselj já havia sido preso por conta de suas posições nacionalistas. O sérvio tornou-se réu em 1985 por “(...) produzir um mapa nacionalista no qual a Sérvia era retratada com fronteiras ampliadas (sobretudo, às custas da Bósnia).” (RAMET, 2006, p. 321, nossa tradução). Oberschall (2006) analisou seus discursos e encontrou em sua base o nacionalismo exacerbado e a defesa retórica da “Grande Sérvia”. Por meio deste discurso, Seselj não apenas advogava pela expansão territorial da república, mas também seu direito à dominação e subjugação dos demais povos da região, eslavos ou não, por não considerá-los nacionalmente equivalentes (OBERSCHALL, 2006, p. 34-36).⁶¹

Por fim, na Bósnia-Herzegovina, o papel de defensor da “nação sérvia” ficou sob a responsabilidade do Partido Democrático Sérvio (PDS), hegemônico na República Srpska durante a Guerra Civil Bósnia (1992-1995). Sob a liderança de Radovan Karadzic e Biljana Plavsic, o partido e seus líderes foram os responsáveis pelas principais atrocidades na Bósnia-Herzegovina, sob a alcunha da defesa da nação sérvia e seu direito à autodeterminação (cf. KARADZIC, 1991; TOAL, MASICK, 2013). Em seu auge, as forças servo-bósnias chegaram a ocupar 76% do território bósnio e perpetraram agressões como o cerco de Sarajevo (1992-1995) e o massacre de Srebrenica (1995).

Embora fossem por excelência os agentes securitizadores, as lideranças políticas também contaram com suporte de outras instituições para propagar e consolidar seu discurso,

⁶¹ Seselj considerava a Sérvia a única “nação histórica” nos Balcãs, o que justificaria seu domínio sobre seus vizinhos (OBERSCHALL, 2006, pp. 34-36).

como organizações de intelectuais (a exemplo da SANU)⁶², grupos extremistas e paramilitares⁶³ e a mídia local (cf. OBERSCHALL, 2006, p. 7). Também contaram com a complacência da Igreja Ortodoxa, a qual beneficiou da sua posição privilegiada de defensora da nação e da preservação da tradição sérvia que tinha adquirido durante os anos comunistas. O papel dessas instituições era o de “vilificar e desumanizar seus adversários, espalhar boatos e mentiras, ampliar ameaças e providenciar justificção moral para agressão e violência contra adversários étnicos” (OBERSCHALL, 2006, p. 7). O papel da mídia, da Igreja e de grupos de intelectuais era, portanto, o de difundir o discurso securitizador na sociedade que seria canalizado por grupos extremistas e justificaria atrocidades durante os conflitos que se seguiram. Eles atuaram, portanto, como mediadores entre os atores securitizadores e a audiência, aumentando a divulgação e a ressonância da mensagem, facilitando sua aceitabilidade.

A segmentação da mídia por república,⁶⁴ demonstrada por Ramet (2002, pp.40-42), atuou neste sentido: a alta correlação encontrada pela autora entre nacionalidade e preferência de mídia permitiu a segmentação do mercado e da mensagem propagada, tornando-se um meio eficaz para a difusão do nacionalismo. Alguns dos periódicos de maior circulação entre membros da nacionalidade sérvia⁶⁵ eram o *Vecernje novosti*, *Politika ekspres* e *Politika* – alinhados ao discurso oficial de Belgrado (RAMET, 2002, p. 41). Conforme a autora, “[s]em o papel ativo da imprensa, o movimento nacionalista sérvio poderia não ter criado a raiva e ressentimento os quais, com o tempo, iriam levar os sérvios a combater seus vizinhos iugoslavos” (RAMET, 2002, p. 41, nossa tradução). Michal Janicko (2015, p. 32), em análise recente sobre a mídia na Bósnia-Herzegovina, demonstrou que essa tendência permanece: a preferência da mídia segue divisões étnicas e nacionais, nas quais se difundem mensagens alinhadas a interesses particulares das lideranças políticas.

⁶² A Academia Sérvia de Ciências e Artes foi, durante as décadas de 1980 e 1990, um importante espaço para o desenvolvimento e propagação do nacionalismo sérvio. À exemplo do Memorando, divulgado em 1986. Outra instituição intelectual que propagou o pensamento nacionalista foi a Associação de Escritores Sérvios. Seu periódico, o *Literary Gazette of Belgrade*, difundiu não apenas textos mas também as caricaturas de Milenko Mihajlovic, de alto teor nacionalista e, especialmente, que enfatizava a mensagem de vitimização do povo sérvio. (cf. BANAC, 1992; SELLS, 1997, p. 35)

⁶³ Entre as principais milícias atuantes estavam os *Tigres de Arkan*, sob a liderança de Zeljko Raznatovic “Arkan” e os *Águias Brancas* ou Movimento Chetnik Sérvio, sob liderança de Vojislav Seselj.

⁶⁴ De acordo com a autora, “havia uma correlação entre república de residência e preferência por jornais e revistas” (RAMET, 2002, p. 40, nossa tradução). A mídia, tal qual outros elementos da cultura iugoslava, passou a refletir preocupações do discurso oficial de sua república ou região de origem em detrimento do supranacionalismo iugoslavo. Dentre os jornais e revista de maior circulação na Iugoslávia em 1990, cinco eram sérvios, sete croatas, três eslovenos, dois bósnios, dois macedônios, dois da Voivodina e um montenegrino (cf. RAMET, 2002, p. 42).

⁶⁵ Inclusive na Bósnia Herzegovina, onde a preferência midiática seguida divisões étnicas: bósnio-muçulmanos liam a imprensa local, enquanto bósnio-croatas e servo-bósnios davam preferência à mídia de Zagreb e Belgrado, respectivamente (RAMET, 2002, p. 40).

Conforme Ramet (2002), as tensões étnicas também impregnaram a cultura popular iugoslava, com importantes autores e músicos tornando-se propagadores do discurso nacionalista. Em um estudo acerca do Rock iugoslavo, Ramet (2002, pp. 127-149) apontou como o ritmo evoluiu durante a ascensão e queda do regime comunista, impregnado de conteúdo político e refletindo as características de seu cenário contemporâneo. Inicialmente supranacional, com odes à Revolução e à liderança de Tito, os anos 1980 viram o rock tornar-se localista, optando pelo folclórico e pela exaltação nacional em suas músicas. O público almejado passara a ser a república em detrimento da federação, ecoando mensagens de apelo e abrangência limitada. O cenário musical e cultural como um todo refletiu essa tendência: com a eclosão das paixões nacionais, cada vez mais valorizou-se o local e o folclórico em detrimento do supranacional (cf. RAMET, 2002).

A Igreja Ortodoxa Sérvia também teve um importante papel na difusão do discurso nacionalista. Afinal, a religião foi um fator importante no conflito uma vez que o marcador étnico-nacional entre os povos eslavos do sul era caracterizado prioritariamente por sua atribuição religiosa, ainda que o secularismo prevalecesse na sociedade iugoslava sob os anos comunistas (SELLS, 2003, p. 309). O que definia vítimas e agressores era a identidade religiosa afiliada a cada grupo nacional: era a fé ortodoxa que diferenciava a *identidade sérvia*, supostamente sob ameaça de acordo com o discurso securitizador adotado (sendo, portanto, o seu *objeto de referência*). Neste sentido, Radmila Radic e Milan Vukomanovic (2003, p. 181, nossa tradução) enfatizaram essa importância da religião ortodoxa uma vez que “(...) identidade étnica e herança foram nutridas pela Igreja, incluindo (...) a história nacional, a escrita cirílica, e rituais e valores tradicionais. A ortodoxia era importante para a singularidade sérvia, sua homogeneização e identidade que os distinguiu de outras comunidades religiosas e nacionais”.

Deste modo, a religião organizada retornou à esfera pública, influenciando o debate político (RADIC; VUKOMANOVIC, 2003 p. 180). Afinal, a década de 1980 foi um período de crise político-institucional do Estado iugoslavo e de fragilidade econômica que, conjuntamente às narrativas de perseguição de sérvios no Kosovo, enfraqueceu o discurso comunista hegemônico (RADIC; VUKOMANOVIC, 2003, p. 180). Com o discurso de vitimização do povo sérvio e o papel atribuído ao clero na preservação da identidade e seus interesses nacionais, a ascensão do nacionalismo foi concomitante ao crescimento na importância da religião como ferramenta de legitimidade política.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Os anos 1980 foram marcados por um processo de queda nos índices de secularização da sociedade iugoslava, no geral, e da sérvia, em específico (RADIC; VUKOMANOVIC, 2014, pp. 180-182)

Como consequência, lideranças ortodoxas ganharam papel de destaque e passaram a ser cortejados por políticos interessados em seu apoio. Entre eles estava Milosevic, que utilizou a simbologia religiosa como estratégia em seu processo de ascensão e consolidação política, embora sua aliança com o clero tenha tido curta duração (cf. SELLS, 1997, p. 35, 2001, p. 181). Fenômeno semelhante ocorreu nas demais nações iugoslavas, uma vez que as instituições religiosas estavam tradicionalmente atreladas à defesa de valores particularistas. Esse processo de redescobrimto religioso na Iugoslávia foi, portanto, marcado pela retomada de sectarismos, agravando tensões étnico-nacionais em despertar nos anos 1980. Bispos, padres e imãs tiveram papel ativo no processo de instrumentalização política do discurso religioso, emprestando sua legitimidade para políticos e projetos nacionalistas e excludentes (cf. RADIC; VUKOMANOVIC, p. 192).

Lideranças sérvias atuaram, portanto, como agentes estratégicos que securitizaram a identidade sérvia como o seu *objeto de referência*, apresentando-a sob ameaça. Para tanto, eles também tiveram apoio de outros atores para difundir sua mensagem, como a mídia, a cultura popular e a religião. Para compreender outros elementos constituintes do *security framing* faz-se necessário estudar o *discurso securitizador* adotado.

3.2.2 Análise de Conteúdo: o discurso securitizador sérvio.

Conforme coloca Oberschall (2006, pp. 6-7), a incapacidade de a estrutura comunista solucionar problemas de natureza política e socioeconômica levou ao acirramento nas disputas inter-republicanas. À exceção da Bósnia-Herzegovina⁶⁷, tais repúblicas geralmente organizavam-se ao redor dos interesses de sua nação majoritária, o que gerou competição entre as nacionalidades iugoslavas, cujo marcador era predominantemente religioso. A competição, contudo, só virou ameaça quando foi securitizada por seus respectivos atores, que no caso foram as lideranças nacionais. Esse processo aconteceu por meio de um *discurso*, ou *ato de fala*, em que o *objeto referencial* (a nacionalidade sérvia) foi apresentado sob uma *ameaça existencial*.

Analisando o discurso de Seselj, Oberschall (2006) chegou a categorizações do discurso nacionalista que podem ser ampliadas e aplicadas aos discursos de outras lideranças de origem sérvia, tais como Milosevic e o Memorando da SANU (1995 [1986]). A justificativa central do

⁶⁷ A BiH não tinha uma nação predominante. Em 1991, às vésperas da Guerra que assolou o país, 43,5% da população era de eslavos muçulmanos, 31,2% de sérvios e 17,4% de croatas (BÓSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1991).

discurso estaria na alegada vitimização do povo sérvio, sob ataque de inimigos internos⁶⁸ e externos⁶⁹ (*ameaça existencial*). O propósito destes ataques seria enfraquecer e subordinar o povo sérvio a interesses alheios a ele (MILOSEVIC, 1991a, 1992b, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1992e, 1992f, 1993c, 1993j, 1993l; OBERSCHALL, 2006, p. 22; SANU, 1995 [1986]). Falsificação histórica e distorção da realidade foram alguns dos mecanismos usados para legitimar o discurso de perseguição e vitimização sérvia. Finalmente, a violência empregada nos conflitos era justificada como meramente defensiva e reativa (ou seja, como *medida extraordinária* – fora da política comum). O quadro 5 apresenta a consolidação do movimento securitizador quando aplicado ao caso iugoslavo, com ênfase no nacionalismo sérvio:

Quadro 5. Aplicação do *Security Framing* no conflito da Bósnia-Herzegovina

Ator Securitizador:	Lideranças sérvias e servo-bósnias
Objeto de Referência:	Nação sérvia
Audiência:	População etnicamente sérvia
Ameaça Existencial:	Bósnios-croatas e Bósnios-muçulmanos
Discurso:	Ameaça de violência contra sérvios étnicos na Bósnia-Herzegovina
Medida Extraordinária:	Violência preventiva para proteger a população servo-bósnia

A análise do conteúdo dos discursos de Milosevic melhor exemplifica estes pontos. O conflito nos países vizinhos seria uma guerra civil⁷⁰, sem lados “bons” ou “ruins”, “vítimas” ou “agressores” – muito embora a disparidade nos números de vítimas conteste essa afirmação. O uso do termo “Guerra Civil” também era intencional, uma vez que negava o caráter de agressão militar perpetrado contra nações soberanas e independentes. Ao escolher o termo, Milosevic omitia seu apoio financeiro e logístico às forças sérvias, militares ou paramilitares (cf. RAMET, 2006, pp. 414-415).⁷¹ Os sérvios étnicos, neste discurso, estariam apenas se defendendo de violências que constantemente sofreram e ainda sofriam (MILOSEVIC, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c,

⁶⁸ Entre os discursos analisados, doze fazem referência à inimigos internos: entre eles estavam outras repúblicas iugoslavas (Eslovênia, Croácia, Bósnia-Herzegovina), políticos e membros de outra nacionalidade e políticos sérvios, acusados de agirem contra os interesses do povo sérvio (MILOSEVIC, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1992d, 1992e, 1993b, 1993c, 1993j).

⁶⁹ Entre os discursos analisados, doze fazem referência à inimigos ou interferência externa na política iugoslava com a finalidade de subjugar politicamente a Sérvia (MILOSEVIC, 1990, 1991a, 1991c, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1992e, 1992f, 1993a, 1993b, 1993h, 1993j).

⁷⁰ Foram encontrados doze textos que fazem referência ao termo Guerra Civil ou termos análogos (MILOSEVIC 1991a, 1991b, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1992d, 1992e, 1993a, 1993c, 1993d, 1993e, 1993j)

⁷¹ Durante os anos de conflito, Milosevic restringe o apoio sérvio à ajuda humanitária. Contudo, em entrevista à Fox News, em 1998, Milosevic reconhece o fornecimento de armamentos para forças servo-bósnias, justificando seu uso defensivo em uma guerra civil.

1992a, 1992c, 1992e, 1993b, 1993j)⁷². E, especialmente, estariam exercendo seu direito à autodeterminação – uma vez que opunham-se à independência de suas repúblicas da Federação Iugoslava (MILOSEVIC, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1992a, 1992b, 1992e, 1993c, 1993g, 1993i). Afinal, por meio de “plebiscitos ilegais”, as populações servo-croata e servo-bósnia não tiveram respeitado seu desejo de manterem-se unificados ao povo sérvio (MILOSEVIC, 1991a, 1993c).⁷³

Milosevic não abandonou a retórica supranacionalista. Ao contrário, no cerne de seu discurso estava uma versão do iugoslavismo adaptado às suas necessidades.⁷⁴ Conforme estabelece Aleksandar Pavkovic (1998), Milosevic inicialmente adotou o iugoslavismo integralista, no qual o fortalecimento da federação iugoslava coincidiria com os interesses nacionais sérvios. Nesta visão, originária do Memorando (SANU, 1995 [1986]), a centralização política seria um meio para a unificação da nação sérvia, então dividida em diferentes territórios (República Sérvia, Croácia, Bósnia-Herzegovina, Voivodina e Kosovo). Afinal, justificaram, as fronteiras republicanas teriam sido desenhadas no pós Segunda Guerra Mundial com o propósito de desunir e enfraquecer os sérvios, uma vez que eram considerados, erroneamente, um povo opressor (SANU, 1995 [1986], p. 120).

A ascensão de Milosevic ao poder foi marcada pelo expurgo da elite partidária sérvia contrária a ideais nacionalistas,⁷⁵ uma vez que suas pretensões passaram a ser revisionistas. Ademais, suas políticas centralizadoras foram recebidas com receio pelas outras repúblicas, especialmente pela Eslovênia e Croácia, desejosas de manter a autonomia política e econômica adquiridas nos anos comunistas (PAVKOVIC, 1998). O acirramento nesse conflito (“centralização vs. descentralização”) foi o que, levado aos extremos, causou a fragmentação iugoslava. É inegável que a intransigência política de ambos os lados levou a esse resultado – agravado pela ausência da figura mediadora de Tito (ou outro político legitimamente reconhecido como tal). Contudo, foram nacionalistas sérvios quem iniciaram as agressões nas

⁷² Há ao menos três referências à perpetração de genocídio contra a população sérvia (MILOSEVIC, 1991c, 1992e, 1993j)

⁷³ “Nós estamos vivendo no Estado Iugoslavo. É um país, uma terra. É o único sujeito internacionalmente reconhecido. Nós não estamos nos opondo ao direito de autodeterminação do povo Croata. Se eles desejam estabelecer seu próprio Estado nação independente, nós não temos razão para nos opormos à isso. Contudo, se eles desejam sair da Iugoslávia, eles não podem levar um pedaço do povo sérvio com eles. Esse direito de autodeterminação pertence aos Sérvios também. Eu creio que isso é muito lógico.” (MILOSEVIC, 1992b, nossa tradução)

⁷⁴ Especialmente nos discursos iniciais, há referências ao supranacionalismo nos discursos de Milosevic (1987, 1989, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1992a, 1992c, 1992e)

⁷⁵ Inclusive seu mentor político, Ivan Stambolic, teve sua carreira política interrompida em 1987 (TRAYNOR, 2003).

repúblicas secessionistas, fomentados por Milosevic e outras importantes figuras públicas (RAMET, 2006).

Uma vez iniciados os conflitos, Milosevic (1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1992a) pôde acusar Eslovênia e Croácia de desestabilizarem propositalmente a política iugoslava e assim como colocar-se como o último defensor do multinacionalismo no governo federal. A responsabilidade pela destruição do Estado iugoslavo foi, portanto, imputado a seus inimigos políticos. A Milosevic, coube o papel de defensor do princípio titoista de “fraternidade e unidade”. Essa retórica foi constantemente observada em seus discursos, geralmente utilizado para justificar as agressões de sérvios étnicos nas repúblicas em guerra (1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1992a, 1992d, 1992e). Em uma entrevista à *Sky Television*, Milosevic (1991b, nossa tradução nossa) argumenta que “[t]udo na Iugoslávia começou quando nacionalistas na Croácia e Eslovênia chegaram ao poder, resultando na secessão. Todo o resto se seguiu”. Em outra entrevista, para a TV Belgrado, Milosevic reiterou seu ponto:

Não somente a Sérvia apoiou uma política de paz, mas eu também espero que seja evidente que a Sérvia nunca apoiou a dissolução da Iugoslávia, que a Sérvia lutou para sua preservação e que, quando a crise começou, nós mesmos dissemos e salientamos que os sérvios e a Sérvia nunca lutou uma guerra de agressão, que sempre lutaram guerras defensivas e que eles sempre saberão se defender, algo que, no final, eles já demonstraram.

(MILOSEVIC, 1991a, nossa tradução).

Segundo Milosevic (1992a), o pacifismo sérvio seria comprovado pelo fato de que os conflitos ocorriam fora de suas fronteiras, no território das repúblicas separatistas. Não seria portanto, uma guerra de agressão, mas sim a comprovação da teoria de guerra civil, em que sérvios habitantes das respectivas regiões só haviam pegado em armas para autodefesa. Esse argumento mostra-se falho: em primeiro lugar, pois, muito embora não houvesse forças militares do exército nacional iugoslavo (JNA)⁷⁶ em território bósnio, conforme alegou Milosevic (1992c; 1993a), isso se deu por uma manobra política. O líder sérvio desmembrou o exército iugoslavo, permitindo a transferência dos soldados servo-bósnios ao exército da República Srpska, sob liderança do General Ratko Mladic (RAMET, 2006, p. 429). O mesmo ocorreu com o controle do armamento iugoslavo armazenado em território bósnio: ele passou às mãos dos agressores servo-bósnios, causando um desequilíbrio entre as forças em guerra. A segunda questão corresponde à própria geografia dos conflitos: eles foram mais intensos onde

⁷⁶ Sigla para *Jugoslavenska narodna armija*. Optou-se por adotar sigla no original, em servo-croata, uma vez que ela é amplamente utilizada na bibliografia secundária.

havia uma significativa população sérvia. Como consequência, as repúblicas separatistas como Eslovênia⁷⁷ e Macedônia⁷⁸ não foram impactadas tal qual Croácia e Bósnia.⁷⁹

A defesa à autodeterminação, neste contexto, tinha como propósito defender o irredentismo sérvio em territórios pertencentes à Croácia e Bósnia-Herzegovina, colocando-a sobre um prisma legalista. Assim, justificar-se-iam as pretensões de revisionismo das fronteiras inter-republicanas, populares entre as lideranças sérvias com a desintegração iugoslava (PAVKOVIC, 1998, p. 514).⁸⁰ Em contraposição a Milosevic, o nacionalista Seselj foi mais enfático quando advogou (e atuou) pela expansão das fronteiras sérvias. No programa de seu partido, PRS, essas pretensões territoriais estão delineadas em seu artigo primeiro:

1. A restauração de um Estado Sérvio livre, independente e democrático nos Balcãs, que englobe integralmente a nação sérvia, todas as terras sérvias, o que significa que dentro de suas fronteiras ele deve conter, em adição ao atual território da unidade federal sérvia, o território sérvio da Macedônia, de Montenegro, da Bósnia, da Herzegovina, de Dubrovnik, da Dalmácia, da Lika, de Kordun, de Banija, da Eslovênia e da Baranja (PARTIDO RADICAL SÉRVIO. Comitê Diretivo, 1997 [1991] p. 104, nossa tradução).

Essa diferença retórica tinha uma finalidade: Milosevic era, acima de tudo, um oportunista político interessado na manutenção de seu próprio poder. Ele utilizou o nacionalismo sérvio como instrumento de ascensão política. Conforme coloca Slobodan Inic (1997, p. 94), Milosevic nunca se pronunciou abertamente ou buscou identificar-se com movimentos nacionalistas sérvios, autoproclamados *Chetniks*. Afinal, Milosevic vendia-se como um Iugoslavista – defensor do unitarismo dos povos eslavos do sul, centralizados em um estado federal forte. Contudo, suas políticas, quando convenientes, promoviam e refletiam

⁷⁷ A guerra na Eslovênia durou 9 dias e, de acordo com Ramet (2006, p. 393), foi liderada pelo JNA e não por Milosevic.

⁷⁸ À independência da Macedônia não se seguiu um conflito, muito embora nacionalistas como Seselj defendessem que os macedônios eram uma nação artificialmente criada pelos comunistas e que o território era, por direito, Sérvio.

⁷⁹ A comunidade sérvia representava apenas 2% das populações eslovenas e macedônias. De acordo com o Censo realizado em 1991, haviam apenas 47.911 sérvios na Eslovênia. Já na Macedônia, o censo de 1994 aponta que haviam 40.228 sérvios vivendo na república.

⁸⁰ “É um fato indisputável que o direito à autodeterminação em um Estado multinacional não pode ser territorialmente limitado às fronteiras administrativas existentes. As fronteiras entre as repúblicas iugoslavas nunca foram fronteiras estatais. É bem reconhecido que elas foram desenhadas arbitrariamente no passado sem critério objetivo – isto é, desconsiderando a composição étnica da população, as consequências do genocídio sofrido pelo povo sérvio ou as normas do direito internacional. Deste modo, o direito à autodeterminação não pode ser restrito a população majoritária em uma república multinacional. (...) O povo sérvio, no geral, deseja permanecer na Iugoslávia e tem o direito de advogar a realização desse objetivo legítimo. (...) A questão das fronteiras não é um problema para o povo que defende a Iugoslávia. É um problema que deve ser confrontado por aqueles que desejam sair da Iugoslávia. É apenas lógico, e também justo, que aqueles que trouxeram o problema sejam os responsáveis por resolvê-lo, considerando o fato de que a solução não pode ser encontrada em detrimento de outros e pode ser encontrada no princípio do respeito ao desejo dos povos e seu direito à autodeterminação” (MILOSEVIC, 1991a, nossa tradução).

interesses compartilhados com aqueles grupos. Quando uma destas políticas, o expansionismo, deixou de ser viável, a partir do ano de 1993, Milosevic passou a pressionar seus antigos aliados a comprometerem-se com acordos de paz.⁸¹ Entre eles, estava Seselj. De acordo com a revista *The Economist* (2016, nossa tradução), “[p]ara Slobodan Milosevic (...), Seselj era um instrumento político útil”, uma vez que pode aproveitar-se dos votos que ele atraía entre extremistas de direita, culpando-o posteriormente pela violência na Croácia e Bósnia-Herzegovina cometida por forças sérvias. Milosevic e Seselj foram, portanto, duas figuras complementares na política nacionalista sérvia no início dos anos 1990: Seselj adotou abertamente a “chamada às armas”, optando pela retórica chauvinista e violenta do nacionalismo. Em contraposição, Milosevic adotou uma tonalidade neutra e legalista, geralmente justificando atrocidades sérvias como necessárias e reativas.

3.2.3 Ameaça existencial: bósnios-muçulmanos e bósnios croatas.

Entre os elementos constitutivos de um processo de securitização está a *ameaça existencial*, ou aquilo que é apresentado como um risco à sobrevivência do objeto referencial. No contexto da desintegração da Iugoslávia, a identidade étnico-nacional foi sua principal característica: bósnio-muçulmanos e bósnios-croatas foram identificados como a *ameaça existencial* à identidade sérvia.

O processo de construção de ameaça advindo dos muçulmanos foi muito mais tênue do que o caso contra croatas – afinal, faltava um sentimento prévio de hostilidade entre as partes.

⁸² Apesar de haver muçulmanos que se aliaram aos *ustashe* durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, a maioria da população não se engajou no conflito e foi igualmente vítima das violências perpetradas (BOUGAREL, 2003, p. 102). Ademais, durante os anos comunistas, o principal foco de tensão política era entre as repúblicas sérvia e croata/eslovena. Nestes casos, a república

⁸¹ O ano de 1993 marcou um revés na política de Milosevic. Confrontando com questões domésticas, como uma crise econômica que minava seu apoio político, o presidente sérvio viu-se obrigado a negociar uma solução na Bósnia-Herzegovina (cf. THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1995; RAMET, 2006, p. 441). Contudo, as paixões nacionalistas que havia despertado em sua ascensão política saíram de seu controle e a proposta de divisão territorial do Plano Vance-Owen não foi aceita por lideranças servo-bósnias (cf. THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1995; RAMET, 2006, p. 441). Esse impasse impediu a retirada das sanções econômicas impostas à Sérvia, que ameaçavam sua recuperação econômica. Foram riscos efetivos ao seu poder político que motivaram Milosevic sentar-se à mesa com reais intenções de negociação. Essa mudança reflete em seus discursos, no qual diminuem referências à vitimização do povo sérvio por parte de inimigos internos e aumentando referências positivas às negociações de paz (Milosevic 1993c, 1993d, 1993e, 1993f, 1993g, 1993h, 1993i, 1993j, 1993k, 1993l).

⁸² Os bósnio-croatas foram associados aos *ustashe* e, especialmente, à reemergência do nacionalismo na república croata, incorporado na figura de Franjo Tuđman. O conflito na Croácia apenas acentuou o sentimento de vitimização sérvia, legitimando suas preocupações.

bósnia geralmente se aliava às pretensões centralistas de Belgrado. De acordo com Sells (1997, p. 37), as justificativas para as agressões perpetradas eram então centradas no caráter de guerra civil do conflito; na acusação de que os bósnios seriam radicalistas islâmicos;⁸³ e, também, na associação entre muçulmanos eslavos e o Império Otomano, responsável pela derrota do Reino Medieval Sérvio e seu domínio por séculos.

Novamente, mídia, lideranças intelectuais e políticas ajudaram a disseminar falsas informações e criar justificativas para o conflito. De acordo com Oberschall (2006, p. 41), o controle de sérvios e servo-bósnios sobre a mídia estatal permitiu a disseminação de informações equivocadas ou falsificadas, com a fabricação de atrocidades supostamente cometidas por membros de outra etnia. Acadêmicos sérvios também auxiliaram na promoção de preconceitos sobre a população muçulmana, validando teorias como a de que eles desejariam ser mártires de uma ideologia totalitária (SELLS, 1997, p. 39).⁸⁴ Biljana Plavsic (*apud* SELLS, 2001, p. 189), política servo-bósnia e professora universitária, defendia que, apesar de originalmente sérvios, eslavos que adotaram o Islã o fizeram por conta de um “gene defeituoso” que se concentrara ao longo de gerações, afetando sua forma de agir e pensar. Seu discurso, claramente eugênico, tinha como propósito desumanizar eslavos muçulmanos, facilitando a violência a eles dirigida. Também foram apropriados por nacionalistas sérvios os controversos trabalhos da historiadora egípcia Bat Ye’Or (SELLS, 2001, p. 194). Para a historiadora (*apud* SELLS, 2001, p. 194), a violência e o parasitismo seriam características da civilização islâmica, cujo propósito final era a aniquilação das comunidades não-islâmicas que a acolhiam. Para aqueles que propagaram esse discurso, a violência preventiva passava a ser justificável uma vez que a nação sérvia estaria sob ameaça frente a um inimigo que a desejava aniquilar, mesmo que não houvessem hostilidades prévias entre as populações servo-bósnias e bósnio-muçulmanas que justificassem a alegação.

⁸³ A figura do presidente bósnio era recorrentemente atacada por nacionalistas sérvios, afinal, ele havia sido preso anteriormente, acusado de radicalismo islâmico. Sua última prisão havia sido em 1980 por conta da publicação seu livro, *Islamic Declaration*, no qual lideranças comunistas haviam o acusado de promover um Estado muçulmano na Bósnia-Herzegovina (BOUGAREL, 2003, p. 109). Nacionalistas sérvios aproveitaram para republicar seu livro e incrementar as acusações, alegando que ele desejaria estabelecer um estado fundamentalista islâmico na região (SELLS, 1997, p. 38). As forças muçulmanas foram associadas a estereótipos orientais como “o roubo de mulheres para compor haréns” (SELLS, 1997, p. 38) Nos discursos de Seselj, Oberschall (2006, p. 17, nossa tradução) encontrou referências que reforçavam tais estereótipos, nos quais “(...) os muçulmanos seriam guerreiros da jihad, criminosos, assassinos, Ustashe islâmicos, mujahedin, terroristas e extremistas (...)”. Novamente cabia aos sérvios a defesa de suas casas e sua família frente às violências de seus vizinhos (SELLS, 1997, p. 37; OBERSCHALL, 2006, p. 17).

⁸⁴ Um estudante da universidade de Belgrado, em entrevista à Oberschall (2006, p. 17, nossa tradução) relembra ter ouvido de um famoso autor sérvio em uma palestra que “A Sérvia [inha] três inimigos: capitalismo transnacional, o Islã e o Vaticano. Seu objetivo [era] substituir a população da Iugoslávia com muçulmanos de países árabes”

O processo de securitização da identidade prévio ao conflito passou pela satisfação dos elementos constitutivos da teoria de securitização: lideranças sérvias e servo-bósnias (*agente securitizador*), por meio de um *discurso*, estabeleceram uma percepção de ameaça existencial contra a identidade sérvia (*objeto de referência*). Essa mensagem de vitimização era direcionado à própria *nação sérvia* (*audiência*). Seu motivo era induzi-la a agir preventivamente contra a ameaça detectada ou, no mínimo, permitir que determinados grupos (militares ou paramilitares) agissem em seu nome – muitas vezes contra aqueles que foram, um dia, seus próprios vizinhos. Somente com o aval de uma parcela significativa do povo sérvio, ou ao menos a conivência de sua maioria, é que os ações de limpeza étnica puderam ser perpetradas. Para tanto, propõe-se analisar como foi possível que o discurso securitizador se transformasse em frame dominante, utilizando os critérios de Credibilidade e Saliência, tal qual proposto por Benford e Snow (2000).

4. A ACEITABILIDADE DO DISCURSO SECURITIZADO NA IUGOSLÁVIA

O processo de securitização, *per se*, não é suficiente para garantir o sucesso de uma política, tal qual proposta por seu *agente securitizador*. Afinal, um tema só move no espectro de securitização quando é devidamente reconhecido como preocupação legítima por sua audiência, justificando, assim, a adoção de medidas extremas (BUZAN et al, 1997; PEOPLES; VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, 2010). Como coloca Peoples e Vaughan-Williams (2010, p. 78, nossa tradução), nem toda tentativa de securitização é bem sucedida, afinal “(...) há sempre um ator e uma audiência. Para que a securitização funcione, a audiência deve aceitar a ameaça como verossímil”.

Neste contexto, a teoria de Buzan et al (1997) prevê critérios que necessitam ser satisfeitos para que o discurso securitizador seja aceito, conhecidos como *felicity conditions*. A teoria de securitização, contudo, coloca demasiada ênfase no processo de securitização *per si*, relegando as preferências de sua audiência para segundo plano. Reconhece-se sua importância, mas sem estudá-la em detalhe. Para tanto, o conceito de *ressonância* (BENFORD; SNOW; 2000), adaptado da sociologia por Carvalho Pinto (2014, p. 165), mostra-se mais completo na tentativa de compreender as preferências e aceitabilidade da audiência. Ampliam-se, assim, as *felicity conditions* da Escola de Copenhague.

Afinal, o conceito de ressonância liga-se à noção de *frame*. Deste modo, seu objetivo central é providenciar sentido a acontecimentos e a uma determinada realidade social, organizando-a e conectando-a a ideias pré-existentes de sua audiência (OBERSCHALL, 2006, p. 12). Para tanto, é necessário que o frame utilize as crenças e significados existentes, ligando-os aos valores culturais, lealdades políticas, eventos históricos e, inclusive, aos preconceitos de sua audiência (BENFORD, SNOW; 2000, p. 614; OBERSCHALL, 2006, p. 12). Ao fazê-lo, aumenta-se sua receptividade.

O conceito de *Ressonância*, tal qual proposto por Benford e Snow (2000), divide-se em seis critérios, divididos em duas dimensões: credibilidade e saliência da mensagem. Conforme previamente abordado, a dimensão credibilidade tem como propósito medir o grau de *confiança* inspirado por um *frame* (CARVALHO PINTO, 2012, cap. 1). Enquanto a dimensão saliência mede o grau de *importância* que a dada audiência atribuiu ao discurso proferido (CARVALHO PINTO, 2012, cap. 1). Um discurso terá maior aceitabilidade quanto melhor satisfizer tais critérios – aumentando, conseqüentemente, as chances de sucesso do processo de securitização.

No caso em questão, o sucesso da securitização de uma ameaça potencial à identidade sérvia passou pela preferência e aceitabilidade de sua audiência. Seu sucesso e,

consequentemente, a adoção de medidas extremas (i.e. a violência preventiva) passaram impreterivelmente pela satisfação dos critérios de ressonância, trabalhados a seguir.

4.1 Dimensão Credibilidade.

4.1.1. Critério: Consistência da mensagem.

O critério de consistência é definido como coerência interna da mensagem. Conforme coloca Oberschall (2006, p. 12), “[a] mensagem em si tem que ser crível” para ser aceita, sendo inteligível para sua respectiva audiência. Conforme colocam Benford e Snow (2000, p. 620), uma mensagem terá maior consistência quanto menor forem suas contradições internas – tanto entre crenças, afirmações e ações. Para Peoples e Vaughan-Williams (2010, p. 79), a lógica interna de um discurso securitizador deve ser avaliado pelo correto uso de seus componentes: no qual “uma ameaça existencial é apresentado como tentativa de legitimar o uso de medidas extraordinárias para combater aquela ameaça”.

No caso em questão, o discurso adotado por lideranças sérvias e servo-bósnias (*agente securitizador*) era o de que bósnios-croatas e bósnios-muçulmanos correspondiam a uma *ameaça* aos servo-bósnios (*objeto de referência*). Seu propósito era legitimar o uso da violência preventiva como *medida extraordinária* de defesa frente à ameaça. O discurso, portanto, tinha coerência interna, sendo inteligível para sua respectiva audiência (a nação sérvia).

4.1.2 Critério: Credibilidade Empírica.

O critério de credibilidade empírica é definido por Carvalho Pinto (2014, p. 166) como a “conexão com problemas pré-existentis tais quais percebidos pela audiência”. Em outras palavras, a credibilidade empírica tem como propósito medir *a adequação entre discurso e percepção de mundo da audiência*. Procurou-se, então, identificar elementos que ligavam o discurso securitizador em questão com percepções de problemas pela população sérvia.

Dentre os elementos identificados está a prevalência da identidade étnico-nacional à identidade supranacional iugoslava durante o regime comunista.⁸⁵ Afinal, conforme

⁸⁵ A prevalência das identidades nacionais também corresponde à fidelidade narrativa, uma vez que “(...) ressoa com narrativas culturais, isto é, com as histórias, mitos e contos folclóricos que são parte significativa da herança cultural de um povo (...)” (SNOW; BENFORD, 1988, p. 210). Contudo, a forma como essa identidade se liga à problemas percebidos pela audiência corresponde à credibilidade empírica.

previamente debatido, o conceito de unidade defendido por Kardelj sobrepôs-se ao iugoslavismo de Tito. Para Kardelj (apud PAVKOVIC, 2003, pp. 252-253), esse conceito de unidade referia-se ao desejo de diferentes grupos nacionais em conviverem juntos em um Estado comunista sem, contudo, se identificarem com uma identidade nacional ou supranacional comum. Os interesses e as necessidades comuns manteriam as repúblicas unificadas ao invés de similaridades étnicas ou culturais entre seus povos componentes (JOVIC, 2003, p. 169). Dessa forma, o conceito de Iugoslávia enquanto um Estado para a nação eslava do sul não foi bem sucedido.

Em consequência, observou-se a reprodução de interesses e identidades nacionais. Esse fenômeno foi possível durante os anos comunistas por meio de políticas descentralizadoras e voltadas à satisfação local em detrimento da federação, consolidando lealdades particularistas. Conforme coloca Ramet (2006, p. 323), “[o] nacionalismo foi produzido dentro da própria estrutura do sistema [socialista] iugoslavo.” A organização federal em repúblicas foi primordial, uma vez que permitiu que interesses republicanos se mesclassem com os interesses de seu grupo majoritário (DENICH, 1993). Estado e nação confundiram-se.

O desejo de Tito de que, a longo prazo, as diferenças nacionais entre os povos desaparecessem, convergindo em uma única identidade Iugoslava supranacional, foi frustrada, tanto pela própria instituição política iugoslava, quanto pela resiliência das identidades particularistas (cf. JOVIC, 2003, p. 171). O quadro 6 mostra a evolução da autodeclaração nacional ao longo das cinco décadas da federação iugoslava. Muito embora houvesse a opção “Iugoslavo” nos censos entre 1953 e 1991, sua adesão variou conforme o contexto político. Essa variação tem diversas fontes de explicação. A alta taxa de autodeclarados iugoslavos em 1953 pode ser atribuída à inexistência de uma categoria específica para muçulmanos que, especialmente na Bósnia, optaram por essa opção em detrimento à “sérvios” ou “croatas”. Em contrapartida, em censos posteriores, aqueles que se autodefiniam como iugoslavos não ultrapassou 2% da população total (1,71% em 1961 e 1,33% em 1971). A baixa adesão à identidade federal nestes anos pode ser explicada por dois fatores: a inclusão da opção “muçulmano” no censo de 1961, o qual dividiu a lealdade dos bósnios-muçulmanos; e, especialmente no censo de 1971, a prevalência de fidelidades locais que, com a descentralização do poder político para as Repúblicas, acentuou o sentimento nacionalista.

Em contrapartida, o expurgo das lideranças liberais nas repúblicas em 1974 e a supressão do discurso provinciano, somados ao bom desempenho econômico iugoslavo na década, contribuíram com a ascensão no número de iugoslavos no censo de 1981. Embora a adesão fosse percentualmente baixa (apenas 5,76% da população), a variação de indivíduos

autodeclarados iugoslavos entre 1971 e 1981 foi substancial (372,77%) - acima da média de crescimento populacional no mesmo período, de apenas 9,28%. Conforme argumenta Florian Bieber (2015, pp. 9-10) três fatores também explicam esta alta: a transição de uma economia agrária para uma economia urbana, no qual residentes de centros urbanos identificar-se-iam mais com o supranacionalismo iugoslavo frente ao localismo provincial característico das comunidades rurais; a filiação à Liga dos Comunistas Iugoslava; e descendentes de casamentos mistos, que optavam pela identidade federal. Finalmente, outro fator pode ter contribuído para a elevada taxa de autodeclaração iugoslava em 1981: o forte sentimento supranacionalista que eclodiu na federação durante os meses de coma de Tito e após sua morte, em maio de 1980, apenas um ano antes da realização do censo (cf. RAMET, 2006, pp. 328-330).

Quadro 6. Evolução do princípio étnico nacional na Federação iugoslava (1948-1991).

Nacionalidade		1948 ⁸⁶	1953 ⁸⁷	1961	1971	1981	1991 ⁸⁸
Monte-Negrinhos	Total	425.703	466.093	513.832	508.843	579.043	534.628
	Percentual	2,70%	2,75%	2,77%	2,48%	2,58%	2,28%
Croatas	Total	3.784.353	3.975.550	4.293.809	4.526.782	4.428.043	4.666.883
	Percentual	23,99%	23,47%	23,15%	22,06%	19,74%	19,88%
Mace-Dônios	Total	810.126	893.247	1.045.516	1.194.784	1.341.598	1.355.113
	Percentual	5,14%	5,27%	5,64%	5,82%	5,98%	5,77%
Muçul-Manos	Total	808.921	0	972.960	1.729.932	1.999.890	2.307.386
	Percentual	5,13%	0,00%	5,25%	8,43%	8,92%	9,83%
Eslo-Vênos	Total	1.415.432	1.487.100	1.589.211	1.678.032	1.753.571	1.758.544
	Percentual	8,97%	8,78%	8,57%	8,18%	7,82%	7,49%
Sérvios	Total	6.547.117	7.065.923	7.806.152	8.143.246	8.140.507	8.521.502
	Percentual	41,51%	41,72%	42,08%	39,68%	36,30%	36,29%
Alba-Nesses	Total	750.431	754.245	914.733	1.309.523	1.730.878	2.184.306
	Percentual	4,76%	4,45%	4,93%	6,38%	7,72%	9,30%
Iugos-Lávós	Total	0	998.698	317.102	273.077	1.291.024	704.623
	Percentual	0,00%	5,90%	1,71%	1,33%	5,76%	3,00%
Total		15.772.098	16.936.573	18.549.291	20.522.972	22.427.585	23.479.958

Fontes: YUGOSLAVIA (1991); BÓSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (1991); CROATIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS (2011); REPUBLIC OF SERBIA (2013); REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (2014); REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA (2017); RAMET (2006, p. 288) Compilação nossa.

⁸⁶ No censo de 1948, muçulmanos não eram reconhecidos enquanto grupo étnico-nacional – apenas religião. A opção dada era, portanto, “muçulmanos etnicamente não declarados”.

⁸⁷ No censo de 1953, não houve a opção “muçulmano”. Portanto, estima-se que grande parte dos autodeclarados “iugoslavos” eram muçulmanos – especialmente da Bósnia-Herzegovina. Somente a partir dos censos de 1961 e 1971 que muçulmanos passam a ser reconhecidos como uma etnia a parte.

⁸⁸ Valores aproximados. Valor obtido por meio da soma dos resultados individuais. Os valores da República da Macedônia foram obtidos pelo censo de 1994, mais completo que o censo de 1991 – que foi interrompido no meio da medição.

Em contrapartida, o censo de 1991 foi marcado por uma queda vertiginosa no número de iugoslavos: 45% menos indivíduos assim se declararam quando em comparação ao censo anterior. Na última pesquisa antes de sua fragmentação, apenas 3% da população total se identificou com a federação em detrimento de uma nacionalidade local. Uma série de eventos sucessivos podem explicar a queda no número de iugoslavos autodeclarados, dentre as quais estão o colapso da LCI, ocorrido em janeiro de 1990;⁸⁹ e a ascensão de Slobodan Milosevic. Conforme propõe Bieber (2015, p. 10), o líder sérvio capturou o projeto iugoslavo, ou ao menos sua retórica, contribuindo para o declínio de popularidade do discurso supranacionalista a nível federal. Somou-se à crise política um período de agravamento na economia nacional, com a acentuação nas disparidades regionais.

Esse processo de enfraquecimento da identidade supranacional iugoslava e o fortalecimento de sectarismos nacionais pode ser compreendido como credibilidade empírica. Neste cenário, a oscilação no percentual de indivíduos autoidentificados como iugoslavos demonstra a conexão entre percepção de mundo e a aceitabilidade do discurso nacionalista por uma dada audiência. O censo de 1981, realizado em um contexto de desenvolvimento econômico e solidariedade étnica, apresentou crescimento exponencial quando comparado a seu predecessor, em 1971. Em contrapartida, as mudanças no contexto político durante a década tiveram como consequência a reificação das identidades nacionais, evidenciada no censo de 1991. Entre as repúblicas nas quais a queda no número de autodeclarados iugoslavos foram mais acentuadas estavam Croácia (72% menos pessoas declararam-se iugoslavas quando comparado ao censo de 1981),⁹⁰ Eslovênia (queda de 53,1%), Sérvia Central (menos 46,4%) e Bósnia-Herzegovina (com queda de 25,6%), protagonistas do processo de dissolução iugoslavo (YUGOSLAVIA, 1991; BÓSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1991; CROATIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2011; REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, 2013; REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA, 2017).

Contudo, é importante salientar que apenas a autodeclaração étnica-nacional não implica diretamente em intolerância entre as partes. Conforme demonstram Randy Hodson, Dusko Sekulic e Garth Massey (1994, p. 1547-1548)⁹¹, o nível de tolerância nas repúblicas iugoslavas do pré-guerra era proporcional à sua diversidade nacional: Bósnia-Herzegovina e Voivodina, os dois entes federais com menor homogeneidade étnico-nacional, demonstraram

⁸⁹ O colapso da Liga dos Comunistas ocorre quando a delegação eslovena decide abandonar as discussões do Décimo-quarto congresso do Partido Comunista.

⁹⁰ O crescimento de indivíduos autodeclarados croatas em 1991 cresceu 8,15% quando em comparação ao censo de 1981. O crescimento de autodeclarados sérvios no mesmo período foi de 9,44%. Ambos cresceram acima da média populacional, que ficou 3,97% (YUGOSLAVIA, 1991; CROATIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2011).

⁹¹ Os autores usaram dados de pesquisas conduzidas pelo “Consórcio do Instituto de pesquisa social da Iugoslávia”, entre os anos 1989 e 1990.

níveis de tolerância mais elevados. As exceções eram Kosovo e Macedônia, que apresentaram os menores níveis de tolerância da federação, embora não fossem os mais homogêneos. Uma explicação possível para o desvio nas respectivas entidades federais é a existência de tensões políticas, acentuando rivalidades entre suas etnias componentes. Aqui destaca-se a presença da identidade albanesa, majoritária no Kosovo e minoritária na Albânia (a qual representava 22,7% da população macedônia) (cf. HODSON; SEKULIC; MASSEY, 1994, p. 1550). Conforme previamente abordado, o início dos anos 1980 foi marcado por revoltas e insatisfação da população albanesa kosovar, o que levou a uma forte reação da opinião pública sérvia. A década foi caracterizada, portanto, pelo processo de intensificação na rivalidade pelo controle e hegemonia na província. Como resultado, observou-se o reaparecimento do nacionalismo sérvio e, especialmente, o fortalecimento da figura de Milosevic. Não é à toa, portanto, que os níveis de intolerância fossem elevados no Kosovo ao final da década de 1980, afinal o período coincide com sua submissão a Belgrado e ao estímulo para a rivalidade étnica. Este processo teria reverberado na vizinha Macedônia, no qual também viviam irredentistas albaneses, impactando seu grau de tolerância (cf. RAMET, 2006. pp. 317-319). A intolerância étnica, deste modo, está ligada à percepção de problemas pré-existentes pela audiência: é a competição política interna às entidades federais as quais organizaram-se em torno da identidade étnico-nacional que constituem credibilidade empírica.

Hodson, Sekulic e Massey (1994, p. 1549-1550) apontam também para o impacto negativo que mídia e religião exerciam, em igual medida, no grau de tolerância entre diferentes nacionalidades, sendo fatores inversamente proporcionais: quanto maior o acesso a notícias e a religiosidade, menor era o grau de tolerância de um indivíduo.⁹² Esses dados corroboram o argumento de que mídia e clero atuaram como propagadores do discurso securitizador, aumentando a fricção entre os grupos étnico-nacionais.

4.1.3 Critério: Credibilidade do Articulador.

O processo de securitização passa, indubitavelmente, pelo ator securitizador. Contudo, para que ele seja bem sucedido, o articulador da mensagem precisa ser reconhecido como legítimo pela audiência que pretende mobilizar (BENFORD; SNOW, 2000, pp. 620-621;

⁹² Um achado relevante é que, no caso iugoslavo, idade tinha um impacto positivo na tolerância, em que pessoas mais velhas eram mais tolerantes do que as mais novas (HODSON; SEKULIC; MASSEY; 1994, p. 1548-1549; 1953). A linha de conclusão que chegamos é coerente: indivíduos mais velhos compartilharam o desejo de unificação iugoslava, enquanto os mais jovens vivenciaram os períodos de competição inter-étnica, tendo impacto no grau de tolerância.

CARVALHO PINTO, 2014, p. 166). No caso em questão, como previamente abordado, os atores securitizadores foram figuras políticas sérvias e servo-bósnias, ajudadas por intelectuais (SANU) e a membros do clero da Igreja Ortodoxa sérvia. Destacaram-se os políticos sérvios Slobodan Milosevic e Vojislav Seselj; e os servo-bósnios Radovan Karadzic e Biljana Plavsic.

Conforme argumenta Oberschall, (2006, p. 12), prestígio, poder e status são características de um ator securitizador considerado “qualificado” por sua respectiva audiência. No presente caso, a credibilidade dos atores foi medida por sua capacidade de mobilizar a audiência, em especial por meio dos resultados de eleições durante o conflito e em anos imediatamente precedentes.

O ator central do processo de securitização da identidade sérvia foi Slobodan Milosevic. Após uma ascensão acelerada dentro da burocracia partidária sérvia, ajudada especialmente por seu padrinho político Ivan Stambolic, Milosevic optou pelo nacionalismo sérvio como ferramenta política para perpetuar-se no poder (cf. DJILAS, 1993; RAMET, 2006, pp. 341-348). Seu sucesso enquanto ator legítimo é comprovado quando se observa sua carreira em cargos eletivos. Afinal, Milosevic manteve-se interruptamente no poder entre os anos 1989 e 2000 por meio do voto popular.⁹³

Sua primeira vitória eleitoral foi em novembro de 1989, a qual o confirmou como (último) presidente da República Socialista da Sérvia, cargo que ocupava desde maio de 1989. Novas eleições presidenciais, realizadas em dezembro de 1992, mantiveram-no no poder, reelegendo-o como presidente sérvio⁹⁴ com 56,32% dos votos (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 500). As eleições de 1992 são relevantes pois ocorreram durante o processo de desintegração da Iugoslávia comunista, meses após o armistício da Croácia e em plena guerra civil na BiH. Nem mesmo os pífios resultados econômicos dos anos antecessores foram então capazes de derrubar a popularidade de Milosevic, muito embora já existisse então oposição política organizada contra o presidente sérvio (cf. RAMET, 2006, pp. 499-500). Finalmente, Milosevic assumiu o cargo de presidente da República Federal Iugoslava após sua terceira vitória eleitoral, em julho de 1997, mesmo sob forte oposição montenegrina. Somente nas eleições de setembro de 2000 é que Milosevic foi derrotado, obtendo 35,01% dos votos, de acordo com monitoramento

⁹³ Ramet (2006) e Oberschall (2006) reportam que métodos não democráticos foram utilizados durante as campanhas presidenciais de Milosevic, como o controle e uso da mídia em favor próprio. Ademais, também há indícios de irregularidades no processo eleitoral. Um exemplo foi o atraso na validação de candidaturas potencialmente prejudiciais, caso de seu opositor nas eleições de 1992, Milan Panic. Como consequência desse atraso da validação de sua candidatura, Panic teve menos tempo para realizar sua campanha eleitoral.

⁹⁴ Entre sua primeira (1989) e segunda eleição (1992), foi proclamada a República Federal da Iugoslava, em abril de 1992, composta por duas entidades federativas: a República da Sérvia e a República de Montenegro. Milosevic foi eleito o (primeiro) presidente da República Sérvia em dezembro de 1992.

realizado pela oposição (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 521). A força de Milosevic na política sérvia não foi observável somente na disputa por cargos, mas igualmente nas eleições legislativas: seu partido, Partido Socialista da Sérvia (PSS), e aliados obtiveram maioria parlamentar ao longo das eleições da década de 1990 (cf. GOATI, 2001).

Entre partidos aliados que se beneficiaram da proximidade com Slobodan Milosevic estava o Partido Radical Sérvio (PRS) de Seselj. Nas eleições legislativas de Dezembro de 1992, o partido conquistou 1,07 milhão de votos, obtendo 73 das cadeiras disponíveis, uma delas ocupada pelo próprio Seselj (cf. OBERSCHALL, 2006, p. 44; RAMET, 2006, p. 500). Durante o biênio de 1992/1993, o PRS foi partido político com segunda maior representação no legislativo. Contudo, novas eleições parlamentares e a ruptura com Milosevic em 1993, implicaram na derrocada no número de votos recebidos e, conseqüentemente, de representantes eleitos. Conforme apontou Yves Tomic (2008, p. 96), essa situação foi apenas temporária, com o PRS recobrando sua popularidade nas eleições legislativas seguintes, em 1997. Com 1,16 milhão de votos, o partido conquistou 82 cadeiras, retomando sua posição como a segunda maior força política na Sérvia dos anos 1990. Simultaneamente, Vojislav Seselj chegou ao segundo turno das eleições presidenciais, no qual foi derrotado pelo candidato de Milosevic, Milan Milutinović (TOMIC, 2008, p. 96).⁹⁵

Já entre servo-bósnios, destaca-se Radovan Karadzic, fundador e presidente do Partido Democrata Sérvio (PDS) às vésperas das primeiras eleições multipartidárias na Bósnia. De acordo com Gerard Toal e Adis Maksića (2013, p. 267), o partido, explicitamente étnico-nacionalista, tinha como propósito unificar a população sérvia na Bósnia-Herzegovina. O sucesso não só de Karadzic mas também de seu partido foram comprovados já nas eleições de novembro e dezembro de 1990, em que se elegeram os membros para a presidência coletiva da Bósnia e também para o legislativo da república.⁹⁶ Mesmo com o curto tempo de campanha, apenas cinco meses, o PDS de Karadzic conseguiu uma vitória expressiva entre os sérvios, conquistando os dois assentos da presidência coletiva destinados à etnia, que ficaram com Biljana Plavsic e Nikola Koljević (cf. TOAL; MAKSIĆA, 2013; pp. 267-268). Já no legislativo, dos 240 assentos disputados, somadas ambas as câmaras, o PDS obteve 72. Tornou-se, então,

⁹⁵ Vojislav Seselj permanece ainda hoje um político popular na Sérvia, assumindo um assento legislativo em Junho de 2016.

⁹⁶ Estavam em disputa nas eleições de 1990 as sete cadeiras da presidência coletiva bósnia, composta por dois membros de cada etnia majoritária (muçulmanos, sérvios e croatas) mais um membro independente, eleito em competição livre entre os partidos. O legislativo era dividido em duas câmaras: Câmara dos cidadãos e Câmara das Municipalidades.

a segunda maior força política na Bósnia, atrás somente do Partido da Ação Democrática (PAD), etnicamente associado à população bósnio-muçulmana majoritária.

A maior vitória de Karadzic, contudo, veio nos anos seguintes, nos quais o escalonamento de ações nacionalistas levou à declaração de um Estado Sérvio independente em território bósnio (cf. TOAL; MAKSICA, 2013, p. 279). A República Srpska foi declarada em janeiro de 1992, antecedendo a secessão bósnia da federação iugoslava. Radovan Karadzic foi eleito, então, o primeiro presidente da República Srpska, ocupando o cargo entre 1992 e 1996, período que cobriu toda a guerra na Bósnia-Herzegovina, mantendo-se incontestado neste quadriênio. Mesmo com o fim de sua presidência e um mandato internacional de prisão por crimes como Genocídio, sua popularidade entre servo-bósnios permitiu-lhe viver durante 13 anos na Bósnia-Herzegovina, sem risco real de ser entregue às autoridades internacionais (BORGER, 2016).

Por fim, Biljana Plavsic, acadêmica transformada em política, foi outra importante liderança servo-bósnia durante os anos de guerra. Plavsic, professora de biologia na universidade de Sarajevo, foi uma das responsáveis por difundir a teoria de que os eslavos muçulmanos eram, em realidade, sérvios degenerados, justificando assim o seu massacre (SELLS, 1998, p. 189).⁹⁷ Sua credibilidade enquanto articuladora pôde ser atestada nos dois cargos eletivos ao qual concorreu e ganhou. O primeiro deles foi em 1990, no qual foi a candidata sérvia mais votada para um assento na presidência coletiva bósnia, conquistando 22,16% dos votos de seus constituintes. Com o fim da guerra, decidido por meio dos acordos de Dayton (1995), Plavsic foi escolhida por Karadzic como sucessora, concorrendo e ganhando o cargo de presidência da República Srpska, cargo que ocupou entre 1996-1998 (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 484). Contudo, a popularidade e legitimidade de Plavsic não foi suficiente para garantir sua reeleição, em 1998. Sua derrota foi creditada especialmente à sua ruptura com Karadzic no ano precedente, a qual a levou a mudar de partido – e que demonstrou que, mesmo oficialmente fora da política e “foragido”, Karadzic ainda era o principal político servo-bósnio.

As eleições sérvias e servo-bósnias não se limitam a comprovar a legitimidade dos articuladores políticos do discurso de securitização. Elas também são bons indicadores da centralidade que a questão étnica ocupou durante os anos de dissolução da Iugoslávia, conforme abordado a seguir.

⁹⁷ Apesar de ter-se declarado arrependida, Biljana Plavsic foi próxima do líder paramilitar Zeljko Raznjatovic, conhecido como Arkan. Seselj (*apud* INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 2005, pp. 43371-43373), em depoimento para o ICTY, em 2005, descreve-a como uma líder extremista, defendendo posições controversas até mesmo “para ele, um nacionalista sérvio”.

4.2 Dimensão Saliência.

4.2.1 Critério: Centralidade.

O critério de centralidade é definido como a relevância atribuída às questões articuladas pelos atores securitizadores. A centralidade é medida, portanto, pelo nível que um assunto atinge na escala hierárquica de prioridades, definidas pela pretendida audiência (CARVALHO PINTO, 2014, p. 166). Para David Snow e Robert Benford (1988, p. 205), centralidade pode ser mensurado pela quantidade de constituintes ou participantes que um movimento engaja. Neste caso, a centralidade do *frame* é atestada pela manifestação da vontade popular, tanto por meio das eleições diretas dos anos 1990, que se organizaram em torno de questões e partidos étnico-nacionais, quanto como por meio de manifestações ocorridas nos anos 1980 (especialmente na chamada “revolução anti-burocrática”) e; finalmente, por pesquisas de opinião conduzidas na virada da década de 1980/1990.

O processo que recolocou o discurso étnico no centro do debate iugoslavo data ao início da década de 1980, com o escalonamento das tensões da província kosovar. Uma das primeiras manifestações acerca de sua centralidade foi a realização de um abaixo-assinado no qual sérvios e montenegrinos não só demonstravam solidariedade aos seus conterrâneos, mas também reivindicavam uma revisão constitucional, em 1986 (cf. RAMET, 2006; SELLS, 1997, p. 33). O propósito era submeter o Kosovo novamente à autoridade de Belgrado e subjugar o nacionalismo albanês ascendente. A questão tornou-se tão proeminente durante os anos 1980 que foi impossível que lideranças sérvias escapassem totalmente a este debate, muito embora não ultrapassassem o campo retórico, de “necessidade de revisão constitucional”, sem tomar ações factíveis (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 331).

Outro fenômeno pré-Milosevic que demonstrou a centralidade das questões étnicas na Sérvia foi o funeral de Rankovic em 1983 que atraiu pelo menos 100 mil pessoas (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 343). Proeminente comunista sérvio, sua política centralista desagradou às repúblicas mais liberais, como Eslovênia e Croácia. Como consequência, ele foi expulso do partido em 1966, com a ascensão de tendências descentralizadoras na política iugoslava. Contudo, no auge das crises (kosovar, política-institucional e econômica), a figura de Rankovic foi resgatada e, especialmente, reinterpretada, colocando-o como “protetor da nação sérvia”, em detrimento das figuras de Tito (croata) e Kardelj (esloveno), que supostamente desejariam enfraquecer a Sérvia em favor de seus projetos políticos e suas nações (cf. SANU, 1995 [1986]).

Slobodan Milosevic só tomou conhecimento do potencial mobilizador do nacionalismo sérvio em abril de 1987 quando, em viagem à Pristina, capital do Kosovo, observou o confronto entre policiais e manifestantes sérvios e montenegrinos. A partir de então, não só se transformou em campeão da causa sérvia, mas também utilizou o sentimento para atingir propósitos pessoais, especialmente sua ascensão e manutenção política (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 343). Desse modo, ele passou a utilizar o apoio popular como ferramenta para promover suas ambições, transformando-se, como coloca Beth Denich (1993, p. 53), em um político de massas. O ápice dessa política foi entre os anos 1987 e 1989, no qual comícios e manifestações ocorreram em diferentes cidades iugoslavas. Composta majoritariamente por sérvios, seu propósito inicial era o de reivindicar reformas constitucionais, revertendo as prerrogativas adquiridas por suas províncias autônomas (cf. DENICH, 1993, p. 54). Contudo, dadas as proporções que atingiram, elas ficaram conhecidas como “Revoluções anti-burocráticas”, indo além de suas propostas iniciais. Entre suas consequências estava não somente o fortalecimento de Milosevic enquanto liderança, mas também a submissão política das províncias e de Montenegro.

Sob o comando do “Comitê para a proteção do Sérvios e Montenegrinos Kosovares”, os protestos eram organizados por aliados de Milosevic. Contudo, a capacidade de mobilização que atraíram foi relevante, especialmente por seu impacto político: até a primavera de 1989, o comitê já havia organizado quase 100 protestos, os quais atraíram, somados, um total de 5 milhões de pessoas (cf. RAMET, 2006, pp. 350-354). Entre maio de 1988 e janeiro de 1989, a pressão política exercida por estes protestos removeu lideranças na Voivodina, Kosovo e Montenegro, substituindo-os por políticos alinhados aos interesses de Belgrado.

A expressiva comoção popular derivada dos protestos demonstra não somente a credibilidade de Milosevic enquanto ator político, mas também a centralidade de temas como revisão constitucional e, especialmente, *do nacionalismo sérvio*. Afinal, entre as pautas dos protestos estavam não apenas o medo de violência étnica, especialmente no Kosovo, mas também o desejo de fortalecimento da República Sérvia frente ao que consideravam agressões sofridas durante os anos comunistas (cf. SANU, 1995 [1986]). De acordo com Ramet (2006, p. 351), entre os slogans proferidos nessas manifestações estavam lemas nacionalistas como “Vida longa à Servia – morte aos Albaneses” ou “Montenegro é Sérvia”.

A análise de pesquisas de opinião igualmente demonstra como preocupações étnico-nacionais consolidaram-se como temas centrais na política iugoslava. Especialmente, demonstra como essa centralidade variou entre o final da década de 1980 e o início dos anos 1990, quando políticas e discursos nacionalistas tornaram-se proeminentes. Comparando duas pesquisas, uma na Bósnia pré-guerra (1989) e outra no pós guerra (1996), Sam Whitt (2013, p.

397) mapeou mudanças significativas na opinião de cada grupo étnico. Questões que anteriormente não eram proeminentes no debate bósnio tornaram-se centrais com o advento da guerra, tais como se cada nação deveria ter um Estado próprio. À exceção de bósnios muçulmanos, a média de indivíduos que concordavam com a frase aumentou, elevando a média de 26% em 1989 para 68% em 1996.⁹⁸ O mesmo pode ser dito com relação à percepção de (in)segurança étnica. Em todos os grupos bósnios, o nível de desconfiança relativamente a outros grupos nacionais aumentou: a média de indivíduos que concordavam com a afirmação de que um só estava seguro pertencesse à nação majoritária passou de 14% em 1989 para 81% em 1996, conforme demonstra o quadro 7.

Quadro 7. Avaliação do dano à tolerância étnica feito pelo conflito na Bósnia-Herzegovina nos anos de 1989 e 1996:

	Bósnio-muçulmanos		Bósnio-croatas		Servo-bósnios		Média ⁹⁹	
	1989	1996	1989	1996	1989	1996	1989	1996
<i>As pessoas só se sentem seguras quando pertencem a nação majoritária de seu país.</i>								
Concorda	11%	55%	17%	93%	13%	96%	14%	81%
Discorda	82%	39%	76%	7%	81%	3%	80%	16%
<i>Cada nação deveria ter seu próprio Estado</i>								
Concorda	6%	17%	14%	88%	5%	98%	8%	68%
Discorda	88%	80%	80%	11%	88%	1%	85%	31%
<i>Casamentos mistos são instáveis/geralmente não são uma coisa boa</i>								
Concorda	25%	54%	29%	81%	23%	65%	26%	67%
Discorda	69%	31%	61%	17%	70%	32%	67%	27%

Fonte: WHITT, 2013, p. 397. (Nossa tradução).

Em uma análise dos dados de 1996, observa-se que a intolerância e (in)segurança associada não só intensificou-se de uma década para outra, mas também variou entre os grupos étnicos, conforme demonstra quadro 8. Para servo-bósnios e bósnios-croatas, a rivalidade era um problema maior do que para Bósnios-muçulmanos. Afinal, para 88% dos servo-bósnios e 66% dos bósnios-croatas, o ódio entre a população na república era uma constante histórica. Respectivamente, 91% e 77%, não acreditavam ser possível superar essa rivalidade em prol de uma convivência pacífica. Este dado contrapõem-se aos 16% de muçulmanos que acreditavam o ódio ser ancestral e aos 15% que não acreditavam na coexistência pacífica com seus conterrâneos. Uma possível explicação era que sérvios e croatas étnicos, independentemente de sua origem bósnia, possuíam o que consideravam um Estado-nacional próprio, o que lhes

⁹⁸ Essa mesma pesquisa, à nível nacional, mostra que 25% dos iugoslavos desejavam a manutenção da estrutura federal pré-existente, 25% desejavam uma nova estrutura federal, 21% uma confederação e apenas 7% defendiam Estados separados (apud OBERSCHALL, 2006, pp. 14-15).

⁹⁹ Cálculo nosso.

despertava interesses irredentistas. Para bósnios-muçulmanos, a perspectiva de que as nacionalidades não conseguiriam conviver conjuntamente implicava no risco de desmembramento do país, cedendo parte de seu território para outros Estados. Perspectiva contra a qual haviam lutado durante a guerra na Bósnia.

Quadro 8. Percepção de intolerância e insegurança na Bósnia-Herzegovina do pós- guerra (1996)

	Bósnio- Muçulmanos	Bósnio- Croatas	Servo- Bósnios	Média ¹⁰⁰
<i>Bósnios-muçulmanos, croatas e sérvios sempre se odiaram por séculos</i>				
Concorda	16%	66%	80%	54%
Discorda	83%	34%	17%	45%
<i>Dado a história comum, servo-bósnios, croatas e muçulmanos não conseguirão mais conviver pacificamente.</i>				
Concorda	15%	77%	91%	61%
Discorda	83%	21%	7%	37%
<i>Você acredita que Croatas, muçulmanos e sérvios conseguiriam viver juntos novamente em um único Estado ou a guerra causou estragos demais para que eles possam conviver novamente?</i>				
Concorda	65%	10%	6%	27%
Discorda	34%	88%	89%	70%

Fonte: WHITT, 2013, p. 397. (Nossa tradução).

Em sua análise, Oberschall (2006, p. 15) argumenta que a questão étnico-nacional foi um tema central inclusive para a Iugoslávia comunista. O que se modificou durante seu processo de desintegração foi o *frame* no qual essas diferenças foram interpretadas: durante os anos comunistas, o *frame* legítimo era o de cooperação entre as nacionalidades, expresso pela máxima titoísta “fraternidade e união” ou no conceito pragmático de unidade defendido por Kardelj; contudo, com a ascensão do nacionalismo sérvio, o *frame* dominante foi então substituído pela competição, no qual a securitização da identidade tornou-se possível. Os dados consolidados no quadro 6 (p. 76), e demonstram esse processo: a identidade nacional nunca foi suplantada por uma identidade iugoslava supranacional. Contudo, o processo de consolidação da rivalidade entre grupos étnicos só foi possível com a securitização do discurso nacionalista, que modificou a forma como o relacionamento entre os grupos era interpretado, saindo da cooperação e convivência para a rivalidade e antagonismo.

A análise da campanha eleitoral sérvia, em 1992, demonstra como a centralidade do tema impactou o processo político. Em estudo do pleito, Vladimir Goati (2001, p. 70)

¹⁰⁰ Calculado pela autora.

demonstrou por meio da análise dos slogans eleitorais como a questão nacional predominou sobre os demais assuntos, inclusive socioeconômicos. De acordo com o autor, 43% dos slogans do Partido Socialista da Sérvia (PSS), de Milosevic, centraram em questões nacionais, seguidos pelo PRS de Seselj, nos quais 22% dos slogans abordavam o tema. Mesmo a oposição, unificada na coalizão DEPOS, abordou a temática em 17% de seus slogans, contra apenas 10% de slogans tratando questões socioeconômicos (GOATI, 2001, pp. 70-71).¹⁰¹

Essa tendência se refletida no eleitorado, uma vez que mesmo para eleitores da oposição a questão étnica era relevante: em pesquisa, apenas 28,1% dos constituintes simpáticos ao DEPOS concordavam com o reconhecimento incondicional das fronteiras republicanas, tal qual estabelecidas pelos anos comunistas (GOATI, 2001, p. 72). O partido, portanto, também adotava o discurso revisionista, no qual a divisão territorial deveria respeitar critérios étnicos e não as fronteiras pré-estabelecidas. O sucesso destes partidos nas eleições federais (que obtiveram, juntos, 71,5% dos votos) e republicanas (68,3%) apenas confirma a centralidade do tema na sociedade sérvia (cf. GOATI, 2001, pp. 72-73).

As supracitadas eleições multipartidárias da Bósnia-Herzegovina também demonstram a centralidade que a questão nacional atingiu na sociedade iugoslava. Não somente o PDS de Karadzic conquistou número expressivo de votos entre os sérvios, mas os outros dois partidos etnonacionalistas também o fizeram em suas respectivas bases políticas. Entre os bósnios-muçulmanos, o Partido da Ação Democrática de Alija Izetbegović conquistou a maioria dos votos (31,5%), enquanto o Partido Democrata Croata (HDZ) obteve 16,1%, refletindo, ao menos parcialmente, seus percentuais populacionais (cf. HAYDEN, 1992, p. 661; BIEBER, 2014).¹⁰²

Em sua análise sobre as eleições de 1990 na Bósnia, Bieber (2014, pp. 548; 553) demonstra cautela em relacionar a votação em partidos étnico-nacionais ao apoio incondicional da violência dos anos subsequentes, embora reconheça a centralidade da questão nacional para a votação – a qual resultaria de um dilema de segurança¹⁰³. Neste cenário, a opção por esses partidos derivaria da incerteza e do medo causado pelo ressurgimento do nacionalismo alheio. A escolha do partido, portanto, era justificado por uma alegada escolha racional, uma vez que

¹⁰¹ Os partidos PSS e PDS abordaram temas socioeconômicos em 12% e 8% de seus slogans, respectivamente.

¹⁰² Partindo do pressuposto de que todos os que votaram nos partidos eram membros de seus respectivos grupos étnicos, e comparando com a composição étnica do censo de 1991, ter-se-ia que 83,6% dos servo-bósnios teriam votado no PDS; 72,5% dos bósnios-muçulmanos no SDA e 92,6% dos bósnios-croatas teriam sido eleitores do HDZ. (Compilado pela autora a partir dos dados de BIEBER, 2014; BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1991). O Partido Reformista do Primeiro Ministro Iugoslavo, Ante Markovic, recebeu apenas 12,8% dos votos totais.

¹⁰³ O autor associa o resultado da votação ao “dilema do prisioneiro”, aqui adaptado para “dilema da segurança” por escolha da autora.

eles seriam representantes legítimos dos respectivos interesses nacionais, e inclusive por suas respectivas seguranças (BIEBER, 2014, pp. 552; 554).

Contudo, para Bieber (2014, p. 548. Nossa tradução), “[a] vitória dos partidos políticos representantes das nações majoritárias da Bósnia-Herzegovina, oferecendo pouco detalhe programático para além da proteção de interesses nacionais não era inevitável (...) e não implicava necessariamente em conflito”. Inicialmente aliados em uma coligação em prol da governabilidade, a evolução para a fragmentação e violência seria consequência não apenas da incompatibilidade dos projetos políticos, mas também da intransigência de suas lideranças em comprometerem-se. Afinal, cada partido passou não somente a perseguir seus objetivos políticos, mas também a fomentá-los junto à sua base, legitimando-os localmente. Nessa esfera, o partido vitorioso geralmente correspondia ao representante do grupo majoritário (HAYDEN, 1992, p. 661). Uma vez estabelecidos, eles removiam membros de outras nacionalidades das posições de autoridade, monopolizando o poder local.

À nível da República, o compartilhamento do poder impedia quaisquer revisões constitucionais drásticas ou guinadas nacionalistas. Contudo, com a declaração de Soberania da República, aprovada por deputados muçulmanos e bósnios-croatas em outubro de 1991, representantes do PDS retiraram-se do parlamento, estabelecendo uma assembleia sérvia independente (cf. HAYDEN, 1992, p. 661; TOAL; MAKSIC, 2013, p. 279; RAMET, 2006, p. 416). Para Hayden (1992, p. 661), essa situação causou o mesmo entrave constitucional sofrido à nível federal, em que o parlamento não era legitimamente reconhecido por todos os seus povos constituintes, impedido o consenso e a formulação política.

A ressonância que ambas as decisões tiveram em seus respectivos constituintes pôde ser observada por dois plebiscitos. O primeiro, organizado pelo PDS em novembro de 1991, perguntava se a Bósnia-Herzegovina deveria permanecer na Iugoslávia ou declarar-se um Estado Independente, voltado especialmente para o público servo-bósnio (cf. TOAL; MAKSIC, 2013, p. 279; RAMET, 2006, p. 417). Seu resultado, no qual foi declarado apoio majoritário à primeira opção, legitimou a proclamação da República Srpska¹⁰⁴ em janeiro de 1992. O segundo plebiscito foi realizado pelas instituições oficiais bósnias como critério para reconhecimento internacional. Realizado entre fevereiro e março de 1992, seu resultado foi majoritariamente favorável à opção separatista, percentual acentuado pelo boicote servo-bósnio. O resultado dos referendos demonstra, portanto, a saliência de cada opção para seus

¹⁰⁴ Seria uma República Soberana em território bósnio, com claras pretensões irredentistas.

respectivos públicos: bósnios-muçulmanos e bósnios-croatas¹⁰⁵ eram desejosos de independência frente à federação, cada vez mais centralizada nas mãos de Milosevic. Em contraposição, os servo-bósnios mostravam-se ressentidos, alegando que seu desejo de permanecer integrado à Iugoslávia havia sido desrespeitado e, especialmente, de que viviam sob ameaça, em território hostil. Conforme coloca Bieber (2014, p. 554), “[b]oicotado pela maioria dos sérvios, o referendo refletiu a vontade da maioria, mas não da maioria das três nações em tornarem-se independentes”.

4.2.2 Critério: Comensurabilidade Empírica

O critério de “Comensurabilidade Empírica” é definido pela conexão entre discurso e as experiências pessoais da pretendida audiência (SNOW; BENFORD; 1988, p. 208). Para tanto, o discurso necessita se conectar à sua realidade cotidiana, não sendo a ela abstrato (SNOW; BENFORD, 1988, p. 208; BENFORD; SNOW, 2000, p. 621). Objetivou-se, portanto, encontrar os elementos que davam comensurabilidade empírica ao *discurso securitizador*, procurando suas ligações com as experiências diárias dos sérvios étnicos.

O primeiro elemento encontrando era a própria estrutura burocrático-institucional do Estado iugoslavo, agravada com a Constituição de 1974. Em sua formação, o Estado foi constituído por seis repúblicas, somadas duas províncias que, ao longo das décadas, adquiriram contínuas prerrogativas políticas. Inicialmente inspirada na constituição soviética, o propósito era promover o livre exercício da condição nacional, sem nações hegemônicas ou subordinadas. Acreditava-se que, com o tempo, essas diferenças nacionais seriam suplantadas, prevalecendo a solidariedade transnacional entre classes operárias.

Contudo, com o rompimento entre Iugoslávia e União Soviética, em 1948, surgiu uma nova proposta para a efetivação do comunismo, a qual pregava o desaparecimento gradual do aparato Estatal (cf. RAMET, 2006, p. 185-187). Como consequência, iniciou-se um processo de descentralização que favoreceu os poderes e as elites das Repúblicas em detrimento do poder central. É importante salientar que, quando criadas, as fronteiras iugoslavas internas não respeitavam a distribuição étnica do território, sendo fronteiras históricas, baseadas em limites previamente existentes. Contudo, em muitos casos, as fronteiras republicanas e étnicas coincidiram, e as republicas foram nomeadas de acordo com sua nação majoritária, no qual, à exceção da Bósnia-Herzegovina, geralmente sobressaiam-se sobre as demais.

¹⁰⁵ De acordo com Ramet, servo-bósnios dividiam-se entre favoráveis a uma Bósnia independente, respeitando as fronteiras republicanas, e aqueles desejosos de integrar seus territórios ao Estado Croata.

Como consequência, o interesse republicano, por vezes, passou a confundir-se com o interesse nacional (DENICH, 1993). O quadro 9 demonstra o percentual da população hegemônica frente à população total em cada república, conforme os censos de 1981 e 1991. Esse alinhamento entre interesse nacional e estado foi mais fácil em repúblicas homogêneas, tais quais Eslovênia (composta por 87,84% de eslovenos étnicos, em 1991), Croácia (78,10% de croatas étnicos, em 1991) e Macedônia (66,6% população identificava-se como macedônia em 1991), e mais difícil em repúblicas nas quais não prevalecia uma nação majoritária, como foi o caso bósnio. A prevalência dos interesses nacionais foi, inclusive, incorporado nas constituições republicanas ao longo dos anos 1980, reconhecendo-as como “Estados-nação”, sendo a Bósnia-Herzegovina a única exceção a não associar constitucionalmente Estado e nação (HAYDEN, 1992, p. 662).

Quadro 9. Percentual da população Majoritária por república, de acordo com os censos de 1981-1991.

	1981	1991 ¹⁰⁶
República	Percentual	Percentual
Eslovênia	90,52%	87,84%
Sérvia Central	85,44%	87,25%
Kosovo	77,42%	82,25%
Croácia	75,08%	78,10%
Macedônia	67,00%	66,60%
República Sérvia ¹⁰⁷	66,38%	65,65%
Montenegro ¹⁰⁸	68,54%	61,84%
Voivodina ¹⁰⁹	54,42%	57,21%
Bósnia-Herzegovina	39,52%	43,48%

Fontes: YUGOSLAVIA (1991); BÓSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (1991); CROATIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS (2011); REPUBLIC OF SERBIA (2013); REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (2014); REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA (2017). Compilação nossa.

Como consequência, rivalidades entre as repúblicas puderam ser interpretadas como competição entre suas nações majoritárias, ainda que fossem consideradas igualmente constituintes do Estado Iugoslavo (cf. DENICH, 1993). Essa competição foi reproduzidas tanto na esfera política como na econômica.

¹⁰⁶ Para maior precisão sobre a composição populacional da Macedônia foram utilizados os dados do censo de 1994.

¹⁰⁷ Considerou-se “República Sérvia” toda a população republicana, incluindo províncias autônomas.

¹⁰⁸ A lealdade em Montenegro era dividida entre indivíduos pró e anti-sérvia, o qual consideravam, respectivamente, que montenegrinos e sérvios eram uma mesma nação ou que Montenegro era uma nação independente. Mais detalhes em Ramet (2006, pp. 316-317).

¹⁰⁹ População majoritária na Voivodina era de sérvios étnicos seguida de húngaros, que compunham 18,94% da população em 1981 e 16,94% em 1991.

Na economia, esse processo iniciou-se com as reformas liberalizantes do início da década de 1965 e consolidadas pela constituição de 1974 (LAMPE, 2003, p. 192; cf. DENICH, 1993, pp. 52-53). Afinal, foi por meio das reformas que, oficialmente, “(...) a teoria de integração econômica Stalinista deu lugar para o conflito entre economia de mercado e gestão política conduzida especialmente ao nível republicano.” (LAMPE, 2003, p. 184).¹¹⁰ A liberalização, por meio da descentralização da tomada de decisões, deu autonomia para as repúblicas gerirem suas respectivas economias, permitindo que as unidades federais perseguissem interesses locais em detrimento da conciliação econômica a nível federal (cf. DENICH, 1993, pp. 52-53; LAMPE, 2003, pp. 192-193; RAMET, 2006, p. 282).

Como consequência, a economia iugoslava foi desagregada em regiões quase autárquicas, aumentando disparidades em vez de suprimi-las. A exemplo das taxas de desemprego e analfabetismo, que eram maiores nas unidades federais subdesenvolvidas e cujas taxas de eficiência no trabalho eram menores do que suas conterrâneas desenvolvidas (cf. RAMET, 2006, pp. 268-271). Ademais, com a constituição de 1974, o principal destino migratório para aqueles em busca de emprego passou a ser o exterior, em detrimento da migração interna (cr. DENICH, 1993, p. 53). Essa realidade foi agravada com a crise econômica de 1980, no qual a economia iugoslava foi severamente atingida com problemas de insolvência econômica, eclosão da dívida externa e inflação exponencial, a qual atingiu o nível recorde de 893,8% em agosto de 1989 (RAMET, 2006, p. 282). Como consequência, a disparidade entre os PIB regionais agravou-se simultaneamente ao declínio no comércio interno, intensificando as competições e ressentimentos a nível nacional (cf. LAMPE, 2003, pp. 194-195)

Com o advento da crise, as repúblicas entraram em conflito entre si. A discordância estava entre defensores de uma reforma orientada para o mercado, cuja solução seria a abertura da economia para investimentos e capital privado, e defensores da intervenção estatal. As elites políticas sérvias alinharam-se ao último grupo, uma vez que atribuíram a crise econômica à falta de gestão central e à existência de interesses divergentes, agravados pela ausência de instituições federais capazes de coordenar e acomodar as rivalidades (SANU, 1995 [1986], p. 106; DENICH, 1993, pp. 52-53; RAMET, 2006, p. 283). O memorando da Academia Sérvia de Ciências e Artes (SANU, 1995 [1986], p. 106) foi além disso, argumentando que o princípio étnico-nacional prevaleceu sobre a lealdade de classes, em que os trabalhadores competiam

¹¹⁰ No imediato pós Guerra, adotou-se um Plano Quinquenal (1957-1951), inspirado pelo modelo soviético, com coordenação centralizada da economia, realizador por meio de investimentos na indústria e infraestrutura. O objetivo era formar uma união econômica no modelo de autarquia praticado na URSS. Com a ruptura com o Cominform em 1948, esse modelo é substituído pela auto-gestão.

entre si por melhores condições. A política de auto-gestão seria, portanto, subordinada aos interesses e autoridades locais em detrimento dos interesses supranacionais da classe trabalhadora, em que o “princípio étnico te[ve] precedência” à solidariedade de classe (SANU, 1995 [1986], p 106).

Neste cenário, a experiência da audiência foi a prevalência de disparidades econômicas entre as repúblicas e unidades federais, agravada com a Constituição de 1974 e pela crise vivenciada na década de 1980. Ademais, a ineficácia do estado iugoslavo comunista em promover integração econômica entre suas diferentes unidades foi apropriado pelos discursos nacionalistas emergentes, acentuando competição e ressentimentos internos. Como consequência, as disparidades econômicas foram então interpretadas como resultantes de um conflito étnico-nacional.

Esse fenômeno ocorreu igualmente na esfera política. Afinal, a constituição de 1974 não apenas garantiu mais autonomia econômica para as unidades federais, mas também acentuou sua independência política frente ao governo federal. A morte de Tito, em 1980, agravou o cenário uma vez que ele era a última liderança iugoslava com legitimidade reconhecida para negociar concessões políticas entre as unidades (cf. DENICH, 1993, pp. 52-53; JONES, 2011, p. 318; RAMET, 2006, p. 329). A ausência de uma figura conciliatória que levou ao impasse político a nível federal, evidenciou a fraqueza político-institucional da LCI (cf. RAMET, 2006, pp. 327-328). Mais importante, esse impasse demonstrou o descompasso entre os partidos locais e seus respectivos interesses; afinal, toda proposta para solucionar as crises política e econômica encontrava resistência de ao menos uma das repúblicas.¹¹¹ Novamente no centro das discussões estavam liberais, marcadamente descentralistas, e conservadores, desejosos da centralização política. A República Sérvia considerava que mais tinha a ganhar com a recentralização,¹¹² e, portanto, promovia a necessidade de reformas constitucionais neste sentido, em oposição à Eslovênia, principal advogada da causa liberal, que ainda contava com apoio croata (RAMET, 2006, p.).

A década de 1980 foi marcada, portanto, por impasses políticos e pelo escalonamento das tensões inter-republicanas acerca de revisão constitucional, com amplo impacto na vida

¹¹¹ Entre Junho de 1986 e Junho de 1988, a presidência coletiva adotou 322 resoluções. Contudo, a maioria não foi implementada ou respeitada. Somente resoluções acerca de questões militares e de segurança é que foram devidamente executadas. (RAMET, 2006, p. 355).

¹¹² A Constituição de 1974 deu mais autonomia para os “*entes federais*” (repúblicas e as provinciais autônomas) em detrimento do governo central. Como consequência, a República sérvia sentiu-se prejudicada não somente com a difusão de poder entre as repúblicas, mas também pelo aumento das prerrogativas políticas de suas províncias Voivodina e Kosovo. Por meio de uma reforma da Constituição sérvia, em 1987, Belgrado retirou as autonomias provinciais, submetendo-as ao governo republicano (cf. DENICH, 1993, pp. 51-52; DJILAS, 1993, p.82; PETSINIS, 2008, p. 10-11).

cotidiana da população iugoslava. Afinal, a incapacidade das lideranças em atingirem o consenso impedia reformas necessárias que, especialmente na economia, agravavam os indicadores socioeconômicos.

Essas tensões foram prejudicadas com a ascensão de Milosevic ao poder na Sérvia e pelas supracitadas manobras para ampliar sua influência política, submetendo as províncias autônomas e Montenegro à seu interesse. O ápice dessas tensões ocorreu durante o Décimo Quarto Congresso da Liga Comunista, um encontro extraordinário do partido realizado em Janeiro de 1990, cujo propósito era atingir o consenso político. Contudo, novamente organizado em torno das Repúblicas, o embate entre os projetos centralizadores e unitaristas levou ao colapso do partido comunista em si, ocasionado pela debanda da delegação eslovena (cf. DENICH, 1993, p. 51; RAMET, 2006, pp. 371-372). Tal qual temia Tito (apud JOVIC, 2003, p. 176), o colapso partidário precedeu a desintegração federal.

Tentativas de negociação do arranjo político institucional do Estado Iugoslavo mantiveram-se constantes a nível federal durante os anos de 1990 e 1991, prevalecendo as supracitadas tendências. Contudo, a nível republicano, a organização da vida política em entidades quase autônomas fortaleceu lealdades locais em detrimento às federais, especialmente após o escalonamento dos embates político-econômicos. Como consequência do desgaste político e da mudança de lealdades, as populações das Repúblicas da Eslovênia, Croácia e Macedônia optaram pela independência de suas repúblicas. Referendos ocorridos entre Dezembro de 1990 e Setembro de 1991 validaram essas opções, precedendo o Bósnio em meses ou anos.¹¹³

O processo de independência das repúblicas iugoslavas iniciou-se, portanto, com a descentralização política e econômica durante as décadas de 1960 e 1970, a qual fortaleceu as repúblicas em detrimento da federação. Embora não linear ou, muito menos, irreversível, esse processo foi resultado de uma soma de fatores independentes. Entre eles estava a organização da vida cotidiana a nível local, fortalecendo lealdades particulares frente ao iugoslavismo supranacional. Com advento da crise econômica e política dos anos 1980, essas lealdades passaram a ser vistas como concorrentes, favorecendo reeleições nacionalistas do período comunista. Finalmente, o impasse em negociar mudanças federais significativas favoreceu as

¹¹³ Referendo de Independência da Eslovênia ocorreu em Dezembro de 1990, no qual 88,5% do eleitorado votou a favor da independência. Na Croácia, o referendo ocorreu em Maio de 1991, com 93,24% dos eleitores votando a favor da proposta de Independência. E, finalmente, na Macedônia, o referendo ocorreu em Setembro de 1991, com 96,4% dos votos a favor da independência.

reivindicações separatistas, ligando comensurabilidade empírica (a organização da vida cotidiana em repúblicas quase autárquicas) ao discurso nacionalista.

Para a população sérvia e suas lideranças políticas, contudo, a dissolução não foi bem recebida. Em especial, as independências de Croácia e Bósnia-Herzegovina foram as mais sentidas, uma vez que ali habitavam significativas comunidades sérvias, que agora seriam minorias em países estrangeiros. Essa realidade confrontava o propósito histórico do nacionalismo sérvio, que era o de reunir toda a sua população sob um mesmo Estado. Conforme indicado pelo quadro 10, com o processo de Independência das repúblicas iugoslavas, 23,9% da população autodeclarada sérvia étnica encontrar-se-ia em território estrangeiro – sendo 16% dos sérvios “em exílio” habitando a Bósnia-Herzegovina e 6,8%, a Croácia, segundo dados do censo de 1991. Dos 76,11% dos sérvios que permaneceriam vivendo na Iugoslávia, somente 59,6% habitariam a Sérvia central, com o resto espalhado entre Voivodina (13,5% da população sérvia total), Kosovo (2,3%) e a República de Montenegro (0,7% do total de sérvios étnicos habitavam a república).

Quadro 10. Sérvios autodeclarados por unidade federal (total e percentual)

República	1981		1991	
	Total	Percentual	Total	Percentual
Bósnia-Herzegovina	1.320.644	16,2%	1.366.104	16,0%
Montenegro	19.407	0,2%	57.176	0,7%
Croácia	531.502	6,5%	581.663	6,8%
Macedônia	44.613	0,5%	40.228	0,5%
Eslovênia	42.182	0,5%	47.911	0,6%
Sérvia Central	4.865.283	59,8%	5.081.766	59,6%
Kosovo	209.498	2,6%	195.301	2,3%
Voivodina	1.107.378	13,6%	1.151.353	13,5%
Iugoslávia	8.140.507	100,0%	8.521.502	100,0%

Fonte: YUGOSLAVIA (1991); BÓSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (1991); CROATIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS (2011); REPUBLIC OF SERBIA (2013); REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (2014); REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA (2017); Compilação nossa.

A eleição de Franjo Tudjman à presidência croata, em maio de 1990, aumentou a ressonância do *security frame* entre a população sérvia. Condenado anteriormente por atividades anticomunistas, Tudjman era um conhecido historiador croata que utilizou símbolos e discursos nacionalistas para ascender ao poder. Reconhecido revisionista, ele questionava a veracidade de atrocidades bósnias durante a segunda guerra mundial, subestimando as violências perpetradas e, especialmente, tratava Jasenovac como um “mito” comunista (cf. DENICH, 1994, p. 376; PETNISS, 2008, pp. 22-23). O slogan de seu recém criado partido, a

União Democrática Croata (UDC), apelava à solidariedade do povo croata, excluindo deliberadamente demais habitantes do território republicano (DENICH, 1994, p. 379). De modo semelhante ressoavam suas outras medidas que, populares entre croatas étnicos, alienavam e excluíam minorias nacionais. Entre tais ações estavam a ênfase na diferenciação do idioma servo-croata, a constrição do alfabeto cirílico e a modificação da bandeira nacional, substituindo a estrela da época comunista pelo brasão xadrez (conhecido como *sahovnica*), já utilizado como escudo de armas croata (DENICH, 1994, p. 378-379). Embora não idêntico ao utilizado durante o Estado Croata Independente,¹¹⁴ sua retomada desagradou servo-croatas, acentuando a rivalidade e o sentimento de apreensão entre os grupos. Esse sentimento foi agravado com a recusa croata em reconhecer os seus conterrâneos sérvios como povos constituintes na Constituição croata em elaboração, em junho de 1990 (TOAL; MAKSIC; 2013, p. 273).

A eleição de Tudjman e a reabilitação de símbolos croatas permitiu a ascensão de nacionalistas sérvios que ligaram o movimento emergente croata às atrocidades *ustache*. Entre os principais beneficiados estava o Partido Democrático Sérvio na Croácia, antecessor do partido bósnio de mesmo nome. Criado em fevereiro de 1990, o partido não havia sido bem-sucedido nas eleições de abril, no qual conquistou apenas 5 cadeiras (TOAL; MAKSIC, 2013, p. 268). Contudo, a ascensão de Tudjman intensificou o sentimento de ameaça para servo-croatas, que foi canalizado por seus líderes nacionalistas. O escalamento das tensões veio em agosto de 1990 quando o líder do PDS croata, Jovan Raskovic, foi substituído por Milan Babic, alinhado a Milosevic e prefeito de Knin¹¹⁵. Como sequência, ativistas do PDS criaram o Conselho Nacional Sérvio e uma “Comunidade de municípios no norte da Dalmácia e Lika com maioria sérvia” que, conforme colocam Toal e Maksic (2013, pp. 278-279) antecederam (e organizaram) os movimentos separatistas nestas regiões.

Conforme coloca Denich (1994, p. 377), “(...) a renovação da identidade sérvia foi uma resposta ao sentimento de ameaça e vitimização sentida pelos sérvios enquanto minoria em território croata (...)”. Esse sentimento não era só compartilhado entre servo-croatas, mas também com demais sérvios étnicos. Iniciado com a polarização no Kosovo, entre albaneses e eslavos ortodoxos, o sentimento de perseguição com base étnica difundiu-se em territórios onde sérvios compunham a população, como a Croácia, e finalmente atingiu a Bósnia, em 1990.

¹¹⁴ Conforme coloca Ramet (2006, p.), no Brasão do HDZ, o primeiro quadrado, no canto superior esquerdo, era branco. No Brasão adotado por Tudjman, o quadrado era vermelho, mudando a ordem de disposição das cores.

¹¹⁵ Resultado de um confronto direto com forças croatas, a cidade de Knin não estava sob controle e jurisdição de Zagreb, contando com patrulhas e forças armadas próprias na defesa da cidade (TOAL; MAKSIC, 2013, p. 278-279; RAMET, 2006, pp. 382-383).

Etnicamente mista, a República da Bósnia-Herzegovina era composta por muçulmanos (43,5% da população), sérvios (31,2%) e croatas (17,4%) (BÓSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1991). Embora a convivência tenha sido pacífica os anos comunistas, a prevalência de diferentes grupos étnicos foi primordial para a divisão da política bósnia em linhas nacionalistas competitivas (TOAL; MAKSIC, 2013, p. 283). Afinal, a convivência inter-étnica fazia parte da realidade cotidiana da audiência, o qual criava a possibilidade de radicalização por meio de um discurso securitizador.

Para tanto, lideranças servo-bósnias aproveitaram-se das tensões na Croácia e seu escalamento para o conflito armado. O propósito era criar um sentimento de perseguição e vitimização que justificasse a emergência do nacionalismo na Bósnia. De acordo com Toal e Maksic (2013, p. 283), a “contribuição genuína de Karadzic era em traduzir os eventos na [região da] Krajina croata, e dentro da BiH, em ameaças existências para o povo sérvio”. Inclusive eventos cotidianos, como uma greve em Banja Luka, foram então reinterpretados com o propósito de aumentar a saliência do discurso de tensão étnica, permitindo que a audiência identificasse um risco potencial na multietnicidade do país (cf. TOAL; MAKSIC, 2013, p. 280).

A súbita realidade que se abateu entre sérvios étnicos com o processo de independência das repúblicas da Croácia e Bósnia-Herzegovina foi, portanto, primordial para a aceitação do discurso nacionalista sérvio. Essas populações não apenas foram confrontadas pela condição de minoria, mas também por um sentimento de ameaça potencial advindo da emergência de nacionalismos igualmente excludentes, tal qual o croata. Igualmente, esse processo foi favorecido pela rememoração de eventos históricos e mitos constitucionais que alegavam um sentimento de rivalidade que perpassaria gerações, que conferiu *fidelidade narrativa* às alegações nacionalistas sérvias.

4.2.3 Critério: Fidelidade Narrativa.

O critério fidelidade narrativa é definido pela literatura como a ressonância cultural de um *frame* à sua respectiva audiência (BENFORD; SNOW, 2000, p. 622; CARVALHO PINTO, 2014, p. 166). De acordo com Snow e Benford (1988, p. 210), a fidelidade narrativa explica o grau no qual “um processo de *framing* ressoa com narrações culturais, isto é, com as histórias, mitos e contos folclóricos que são parte significativa da herança cultural de um povo (...)”, relacionando-se com os eventos vivenciados pela audiência. O objetivo, portanto, foi identificar os mitos fundacionais que, reapropriados pelo nacionalismo sérvio, atuaram para legitimar seu *frame* e solução proposta.

O principal mito reapropriado com o “despertar” do nacionalismo sérvio foi o da Batalha do Kosovo,¹¹⁶ ocorrida em 1389, que teria levado à queda do Reino Sérvio Medieval. Com a derrota das forças do Príncipe Lazar, ter-se-ia iniciado os 500 anos de ocupação do território, o qual só foi totalmente liberto nos anos iniciais do século XX (cf. SELLS, 2001, p. 181; DJOKIC, 2009, p. 218). O mito da Batalha do Kosovo, especialmente desenvolvido pelo movimento romântico do século XIX, criou elementos fundacionais do nacionalismo sérvio: o primeiro deles é o território Kosovar como “o berço espiritual” da nação (cf. KASER; HALPERN, 1998, pp. 100-102; DJOKIC, 2009, p. 221). Portanto, o irredentismo albanês da década de 1980 pôde ser interpretado como uma encenação de eventos ocorridos séculos antes, como a ameaça a identidade sérvia, novamente sob ataque por agentes estrangeiros (e muçulmanos) (cf. DJOKIC, 2009, p. 220). Esses eventos também se ligaram com o mito do martírio histórico do povo sérvio. De acordo com autores românticos como Petar II Petrović Njegoš, ao ser derrotado pelos Otomanas, o Reino Sérvio deixava de ser terreno para ser celestial, iniciando um ciclo de subordinação e violências impostas aos sobreviventes (cf. KASER; HALPERN, 1998, p. 101; DJOKIC, 2009, p. 219;). Todo o período subsequente, inclusive as violências sofridas durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, sob forças *ustashe*, ou mesmo os anos comunistas, seriam decorrentes dessa escolha. Assim, Milosevic, ao ascender ao poder, quebraria este ciclo de martírio, reivindicando a libertação de seu povo.

Igualmente são referenciadas pela mitologia da batalha do Kosovo as figuras do herói, Milos Obilic, responsável por matar o sultão Murad I, e do traidor, Vuk Brankovic, que havia se aliando aos Otomanos para derrotar o exército do príncipe Lazar (SELLS, 1997, p. 28, 2001, pp. 181-182; DJOKIC, 2009, p. 220). Deste modo, líderes religiosos e políticos apropriaram-se da figura do herói, imputando aos eslavos muçulmanos a figura do traidor: tal como Vuk Brankovic, eles haviam traído seus conterrâneos no passado, e o fariam novamente, se necessário. Conforme coloca Sells (1997, pp. 28-31, 2001, p. 183), ao converterem-se ao islamismo, esses eslavos haviam se transfigurado em turcos, sendo igualmente responsáveis pela morte de Lazar e, portanto, pela subjugação e martírio do povo sérvio.

Não apenas símbolos e mitos passados foram reapropriados pelo nacionalismo, mas foram também revividos por proeminentes lideranças durante as décadas de 1980-1990, unindo comensurabilidade empírica e fidelidade narrativa. No caso da batalha do Kosovo, Milosevic

¹¹⁶ Ocorreu uma batalha em território kosovar, opondo forças do reino medieval sérvio e otomanas, em 1389. Contudo, a partir de memórias da batalha que sobreviveram ao domínio otomano criou-se o mito fundacional do nacionalismo sérvio, no século XIX. Para mais informações sobre a batalha e o mito decorrente ver Kaser e Halpern (1998) e Djovic (2009).

aproveitou a comemoração de seus 600 anos, em junho de 1989, para fortalecer-se como principal liderança sérvia, com o auxílio da Igreja Ortodoxa (cf. DJOKIC, 2009, p. 215; SELLS, 1997, p. 35, 2001, p. 180). Às vésperas da comemoração, os restos mortais do príncipe Lazar percorreram a Iugoslávia com o propósito de serem enterrados no monastério de Gracanica, nos arredores onde ocorreu a batalha em 1389 (SELLS, 2001, p. 184). De acordo com o autor, “[e]nquanto o tempo sagrado de 1389 colapsava com o presente de 1989, o espaço sagrado da Grande Sérvia e do Kosovo eram ritualmente demarcados em uma procissão ao epicentro do sítio da batalha ancestral (...)” (SELLS, 2001, p. 184). O dia 28 de Junho de 1989 foi então marcado não apenas pelo fim da procissão, mas também pela presença de ao menos 1 milhão de peregrinos que vieram de diferentes partes do país para a ritualização do nacionalismo sérvio, em comemoração dos 600 anos da mítica batalha (cf. SELLS, 2001, p. 180). E, em seu epicentro, estava Milosevic. Em épico discurso, o político consolidou-se como o campeão dos interesses nacionais ao advogar pelo fim do martírio do povo sérvio, sob sua liderança (MILOSEVIC, 1989).

Os eslavos muçulmanos também foram associados ao período de domínio otomano nos Balcãs. Convertidos ao islã ao longo dos cinco séculos nos quais o território ficou sob controle turco, esse processo não teve uma motivação única, tal qual aponta Florian Bieber (2000, pp. 21-22). Desde a maior receptividade que determinados grupos eslavos tinham em territórios sob domínio muçulmano¹¹⁷ até incentivos econômicos e materiais¹¹⁸ foram algumas das motivações para a conversão. Contudo, a ênfase da historiografia nacionalista foi no sistema otomano conhecido como *devshirme*: o recrutamento forçado de crianças cristãs e do sexo masculino com o propósito de educá-las dentro da fé islâmica (cf. BIEBER, 2000, p. 22-23; SELLS, 2001, p. 183). Esse sistema foi descrito pelo escritor sérvio Ivo Andric (*apud* SELLS, 2001, p. 183) como uma “forma de drenar o sangue sérvio”. O objetivo era enfatizar uma suposta natureza violenta do império Otomano e, especialmente, da religião islâmica.

Novamente, efetivou-se buscar no presente supostas evidências de que eslavos muçulmanos tinham interesse em criar um Estado islâmico nos Balcãs, em detrimento da população sérvia (cf. SELLS, 1997, p. 38). Para tanto, a figura do presidente bósnio Alija Izetbegovic foi primordial. Izetbegovic havia sido preso por atividades anti-comunistas por seu

¹¹⁷ Membros da autocéfala Igreja Bósnia tinham melhor tratamento em território muçulmano do que em território cristão (ortodoxo ou católico).

¹¹⁸ Aos eslavos convertidos ao islamismo, especialmente à nobreza, eram fornecidas vantagens econômicas e políticas, tal qual isenção fiscal ou a ascensão em carreiras do Estado, como administração pública ou exército (BIEBER, 2000, p. 23). Ademais, conforme aponta Bieber (2000, p. 27), “(...) ao contrário da sociedade feudal da Europa Ocidental, mesmo pessoas de origens modestas podiam ascender no aparato estatal. A única precondição para essa mobilidade era a fé islâmica”.

livro *The Islamic Declaration*, o qual desejava fazer da Bósnia um Estado-nacional para a população eslava muçulmana (cf. BOUGAREL, 2003, p. 109). Sua contraditória figura foi, portanto, explorada por nacionalistas sérvios para dar legitimidade às alegações de islamização dos Bálcãs. Nacionalistas sérvios aproveitaram para republicar seu livro e incrementar as acusações, alegando que ele desejaria estabelecer um estado *fundamentalista islâmico* na região (SELLS, 1997, p. 38). Igualmente, os muçulmanos foram associados a estereótipos orientais como “o roubo de mulheres para compor haréns”¹¹⁹ (SELLS, 1997, p. 38). De todo modo, a longínqua dominação otomana da região possibilitou aos nacionalistas sérvios associar população muçulmana, ainda que eslavos, a alegados crimes cometidos no passado. A violência preventiva, portanto, seria apenas uma forma de evitar a repetição da história, ainda que romantizada e reinterpretada.

Finalmente, um outro evento histórico que foi amplamente utilizado pelo nacionalismo sérvio como legitimador de seu projeto foi o Estado Independente Croata (1941-1945), marcadamente nacionalista.¹²⁰ De acordo com Vassilis Petsinis (2008, pp. 19-21), Oberschall (2006, p. 16) e Denich (1993, pp. 78-80), os crimes *ustashe* foram alvo de revisionismo histórico não apenas por sérvios, mas também por croatas, conforme o interesse de suas lideranças políticas. Por um lado, os nacionalistas sérvios inflaram o número de vítimas por mãos croatas com objetivos políticos claros, tal qual comprovar que eram historicamente alvo de perseguições e genocídios.¹²¹ Por outro, nacionalistas croatas, como o presidente (e historiador) Tudjman, contestavam números e atrocidades croatas, chamando-as de mitos ou invenções (cf. PETNISS, 2008, pp. 21-23). O argumento consistia em que as violências perpetradas durante o Estado Independente Croata eram infladas com o propósito de subjugar política e economicamente a nação croata. Sendo seu propósito político não outro do que reabilitar o nacionalismo croata e, especialmente, legitimar o desejo separatista da república.

Tal qual os mitos da Batalha do Kosovo e Domínio Otomano, a fidelidade narrativa dos crimes *ustahse* foram fortalecidos por eventos cotidianos, aumentando sua validade frente à audiência sérvia. O próprio renascimento do nacionalismo croata, com suas figuras revisionistas e a reapropriação de símbolos ligados ao período, atuaram para aumentar a credibilidade

¹¹⁹ Oberschall (2006, p. 40) reporta a notícia de um casal que fugiu de sua cidade natal com medo de boatos de que, uma vez que os homens fossem assassinados, as mulheres seriam divididas entre os haréns dos soldados muçulmanos.

¹²⁰ Para mais informações, ver capítulo 3.

¹²¹ Entre nacionalistas sérvios surgiram estimativas infladas de que entre 500.000 e 700.000 sérvios haviam sido assassinados apenas no infame campo de concentração de Jasenovac, número contestado por historiadores recentes (cf. PETSINIS, 2008, pp. 19-21; RAMET, 2006, p. 161). De acordo com Vladimir Zerjavic (apud RAMET, 2006, p. 161), a estimativa de vítimas sérvias em território *Ustasha* é de 307.000.

empírica e a fidelidade narrativa da potencial ameaça. Inclusive questões legítimas, como o trauma de familiares e sobreviventes do período atuaram para fortalecer o argumento nacionalista sérvio. Dentre tais artefatos explorados por nacionalistas sérvios estavam as cerimônias de exumação de vítimas do Estado fascista, ocorridas no final dos anos 1980 (cf. DENICH, 1993, pp. 78-80; SELLS, 2001, pp. 184-185). Essas exumações não apenas serviram para recuperar a memória coletiva dos crimes cometidos, e seu caráter étnico, mas foi igualmente um reforço para o processo de securitização da identidade sérvia. Afinal, essas cerimônias puderam ser apropriadas como um sinal de alerta caso a nação sérvia não se unisse para sua autoproteção, aumentando assim a saliência do discurso. Denich (1994, p. 382) identificou como o fim do tabu acerca das atrocidades *ustashe* não foi apenas um reconhecimento histórico tardio das violências sofridas em um espaço-tempo específico (o NDH, durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial), mas que também atuou como um gatilho emocional para a união da população sérvia sob um projeto político nacionalista, sob a justificativa de que estariam novamente sob ameaça.

Portanto, assim como o mito da Batalha do Kosovo foi importante porque justificou as pretensões políticas sérvias na província em questão, a rememoração de eventos e mitos históricos legitimou pretensões irredentistas nas repúblicas da Croácia e Bósnia-Herzegovina. Ainda mais importante, ligou cidadãos contemporâneos a agentes históricos, justificando violências contra eles perpetradas: afinal, tanto na Croácia quanto na Bósnia-Herzegovina, a população local pôde ser associada a elementos *hostis* históricos. Croatas foram associados a milícias fascistas, enquanto os bósnios-muçulmanos foram igualados às forças otomanas invasoras, quando não a *ihadistas* e extremistas religiosos contemporâneos.¹²²

¹²² Em alguns casos, o Estado Croata Independente também foi apropriado para justificar a violência contra bósnio-muçulmanos, rememorando a limitada divisão Handzar, o qual colocava uma parcela de bósnios-muçulmanos sob a hierarquia das SS (cf. BOUGAREL, 2003, p. 104).

CONCLUSÃO

Os caminhos que levaram à Srebrenica não foram decorrentes de um processo espontâneo ou de animosidades históricas, mas sim de deliberada manipulação política, no qual securitizou-se a identidade étnica-nacional com a finalidade de justificar projetos de Estado e poder excludentes. A violência tornou-se uma ferramenta política viável a partir da ressignificação da realidade por parte de atores estratégicos que, no caso, foram políticos sérvios e servo-bósnios. Afinal, como coloca Oberschall (2006, p. 15) muito embora a questão étnico-nacional também tenha sido um tema central na Iugoslávia comunista, a forma como ela foi interpretada variou: partindo da cooperação dos anos iniciais para a rivalidade do período de fragmentação política. O marco teórico, o *Security Framing*, permitiu compreender como esse processo ocorreu.

Desse modo, fez-se necessário compreender os discursos nacionalistas e supranacionalistas que permearam a política iugoslava como *frames*, uma vez que serviram como “esquema de interpretações” que permitiram aos indivíduos que “localizassem, percebessem, identificassem e rotulassem” suas experiências (cf. GOFFMAN *apud* SHOW et al, 1986. 464, nossa tradução). Por um lado, o supranacionalismo enfatizou a união entre os povos eslavos do sul em contraposição aos nacionalismos que, frente às similaridades entre os povos, enfatizaram suas diferenças por meio de “marcadores étnicos”. A religião, o idioma e as histórias nacionais serviram, então, como tais marcadores. Foram esses *frames*, e suas variações, que atuaram durante todo o período do Estado Iugoslavo, incentivando desde sua formação, em 1918, até sua derrocada final, na década de 1990.

Seu sucesso dependeu não somente do discurso, mas também do aceite de sua respectiva audiência, uma vez a securitização é um processo intersubjetivo. Dessa forma dá-se a importância dos dois estados iugoslavos e do período entre guerras: eles forneceram as experiências nos quais os *frames* atuaram. Deste modo, o Reino da Iugoslávia (1918-1941) forneceu a primeira experiência de um Estado eslavo unificado nos Balcãs. Ademais, o exercício da política iugoslava nos anos 1920 permitiu associar os *frames* a padrões de comportamento político que criaram uma memória coletiva: o centralismo político passou a ser associado com os interesses e a hegemonia política sérvia, em detrimento dos interesses políticos dos outros povos eslavos. Essa associação, contudo, foi menos decorrente de características intrínsecas à nacionalidade sérvia e mais da intransigência de seus políticos. Igualmente esse exercício político relegou políticos croatas à oposição. Contudo, essa oposição era menos ao Estado do que à sua organização político-institucional. Afinal, a formação do

Estado iugoslavo foi um processo negociado entre sérvios e demais representantes políticos eslavos, organizados no Comitê Iugoslavo durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial (1914-1918). Ademais, cabe lembrar que o conceito de Iugoslavismo surgiu inicialmente entre intelectuais croatas e eslovenos, como Ljudevit Gaj, Franjo Racki e Josip Juraj Strossmayer, não sendo, portanto, a noção de identidade comum alheia a esses grupos étnico-nacionais.

O período da Segunda Guerra Mundial nos Balcãs (1941-1945) foi talvez o momento em que as tensões étnicas estiveram mais acirradas. Entretanto, cabe lembrar que essas violências foram perpetradas ou por um Estado organizado, como o NDH, ou por grupos paramilitares defensores de uma retórica nacionalista, os Chetnicks, não sendo violências espontâneas. Ademais, esses grupos coexistiam com outros, tais como o supranacionalista partisan, que conseguiu mobilizar indivíduos de diferentes etnias eslavas contra o invasor fascista e ambas as doutrinas nacionalistas.

Finalmente, o período de domínio comunista não suprimiu as diferentes nacionalidades, inclusive tolerou seu livre exercício. Contudo, em sua base estava a doutrina Marxista que acreditava na obliteração das diferenças nacionais em prol da solidariedade de classes. Contudo, o próprio exercício do Estado comunista, em especial a partir da década de 1960, acentuou e agravou as diferenças nacionais. Afinal, optou-se pela descentralização do planejamento econômico e da organização da vida política nas repúblicas em detrimento da coordenação federal. Os incendiários anos 1980, com a eclosão da crise econômica e o agravamento da crise político-institucional, levou ao renascimento do nacionalismo enquanto um discurso viável. Neste contexto, políticos revisionistas, como Slobodan Milosevic e Franjo Trudjam ascenderam o poder.

Mesmo nesse contexto, o separatismo e a violência étnica não eram inevitáveis, como demonstram pesquisas de opinião conduzidas pré-Independência: de acordo com Oberschall (2006, p. 14), em pesquisa realizada em 1990, 70% dos iugoslavos entrevistados tinham preferência em viver em algum tipo de federação ou confederação contra 7% que defendiam estados separados. Analisando as respostas na Bósnia-Herzegovina, Whitt (2013, p. 397) encontrou números semelhantes: em média, 85% dos respondentes discordavam da afirmação de que “cada nação deveria ter seu próprio Estado”. Este número caiu para 31% em pesquisa realizada no pós guerra, em 1996 (WHITT, 2013, p. 397). Finalmente, Hodson, Sekulic, Massey (1994) demonstraram que maior intolerância estava ligada a fatores que não a diversidade étnica de uma república ou província. Entre questões que impactavam esses indicadores estavam religião e mídia, sendo fatores inversamente proporcionais: quanto maior o acesso a notícias e a religiosidade, menor era o grau de tolerância de um indivíduo. Esses

dados apontam para a relação entre securitização da identidade e a intolerância étnica, uma vez que mídia e clero atuaram como propagadores do discurso securitizador. Idade também atuou como um indicador importante de tolerância nacional: indivíduos mais velhos, que cresceram dentro da estrutura supranacionalista ou mesmo anteriores à ela eram mais tolerantes do que indivíduos mais novos, que cresceram em um contexto de rivalidade étnica (cf. HODSON, SEKULLIC, MASSEY, 1994, p. 1549-1550).

O conflito da Bósnia-Herzegovina, portanto, foi consequência de um processo deliberado de securitização da identidade étnica-nacional por parte de atores estratégicos, suas lideranças políticas. Para tanto, eles apropriaram-se de experiências da audiência, reinterpretando-as, na tentativa de angariar suporte para seus projetos de Estado, excludentes e nacionalistas. Foi esse processo intersubjetivo, e não ódios ancestrais, que culminaram nas violências observadas na guerra.

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ANEXO A – MEMORANDUM OF THE SERBIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS.

A slowdown in society's development, economic difficulties, growing social tensions and open inter-communal clashes have all given cause for deep concern in our country. Not just the political and economic system but the entire public order of the country is undergoing a severe crisis. Laxity and irresponsibility in the workplace, corruption and nepotism, a lack of legal security, bureaucratic high-handedness, flouting of the law, growing distrust among people and crass individual and group egoism are everyday phenomena. A breakdown in the moral standards and prestige of society's leading institutions and a lack of confidence in the capabilities of those in power are combined with public apathy and dissatisfaction and the alienation of the individual from all the representatives and symbols of the public order. An objective examination of the situation in Yugoslavia suggests that the present crisis might well culminate in social upheavals with unforeseeable consequences, not even precluding such a catastrophic outcome as the break-up of the Yugoslav state. No one has the right to shut his eyes to what is happening and to what might happen. And this particularly holds true for the most venerable institution of scientific and cultural achievement of this nation.

The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts feels called upon at this critical juncture to declare its views on the state of society, in the conviction that it will thereby be making its contribution to efforts to find a way out of the present adversities. The nature of this paper, however, does not allow any sidestepping of the key issues of the Yugoslav situation. Unfortunately, one of these issues is the ambiguous and difficult position of the Serbian people, which has been brought into sharp focus by recent events.

THE CRISIS IN THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

1. The economic crisis has been going on for five years now, and there is no end to it in sight. With a 0.6% growth rate of the GNP in the 1981-1985 period, Yugoslavia joined the ranks of the least economically successful countries in the world. Nor are the other growth indices any more comforting. The figure of over one million unemployed dims prospects for school-leavers of finding a job and earning a living in the foreseeable future. The steps taken to raise employment have been motivated by social welfare considerations. However, the opening of new jobs at a time when output is stagnating has resulted in lowered labour productivity. Gross fixed capital formation and real personal incomes have declined by one third. A surplus in the balance of payments, finally achieved thanks to the policy of a realistic exchange rate

and restrictions on all forms of consumption, is the only positive result of efforts to deal with the crisis. However, the merits of maintaining liquidity in foreign trade should be weighed against the high level of indebtedness, loss of the country's economic independence in formulating economic and to some extent also development policy, and the increasing disarray in the economy, which despite the best efforts has not yet managed to reach the criteria of efficient business performance. Such a situation has given rise to galloping inflation, which is eroding all economic criteria and incentives, at the same time revealing society's powerlessness to channel rampant economic flows.

As time goes on, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the crisis cannot be overcome unless far-reaching changes are made in the economic and political systems. A particular cause for anxiety is that official political circles are unwilling to acknowledge the true reasons for the economic crisis, making it impossible to take the steps necessary for economic recovery. This unwillingness is all the more baffling as economic studies have accurately pinpointed the causes of the crisis. Contrary to attempts to view these causes solely as the result of inappropriate responses on the part of economic policy-makers in the 1976-1980 period, analyses have shown that the roots of the crisis should be looked for in the decade of the 1960s, when economic growth first began to falter, grinding to a complete halt in 1980. The economic reform of that time had some good points, such as: freeing the economy of bureaucratic red tape, granting greater scope to market forces, removing price disparities, and integrating the Yugoslav economy into the world economy. Unfortunately, only price disparities were reduced to some extent, but not completely done away with, whereas the other goals were not even partially accomplished. Instead, unfortunate improvisations in development strategy and inefficacious innovations in the economic system not only remained but underwent even more inopportune transformations in the 1970s.

As early as the decade of the 1960s, economic development found itself in a backwater when in 1964 the 1961-1965 five-year plan was scrapped, a plan which, in an attempt to remove bottlenecks, gave priority to greater production of raw materials and energy resources. It is a well known fact that these bottlenecks have not been removed to this day. Yugoslav development strategy made matters even worse with two major mistakes. First, it did not recognize the basic requirement for optimal growth of the economy, which is that the factors of production must be used in proportion to their availability. While opting for the greater use of social capital, which in this country is one of the scarcest factors of production, this strategy at the same time saved on living labour, which is in the most abundant supply, so that Yugoslavia did not make use of its comparative advantages in the international division of labour. As a

result, economic development was less than optimal, and the doors were thrown open to an explosive rise in unemployment. The second strategical miscalculation was to expect the growth in real personal incomes alone, without any other measures, to give strong impetus to a growth in labour productivity and output, as is being done by the developed countries. The application of this concept in Yugoslav conditions soon proved to be an error with many economic repercussions.

There were a particularly large number of mistakes made in the choice of basic options for the economic system. In the first place, the system of planning was thoroughly disrupted. A five-year plan was not even adopted for the second half of the 1960s, and the subsequent five-year plans, lacking the necessary backing of resources and measures, remained a dead letter, which no one observed. With the abolition of planning, the coordinating functions of the federal government withered away, while the impeding of market forces stifled economic initiative. In other words, neither was the economy subject to direction nor were self-regulating mechanisms allowed to operate freely. The attempt to replace economic planning and the market with a system of compacts and agreements proved to be a total fiasco. A system in which everyone was supposed to consult with everyone else on everything had no prospects of functioning properly. As a result, the "guiding forces" of the regime had to be called upon more than was beneficial, and a political propaganda campaign was needed to regulate economic flows.

Decentralization, originally conceived as a way to free the economy from the fetters of bureaucracy, degenerated into disintegration along territorial lines and branches of the economy. Eight economic areas were created, with the national economies as their ideological base. The unified Yugoslav market was thereby broken up. The republics and provinces increasingly sought to make their economies autarkic. In addition to the fragmentation of the national Yugoslav economy into separate republican economies, economic enterprises were also split up into smaller units, called "basic organizations of associated labour." This was one of the least expected measures, for small enterprises had been crying out for integration in order to take advantage of economies of scale, but instead what they underwent with the introduction of basic organizations of associated labour was a further fragmentation. Thus two forms of disintegration set the economy running on anti-historical tracks of development. This was the worst thing that could happen to any economy.

The mistakes in development strategy, if we can talk at all of a planned strategy, as well as many shortcomings in the economic system, resulted in a decline not just in the growth rate of production and employment but also in the quality of business performance, on which the success of many of the goals of the economic reform hinged. The growth rate of individual

labour productivity in the 1966-1979 period, when attempts were made to introduce intensive production methods, was lower than in the period of extensive growth, from 1953 to 1965. Incentives for workers to increase their labour productivity were not improved, notwithstanding a rapid rise in real personal incomes. This unexpected trend, which came as a surprise to economic planners, points up the untenability of the notion that a growth in personal consumption expenditure is enough to stimulate the growth of the entire economy and reveals the irremediable weaknesses of the officially approved consensus economy, which is devoid of economic inducements to work.

The productivity of social capital met an even worse fate. After 1965, returns on investments began to decline rapidly. The weaknesses in the economic system gave the wrong signals to enterprises and sociopolitical communities in the adoption of investment and other decisions. The autarkic republican and provincial economies were not interested in an optimal structure for the Yugoslav economy, nor did they take into account the dangers of duplicating capacity. Investment credits were put to a variety of badly planned uses, and for the most part repayment was cancelled out by inflation. The obligation to subsidize general public and collective consumption expenditure from the income of their own economies led communes to enter into new investment projects with little forethought. Either because of a lack of information or because the basic structure of investments was not planned, duplicate productive capacity was built. The fragmented capital accumulation, linked to economic sectors and territories, opened up a wide front of ongoing investment projects, with long completion deadlines, inasmuch as these projects were ever completed. The small-scale capital accumulation in dwarf-sized banks induced investors to achieve the greatest possible earnings and employment with little capital, a situation which resulted in the construction of superfluous capacity in the manufacturing industry and insufficient capacity for the production of raw materials and energy. Superficially analyzed investment projects resulted in serious investment fiascos. There were no economic or social sanctions for wrong investments; politicians remained in the background, even though they often had a decisive influence on investment decisions. All the above-enumerated factors causing the low efficiency of investments were products of the economic system. Therefore, mistakes in economic development and in the economic system, manifested in the drop in overall productivity of the economy (the productivity of labour and of capital taken together), were the main cause of the crisis in the Yugoslav economy.

Also to blame for the crisis is the economic policy pursued in the 1970s, which did not take the proper measures for subsequent adjustment. In order to offset the effects of the decline

in overall productivity and worsened terms of trade caused by the sharp rise in oil prices, with the aim of maintaining the expansion of production without a rise in inflation or deficit in the balance of payments, a different allocation of aggregate income on savings and consumption expenditure was required. The absence of an incomes policy which would regulate the various forms of consumption expenditure in society was particularly critical as not even a decline in exports was forestalled by the customary policy of introducing a realistic dinar exchange rate and other measures. All these failings, especially when they took the form of illiquidity in foreign trade, forced economic planners at last to introduce long overdue restrictions on all forms of consumption expenditure, which were able to prevent the further deepening of the crisis but not the crisis itself.

The reasons for these economic ills cannot be fully understood without insight into the economic philosophy underlying the economic system. The setting aside of economic laws and coercion, reliance on people's sense of civic duty rather than on their own interests as an incentive for economic behaviour, the emphasis on living labour as the sole creator of income, insufficient attention to costs and economic categories in their real expression -- these were all component parts of the official economic philosophy and institutional arrangements which in practice had even worse consequences than they would have had otherwise because they enjoyed ideological support, even when they were obviously at odds with the demands of economically rational behaviour. This, among other things, explains the condoning of economically perverted relations, economic pathology, and social profligacy, all of which has been going on far too long not to have left scars on ways of thinking and the behaviour of the economy. The enormous losses in the economy show that not even after four decades has the principle of profitability become obligatory, and that there are no economic penalties for poor business performance. Subsidies to the economy in the form of credits, the covering of losses from public funds, low rate of amortization, toleration of shoddy quality, a growth rate of real personal incomes which for years exceeded that of labour productivity, all created very easy terms of production, introducing on a large scale a wide variety of forms of parasitism in the economy and elsewhere. Such conditions were able to persist thanks to growing foreign debts, which will have to be serviced not just by present generations, but by generations to come. The principle of remuneration according to work performed could not be applied in the economy either because of the unresolved question of primary allocation, or because many firms are earning interest from public funds. The incentive for workers to increase their labour productivity has inevitably been weak because of social distinctions which are not based on labour. The countenancing of idleness and other forms of social demagoguery are a high price

to pay for social harmony and maintaining the material privileges of the ruling classes. In view of all these considerations, it is no wonder that people see the tightening up in the terms of production as an attack on their prerogatives, as can be seen from the resistance to the introduction of economically positive interest rates and the priority given to payment of personal incomes. The economy finds good reasons for its resistance to this tightening up in the large contributions which it has to pay to maintain a top-heavy bureaucracy, whose costs represent an intolerable burden for the economy.

Saturated as it is with economic irrationalities, the economic climate has inevitably affected the behaviour of citizens, who, thanks to the contracting of foreign debts by the country, had enjoyed a rapidly rising standard of living. The sharp increase in personal consumption, bordering on extravagance, is still regarded by people as their birthright. The drop in real personal incomes, which should be seen as a necessary correction to bring them into line with the real level of labour productivity, is seen by the public as an unconscionable act of violence against them and not as an objective necessity. Things could not be otherwise in a country where for years people have lived beyond their means. Consumer and investment credits, the purchase of imported goods at low prices, allocation of socially-owned flats and low rentals all meant that a large segment of the population was in fact being subsidized by public funds. Economic irrationalities and the topsy-turvy economic relations have lasted for a long time and can be seen at every turn. As a result, the public considers this situation to be normal. Everyone, motivated by his own selfish interests, has his own model of economic behaviour, which for some groups might even have been successful, but for society and the economy as a whole has as a rule been fatal. The painful question must be tackled of how to reaffirm the work ethic as the basis for existence and for the individual's social and economic status.

2. With the outbreak of the all-pervasive crisis in society, responsibility for Yugoslavia's future made it incumbent first to determine the true dimensions and real causes of the crisis and then to set about at once devising measures to remedy this state of recession and uncertainty. This, however, was not done. Three years had to go by before official reports started referring to an "economic crisis," and this acknowledgement was gradual and reluctant. In the first two years of the crisis it was referred to as "minor," "short-term," or "passing" troubles, but most popular of all was the phrase "difficulties of economic growth." It was de rigeur to say in the same breath that there was no need to change the economic system in any major respect and that all that was necessary was to make sure it was fully observed. When these assertions became untenable, the thesis was launched that the Yugoslav crisis was of

greater scope than had originally been thought, but that it was exclusively economic in nature, that its causes lay in foreign trade and an inappropriate economic policy after 1976. At the same time an attempt was made to exempt the political factor from any blame for the economic crisis, and by insistence on economic policy as the main culprit to spare the economic system from critical scrutiny. Since this line could also not last forever, a concession was made by at long last subjecting the political system to scrutiny. Unfortunately, this scrutiny has not only bypassed the key issues in the political system, but in its section on the economy it negated the concepts put forward in the Stabilization Programme.

The recognition of the crisis in stages, only for it to be denied again, resulting in valuable time being wasted, belies the irresolution and unwillingness of official political circles to carry out the changes which the new situation demands. The reluctance to make an accurate diagnosis and to tackle the crisis with timely measures has undermined public confidence in the statesmanship, political courage and sincere intentions of the individuals who are in charge of public affairs, as well as their preparedness to make a break with the delusions which have brought the country to the brink of disaster. A disinclination to look the truth in the face and resistance to any substantive changes are reflected in the fact that it was only under pressure from the International Monetary Fund that some economic measures were adopted which would have been less painful and which would have had a greater effect if they had been taken much earlier on our own initiative. But nothing so eloquently speaks of the opposition to efforts to achieve economic efficiency than the fact that the government did not implement its own Stabilization Programme. Those who said that this document could only have been adopted because it was too generalized to put concrete obligations on anyone were right. It was predicted that the implementation of the programme would encounter unsurmountable obstacles in conflicts of interest between republics, provinces, and industry groups. When these predictions came true, doubt began to grow over whether the Stabilization Programme was really conceived as a plan of action for economic recovery, or whether it had a political propaganda role, calculated to make the public think that something was being done to find a way out of the crisis, whereas in fact the necessary changes were being stymied. The Stabilization Programme, which took a realistic approach to the economy, received its heaviest blow from the Critical Analysis of the Functioning of the Political System, which rehabilitated the already abandoned ideology of a "consensus economy," which has been most responsible for the woes of the Yugoslav economy. What is more, two documents with fundamentally different economic concepts were both officially adopted. Perhaps that was the most effective way to maintain the status quo, but it could not provide an answer to the crisis in Yugoslav society.

Justification for the economic difficulties and delayed response to the crisis is sometimes sought in the limitations of the science of economics and the failure of economists to agree on key issues. There have always been disagreements between economists in all countries and at all times, but it is up to the government to decide whose opinions to honour and to take responsibility for its choice. The problem is, however, that the opinion of economists was never sought in the proper manner. Economic science was acceptable to the extent to which it provided rational explanations for official policy. Consequently, those in power did not give due attention to the timely warnings and valuable proposals made by economists on their own initiative. The systematic neglect of professional expertise throughout the entire postwar period is hard to understand, but it is even harder to understand why such a thing could happen in a socialist society, which in principle takes science as the cornerstone of its development. The neglect of academic scholarship, especially in the last two decades, should be regarded as part and parcel of the tendency to subordinate economic development and economic efficiency to the strengthening and preservation of polycentrism and a monopoly of power in society of the republican and provincial leaders, as an undeclared goal which took absolute priority. This goal stems from the symbiosis of nationalism, separatism, and the lust for power, and it is pursued by the efforts of the political factor to increase its power, using republican states' rights as a power base, and to act as mediator and arbiter in the local economy and society.

This goal has only recently become clear to the general public, when malignant disintegration as the dominant trend in the economy and society took on alarming proportions. The danger that the political system would evolve in the direction of polycentrism unless timely efforts were made to head it off by setting up workers' councils for branches of the economy at the level of Yugoslavia was noted by Boris Kidric as early as 1950. His suggestions, unfortunately, were not heeded. A deaf ear was turned to his warning that, if such councils were not created, the outcome would be "a number of state capitalisms, with localistic proclivities vis-à-vis the whole but with bureaucratic centralist proclivities vis-à-vis work collectives." In Yugoslavia today we have the situation which Kidric dreaded most.

This situation is the upshot of an evolution which has been going on for almost three full decades. During the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s it seemed as though democratization, the substitution of government with self-management institutions, and the deprofessionalization of politics had gained widespread public support. Prospects that progress in this direction would continue were all the brighter in that, thanks to a better balanced programme of investments and a better link between coordination and initiative, the economy had scored convincing success, both in raising output and creating new jobs and in improving

the quality of business performance and increasing exports. Labour productivity had grown rapidly; investment efficiency was at a high level, and economic relations with foreign countries were virtually on an equal footing. It was as though there was nothing standing in the way of building the political and economic system on principles which were giving palpable results. It is true that in that period there were already clear intimations of separatism and nationalism in the form of the slogans: "to each his own" or "we are splitting up in order to become reunited" or the persistent campaign against an overly exaggerated and imagined unitarism.

Things started going wrong in the mid 1960s, when, to everyone's surprise, these intimations became the ruling trends, which brought the progressive course of political change to a halt. Some aspects of the system which had almost been eliminated became revived. Instead of withering away, as had been expected, government authority and the state became stronger in the republics, provinces, and communes. As a result, the laws of economic efficiency as imperatives of a modern, civilized society were given short shrift. Admittedly, even before the economic reform of the 1960s politics took precedence over the economy, but economic growth had been the most important political priority. However, when politics became a goal unto itself, in the economy the emphasis shifted from economic growth to the economic system, from the earning of income to its allocation, from production to consumption. All this shows the extent to which economic development was neglected, precisely in the rejection of the knowledge gained by developed societies and suspension of economic science. Such views found fullest expression in the thesis that the demands of self-management and efficient business performance could not be reconciled.

The abortive attempt to reintegrate the railways and other large systems at the federal level is a concrete example of how the most obvious principles of economic efficiency go by the board if they threaten to limit the power wielded by the republican and provincial leaderships. However, we should also take this as indicative of the extent of political voluntarism, which has cleared the field for itself for complete freedom of action. Serious obstacles to it might have been posed by the economic plan, which, once adopted, does not allow for caprice, even for those who have adopted it, or by the market, implying autonomy of decision-making on the part of economic entities. Precisely because they posed an impediment to voluntarism, the economic plan and market were neutralized, so as to create scope for a brand of economics which is not based on market mechanisms and economic constraints but instead takes all relationships to be arbitrary. In this country the basic task of the economic system is not to promote economic growth and honour the principles of economic efficiency; rather it is designed to serve as a means of strengthening the political factor. We have seen that political

voluntarism does not let even the law stand in its way; if laws prove to be constraining, they simply are not enforced. Voluntarism breeds an unholy alliance between ignorance and irresponsibility and abundantly passes on these characteristics to the economy, which it keeps under heel and in a position of dependence. No one needs to be persuaded anymore of the fact that politics takes precedence over economics. This fact is being openly discussed by political leaders, as though they were not the main culprits for such a state of affairs.

The system of self-management did not curb political voluntarism. The reason for this is simple: this system was imposed by the will of the political leaders, who have not the least difficulty in either increasing or restricting the scope of its influence or in controlling it from within. The thesis that self-management is most fully exercised within basic organizations of associated labour in fact is just an excuse not to allow it access to that essential (macroeconomic) field of action in which decisions of vital importance for society are taken. The political factors jealously keep this domain reserved for themselves. In the 1960s, self-management was pushed into a backseat, and herein lie the roots of many of our present troubles. In fact it is non-existent on a global scale, and it never was even elaborated into a comprehensive democratic system, nor have conclusions been drawn from this fact. Consequently, self-management is mere window dressing and not the pillar of society. The system is totally inconsistent. There is no real plan, no real market, no real government, and no real self-management.

3. The disintegration of the Yugoslav economy into separate economic sectors and territories, which is an anachronistic trend, directly stems from an even more widespread and more significant anachronistic trend, which is the transforming of the federal state as constituted in the decisions taken at the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia and during the first decades of postwar development into a kind of confederation, which became institutionalized in the most recent Constitution of 1974. There have been many cases in history of a confederation turning into a federation, but there is not one single example of the opposite occurring. The changing of a federal state into a federation of states is all the more unacceptable in that after relatively frequent changes in the years after the war, Yugoslavia now has an iron-clad constitution, which for all practical purposes is impossible to change. Eleven years have been more than enough time for the enormous difficulties caused by all the consequences of confederalism in the social order to become clear, as a result of which even the Constitution itself has found itself in the focus of criticism of the political system.

The most important element of confederalism consists of the requirement that the assemblies of all the republics and provinces must first give their consent before even the most

minor amendment can be made to the Constitution, as well as the requirement that a decision voted upon in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces may be considered to have been carried only if all the delegations vote in favour of it. In both cases, opposition by just one participant in decision-making has the character of a veto. If we bear in mind the possibility of behind-the-scenes manoeuvring intended to foist decisions on the minority, it is hard to find fault, either in general or on any other basis, with the principle of consensus in the system of decision-making, provided such decision-making concerns major questions affecting the social order, as is envisaged by the Constitution. The trouble, however, is that the principle of unanimous decision-making has overstepped its constitutional framework and without good reason has found a place both in many statutes and regulations and in decision-making within the economy, cultural life, and sports organizations.

The affirmation of republican and provincial attributes of statehood alongside the simultaneous disappearance of the coordinating functions vested in the federal government have opened the doors wide to the promotion of local interests at the expense of national interests. The Constitution ostensibly tried to forestall such an eventuality by including a declarative provision calling upon the republics and provinces to concern themselves both with their own development and with the development of Yugoslavia as a whole. But since "charity begins at home" they concentrated on their own development and largely ignored the development of the entire country. A balance between optimal local and optimal national development is a theoretically untenable construct which has never passed the acid test of practice. Such constructs have not passed muster in other cases as well. Ethnic interests have taken precedence over class interests, and the provinces have insisted more on their status as a constituent element of the federation than on the fact that they are an integral part of Serbia. Balances of this sort have served as a means of pacifying those who were concerned about maintaining the state and economic integrity of the country as a whole, but they have also encouraged separatists of all stripes to push through their own agendas in practice.

Another element of confederalism is the principle of parity in the composition of the Presidency of the SFRY, as well as of the other highest organs. The constitutional provision stating that federal statutes are in principle to be enforced by the governments of the republics and provinces is essentially confederal in nature, and in practice it often meant that these laws were not enforced at all. Another strong element of confederalism is the fact that there is no requirement for republican and provincial constitutions to be in harmony with the federal constitution; the only stipulation is that they may not conflict with it. No legal remedies have been envisaged for dealing with any conflicts that might arise. On the other hand, in the case of

a conflict between a republican or provincial statute and a federal statute, it is the republican or provincial statute that remains in force until such time as the Constitutional Court makes its ruling.

The present-day political system of Yugoslavia is increasingly contradictory, dysfunctional, and expensive. It multiplies the unwieldy machinery of government on three levels, leading to a strong proliferation of red tape and increased public spending. Whether it is a case of political or economic matters, the system can serve as a textbook example of inefficiency. Decision-making at the federal level is so slow that even when appropriate measures are taken, they only have a limited effect because they come late. As a result of conflicts between the participants in decision-making, there is often a complete impasse, and not just at the federal level. The Republic of Serbia has not managed in ten full years to pass republican laws. The insufficient flexibility of the system is seen when it comes to both new decisions and amendment of earlier decisions. The system does not make provision for timely adjustment to new situations. Its inertness does not permit simple changes to be made quickly if such changes become necessary. We should also mention here the frequent impotence on the part of federal agencies to secure enforcement of federal laws. The social system is obviously in a state of paralysis.

In order for the necessary changes to be effected, we must throw off the ideology which lays primary emphasis on ethnic and territorial considerations. Whereas in modern-day civilized society integrational trends are gaining momentum, with full affirmation of civil and human rights, the superseding of authoritarian forms of government, and democratization of government, what we have in our own political system is growing centrifugal forces, local, regional and national egoism, and authoritarian, arbitrary government, which on a large scale and at all levels of society violates universally recognized human rights. The propensity to divisions and fragmentation of global entities in society, which is in fact resistance to a modern, democratic, integrated federation, takes shelter behind the specious ideological catchword of a struggle against “unitarism” and “centralism.” However, the real alternative to “unitarism” and “centralism” is not ethnic egoism and polycentrism, with local “national” (in fact republican and provincial) economies, with forcible restriction of science, culture, and education within territorial boundaries and the subjugation of all aspects of public life to the unchecked power of republican and provincial oligarchies. The real alternative is a democratic, integrating federalism, in which the principle of autonomy of the parts is in harmony with the principle of coordinating the parts within the framework of a single whole, in which political institutions at all levels of society are set up in a consistently democratic way, in which decision-making is

preceded by free, rational, and public debate, and not by secret behind-the-scenes manoeuvring by cabals of self-styled and self-appointed champions of special ethnic interests.

The aforementioned attitude toward the state and nation has blocked the development of self-management. Self-management is stunted and deformed not just because it has been reduced to the level of social micro-entities, but also because it has been completely subordinated to the organs of alienated authority – from the communes all the way up to republican and provincial governments. The disintegrated working class has been turned into a conglomerate of work collectives, placed in a situation where they have to fight with one another over how to divide up income. There are no self-management institutions for groups of enterprises, for economic sectors, or for the economy as a whole which would efficiently regulate production and lay down guidelines for economic development. A welter of legal regulations has reduced to a minimum the area in which self-management organs can exercise freedom of decision-making. This area has been further whittled down by the arbitrary interventions of local authorities, in collusion with technocratic forces. It is paradoxical that in a society which considers itself to be socialist, the working class has no opportunities of becoming organized or of being represented in the Federal Assembly. Just how much the ethnic and territorial principle has gained ascendancy over the economic principle of production can best be seen from the vehemence with which the idea of setting up a chamber of associated labour in the Federal Assembly is being resisted.

For a better understanding of why the ethnic principle takes precedence in the present-day practices of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, we must look to the influence of the Comintern on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the years between the two world wars. The Comintern's strategy in this period was based on its conclusion that in view of the failure of proletarian revolutions to materialize in Western Europe, the communist parties in Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe would have to rely on national movements, even if they were expressly anti-socialist and revolved on the idea of national and not class unity. Stalin took a hand personally in breaking down all opposition to this strategy (for instance, one of the founders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Sima Markovic, came to grief because of his objections to this policy). It was in this spirit that Sperans (Kardelj) formulated and gave the theoretical elaboration to the programme for dealing with the national question in his book *The Evolution of the Slovene National Question*, which largely served as the ideological model for Yugoslavia's evolution in the direction of a confederation of sovereign republics and provinces, culminating in the 1974 Constitution.

The two most developed republics, which thanks to this Constitution accomplished their nationalist agendas, are today zealous defenders of the existing system. Thanks to the political position of their leaders in the centres of political power, both before and after the critical decade of the 1960s, they have provided the initiative on all matters concerning the political and economic system. They have shaped Yugoslavia's social and economic order to their own measure and to meet their own requirements. Nothing would be more normal than for them now to defend the system which they worked so hard and long on creating, a system in which they see the realization of the major portion of their national programmes.

According to the ruling ideology in these two republics, their political leaders must not defer to the economic interests of the entire country, or indeed even their own economic interests, if doing so would restrict their political autonomy.

There is no need to say that separatism and nationalism are both at work on the social scene, but there is not enough awareness that such trends were made ideologically possible by the 1974 Constitution. The constant strengthening and synergetic effect of separatism and nationalism have cut the national groups off from one another, to a critical degree. Machinations with language and the caging of academics and cultural personalities in republican and provincial enclosures are depressing signs of the burgeoning strength of particularism. All the new ethnogenies are not so much the unfortunate fabrications of an academic community shut up within a provincial bell jar and plagued by the incubus of regional ideologies as they are symptoms of growing alienation, not only from a common present and future but even from the common past. It is as though people were in a hurry to get out of a house which is tumbling down around their ears and were trying to run away as fast and as far as possible. The intellectual climate provides a warning that the political crisis has come close to the flash point of complete destabilization of Yugoslavia. Kosovo is the most obvious portent. Incidents such as Slivnitsa leave no one in doubt that those who have aspirations to Yugoslav territory have already defined their interests.

The bureaucratic decentralization which in recent decades has been carried out by the holders of political power in this country has at one and the same time been an impediment to the advancement of democracy. After the Second World War, political life in Yugoslavia adjusted to peacetime conditions, when there was no longer any need for clandestine activities, slowly and not particularly successfully. The legacy of Stalin and the Comintern is still very much in evidence. The conditions prevailing within the underground communist movement left deep traces: conspiratorial methods, internal hierarchy, the participation of only a handful of individuals in decision-making, insistence on ideological unanimity and unquestioning

acceptance and carrying out of assignments, and harsh epithets (“factionalist” or “enemy”) for anyone who disagreed with or criticized the adopted political line. If we add to this the tendency for power, once gained, to be strenuously defended, both with repression and with encouragement of slavish obedience, then it is understandable why it has been so hard to find ways of arriving at genuine democracy.

Hopes for progress along democratic lines were raised in the 1950s, when Yugoslavia declared a policy of debureaucratizing the economy and society, at the same time putting forward a programme of socialist democracy in the form of social self-management. The famous passage from the LCY Programme that “nothing is so holy” promised an openness to new ideas which no dogmatism would be allowed to fetter. This social programme was not elaborated in sufficient detail to be clear on all points, any more than were the ways in which it was to be put into effect, but all the same it was widely accepted as an opportunity for democratic development which would be sensitive to modern-day changes and sufficiently determined to make timely adjustments to these changes.

Such expectations, however, have come to nought. In the mid-1960s, efforts to do away with bureaucracy suddenly flagged and gave way to decentralization, which in essence was bureaucratic. The present-day political system of Yugoslavia does not have a single one of the advantages of contemporary political systems. It is not a liberal democracy, nor a consultative democracy, nor even an enlightened bureaucratic system. It lacks political liberty, the direct participation of citizens in political life, and functioning of the system according to set rules and norms. The entire system has been constructed on the principle of an active role for the top leaders in the political hierarchy and hopeless political passivity of the citizens. The Federal Chamber of the Assembly of the SFRY is federal in name alone. Here, too, it is the republics and provinces that are represented, and not the citizens of the federal state regardless of what republic or province they belong to. There is no special chamber (a chamber of associated labour) in the Assembly of the SFRY in which the Yugoslav working class would be represented. Direct elections, as one of the great achievements of civilization, have been replaced by indirect elections. The delegate system which was introduced has proved to be unworkable. Political manipulation of citizens is successfully carried out and constant. Citizens are from time to time called upon to vote in a “plebiscite” to put their rubber stamp on elections which have already been carried out by the ruling hierarchy behind the political scene. The undemocratic electoral system puts voters into a situation where they do not know whom they are electing, or rather for whom they are casting their votes, and the delegates have no one to whom they are accountable for their actions.

In fact, the political system of Yugoslavia is a mixed bag, with hold-overs from the old political state and the authoritarian state inherited from the so-called “real socialism” in Eastern Europe. A state with such mixed attributes is incapable of creative action, of making necessary changes, and of adjusting its institutions and goals to a society which is in constant flux. The blocked political organization became an organization to preserve the status quo, to maintain unproductive, unimaginative professional politics and an appointments policy which ensures the selection of loyal but incompetent individuals.

Democratization is a vital prerequisite both for recovery from the deep-seated crisis and for the imperative revitalization of society. Yugoslavia does not need lip service to democracy, which changes nothing; what it needs is democratization of people’s minds and relationships in society. The demand for a genuinely democratic system is all the more important in that Yugoslav civic-mindedness is particularized and fragmented. It is hard to imagine genuine democratization without alternative concepts of development. The sorely needed accountability might be achieved only if it appeared likely that, because of mistaken ideas or inefficacious work, a different conception and its protagonists might win public confidence. Democratic centralism has a rationale if in the process of arriving at decisions the minority is an equal partner in discussions, and if it is defeated by the force of argument and outvoted after a truly democratic debate. This road was not the one taken. Every dissenting opinion has been proclaimed to be factionalism. The deep-seated aversion to change is best illustrated by resistance to proposals that two or more candidates should stand for each electoral post, even though, there being no alternative concepts, they could not do any harm to the established political line. However, the repercussions of such an innovation would be enormous from the standpoint of the monopoly on appointments held by the top political leadership, which selects delegates in return for their votes. The situation has reached such a pass that within the republics and provinces informal caucuses are formed to bid for the most influential positions. Similarly, at the federal level, instead of a principled and argued battle of opinions, coalitions are formed to satisfy republican and provincial interests and to assure the autonomous, monopolistic status of the ruling political cliques in them.

There are other ways in which the latitude for political action by citizens is restricted. Attempts to make the vitally needed step in the direction of emancipating thought and speech have to date produced only modest results. There is no denying that the mass media are much freer, even when they deal with certain topics which until recently were taboo. From time to time a voice will be raised in political circles talking about the need for debate, or stating that different points of view should not be regarded as something unusual. Unfortunately, public

statements are not regarded as binding by the holders of power. Public declarations carry no weight and make no impact whatsoever, even when they communicate important insights. Public opinion does not have a corrective function, nor is it included in debate. Not even academic and professional opinion succeeds in making a mark by force of argued assessments and suggestions if they differ from the fixed opinions and attitudes of the political factors.

Just how insignificant the role of public opinion is can best be seen from the imprudent contracting of foreign debts and the large number of failed investment projects. An interesting sidenote is that no one had any idea of how much Yugoslavia owed or to which foreign creditors, so that a foreign firm had to be hired to determine the actual state of affairs. It is another question why the extent of the foreign debt was kept a secret from the public. Today we know how much is owed to foreign creditors, but the public does not know how much in loans has been handed out by Yugoslavia and whether or not they are being repaid on a regular basis. The debate on nuclear power plants has shown that undemocratic practices in investment decisions and the contracting of debts abroad are continuing. However, the problem lies not in individual decisions but rather in the absence of fundamental democracy in resolving the dilemma over whether to retain or change the political and economic system. There is no doubt that public and professional opinion is strongly in favour of radical changes, but the political factor still takes no heed of it. This is indeed the most convincing proof that democratic channels have not yet been created for the communication of demands to the political leaders. As regards the institution of "verbal crimes" and their arbitrary interpretation, no society aspiring to democracy can be proud of such a compromising means of repression.

It would be a step forward for civilization and not just for democracy if such repression were to disappear forever. Which is not to say that a clamp-down would not be welcome in regard to economic and other crimes. The reasons for excessive repression where it is not needed and too little where it is indispensable should be sought among other things in the fact that for the state, ideological considerations and criteria are paramount. Disorganized to an unreasonable extent, the state has degenerated into an institutional form of republican, provincial, and communal voluntarism. Many ills are caused by the fact that there is no well organized and democratically controlled state, with a professional and publicly accountable civil service for the implementation of adopted policy. For the moment, there are certain economic functions which no one but the state can successfully perform. These are above all long-term planning, fiscal and monetary policy, and incomes policy. Society needs this kind of government in order to rid itself of parallel institutions of decision-making. As things stand

today, those who in formal terms do not have power in fact take decisions, while those who formally hold power in fact do not decide on anything. Society will never be able to establish accountability unless it eliminates the practice of informal decision-making, which is always closed to public scrutiny and control.

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia forms the backbone of the political system, and its leadership holds an absolute monopoly of power in society. There are reliable reports that it has succumbed to the temptations of this monopoly, that the League of Communists is living off the glory of its revolutionary past, that to a large extent it has become privatized, that it has a hierarchical structure of professional officials who manage to stay in their positions thanks to personal loyalty to their superiors and unquestioning obedience, and that democratic centralism means that the leaders make decisions and the rank and file unquestioningly carry out these decisions. The LCY has fused with the state. From an ideological leader it has become the ruling party. All aspects of the lack of democracy within the League of Communists are transferred to society as a whole. The League's claim to be the vanguard of society is obviously at variance with the unsettled state within it. Such a state of affairs could have been a direct catalyst for a reassessment of all relationships in society, as was attempted in the USSR and in China after the deaths of Stalin and Mao Tse Tung. However this did not take place. The need for a thorough-going reassessment was consistently denied, even though there was a glaring need for it as the situation continued to deteriorate. Not even the bulk of the short-term measures with immediate effect was taken. Instead of energetic action, there were long-winded and fruitless discussions which only gave a pretense that something was being done. No one even pays attention any more to the mass of generalized recommendations. If there is a lackadaisical attitude to problems which brook no delay, there is even less interest in the question of Yugoslavia's inclusion in modern trends and its ability to take part in the third technological revolution.

These questions would not even have arisen if the revolutionary movement had not changed into a party of vested interests, if the self-image of the ruling forces in Yugoslav society had not thereby become highly conservative. Ideas about the structure of society and the working class formed long ago in the past and differing radically from modern-day reality die hard. Conservatism, to be sure, is not manifested merely in the emphasis given to the role of production workers who, it should be noted, have not received the attention from society which would be proper and possible in socialism. It is seen most of all in the deep suspicion with which experts and intellectuals are regarded, who both numerically and in terms of their creative contribution are receiving an ever more important place in the developed countries. The

working class cannot stay a genuine vanguard for long if its intellectuals are looked upon as unreliable fellow-travellers of the revolution. The limited confidence placed in the intelligentsia is perhaps most disastrous in that the country is losing step with technical advances. Deliberations on the system of production, the taking of investment decisions, organization and development of production do not go beyond the conceptual framework of the second technological revolution, which is on the way out. The right moment for joining in the third technological revolution has, it appears, been missed.

The shortcomings of the political system are so numerous and of such magnitude that their reverberations are felt throughout Yugoslav society. The tackling of these defects must begin with a thorough reexamination of the Constitution, without any prejudice or ideological bias. Such reassessments are prompted not just by the weaknesses in the political system, but also by the basic economic flaws in the Constitution, such as: an insufficiently clear definition and institutionalization of socially-owned property, topsy-turvy relations between the parts and the whole, inoperability of the self-management mechanism, an income principle which is not scientifically founded, an insufficiently elaborated concept of planning and the market mechanism, an incorrectly constituted status and responsibility of the basic organization of associated labour, etc.

In jurisprudence there is general agreement that a country's constitution should be concise, with clear enunciation of the basic principles of the social order and with precisely defined rights and obligations, so that they are easily understood and remembered by every citizen. Such a constitution is not merely the product of the experience and knowledge of the science of law; it also derives from the right of citizens in a democratic and civilized country to have this type of constitution. The Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 did not abide by the aforementioned principles. The desire to be original in organizing society at all times, unless there was a deliberate attempt to create ambiguities, resulted in Yugoslavia having the most lengthy constitution in the world. It deals with such minor issues as housing for military personnel, or appointment of managers of firms, matters which are properly topics for statutes or bylaws. An inappropriate terminology makes the text of the constitution hard to understand for ordinary folk, and indeed not just them. Sentences containing over one hundred words, articles which cover many pages of text, and the inconsistent and incorrect use of various terms are all symptomatic of an impermissibly low level of legal expertise in drawing up a legal document. At the same time it shows that jurists did not have enough say in the drafting of the Constitution.

4. In addition to the economic and political crisis there is a moral crisis, which is seriously eroding Yugoslav society. Its numerous causes have deep historical roots. But in an ideological society such as ours, the moral crisis has essentially been caused by the ideological crisis, by the failures of the ideological programme of the revolution, by deviations from avowed socialist goals and principles, by a discrepancy between word and deed on the part of the political leadership, by an imperfect legal order, by an inferior and dependent judiciary, by bureaucratic high-handedness and privileges, by moral conformism and reward of careerism, by an absence of free and open criticism of trends, ideas, people in official positions, in short, by a lack of democratic public opinion which would act as the effective conscience of society. Nothing was done to try to stem the massive migration from the countryside or address all the problems it entails with a programme of cultural education, or by establishing a definite code of conduct and morality. The ubiquitous small-minded peasant mentality, made worse by the notion that everything which is not expressly forbidden is permitted and with a penchant for focussing on immediate interests in the here and now, completely neglecting longer-term or more general interests, has been able to survive for a long time, and in times of crisis it emerges as a force which completely wrecks the system of morality, creating wide opportunities for criminality and other phenomena which have little in common with the values of a socialist society.

Everywhere we see attempts to appropriate socially-owned property, and theft, embezzlement and corruption have become such a normal way of supplementing their budgets for so many citizens that income of this provenance has to be taken into account when the amount of personal consumption expenditure is being calculated. The bad example set by the often unpunished infractions of the law by enterprises and sometimes even by administrative agencies also takes its toll. Privileges are clung to, despite unanimous public censure. There is virtually no appreciation in society of what it means to do an honest day's work. There are few people who ask themselves just what they have done and how hard they have worked to earn their pay checks. Because the terms of production are not uniform, a situation arises in which the principle of remuneration according to work is abandoned. The salaries paid out in enterprises often depend less on performance and more on someone's agility in fighting for higher prices or lower taxes. The systematic practice of covering the losses of some firms with the earnings of others kills incentive for both sides. A relatively large number of people have acquired wealth in a legal manner but not through their own labour. The widening social disparities caused by the chaotic state of affairs in the economy and society are all the more economically intolerable and morally indefensible as they are appearing in a time of crisis.

Unemployment is also devastatingly demoralizing the masses. Nepotism is universal, and the favouring of relatives when hiring is done has virtually gained the force of customary law. Unemployment is a difficult social problem not just because a large number of young people cannot make an independent living, but also because a large section of the population, younger and with higher qualifications than the employed work force, has remained unproductive, even though the harnessing of their skills would greatly improve the situation. It is painful to see the demoralization of these people and their families, the hopelessness of students who go through school without any prospects of finding a job when they get out, or the state of mind of those people who, having at last found employment after several years of waiting, regard their job as no more than a means of livelihood, with no ambition to excel, especially since the years of waiting for a job have caused them to lose touch with their profession and forget most of what they have learned. Nor is the fashion of seeking "temporary" employment abroad any less disastrous. It has become accepted wisdom that it is impossible to make a decent living at home by honest work. People are losing faith not just in the merits of doing one's job conscientiously but also in socialism, whose halo has become tarnished in the light of the ill repute this system has in the countries to which Yugoslav citizens have gone as "guest workers."

The loss of confidence and low level of motivation are the clearly visible signs of moral crisis. So far it has not been possible to effect a general mobilization of all the country's energies to tackle present social problems. The general public lacks a clear sense of civic duty, of working towards and sacrificing oneself for general social goals. The official ideology which instead of a real socialist programme only offers empty political proclamations has largely squandered its ability to win people's hearts and minds. The credibility gap between socialist principles and harsh reality is so great that it is giving rise to large-scale apathy, privatization, and growing discontent. The reforms that today might be able to restore a healthy climate in society and perhaps reverse present trends will not be enough tomorrow.

The erosion of the system of values, which has become more and more pervasive with time, goes beyond moral norms. We have come to such a pass that almost nobody knows what values Yugoslav society seeks to uphold. The horizon of needs has never been seriously opened up for democratic debate. Consequently, the scale of priorities of needs is created spontaneously, largely under the influence of the consumer society mentality. This psychology, linked with an untrammelled primitivism, has greatly strengthened the propensity towards kitsch in literature, music, film, and entertainment of all types. This propensity is even being deliberately and systematically pandered to by the press, radio and television. Under the assault

of the aggressive kitsch which reigns supreme on the scene, genuine cultural values have failed to take root on a large scale in society, despite the large number of important accomplishments in Yugoslavia's cultural life. There are few planned efforts to bring these works to a wider public.

The crisis in culture is seen not just in the fact that genuine social values cannot compete against kitsch. Cultural life is becoming more and more regionalized; the Yugoslav and universal significance of culture is becoming obliterated, and in large part it is putting itself in the service of republican and provincial aspirations to carve out their own fiefdoms in this sphere as well. The overall provincialization of cultural life lowers standards and makes it possible for the less talented to gain wide public recognition. Deep-rooted as they are in provincial cultural life, separatism and nationalism are becoming increasingly aggressive.

5. This sweeping and profound crisis in Yugoslav society poses many questions, two of which are uppermost: What has become of the plan for building a new society for which so many lives were sacrificed? Where do we stand today in relation to modern European civilization?

An objective, scholarly analysis, free both from ideological apologetics (which resist any alterations whatsoever to the system) and from ideological scepticism (which rejects the system out of hand, from its very inception) reveals all the contradictions in postwar development and explains why, after a period of impressive economic growth, progressive democratization and intellectual emancipation, there followed the social strife of the late 1960s, restoration of authoritarianism in the early 1970s, a loss of stability and structural proportions, economic stagnation, and growing spiritual disorientation as the upshot.

The collapse that has occurred would not be so grave and intractable if it were the result of just one misconceived policy. The new political strategy introduced in the 1960s was not just a plan of economic reform but termination of the process of political and economic democratization, of the disalienization of politics, of long-term social planning, of the building of an integrated federation. The new social plan, which gave free rein to group and national egoism, has led to an irreconcilable conflict with all the recognized moral values of the past and to an increasing demoralization of the masses.

In order to explain why the fatal turnabout occurred after a period of successful development from 1953 to 1965, we must take into account a number of factors: precedence to individual and group over general interests; the acquisitiveness of the new middle class; ascendancy of the interests of the most developed republics; defence of the politocratic monopoly of power in the face of growing pressure for further democratic reforms; and the

obstinate resistance to emancipation put up by the patriarchal tradition. Of the outside factors, we should especially mention the pressure of the great powers, which in the political sphere have lent their support to authoritarianism, and in the economic sphere strove, in the end successfully, to force the country into technological and economic foreign dependency.

At the same time, we cannot be satisfied with an explanation which would idealize the plan of revolutionary transformation or the undeniable successes scored in the first two decades after the war, and which would regard the subsequent mistakes and decline as merely the deformation of this plan by those in power. It is a home truth that this plan itself has its limitations, both as regards its initial vision, which (notwithstanding all its humanistic and emancipatory ideas) overemphasizes the role of violence and dictatorship in the transitional period, and the manner in which this vision was interpreted and applied in Yugoslavia under the pressure of Stalinism and the legacy of the Comintern.

Successful opposition to Stalinism mobilized considerable social forces, which ensured national independence, industrialization of the country, an enviable economic growth rate in the period 1953-1965, the initial forms of self-management, and intellectual emancipation from narrow ideological frameworks in the sphere of culture. Nonetheless, once established, the hierarchical relationships could not be superseded. They proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to the process of democratization. This process was tolerated and encouraged so long as it liberated creative forces at the micro-level of society and in spheres of activity far removed from politics. It was then strictly controlled when it became extended to political institutions, with the demand for deprofessionalization and debureaucratization of politics, and it was definitively halted when it began to threaten the centres of political power, in the form of a demand for freer elections and for transformation of government agencies into organs of self-management. The economic reform of 1965 essentially marked a change of course in the strategy of social development: the plan for political democratization was supplanted by a plan of economic liberalization. The idea of self-management, which pivots on the disalienization of politics, was replaced with the idea of decentralization, which led to the setting up of regional centres of alienated power. The ethics of mutual aid and the welfare state gave way to a spirit of grasping individualism and promotion of group interests. Political voluntarism, bold and dynamic in the first postwar decades, when it was able to count on mass support from the citizens, is now becoming hidebound and tenacious in defending the system, even when it is becoming obvious that this system is incoherent and inefficient.

The basic problem of Yugoslav society does not lie in the fact that the historical blueprint which came into being during the national liberation war was not put into effect in its

entirety or was distorted. It has been the fate of all programmes in recent history for their implementation to be accompanied by outdated elements from the past, eventually resulting in a variety of mixtures of the old and new society. However, even though they did not accomplish all their emancipatory goals, such hybrids proved to be progressive achievements which helped to overcome the various crises and to accelerate social development.

One of the most typical features of Yugoslav society is the historically unprecedented credibility gap between normative proclamations and reality. According to the official ideology, Yugoslav society has already superseded all the attainments of modern civilization, both in the East and in the West: it has achieved the highest level of democracy; by virtue of the system of self-management it has given the working class power; it has achieved the brotherhood and unity of national groups; it has done away with etatism; for the first time in the world it has proven possible the existence of an efficient market economy in socialism. In actual fact, our society lags behind modern civilization. In Yugoslavia the fundamental civil rights of individuals can still be violated with impunity; elections of officials are a farce; the judiciary depends on the executive branch; freedom of speech, freedom of organization, and public assembly are restricted by bureaucratic arbitrariness and legal prescriptions which make it possible to persecute opinions which differ from the official line. The working class enjoys no legal right of self-organization or strikes, and it does not have any real voice in political decision-making. Relations between national groups are characterized by clashes of conflicting interests, exploitation, and poor cooperation between autarkic national economies. We can no longer even speak seriously of a Yugoslav development policy or an integral Yugoslav market. Etatism has not been abolished; it has merely been transferred to the republican level, where it is the most inefficient and malignant. When undesirable consequences began to appear as early as 1967/68 in the form of stagflation and unemployment, the poorly conceived" economic reform" was tossed out the window, and we never did achieve a modern market economy regulated by instruments of a comprehensive development policy. In contradistinction to other modern mixed societies, the specific Yugoslav mix of features of a pre-modern authoritarian state, a civil society, and socialism, which received its definitive form in the 1974 Constitution, does not possess even the minimum coherence needed to ensure the further development of society.

Unless there is a change in this Constitution and the political and economic system based on it, it will be impossible to resolve any of the basic problems in our society; it will be impossible to halt the present process of disintegration, and the country will slide ever deeper

into crisis. It is imperative to see solutions in the light of the following great principles of civilization which are an indispensable prerequisite for the forward progress of modern society:

a) The sovereignty of the people. At the very foundations of modern civilization is the idea that political power is vested in the people, that the sole legitimate political authority is the one which derives from the freely expressed will of the people, and that therefore there are no moral or legal grounds for any elite (by the will of God, by blood, religion, race, class, ideological credentials, historical merit or on any other grounds) to arrogate to itself the right to speak, decide, or use force on behalf of a nation. A nation can only devolve political power to its representatives for a limited time, with the right to appoint, oversee, and replace them, and if need be remove them by force if they violate the "social contract" and instead of general national interests begin to pursue their own special interests. The principle of the sovereignty of the people has been affirmed by the democratic political philosophy and practice of the democratic revolutions of the 18th century. However, socialist theory has taken this principle to extremely radical lengths. If a monopoly of economic power is also one of the means by which elites are formed, which can foist themselves upon society and gain full control over its political life, then all the institutions which make such a monopoly of power possible are incompatible with the principle of the sovereignty of the people, regardless of whether it is big capital or a bureaucratic state. In this sense, full sovereignty of the people could be achieved only in a classless society, in which political, economic, and cultural life would be organized in a democratic manner. The prerequisite for such a democracy ("consultative democracy" or "integrated self-management") is the free election and recall of all officials, public oversight of their work, a separation of powers, and the absence of bureaucratic privileges. These prerequisites have long ago been created in modern society. Yugoslavia has still not achieved this level, even though many years have gone by since it proclaimed the ideas of self-management, debureaucratization, and deprofessionalization of politics.

b) Self-determination of nations. In modern, civilized society, any political oppression or discrimination on ethnic grounds is unacceptable. The Yugoslav solution of the national question at first could have been regarded as an exemplary model of a multinational federation, in which the principle of a unified state and state policy was happily married to the principle of the political and cultural autonomy of national groups and ethnic minorities. Over the past two decades, the principle of unity has become weakened and overshadowed by the principle of national autonomy, which in practice has turned into the sovereignty of the federal units (the republics, which as a rule are not ethnically homogeneous). The flaws which from the very beginning were present in this model have become increasingly evident. Not all the

national groups were equal: the Serbian nation, for instance, was not given the right to have its own state. The large sections of the Serbian people who live in other republics, unlike the national minorities, do not have the right to use their own language and script; they do not have the right to set up their own political or cultural organizations or to foster the common cultural traditions of their nation together with their conationals. The unremitting persecution and expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo is a drastic example showing that those principles which protect the autonomy of a minority (the ethnic Albanians) are not applied to a minority within a minority (the Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, and Roms in Kosovo). In view of the existing forms of national discrimination, present-day Yugoslavia cannot be regarded as a modern or democratic state.

c) Human rights. The modern age began with the affirmation of human rights. These were originally civil rights: the right of freedom of thought, conscience, speech, movement, association with others, organization, public assembly, public demonstrations, and the election of representatives. In our century, social and economic rights have been added to the list of civil rights: the right to work, to a free choice of occupation, to an education, to equal pay for equal work, to social security. The UN General Assembly formulated all these rights in its Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted on December 10, 1948. Yugoslavia was one of the member states sponsoring this declaration; Yugoslavia is also a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act and all similar international instruments. There is no doubt that there are quite a few modern-day states which have a lower standard of human rights than our own. But in Yugoslavia "verbal crimes" are still prosecuted; books are still being banned and destroyed, and plays are taken off the repertoire of theatres if they are deemed "ideologically unacceptable." Public expression of opinions is trammled; association, assembly, and public demonstrations are prohibited; exercise of the constitutional right to send petitions of protest to government agencies is branded as a hostile act; the organizers of protest strikes are hounded; elections of officials have turned into a farce of self-nomination. So long as all these things persist, we cannot call ourselves a civilized and enlightened society.

d) Efficiency. The modern age is the age of efficiency. Public institutions and the manner of organizing the overall life of society must pass the test of rationality. This does not always mean an efficient selection of goals: it is a great shortcoming of our age that the spheres of politics, ethics, and science have become separated. However, instrumental efficiency and the ability to find the proper means to achieve set goals and the effective implementation of a given policy are the *conditio sine qua non* of every modern state. This further means that every modern state is a large system whose individual parts are regulated, coordinated and directed

in a uniform manner, that the rules of the game are clear, constant, and can be changed only after serious study and preparation, that state officials are selected primarily according to standards of competence and personal integrity, that the adoption of decisions is based to the greatest possible extent on reliable information and analysis of costs and expected gains. Not a single one of these prerequisites for a rational, efficient policy has been met in Yugoslavia: the country is made up of eight separate and poorly linked systems; there is no uniform development policy at the national level, and even if such a policy did exist on paper, it could not be put into effect in practice; officials are selected primarily according to the criterion of loyalty, so that in great measure they are incompetent and easily corrupted; decisions are taken without proper deliberation, arbitrarily and with bias, without prior public debate, and on the basis of unreliable, one-sided information, without any consideration of possible alternatives. So long as such an inefficient style of work prevails in Yugoslav political life, we cannot consider ourselves to be a modern state.

It follows from this analysis that political democratization and infusion of new blood, genuine self-determination and equality for all members of all the Yugoslav nations, including the Serbs, full exercise of human, civil, and economic and social rights, and consistent streamlining of the Yugoslav political system and development policy are those indispensable prerequisites without which recovery from the present crisis in Yugoslav society could not even be imagined.

THE STATUS OF SERBIA AND THE SERBIAN NATION

6. Many of the troubles bedeviling the Serbian nation stem from conditions which are common to all the Yugoslav nations. However, the Serbian people are being beset by yet other afflictions. The long-term lagging behind of Serbia's economic development, unregulated legal relations with Yugoslavia and the provinces, as well as the genocide in Kosovo have all appeared on the political scene with a combined force that is making the situation tense if not explosive. These three painful questions, which arise from the long-term policy taken towards Serbia, are so dramatic that they are threatening not just the Serbian people but the stability of the entire country. For this reason they must be given due attention.

Not much knowledge or statistical data were needed to ascertain that Serbia's economy has been lagging behind for many years. Nevertheless, this fact was only officially recognized in the Plan for 1981-1985, which stated that measures would be taken in this period to halt this trend. This undertaking was soon forgotten. The five-year period was spent making new studies to see whether Serbia was indeed falling behind in its development. The findings convincingly

showed what everyone already knew, viz., that according to all relevant indices Serbia's economy was consistently below the Yugoslav average, and the gap was widening. The slowed rate of growth did not produce enough momentum to overcome economic underdevelopment in a section of its territory with 1.5 million inhabitants and a per capita national income more than 30% below the corresponding income in the three underdeveloped republics.

Studies have left not the shadow of a doubt that the relative lagging behind of Serbia was primarily the result of lower investment expenditure per head of population and not of poorer investment efficiency. According to official statistics, the rate of return on investments in Serbia for the entire postwar period was only lower than that in Slovenia or Vojvodina, while in the last decade (the period 1976-1983) it was the highest in Yugoslavia. Greater investment efficiency could only partially compensate for the loss in social product because of lower investment, but it was not able to prevent the formation of a per capita value of fixed assets at a level of just 80.5% of the Yugoslav average, which is even lower than the level achieved by Montenegro or Bosnia and Hercegovina, two republics which have the status of underdeveloped republics.

Throughout the entire postwar period, Serbia's economy has been subjected to unfair terms of trade. A current example of such exchange is the low cost of electric power which is distributed to the other republics in large quantities. Instruments and measures of current economic and credit and monetary policy, and especially the contribution levied for the Federal Fund for the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas, have most recently been the most important factors accounting for Serbia's lagging behind. If we add to this the fact that the most developed republics, because of Serbia's lack of capital, are investing their capital in its economy (in agriculture, the food processing industry, retail trade, and banking), we gain a picture of a subordinated and neglected economy within the territory of Yugoslavia.

Consistent discrimination against Serbia's economy in the postwar period cannot be fully explained without insight into the relations among the Yugoslav nations between the two world wars, as seen and assessed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Its views were decisively influenced by the authoritative Comintern, which, in its efforts to achieve its own strategical and tactical goals at the international level, sought to break up Yugoslavia. Finding its ideological justification in drawing a distinction between the "oppressor" nation of Serbs and the other "oppressed" nations, such a policy is a drastic example of how Marxist teachings about the class divisions in each nation were eclipsed by pragmatic considerations which, in an effort to take advantage of inter-communal friction, pushed class internationalism onto the sidelines. This fact explains to some extent why the CPY did not make an effort to carry out its

own research in order to arrive at the real truth about the economic nature of relations between the Yugoslav nations. The assessment of these relations, which amounted to the theory that

the political hegemony of the Serbian bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding economic domination by Serbia, was in fact taken over wholesale from the separatist-minded bourgeois political parties. Neither before nor after the war was the CPY willing to determine for itself the actual state of affairs, nor was it willing to enter into any kind of debate which might call into question the assessments and policies made in the past, which are still being insisted upon to this day. This consistent line was all the more remarkable in that even without special studies, with only a cursory look at the basic indicators of the level of development in the census year of 1948, it could be seen that Serbia could not have had an economically privileged position in the years between the two world wars. The strongly pronounced agrarian character of Serbia's economy clearly showed that it was lagging behind in industrialization. The share of agriculture in the social product was greater and the share of industry smaller than the Yugoslav average. The CPY did not revise its assessment in the light of these facts, and what is more it did not pay even the slightest attention to the studies made by research institutes which as early as the beginning of the 1950s documented quite a different picture of Serbia's economic position between the two world wars. The constant repetition of the prewar assessment over the course of four decades gives an idea of the exceptionally large political and economic stake held in maintaining such a distorted view. The purpose was to inculcate in the Serbian people a feeling of historical guilt in the hope of weakening their opposition to the political and economic subordination to which they were consistently subjected.

The postwar policy towards Serbia's economy, which was quite clearly mapped out in the report on the First Five-Year Plan, was based on the prewar assessment. In this plan Serbia was unjustifiably assigned the slowest rate of industrialization, after Slovenia. In practice this policy was inaugurated with the relocation to other republics of industrial plants for the manufacture of airplanes, lorries, and armaments, and it was carried on with compulsory purchases of agricultural produce, price scissors to the detriment of raw materials and agricultural products, lower investment rates per head of population than the Yugoslav average, and levies for the development of underdeveloped regions. But nothing so eloquently speaks of Serbia's subordinated position than the fact as it did not have the initiative in a single key issue having to do with the political and economic system. Therefore, Serbia's status should be studied in the context of the political and economic dominance of Slovenia and Croatia, which have initiated changes in all the systems to date.

Slovenia and Croatia started at the highest level of development, and they have enjoyed the fastest rates of growth. As their relative status has improved, the gap between them and the rest of Yugoslavia has become much wider. Such a course of events, which flies in the face of the declared policy of balanced development, would not be possible if the economic system were not biased, if these two republics had not been in a position to impose plans which furthered their own economic interests. Manufacturing industries, which have a relatively larger share in their economies, throughout the entire postwar period have enjoyed more favourable terms of production, strongly influenced by price disparities and the price regime, as well as protective tariffs. The greater scope given to the market in the 1960s worked more to the advantage of the developed parts of the country. The suspension of the 1961-1965 Five-Year Plan, which placed emphasis on expanding production of raw materials and energy, should be seen as a reluctance on the part of the republics to invest in underdeveloped regions which are relatively rich in natural resources. Yugoslavia's growth rate from this period was based more on the factors of production of the two developed republics than on the situation in the rest of the country. Consequently, the work force did not receive a commensurate place in the development plan, a fact which particularly affected Serbia and the underdeveloped regions.

Serbia's economic subordination cannot be fully understood without mention of its politically inferior status, from which all other relationships flowed. As far as the CPY was concerned, the economic hegemony of the Serbian nation between the two world wars was beyond dispute, regardless of the fact that Serbia's rate of industrialization was lower than the Yugoslav average. This ideological platform gave rise to opinions and behaviour which were to have a crucial influence on subsequent political events and inter-communal relations. Before the Second World War, the Slovenes and Croats set up their own national communist parties, and they gained a decisive voice in the CPY's Central Committee. Their political leaders became arbiters on all political issues both during and after the war. These two neighbouring republics shared a similar history; they had the same religion and aspirations for greater independence, and as the most highly developed, they also had common economic interests, all of which provided sufficient grounds for a permanent coalition in the endeavour to achieve political dominance. This coalition was cemented by the long years of collaboration between Tito and Kardelj, the two most eminent political figures in postwar Yugoslavia, who enjoyed inviolable authority in the centres of power. A monopoly on appointment of officials gave them the deciding voice on the composition of the top political leaderships of Yugoslavia and of all the republics and provinces. Everyone knows about the exceptionally large contribution made by Edvard Kardelj in the drafting and adoption of the decisions by the Anti-Fascist Council of

National Liberation of Yugoslavia and all postwar constitutions. He was in a position to build his own personal ideas into the foundations of the social order, and in practice no one could challenge them. The doggedness with which Slovenia and Croatia are today opposing any constitutional change shows how well the 1974 Constitution suits them. Ideas about the social order had no prospects whatsoever of being accepted if they differed from the views taken by these two aforementioned political authorities, and even after their deaths nothing could be done, since the Constitution, with its provisions for a veto, was insured against any changes. In view of all this, there can be no doubt that Slovenia and Croatia entrenched their political and economic domination, thanks to which they are achieving their national agendas and economic aspirations.

In such circumstances, and subjected to a constant barrage of accusations of being” oppressors,””unitarists,””centralists” or” policemen,” the Serbian people could not achieve equality in Yugoslavia, for whose creation they had borne the greatest sacrifices. The vindictive policy against the Serbs began before the Second World War, in the sense that a communist party was deemed unnecessary for a” nation of oppressors.” There were relatively few Serbs in the CPY’s Central Committee, and some of them, probably in order to maintain their positions, declared themselves to be members of other ethnic groups. During the war Serbia was not in a position to take an equal part in adopting decisions which set the course for future relations between the Yugoslav nations and determined Yugoslavia’s social order. The Anti-Fascist Council of Serbia was set up in the second half of 1944, later than in the other republics, while there was no Communist Party of Serbia until the war was over. Delegates to the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia were elected from the Serbian military units and members of the Supreme Headquarters who happened to be in the territory of Bosnia and Hercegovina at the time, unlike the delegates from some other republics, who travelled to the session from their own territories and who had the backing of national political organizations with elaborated positions and programmes.

These historical facts show that during the war Serbia was not even formally and certainly not genuinely in an equal position when decisions of far-reaching importance for the future ordering of the state were taken. This is not to say that the Serbs would not have opted of their own free will for federalism as the most appropriate system for a multinational community; however, they were compelled, in wartime and without prior preparation and support from their political organizations back home, to give their consent to arrangements which set the stage for their own fragmentation in the future. The status of the Serbs should have been thoroughly studied beforehand and regulated so as to ensure their national integrity

and untrammled cultural development, instead of which this exceptionally important question was left open for solutions which impaired the vital interests of the Serbian nation.

The gravity of the social and economic repercussions following from these solutions in the postwar period makes it imperative that we put a stop to the loose use of the theory of oppressor and oppressed nations which has been responsible for Serbia's unenviable economic position. Exemption of Serbia from the requirement of paying in contributions to the Federal Development Fund, so as to strengthen its capital reserves and accelerate economic growth, would have provided an opportunity for heralding an end to such a policy. It was expected that the political representatives of Serbia would come forward with such a logical and justified request and that they would insist that it be met. Our surprise was all the greater when they agreed to pay in contributions at the full rate, in return for vague reassurances that the contributions would be financially compensated in some other sphere.

This outcome is at odds with the findings concerning Serbia's flagging economy, and at the same time it is in historical terms an irresponsible act against one's own people. The capitulation of Serbia's political spokesmen makes one wonder, especially about their right to take such a step. We might well ask who is authorized to acquiesce to a decision which condemns Serbia's economy to long-term stagnation in the future, with inevitable political consequences. At stake are enormous amounts of money, badly needed to get Serbia's economic growth moving again and to provide a livelihood for the large number of young people without jobs, many more than in any other republic. Without a referendum for the Serbian people, who alone have the right to determine their fate, no one can usurp the right to negotiate behind closed doors, take decisions and consent to the setting of heavy restraints on that nation's economic progress.

Serbia could have requested exemption from paying in contributions to the Federal Development Fund with a clear conscience, secure in the knowledge that it has more than fulfilled its obligations of providing mutual aid. Only Serbia made genuine sacrifices for the sake of the development of the three underdeveloped republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, helping others at the price of its own economic stagnation. This has not been the case as far as the three developed regions are concerned. Application of a rate of contributions proportional to the social product did not observe the basic rule that taxes should be levied according to ability to pay. The proportional rate of contributions spared Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina from progressive rates of taxation, a fact which enabled them not only to grow at a normal rate but also to improve their own relative position in relation to the Yugoslav average. However, such rates of taxation have been an enormous burden for Serbia

proper. Its economy has been setting aside about half its net capital savings for the underdeveloped regions, as a result of which it has itself been dragged down to the level of the economies of the underdeveloped republics.

Despite the fact that its contributions have aided the development of the underdeveloped regions and relieved some of the burden from the developed parts of the country, Serbia has not met with sympathy for its own economic plight either from the former or from the latter. Both these categories of regions have a vested interest in forming a coalition to maintain the status quo, in which they are promoting their own interests at Serbia's expense. In the case of the rate of contributions to the Development Fund, the anti-Serbian coalition has shown its hand more openly and with less political tact than ever before in the past. Blatant pressure has been brought to bear on Serbia to make it accept the rate of contributions as a whole. This pressure is also significant as a sign that the traditional discrimination against Serbia has not lessened and perhaps has even increased.

In view of everything that has occurred in the postwar period, such pressure is nothing new. What would be new would be for Serbia to put up determined resistance to this pressure. Unfortunately, this did not materialize. The Serbian leaders did not even avail themselves of all the legal remedies at their disposal, such as the veto power, which is their only recourse in a situation when they stand alone with their justified demands, and it seems that they did not even consider making an appropriate response, up to and including the forcing of a political crisis if there was no alternative. Serbia's politicians proved to be unprepared for the historical task which was posed for them by the extremely adverse internal relationships within the Yugoslav state. The historical moment behooved them to put their foot down and state in no uncertain terms that there would be no more of the postwar practice of ousting politicians who broach the issue of equal rights for Serbia, the practice of discriminating against economists, sociologists, philosophers and writers from Serbia who give timely warnings about socially harmful phenomena and the consequences of wrong decisions, as well as the practice of getting rid of able businessmen, thereby crippling Serbia's economy in the stepped-up competition in the market.

7. The attitude taken to Serbia's economic stagnation shows that the vindictive policy towards this republic has not lost any of its edge with the passing of time. On the contrary, encouraged by its own success, it has grown ever stronger, to the point of genocide. The discrimination against citizens of Serbia who, because of the representation of the republics on the principle of parity, have fewer federal posts open to them than others and fewer of their own delegates in the Federal Assembly is politically untenable, and the vote of citizens from

Serbia carries less weight than the vote of citizens from any of the other republics or any of the provinces. Seen in this light, Yugoslavia appears not as a community of equal citizens or equal nations and nationalities but rather as a community of eight equal territories. And yet not even here is Serbia equal, because of its special legal and political status, which reflects the desire to keep the Serbian people constantly under control. The watchword of this policy has been "a weak Serbia ensures a strong Yugoslavia," and this idea has been taken a step further in the concept that if the Serbs as the largest national group are allowed rapid economic expansion, they would pose a threat to the other national groups. It is for this reason that all possible means have been used to hamstring Serbia's economic progress and political consolidation by imposing more and more restrictions on it. One such restriction, which is very acute, is the present undefined and contradictory constitutional status of Serbia.

The Constitution of 1974 in effect split up Serbia into three parts. The autonomous provinces were put on an equal footing with the republics in all respects, the only difference being that they were not defined as states and they do not have the same number of representatives in various organs of the federal government. They make up for this shortcoming in that they can intervene in the internal affairs of Serbia proper through the common republican assembly, whereas their own assemblies are completely autonomous. The political and legal status of Serbia proper is quite ambiguous: it is neither fish nor fowl, neither a republic nor a province. The system of government within the Republic of Serbia is confused. The Executive Council, an arm of the republican assembly, in fact serves as the executive government of Serbia proper alone. This is not the only example of an absence of logic in the definition of jurisdictions. The sweeping and institutionally deeply entrenched autonomy of Serbia's provinces has opened up two new fissures splitting the Serbian people. Admittedly, the separatist and autonomy-seeking forces were the ones to insist on having this autonomy widened even further, but they would have had great difficulty in achieving their aim if they had not received moral and political support from republics where separatist tendencies have been kept alive.

The widening of autonomy was rationalized by assurances that it would bring about a higher degree of equality between the national groups and expedite the conduct of public affairs. The events in Kosovo at the end of the 1960s were forewarning of what could happen if autonomy were to be extended. There was even less reason for giving Vojvodina more autonomy. The greater prerogatives it received have encouraged the creation of an autonomous bureaucracy and have resulted in serious instances of separatist behaviour which had never occurred in the past, in growing autarky of the economy, and in political voluntarism. The

influence has grown of those outside the provinces and in Vojvodina itself who are spreading misinformation designed to divide the Serbian people into "Serbs from Serbia" and "Serbs from Vojvodina." With wholehearted assistance from outside, the Serbian provinces have become transformed into "constituent elements of the Federation" a status which has given them cause to feel and behave like federal units, ignoring the fact that they are an integral part of the Republic of Serbia. Once again the attempt to achieve a balance through dualism could not succeed. The way the provinces are behaving today shows that in practice the separatist forces and those seeking greater autonomy have totally prevailed. The Republic of Serbia has had its hands tied and in issues of vital importance is prevented from taking concerted action to protect the interests of the national group to whom it belongs.

The unclear relationships within the Republic of Serbia are a logical outcome of its constitutional status and the appointment of separatist and autonomy-minded officials, who precisely thanks to their policies enjoy the patronage of those individuals who have held a monopoly on government appointments in Yugoslavia. In the absence of a commensurate counterbalance in coordination, as a rule the practice of regionalization turns into provincial narrow-mindedness and blindness to broader national interests.

Those individuals who did everything they could to plant the seeds of internal conflicts in the constitutions are today coming forward as arbiters and peace-makers, who, in the time-honoured practice of apportioning blame equally to all concerned, are slapping the wrists of both Serbia proper and its provinces and suggesting to them that a way out should be sought in the strict application of these selfsame constitutions. The problem will never be resolved in this fashion, and Serbia will continue to dissipate its energies coping with conflicts without any prospect of achieving complete success in the enterprise. This no doubt was the idea when the provinces were given wider autonomy, especially since the perpetuation of strife in Serbia gives others an excuse to interfere in its internal affairs and in this way prolong their domination over it. After the federalization of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, such interference in the internal affairs of a republic has only remained possible in the case of Serbia.

The relationships between Serbia and its provinces cannot be seen solely or even predominantly in terms of an interpretation of the two constitutions from a formal legal standpoint. The question concerns the Serbian nation and its state. A nation which after a long and bloody struggle regained its own state, which fought for and achieved a civil democracy, and which in the last two wars lost 2.5 million of its members, has lived to see the day when a Party committee of apparatchiks decrees that after four decades in the new Yugoslavia it alone is not allowed to have its own state. A worse historical defeat in peacetime cannot be imagined.

8. The expulsion of the Serbian people from Kosovo bears dramatic testimony to their historical defeat. In the spring of 1981, open and total war was declared on the Serbian people, which had been carefully prepared for in advance in the various stages of administrative, political and constitutional reform. This open war has been going on for almost five years. It is being waged with a skilful and carefully orchestrated use of a variety of methods and tactics, with the active and not just tacit support of various political centres in Yugoslavia, which they are taking no pains to conceal and which is more ruinous than the encouragement given by our neighbours. Moreover, we are still not looking this war in the face, nor are we calling it by its proper name. It has been going on now longer than the entire national liberation war fought in this country from April 6, 1941, to May 9, 1945. The Ballists' rebellion in Kosovo and Metohija at the very end of the war, which was organized with the collaboration of Nazi units, was militarily put down in 1944-1945, but as we now see, it was not politically quelled. In its present-day physiognomy, disguised with new content, it is being pursued with greater success and is getting close to final victory. There has been no real showdown with neofascist aggression; all the measures taken to date have merely removed manifestations of this aggression from the streets, while in fact steeling resolve to achieve its uncompromising, racially motivated goals at any cost and using all possible means. Even the deliberately draconian sentences handed down against young offenders have been designed to incite and spread ethnic hatred.

The five years of the ethnic Albanians' war in Kosovo have convinced its organizers and protagonists that they are stronger than they even dared dream and that they enjoy support from various power centres in the country which is incomparably greater than that which the Kosovo Serbs receive from the Republic of Serbia, or this Republic from the other republics in Yugoslavia. Aggression has been encouraged to such an extent that the highest officials of the Province as well as its academics are behaving not just with arrogance but also with cynicism, proclaiming the truth to be a lie and their extortionate demands to be a legitimate claim to rights allegedly denied them. The organized political forces in Yugoslavia, which carried out a revolution in virtually impossible circumstances, triumphing over a superior enemy in this entire century, have now all of a sudden proven to be not just ineffective and incompetent but almost uninterested in the only proper response to a declared war: a resolute defence of their nation and their territory. And once the aggression is put down, to settle political scores not by arrests, attempts to "separate the sheep from the goats" or false loyalties, but by a genuine revolutionary struggle and open confrontations, with the right to free expression and even propagation of opposing viewpoints.

The physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija is a worse defeat than any experienced in the liberation wars waged by Serbia from the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 to the uprising of 1941. The reasons for this defeat can primarily be laid at the door of the legacy of the Comintern which is still alive in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia's national policy and the Serbian communists' adherence to this policy, but they also lie in costly ideological and political delusions, ignorance, immaturity, or the inveterate opportunism of generations of Serbian politicians since the Second World War, who are always on the defensive and always worried more about what others think of them and their timid overtures at raising the issue of Serbia's status than about the objective facts affecting the future of the nation whom they lead.

It was the Albanian nationalists in the political leadership of Kosovo who began to turn the principle of equal national rights, for whose sake in Kosovo and Metohija as well as elsewhere it was Serbian soldiers who had shed the most blood, into their opposite by pursuing a very well defined policy in planned stages, according to a set plan of action, with a clear goal. At a suitable moment the autonomous region acquired the status of an autonomous province, and then the status of a "constituent part of the Federation" with greater prerogatives than the remaining sections of the Republic, to which it only de jure belongs. Thus the preparations for the next step, in the form of the Albanianization of Kosovo and Metohija, were carried out in full legality. Similarly, unification of the literary language, the national name, flag, and school textbooks, following instructions from Tirana, was carried out quite openly, and the frontier between the two state territories was completely open. Conspiracies, which are usually hatched in secret, were planned in Kosovo not just openly but even demonstratively. Accordingly, the large-scale popular demonstrations in 1981 appeared more as an instance of exhibitionism and bravado than as a new phenomenon posing a threat to the entire country, just as subsequently each new revelation of the persecution of Serbs in Kosovo was regarded as "nit-picking" and news items appearing in the "Belgrade press" were virtually considered to be a greater crime than the acts of arson, murder, rape, or vandalism which were reported, acts committed by persons many of whom to this day have not been politically identified or brought to justice.

The attitude taken by those in power and the authorities in Kosovo towards the violence directed at the Serbian people is particularly significant. The hushing up or glossing over of these crimes, the practice of suppressing the whole truth, and dilatory tactics in enquiries and prosecution all encourage large and small acts of terror, and at the same time a false "sanitized" picture of conditions in Kosovo is created. Moreover, there is a persistent tendency to find a political excuse for the violence perpetrated against Serbs in the alleged existence of hatred on

both sides, intolerance, and vindictiveness, while of late more and more is being heard of the imaginary activities of an “external” enemy from outside the Province, viz., Serbian nationalism emanating from “Belgrade.” The Martinovic case is noteworthy not only because of the particular type of unprecedented violence involved, which is reminiscent of the darkest days of the Turkish practice of impalement, but also because of the stubborn refusal to let a court of law determine and acknowledge the truth. Instead of providing an opportunity for reaffirming the rule of law and human rights as the highest values, this case was regarded in Kosovo as an opportunity to insist on the province’s sovereignty, which it does not have in terms of the Constitution, and to impose on the Socialist Republic of Serbia the principle of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of the province, as though two international personalities were involved.

The Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija not only have their past, embodied in cultural and historical monuments of priceless value, but also their own spiritual, cultural, and moral values now in the present, for they are living in the cradle of the Serbs’ historical existence. The acts of violence which down through the centuries have decimated the Serbian population of Kosovo and Metohija are here and now, in our own era, reaching their highest pitch. The exodus of the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija in Socialist Yugoslavia exceeds in scope and character all earlier stages of this great persecution of the Serbian people. In his day, Jovan Cvijic estimated that in all the population migrations, from the mass exodus led by Arsenije Carnojevic in 1690 to the early years of the present century, more than 500,000 Serbs were uprooted; of this number, between 1876 and 1912, some 150,000 Serbs were driven from hearth and home by the savage terror of the local privileged Albanian bashi-bazouks. During World War II, more than 60,000 Serbs were expelled from Kosovo and Metohija, but it was after the war that this exodus reached its highest proportions: in the last twenty-odd years, upwards of 200,000 Serbs have been forced to leave. It is not just that the last of the remnants of the Serbian nation are leaving their homes at an unabated rate, but according to all evidence, faced with a physical, moral and psychological reign of terror, they seem to be preparing for their final exodus. Unless things change radically, in less than ten years’ time there will no longer be any Serbs left in Kosovo, and an “ethnically pure” Kosovo, that unambiguously stated goal of the Greater Albanian racists, already outlined in the programmes and actions of the Prizren League of 1878-1881, will be achieved.

The petition signed by 2,016 Serbs from Kosovo Polje, which was sent to the Federal Assembly and other authorities in the country, is the inevitable consequence of this state of affairs. No party caucuses can deny the Serbian people the right to protect themselves against

violence and annihilation with all the legitimate means at their disposal. If this protection cannot be offered in the Province, the people can and must seek recourse at the level of the republican and federal government. The fact that citizens from the Province came to the Federal Assembly shows their civic sense of this right. The action taken by these citizens could be condemned as unacceptable and regarded as a hostile act only if viewed through a separatist and chauvinistic prism.

The present-day situation in Kosovo can no longer be fobbed off with empty words, convoluted, unreadable resolutions, or vague political platforms; it has become a matter of Yugoslav concern. Between provincial segregation, which is becoming increasingly exclusive, and federal arbitration, which merely paralyzes every appropriate and often urgent action, the unresolved situation is turning into a vicious circle of unresolvable issues. Kosovo's fate remains a vital question for the entire Serbian nation. If it is not resolved with the sole correct outcome of the imposed war; if genuine security and unambiguous equality for all the peoples living in Kosovo and Metohija are not established; if objective and permanent conditions for the return of the expelled nation are not created, then this part of the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia will become a European issue, with the gravest possible unforeseeable consequences. Kosovo represents one of the most important points in the central Balkans. The ethnic mixture in many Balkan lands reflects the ethnic profile of the Balkan Peninsula, and a demand for an ethnically pure Kosovo, which is being actively pursued, is not only a direct and serious threat to all the peoples who live there as minorities but, if it is achieved, will spark off a wave of expansionism which will pose a real and daily threat to all the national groups living in Yugoslavia.

Kosovo is not the only area in which the Serbian people are feeling the pressure of discrimination. In absolute and not just relative terms, the decline in the number of Serbs in Croatia provides ample proof to back this statement. According to the 1948 census, there were 543,795 Serbs in Croatia, who made up 14.8% of the population. The census of 1981 shows their number as having fallen to 531,502, or 11.5% of the total number of inhabitants of Croatia. In thirty-three years of peacetime the number of Serbs in Croatia has dropped even in comparison with the years immediately after the war, when the first census was carried out and when, as is known, the number of Serbian inhabitants had been greatly decreased by the ravages of the war.

Lika, Kordun, and Banija have remained the least developed parts of Croatia, a fact which has given strong impetus to the emigration of Serbs to Serbia, as well as migration to other parts of Croatia, where the Serbs, as newcomers, members of a minority and second-class

citizens, have been very susceptible to assimilation. Indeed, the Serbian population in Croatia has been subjected to a subtle but effective policy of assimilation. A component part of this policy is prohibition of all Serbian associations and cultural institutions in Croatia, of which there used to be many in the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or Yugoslavia between the two world wars. Then there is the insistence on the official language, which bears the name of another national group (Croatian), as a personification of national inequality. Under an article of the constitution this language has been made compulsory for the Serbs living in Croatia, and the nationalistic Croatian grammarians have carried out a systematic and well organized campaign to make it as different as possible from the standard language spoken in the other republics of the Serbo-Croatian language area, resulting in a weakening of the bonds between the Serbs in Croatia and the other Serbs. Such an outcome is willingly paid for with a break in linguistic continuity for the Croats themselves and the expunging of international words highly useful for communication with other cultures, especially in the sphere of science and technology. However, the Serbian population in Croatia is not just culturally cut off from their conationals in Serbia; Serbia has much fewer opportunities for receiving information about their fate and their economic and cultural status than is the case with some other national groups in Yugoslavia as regards their conationals living in other countries. The integrity of the Serbian nation and its culture throughout Yugoslavia presents itself as the most crucial question of its survival and progress.

The fate of Serbian institutions which were established in the course of the Second World War and in its immediate aftermath also fits into this general picture. In the national liberation war and in the early years after its conclusion, the national life of Serbs in Croatia was very intensive in their own political, cultural, and educational institutions. A general decision adopted by the Executive Board of the National Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH), dated November 10, 1943, called for the setting up of a Serbian group of delegates to ZAVNOH to act as a national and political leadership of the Serbian population in Croatia. This group was established on January 12, 1944, in liberated Otocac. At the end of the war, on the initiative of the Serbian Group, the First Congress of Serbs in Croatia was held in Zagreb on September 30, 1945, where the more than 30,000 participants formed an Executive Committee of Serbs in Croatia to serve as a "broad-based political organization of the unified Serbian people in Croatia," within the National Front. With the direct participation of these political bodies, the Serbs subsequently founded their own cultural institutions and began organizing national education. On October 22, 1944, the Obilic Serbian Choral Society was set up on the ruins of the Glina Orthodox church, the scene of horrific ustasa

massacres, and less than a month later, on November 18th, again in Glina, the Prosvjeta Serbian Cultural and Educational Society was founded. On January 4, 1948, in Zagreb, a Central Serbian Library and Museum of the Serbs in Croatia were established under the auspices of Prosvjeta, which also sponsored publishing activities and had its own printing works. What is more, starting from September 10, 1943, the national liberation movement published a special newspaper for the Serbian population in Croatia printed in the Cyrillic script and called Srpska rijec. In the postwar years, Srpska rijec changed its name to Prosvjeta. The national liberation movement distributed Cyrillic readers to the Serbian children in Croatia in the school year 1944/45, and in a decision taken on July 18, 1944, the Presidency of ZAVNOH guaranteed full equality of the Cyrillic script with the Latin script, and in schools in the territory of Croatia where the majority of the pupils were Serbian children, Cyrillic was allowed to have precedence.

All these prerogatives had much deeper significance for the Serbian population in Croatia than merely as a token of the services they rendered in the national liberation war. In a special proclamation issued to the "Serbian people in Croatia," on January 12, 1944, the Serbian Group of Delegates to ZAVNOH explained its existence as a "sign of equality between Serbs and Croats" and a "guarantee that the interests of the Serbian people will be fairly represented in free Croatia." When it was being formed, the Executive Committee of Serbs in Croatia was described as a "political organization of the unified Serbian people in Croatia," whose task was to promote "free thinking" and to be a "sufficient guarantee that the Serbs in Croatia will continue to enjoy the benefits of an equal nation." The Serbs themselves regarded these prerogatives, which they had earned for themselves by shedding blood, as "outward and visible signs of the equality of the Serbian and Croatian nations in Croatia."

Such a situation prevailed during the war years and just after the war, but then gradually everything changed. It is not recorded anywhere that the Serbs had themselves ever decided that one of these institutions was not needed, that it should be done away with or replaced with another one which would be more in keeping with the spirit of the times. And yet, all these institutions, one after the other, were done away with in the course of the 1950s, pursuant to decisions handed down by the competent republican authorities of Croatia. The last to be forced to close its doors was the Prosvjeta Serbian cultural society, under a decision of the Croatian Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of May 23, 1980. The help of the Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Croatia was enlisted to justify this fait accompli. The resolutions adopted at a meeting held on October 2, 1980, explain that the

situation had radically changed from that which prevailed in the war years and just after the war.

These resolutions in effect leave no scope for any demands for the setting up of special institutions for the Serbian people in Croatia:” concern for the questions of culture, history, life and creativity of the Croatian or Serbian nations in the Socialist Republic of Croatia cannot be relinquished to any separate national societies or organizations.” This position was explained as follows:” While it is right for our national minorities to have their own cultural institutions and clubs, it is not right for members of the nations to found such institutions, and this holds true everywhere in Yugoslavia, but it is particularly not right for Serbs in Croatia or Croats in Croatia to do so.” At the end of the document we also find these words:” Everything should be done so that the Serbs in Croatia are not ignored as a nation, so that, as is the case in some school textbooks, they are not referred to virtually as newcomers. We have a common history, culture and language, but individual features should be respected.” At the consultation opinions were also voiced to the effect that the Cyrillic script should be taught more widely in Croatia.

Thanks to the position taken by the Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Croatia, against which not one political instance in Croatia, or outside it, protested, all the forms of national life of the Serbian people in Croatia which they had established in the course of their long history and in the national liberation war publicly and definitively ceased to exist. The policies on inter-communal relations which had been laid down by the national liberation movement were radically revised, and even the constitutional guarantees of national rights and freedoms, not to mention civil rights, came under a cloud. The practical meaning of such statements as:” everything should be done” etc., or” the Cyrillic script should be taught more widely in Croatia” can be assessed only in the light of the actual policy on language which is being pursued in the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The fanatic zeal to create a separate Croatian language countervailing any idea of a common language of the Croats and Serbs in the long run does not leave much hope that the Serbian people in Croatia will be able to preserve their national identity.

Except for the time under the Independent State of Croatia, the Serbs in Croatia have never before been as jeopardized as they are today. Solution of their national status is a question of overriding political importance. If solutions are not found, the consequences might well be disastrous, not only for Croatia, but for the whole of Yugoslavia.

The status of the Serbian nation is rendered particularly acute by the fact that a very large number of Serbs live outside Serbia, and particularly outside Serbia proper; in fact this number is larger than the total number of members of some other national groups. According

to the 1981 census, 24% of all Serbs, or 1,958,000, lived outside the territory of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, a number much larger than the number of Slovenes, Albanians, or Macedonians in Yugoslavia taken individually, and almost the same number as the Muslims. There are 3,285,000 Serbs who live outside Serbia proper, accounting for 40.3% of their total number. In the general process of disintegration which is taking place in Yugoslavia, the Serbs are the most sorely affected. The present course being taken by Yugoslav society is completely at odds with the one followed for decades and even centuries until the common state was formed. This process is aimed at completely breaking up the national unity of the Serbian nation. The case of present-day Vojvodina and its autonomy is the best illustration of how everything has been subordinated to such goals. Vojvodina was given autonomy, among other things, because the Serbian people living within the Habsburg monarchy had aspired to autonomy since the end of the 17th century. The Serbs in Austria and later in Austria-Hungary sought the creation of an autonomous region (a despotovina or vojvodina, which they, however, called Serbia), so that, surrounded as they were by the more numerous and more powerful Hungarians and Germans, they would be able to preserve their national individuality and their Orthodox religion. The creation of a separate autonomous region in alien state territory was designed to weaken this state so that, at a given moment, the Serbs could all the more easily separate from it and unite with their brethren south of the Sava and Danube rivers.

This is the history of the Serbian Vojvodina, for whose creation Serbs from Serbia also shed their blood in the revolution of 1848/49. Today everything is just the opposite. The political leaders of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina are not trying to promote togetherness; instead they are seeking greater independence and secession from the Republic of Serbia. However unnatural this process might be, however much it flies in the face of historical logic, nevertheless it is achieving palpable results and is accelerating the disintegration of the Serbian nation.

9. For more than half a century stigmatized as an oppressor of the other Yugoslav peoples, the Serbian nation was not able to return to its own historical roots. In many of its aspects, this history itself was brought into question. The democratic tradition of a civil society, which Serbia strove for and achieved in the 19th century, has until just recently been completely overshadowed by the Serbian socialist and workers' movement, thanks to the narrow-mindedness and lack of objectivity on the part of official historiography. As a result the historical picture of the actual legal, cultural and constitutional contributions made by Serbia's civil society has been so blurred and distorted that it could not serve anyone as a spiritual and moral paradigm or a basis for preserving and reviving the nation's historical self-image. The

honest and brave liberation efforts of the Serbs from Bosnia and Hercegovina and the entire Yugoslav youth, of which the Young Bosnia organization was a part, have suffered a similar fate, having been eclipsed in the history books by class ideology, whose founding fathers were Austrian Marxists, avowed enemies of national liberation movements.

In the climate created by the ruling ideology, the cultural achievements of the Serbian nation have become alienated, usurped or denigrated, ignored and left to decay; the language is being suppressed, and the Cyrillic script is progressively disappearing. The literary community in this respect is serving as the main bastion of arbitrary power and lawlessness. No other Yugoslav nation has had its cultural and spiritual integrity so brutally trampled upon as the Serbian nation. No one else's literary and artistic heritage has been so despoiled and ravaged as the Serbian heritage. The political values of the ruling ideology are being foisted upon Serbian culture as being more worthwhile and more relevant than academic or historical criteria. Whereas the Slovenian, Croatian, Macedonian, and Montenegrin cultures and literatures are today becoming consolidated, the Serbian culture alone is becoming systematically disintegrated. It is considered ideologically legitimate and consonant with self-management to subdivide Serbian literature and differentiate Serbian writers as Vojvodina, Montenegrin, or Bosnian and Hercegovinian writers. Serbian literature is being stripped of its best authors and most important works for the sake of artificially establishing new regional literatures. The usurpation and fragmentation of the Serbian cultural heritage has gone so far that in school the children are taught that Njegos is not a Serbian writer, that Laza Kostic and Veljko Petrovic are writers from Vojvodina, while Petar Kocic and Jovan Ducic are classified as writers from Bosnia and Hercegovina. Until just recently Mesa Selimovic was not allowed to call himself a Serbian writer, and even now his last wish to be included in the opus of Serbian literature is not being honoured. Serbian culture has more writers and intellectuals who are out of favour, proscribed, ignored, or deemed undesirable than any other national culture in Yugoslavia; to make matters worse, many of them have been completely wiped out of literary memory.

Prominent Serbian writers are the only ones featuring on the black lists of all the Yugoslav mass media. The presentation of Serbian literature in compulsory school readers has been seriously impaired by being forced into the Procrustean bed of republican and provincial reciprocity rather than selections being made according to the criteria of importance or merit. In the school curricula of some republics and provinces, not only has the history of the Serbian people been taught in a version greatly watered-down for ideological reasons, but it has also been subjected to chauvinistic interpretations. The Serbian cultural and spiritual heritage is

made out to be less than it really is, and the Serbian people are thus denied access to an important fountainhead of their moral and historical identity.

The impressive and truly revolutionary cultural advances made in the first decades after the Second World War, as seen among other things in the creation of a far-flung network of educational institutions, from elementary schools to universities, began to lose momentum towards the end of the 1960s. Stagnation set in, followed by marked deterioration, so that today our system of education and schools are very primitive and lag far behind the needs and goals of the modern society and civilization in which we live. The school system based on so-called "career-oriented" education and characterized by inferior quality of instruction has proven to be completely bankrupt. Several generations of school-leavers have been intellectually crippled and impoverished; we are turning out a surplus of uncultured, half-baked professionals, unequipped to take an effective role in the economy and social services and unprepared for creative and intellectual efforts. There is no country on earth which has encumbered its educational system with more legal regulations than Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has a total of one hundred and ten federal, republican, and provincial statutes on the books regulating various and sundry aspects of the school system, many of which have been amended a number of times, so that considerable research is sometimes needed to arrive at the definitive text of a given law.

Despite all this, education in Yugoslavia has never been so superficial, fragmented and mediocre as it is today. Law-makers have de jure created eight educational systems, which are growing farther and farther apart from one another, and no amount of consultation about core curricula can reverse the course of development which has been mapped out in the legal statutes. The practice of holding meetings and consultations about common principles, which has become popular of late, after fifteen years of systematic dismantlement of the Yugoslav state community, would appear to be a utopian dream. What first must be done is to eliminate those laws which have a centrifugal effect so as to continue along the line of togetherness and unity which has been followed in these parts for more than one hundred and fifty years. Otherwise, we shall produce, and we are producing, generations who will be less and less Yugoslavs and more and more dissatisfied national romantics and self-seeking nationalists. A country which does not have a uniform system of education cannot hope to stay united in the future.

Ever since the age of humanism, since the 15th and 16th centuries, we have held the ideal that schools are meant to help each individual realize his full potential and make the most of the spiritual and intellectual powers that every child is born with. There is nothing more ruinous than the notion that schools should be strictly in the service of the labour market and professions and that they should be designed solely for this purpose. Such a notion comes down

to us from an unreconstructed glorification of the proletariat, which, in the last analysis, leads to the formation of a slavish and primitive personality. The channeling of boys and girls towards specific vocations from the age of 14 is the epitome of a fundamental lack of freedom.

The ideological cudgels taken up against "elitism" have had an unfortunate sequel: for at least two decades we have been fostering mediocrity at all levels of society, including education. There is no society in the world that wants to destroy its elite in the areas of scholarship and expertise, science and innovation. By declaring war on such an elite, we have created an elite of well-heeled individuals who are able to give their less than gifted children the kind of education which is no longer provided by the elementary and high schools. The financial straits in which the schools find themselves have vitiated their social standing, and the insistence on "moral and political correctness" especially at the universities, has spawned moral and political conformism and careerism, so that the universities, especially the liberal arts colleges, have been deprived of intellectuals of the present generation. In no other European country has education been brought into such a plight of financial and social stagnation.

Precisely at a time when public funds are being lavishly squandered, a policy of restricted spending has been introduced for the universities, which have been receiving less and less money. For a decade and a half the university faculties have not been able to employ new teaching assistants, so that the oldest Yugoslav universities, especially the Belgrade University, have never before in their history had such a high average age of their professors and researchers. Higher education and scientific research, which in all countries are the basic engine of development in the computer age, have been completely neglected. University "reforms," most often carried out under political duress and not for academic reasons (as witnessed by the introduction of vocational diplomas in higher education, the compartmentalization of university faculties on the model of basic organizations of associated labour in the economy, etc.), have all been wide of the mark. Particular harm was done by the removal of the scientific research effort from university auspices, the creation of barriers, systemic and administrative, between research done in institutes and research done in universities. As a result the universities lost access to many laboratories; parallel programmes were created; research personnel in the field of science lost contact with one another, and the normal flow of scientists from universities to research institutes and from institutes to the universities was interrupted.

What must be done is to change the school system and laws on education, modernize curricula, giving greater emphasis to the humanities, set up specialized schools, make special programmes for gifted children, improve the adverse material position of education, devote greater attention to the intellectual rather than just ideological profile of teachers, attract to the

universities the best academic and intellectual minds, and pass laws which will ensure a uniform system of education in the Socialist Republic of Serbia.

In this hour of crisis, we must today begin to think about tomorrow, about the 21st century; even though socioeconomic conditions are not favourable, we must create a vision of tomorrow's world in which civilization will be based on microelectronics, artificial intelligence, robotization, computer information, artificial insemination, and genetic engineering. For all these reasons, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts proposes that a carefully planned and thorough-going reorganization of the public, institutional basis of our scientific research effort be undertaken immediately and without dogmatic, ideological bias or "self-management" sluggishness. Such a reorganization must be in the spirit of modernization and efficiency, with larger financial investments, greater attention to young scientists, a freer hand and greater independence for creative personalities in designing academic and scientific research programmes. In short, it is vital that we integrate all our scientific potential into the mainstream of world science as soon as possible.

10. After the dramatic inter-communal strife in the course of the Second World War, it seemed as though nationalism had run its course and was well on the way to disappearing completely. Such an impression has proven to be deceptive. Not much time passed before nationalism began to rear its ugly head again, and each successive constitutional change has created more of the institutional prerequisites needed for it to become full blown. Nationalism has been generated from the top, its prime initiators being the politicians. The basic cause of this manifold crisis is the ideological defeat which nationalism has inflicted on socialism. The disintegrational processes of all descriptions which have brought the Yugoslav state to the verge of ruin, coupled with a breakdown in the system of values, are the consequences of this defeat.

Its roots lie in the ideology propagated by the Comintern and in the CPY's national policy before the Second World War. This policy incorporated elements of retribution against the Serbian people, as an "oppressor" nation, and it had far-reaching repercussions on inter-communal relations, the social order, the economic system, and the fate of moral and cultural values after the war. The Serbian people were made to feel historical guilt, and they alone did not resolve their national question or gain a state of their own, as did the other national groups. Consequently, it is above all necessary to remove the stigma of historical guilt from the Serbian nation; the charge that the Serbs had a privileged economic status between the two world wars must be officially retracted, and their history of liberation wars and contribution to the formation of Yugoslavia must no longer be denied.

The establishment of the Serbian people's complete national and cultural integrity, regardless of which republic or province they might be living in, is their historical and democratic right. The acquisition of equal rights and an independent development for the Serbian nation have a more profound historical significance. In less than fifty years, for two successive generations, the Serbs were twice subjected to physical annihilation, forced assimilation, conversion to a different religion, cultural genocide, ideological indoctrination, denigration and compulsion to renounce their own traditions because of an imposed guilt complex. Intellectually and political unmanned, the Serbian nation has had to bear trials and tribulations that are too severe not to leave deep scars in their psyche, and at the close of this century of great technological feats of the human mind, this fact must not be ignored. If they want to have a future in the family of cultured and civilized nations of the world, the Serbian people must be allowed to find themselves again and become an historical personality in their own right, to regain a sense of their historical and spiritual being, to make a clear assessment of their economic and cultural interests, to devise a modern social and national programme which will inspire present generations and generations to come.

The present state of depression of the Serbian people, against a background of chauvinism and Serbophobia which are gaining in intensity in some milieux, provides fertile soil for an ever more drastic manifestation of the national sensibilities of the Serbian nation and reactions which might be inflammatory and dangerous. It is incumbent upon us not to overlook or underestimate these dangers for a single moment. But at the same time, while calling for a struggle against Serbian nationalism as a matter of principle, we cannot condone the ideological and political symmetry which has been established in apportioning historical blame. This equal apportionment of historical guilt, so corrosive to the spirit and morale, with its time-worn injustices and falsehoods, must be abandoned if we wish to see a democratic, Yugoslav, humanistic climate prevail in contemporary Serbian culture.

The fact that citizens as a whole and the working class are not represented in the Federal Assembly in their own chambers cannot be blamed solely on the tendency to give precedence to national attributes; it also reflects a desire to put Serbia into an inferior position and in this manner weaken its political influence. But the worst misfortune of all is the fact that the Serbian people do not have their own state, as do all the other nations. Admittedly, the first article of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia contains a clause declaring that Serbia is a state, but the question must be asked what kind of a state is denied jurisdiction over its own territory or does not have the means at its disposal to establish law and order in one of its sections, or ensure the personal safety and security of property of its citizens, or put a stop to

the genocide in Kosovo and halt the exodus of Serbs from their ancestral homes. Such a status is evidence of political discrimination against Serbia, especially in the light of the fact that the Constitution of the SFRY has imposed upon it internal federalization as a permanent source of conflict between Serbia proper and its provinces. The aggressive Albanian nationalism in Kosovo cannot be brought to heel unless Serbia ceases to be the only republic whose internal affairs are ordered by others.

The formally proclaimed equality of all the republics in the Constitution of the SFRY has been negated by the fact that the Republic of Serbia has been forced to hand over a large portion of its rights and prerogatives to the autonomous provinces, whose status has been regulated in detail by the federal constitution. Serbia must state openly that this arrangement was forced upon it, especially as regards the status of the provinces, in effect raised to that of republics, which regard themselves much more as a constituent unit of the federation than a part of the Republic of Serbia. On top of its failure to provide for a state for the Serbian nation, the Constitution of the SFRY also put insurmountable difficulties in the way of constituting such a state. It is imperative that this constitution be amended so as to satisfy Serbia's legitimate interests. The autonomous provinces should become genuinely integral parts of the Republic of Serbia, while receiving that degree of autonomy which does not disrupt the integrity of the Republic and which will be able to satisfy the general interests of the community at large.

The unresolved issue of Serbia's statehood is not the only flaw which should be remedied through amendment of the Constitution. Under the 1974 Constitution, Yugoslavia became a loose state community, in which there are those who are considering other possibilities and not just the Yugoslav option, as can be seen from recent statements made by public figures in Slovenia and the earlier positions taken by the Macedonian politicians. Such trends and the thorough job made of disintegration of the country make one think that Yugoslavia is in danger of further dissolution. The Serbian people cannot stand idly by and wait for the future in such a state of uncertainty. All the nations in Yugoslavia must therefore be given the opportunity to state their desires and intentions. In this event Serbia would be able to make its own options and define its own national interests. Such a discussion and consultation would have to precede a review of the Constitution. Naturally, Serbia must not be passive and wait to see what the others will say, as it has done so many times in the past.

While supporting the arrangements first outlined by the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation during the war, Serbia will have to bear in mind that the final decision does not rest with it, and that the others might prefer some other alternatives. Consequently, Serbia has the task of clearly assessing its own economic and national interests, lest it be taken unawares by

events. By insisting on the federal system, Serbia would not only be furthering the equality of all the national groups in Yugoslavia but also facilitating resolution of the political and economic crisis.

If Serbia is to champion equal rights, then it must take the initiative in tackling the key political and economic issues to the same extent as the others have the right to take such an initiative. The four decades of passivity on the part of Serbia have proven to be detrimental to the whole of Yugoslavia, which has been deprived of ideas and criticism of a community with a long tradition of statehood, with a keen sense of national independence, and rich experience in combatting local usurpers of political liberties. Without participation by the Serbian nation and Serbia on an equal footing in the entire process of adopting and implementing all its vital decisions, Yugoslavia cannot be strong; indeed, its very survival as a democratic and socialist society would be called into question.

An era in the evolution of Yugoslav society and Serbia is obviously coming to an end with an historically exhausted ideology, general stagnation, and a deepening recession in the economic, moral and cultural spheres. Such a state of affairs makes it imperative to carry out radical, well-studied, scientifically based and resolutely implemented reforms of the entire state order and organization of the Yugoslav community of nations, and also in the sphere of democratic socialism, for a faster and more effective participation in contemporary civilization. Social reforms should to the greatest possible extent harness the natural and human resources of the entire country so that we might become a productive, enlightened, and democratic society, capable of living from our own labour and creativity and able to make a contribution to the world community.

The first requirement for our transformation and renaissance is a democratic mobilization of all the intellectual and moral forces of the nation, not just in order to carry out the decisions handed down by political leaderships, but rather to devise programmes and map out the future in a democratic way. For the first time in recent history, expertise and experience, conscientiousness and boldness, imagination and responsibility would all come together to carry out a task of importance for the entire society, on the principles of a long-term programme.

The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts once again expresses its willingness to do everything it can, to the best of its abilities, to assist efforts to deal with these crucial tasks and the historical duties incumbent upon our generation.

ANEXO B – Discursos de Slobodan Milosevic analisados (1987–1996).

ANEXO B.1 – Speech of Slobodan Milosevic at Kosovo Polje.¹²³

There is no need for us trade places with each other in order for us to seek accountability for you, as our colleague suggested a short time ago in the discussion. That is our duty. When the issue is about this unpleasant event today and the police intervention, responsibility will take shape regarding this intervention for which there was no reason. When our friend Mitar filled us in on what happened in front of the building, you know well that in a single minute we agreed that order isn't maintained by the police, but you take this upon yourselves in the interest of the safety of the citizens and children who are there. Proof that we correctly agreed is that order was thoroughly maintained and that the issue is about the people who behaved in such a lordly way.

At the conclusion of this discussion I wish to say a word or two about how they assess, how they qualify our gatherings such as these. To be brief, gatherings such as these aren't nationalist gatherings. Gatherings such as these aren't gatherings of enemies. But that is exactly why I know that the majority of the nation thinks that way in this hall and elsewhere, we can't allow this for the very reason that this is not a gathering of enemies, but of citizens. We can't allow ill-wishing people to misuse nationalists which every upstanding person must oppose. We must protect brotherhood and unity like the pupil of our eyes. But because of exactly that, today when brotherhood and unity are jeopardized, we must and can win. Neither do we wish, nor are we able, to divide people into Serbs and Albanians, but rather we must create delimiters both for the upstanding and progressive ones that fight for brotherhood and unity and national equal rights and for the counter-revolutionaries and nationalists on the other side.

Further, I want to tell you, have faith that not one of the problems about which you spoke, literally not one word about them, will be left out before the members of the Central Committee SK Serbia. And that's not to say we're just informing them, but rather we'll solve them in the environment of our institutional system. I feel compelled to say this at the outset, because it isn't even physically possible to speak of all the questions that have been raised here.

To everyone today, throughout all of Yugoslavia, it is clear that Kosovo is a huge problem for our people that will be very slowly solved. I must, meanwhile, tell you that Kosovo

¹²³ Discurso proferido em 24 e 25 de abril de 1987 em visita à Pristina, Kosovo. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/spch-kosovo1989.htm>>. Último acesso em 27 dez. 2014.

has been the only problem, or at least the only larger problem for the Yugoslav people, that could surely be solved faster and better.

But Kosovo has struck us as the weightiest problem during a difficult economic crisis, when standards have fallen drastically, when prices have climbed, when there are more unemployed.

And that's how it is a political crisis: Yugoslavia is a nation unsettled by separatists and nationalists as you well know in many of your areas, even those not far from here on Kosovo, and at last, when anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist forces are all the more present and all the more aggressive. As you see, all at once and all at the same time there were many serious problems and that's why our people and the communist party have a huge load and show slowness in their solutions.

And in the solving of all these problems the communist party hasn't always been unified, and because of that it couldn't be adequately effective. I'm not saying this to chastise them, because I wouldn't have the right to do that, but rather I'm merely making a determination.

So that we could solve the problems on Kosovo, like all the other problems that we have, it falls upon us to have a unified communist party, and that unity is the most critical task facing the party today. That wish for unity has been rightfully expressed by almost every speaker at the two-day meeting held by SK Serbia. I am faithful we have taken a sizable step toward the unity of SK Serbia and SKJ. And really, with unity we can solve many problems, if not all. Without unity we can't solve even one.

In spite of many changes, some of you have brought up here, at least those that have till now attempted, and especially in the last year, that the state of things on Kosovo in economic and political and other terms are dissatisfying.

Kosovo is also underdeveloped, unemployment is high, it is in deep foreign debt. What is hardest of all, there is an ill-intended element present and at work in many functions, and in the political realm. We spoke about that yesterday at the meeting of the Presidency PK Kosovo.

We spoke about the fact that the process of education and training, such as the personnel in political taxation, and others has the spirit of separatism and often counter-revolution.

The process of settling Serbia and Montenegro under economic, political, or ordinary physical pressure created what was likely the last tragic exodus of an entire European population. The last time such a procession of despairing people set off was in the middle of the century.

I know that you don't need to listen to more of what was, and some guy's analysis of the present situation doesn't interest you either. That's fine. You and all of us can be interested in

and need to be interested in only those agreements that can change things for the better, that solve this position which reasonable people, above all, you, and then us also, aren't satisfied with.

But I want, at first anyway, to assure you that enough measures in the spheres of material life, political relationships, political processes, are taken every day and that the tempo of these changes in the next months will be faster.

In material growth Kosovo is constantly investing, separatism and nationalism have received an infusion of counter-revolutionism and have achieved larger and larger procedural changes, but are being rooting out via legal, administrative and politico-ideological measures. Nobody is satisfied with the speed of this process, not in PK, not in SK SKS, not in SK SKJ. Yesterday we determined this in the meeting of the Presidency of PK. But the process has gained some speed and I am confident that this speed will increase. And you need to know that.

But, it's understood, from that I don't think to suggest that the matter is settled and that we have reason to be satisfied. On the contrary, Kosovo is still poor today; the poorest portion of our country. Albanian separatists and nationalists have calmed down somewhat. They're banking on time, and it's understood that conditions are working for them. But they need to know, on this plain tyranny will be no more. Progressive people won't give up Kosovo, neither will Serbia nor will Yugoslavia.

And in a political light the perception is very present that the desire for an ethnically pure Kosovo is well-founded and possible. That foundation is here [in Kosovo].

Since, from the premise that SAP Kosovo political party of the nation of Kosovo, who propounds counter-revolution, is proposing the natural consequence that in that sense the province should be effectively transformed into a republic, through which in reality are taken the first, but not ignorant, steps toward shattering the territorial integrity of SR Serbia and SFRJ. We have, with our colleagues, understood the cost, progressive people in Kosovo have understood it also, and in Serbia, and in Yugoslavia.

When one has in sight all that we've accomplished, and all that is left that must be done, and what is remaining is inappropriately more than that which is accomplished, what is before us aren't tasks and responsibilities, but rather a great patriotic offensive whose goal needs to be material and cultural growth of Kosovo and free and fulfilling life for its citizens.

But first some misunderstandings must be cleared up. Among citizens there is an understanding that all the peoples living in this province that aren't calling out their nationalism every day, just like they don't do a daily roll call of their sex, age, social ancestry, education or profession.

In that sense we can't speak of minorities nor of majorities on Kosovo. Serbs, Montenegrins, aren't minorities in relation to Albanians on Kosovo, just like Albanians aren't a minority in Yugoslavia, but rather they are nationalities that live together under equal rights with other nations and nationalities in three of our socialist republics.

The premise of an ethnically pure, economically and politically autonomous, untethered Kosovo isn't possible by political ideals or ethically, but at the end of the line, that premise isn't in the interest of the Albanian nation. This kind of nationalism would exclude it from all circles, and it wouldn't just slow down, but stop its growth in both economic and a completely spiritual sense. Just like Enver Hoxha with his politics, so is the tiny Albanian nation still one very underdeveloped people, isolated from Europe, shut off from any possibility of taking part in the dynamic life of today's world.

And this part of the Albanian nation is striving toward Europe, toward being a modern nation, there is no need to stop them on that path.

Nationalism always means isolation from others, being locked in a closed circle, and that also means stopping growth, because without cooperation and connection with Yugoslavia, and then widening vistas, there is no progress. Every nation and nationality which shuts itself off and isolates itself behaves irresponsibly toward their constituents' growth. That is why before anything else, we communists must do all that is required to eliminate the consequences of nationalist and separatist behavior, and counter-revolutionaries forces, as on Kosovo, so in other parts of our land.

But our goal is to emerge from a state of hatred, intolerance and mistrust. That all people on Kosovo live well. And that is why, in relation to that goal, I want to tell you colleagues, yes, you need to stay here. This is your land. Your homes are here, your memories.

You won't very well give up your land just because life in it is difficult, just because you've been pressured by crime and humiliation. It was never in the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin nation to bow before adversity, to demobilize when they need to fight, to demoralize when times are tough.

You need to stay here because of your forefathers and because of your descendants. You would shame your forefathers and disappoint your descendants.

But I'm not proposing that you should stay tolerant, hold on, and bear this situation with which you aren't satisfied. Quite the contrary. You need to change it, together with all the progressive people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia.

Don't tell me that you can't do it alone. It's understood that you can't alone! We'll change it together, we, Serbia and all of Yugoslavia! We can't in our time return the national fiber to

the Kosovo population in the past tense. But we can at least stop the exodus, we can assure the condition that all people that live on Kosovo be in their homes, live under equal rights and equal allotment of Kosovo economic opportunity before anything else, and then all other opportunities.

In the ears of some of the European population this desire sounds absurd, humorous in the present era. They would with good reason ask: aren't the lives and jobs of citizens, their safety and equality, their rights and duty regulated by charter and law?

They regulate when they enforce, and when they don't enforce then there is no regulation, then you must with every key political office warn the organs of the state, an organ must rightly do its job.

That job, the job that must enforce the charter and law on Kosovo, is in the interest of all its residents. Serbs and Montenegrins, but also Albanians, colleagues. Because, if we legalize a state which has no law, then all those that are outlaws are exposed and at the end of the line are in danger. Today from unenforced law Serbs and Montenegrins are suffering the most, but tomorrow that could be Albanians as well. That is why instituting respect for the law, order and equality really is in a deep historical sense in the interests of all citizens of Kosovo. This is the first and most urgent thing that we can accomplish together on Kosovo.

And the second is next: it has to do with the return, especially of talented people, to Kosovo. I firmly believe that we cannot stop the process of moving away while there is no incentive for the process to return to Kosovo.

The return of Serbs and Montenegrins to Kosovo is a process. We can't issue a decree and by force return people to where they don't want to be. But we can launch a political campaign to create material, economic, employment and cultural conditions such that they who because of dissatisfaction and abuse of rights left, would return, guaranteed that in their homes and workplaces this would really happen. In creating those conditions all progressive forces can and must get involved, communist and youth, all that is respectful and progressive in all of Serbia. And there cannot be even one cost too great to accomplish this.

Ordinarily in our political language we speak like we aren't in favor of campaigning, but rather prefer drawn-out processes. In this situation the state of affairs is so alarming that we must bring a campaign, and the right campaign, for returning 50, then 100, then 200 professors, doctors and other crucial talented people, qualified workers, and the rest. This campaign needs to bring a process. Only then will things look like the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo can stop.

And seriously, friends, in Yugoslavia salaries are low and prices are high, the prices of shoes and books are high, it's hard to take a vacation. But we won't because of that very well give up Yugoslavia and settle in a happier and richer land. Those are rather more worthwhile reasons to stay in our country and make it richer and happier. It's possible to make this happen, but through one mandatory condition: to accomplish the separating of the forces of socialism, brotherhood and unity, and progress from the forces of separatism, nationalism and conservatism. In that separation of progressives from reactionaries Serbs and Montenegrins on Kosovo surely will receive the support of many Albanians, communists and Albanian people among whom they have relatives and friends, and their children's friends. Because here everyone's common goal is the cultural and economic growth of the province, so that people, all people, live better and happier. Around that goal all respectful working people should gather, that is the principle of brotherhood and unity on Kosovo.

That is why I believe that those who carry the spirit of brotherhood and unity, equal rights and progressiveness can be and must be the only working class of Kosovo, because those that are unified have identical interests, and the least reason to divide into nationalism.

She strove to fight against greater abuses, only she can win in this.

Surely, SK and others must assess why their nation is coming back, because its proof, as someone said here, that the nation believes in the party. That is exactly why I want to say, friends and colleagues, that in all of SK, in the leadership SK we'll do all that we have, as SK, given ourselves to do.

Everything in question is on our schedule: rights, freedom, culture, language and letters. Everything in question from beginning to final changes, from kindergartens to courtrooms. In that forest of difficult problems that anger and worry and exacerbate the upstanding people of Kosovo, Serbia and Yugoslavia, only worrying and exacerbation aren't enough. But the preparedness of the nation and Kosovo and Serbia and Yugoslavia to solve these problems and for everyone to give their due, and for everyone to roll up their sleeves and solve things is the only guarantee that we will solve the systemic, economic and political problems on Kosovo.

In that sense we don't have anyone else in whom we should trust, friends and colleagues, but in ourselves.

I want to also assure you that every member of the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia will always be ready for conversations like these and for constant presence on this job together.

Rest assured, this is a feeling that is uplifting all of Yugoslavia. All of Yugoslavia is with you. The issue isn't that it's a problem for Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia and Kosovo. Yugoslavia doesn't exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia would disintegrate without Kosovo!

Yugoslavia and Serbia will never give up Kosovo!

ANEXO B.2 – Slobodan Milosevic's 1989 st. Vitus day speech.¹²⁴

By the force of social circumstances this great 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo is taking place in a year in which Serbia, after many years, after many decades, has regained its state, national, and spiritual integrity. Therefore, it is not difficult for us to answer today the old question: how are we going to face Milos [Milos Obilic, legendary hero of the Battle of Kosovo]. Through the play of history and life, it seems as if Serbia has, precisely in this year, in 1989, regained its state and its dignity and thus has celebrated an event of the distant past which has a great historical and symbolic significance for its future.

Serbian Character -- Liberational

Today, it is difficult to say what is the historical truth about the Battle of Kosovo and what is legend. Today this is no longer important. Oppressed by pain and filled with hope, the people used to remember and to forget, as, after all, all people in the world do, and it was ashamed of treachery and glorified heroism. Therefore it is difficult to say today whether the Battle of Kosovo was a defeat or a victory for the Serbian people, whether thanks to it we fell into slavery or we survived in this slavery. The answers to those questions will be constantly sought by science and the people. What has been certain through all the centuries until our time today is that disharmony struck Kosovo 600 years ago. If we lost the battle, then this was not only the result of social superiority and the armed advantage of the Ottoman Empire but also of the tragic disunity in the leadership of the Serbian state at that time. In that distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire was not only stronger than that of the Serbs but it was also more fortunate than the Serbian kingdom.

The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history. Even in the last war, this lack of unity and betrayal led the Serbian people and Serbia into agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral sense exceeded fascist aggression.

Even later, when a socialist Yugoslavia was set up, in this new state the Serbian leadership remained divided, prone to compromise to the detriment of its own people. The concessions that many Serbian leaders made at the expense of their people could not be accepted historically and ethically by any nation in the world, especially because the Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others.

¹²⁴ Discurso proferido em 28 de Junho de 1989 em comemoração aos 600 anos da Batalha do Kosovo. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/sps1.htm>>. Último acesso em 30 jun. 2017.

Their national and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of history and through two world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and when they could they also helped others to liberate themselves. The fact that in this region they are a major nation is not a Serbian sin or shame; this is an advantage which they have not used against others, but I must say that here, in this big, legendary field of Kosovo, the Serbs have not used the advantage of being great for their own benefit either.

Thanks to their leaders and politicians and their vassal mentality they felt guilty before themselves and others. This situation lasted for decades, it lasted for years and here we are now at the field of Kosovo to say that this is no longer the case.

Unity Will Make Prosperity Possible

Disunity among Serb officials made Serbia lag behind and their inferiority humiliated Serbia. Therefore, no place in Serbia is better suited for saying this than the field of Kosovo and no place in Serbia is better suited than the field of Kosovo for saying that unity in Serbia will bring prosperity to the Serbian people in Serbia and each one of its citizens, irrespective of his national or religious affiliation.

Serbia of today is united and equal to other republics and prepared to do everything to improve its financial and social position and that of all its citizens. If there is unity, cooperation, and seriousness, it will succeed in doing so. This is why the optimism that is now present in Serbia to a considerable extent regarding the future days is realistic, also because it is based on freedom, which makes it possible for all people to express their positive, creative and humane abilities aimed at furthering social and personal life.

Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. National composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together more and more frequently and more and more successfully.

Socialism in particular, being a progressive and just democratic society, should not allow people to be divided in the national and religious respect. The only differences one can and should allow in socialism are between hard working people and idlers and between honest people and dishonest people. Therefore, all people in Serbia who live from their own work, honestly, respecting other people and other nations, are in their own republic.

Dramatic National Divisions

After all, our entire country should be set up on the basis of such principles. Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can survive only under the conditions of full equality for all nations that live in it.

The crisis that hit Yugoslavia has brought about national divisions, but also social, cultural, religious and many other less important ones. Among all these divisions, nationalist ones have shown themselves to be the most dramatic. Resolving them will make it easier to remove other divisions and mitigate the consequences they have created.

For as long as multinational communities have existed, their weak point has always been the relations between different nations. The threat is that the question of one nation being endangered by the others can be posed one day -- and this can then start a wave of suspicions, accusations, and intolerance, a wave that invariably grows and is difficult to stop. This threat has been hanging like a sword over our heads all the time. Internal and external enemies of multi-national communities are aware of this and therefore they organize their activity against multinational societies mostly by fomenting national conflicts.

At this moment, we in Yugoslavia are behaving as if we have never had such an experience and as if in our recent and distant past we have never experienced the worst tragedy of national conflicts that a society can experience and still survive.

Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its economic and social prosperity. In this respect Yugoslavia does not stand out from the social milieu of the contemporary, particularly the developed, world. This world is more and more marked by national tolerance, national cooperation, and even national equality. The modern economic and technological, as well as political and cultural development, has guided various peoples toward each other, has made them interdependent and increasingly has made them equal as well [medjusobno ravnopravni]. Equal and united people can above all become a part of the civilization toward which mankind is moving. If we cannot be at the head of the column leading to such a civilization, there is certainly no need for us to be at its tail.

At the time when this famous historical battle was fought in Kosovo, the people were looking at the stars, expecting aid from them. Now, 6 centuries later, they are looking at the stars again, waiting to conquer them. On the first occasion, they could allow themselves to be disunited and to have hatred and treason because they lived in smaller, weakly interlinked worlds. Now, as people on this planet, they cannot conquer even their own planet if they are not united, let alone other planets, unless they live in mutual harmony and solidarity.

Therefore, words devoted to unity, solidarity, and cooperation among people have no greater significance anywhere on the soil of our motherland than they have here in the field of Kosovo, which is a symbol of disunity and treason.

In the memory of the Serbian people, this disunity was decisive in causing the loss of the battle and in bringing about the fate which Serbia suffered for a full 6 centuries.

Even if it were not so, from a historical point of view, it remains certain that the people regarded disunity as its greatest disaster. Therefore it is the obligation of the people to remove disunity, so that they may protect themselves from defeats, failures, and stagnation in the future.

Unity brings Back Dignity

This year, the Serbian people became aware of the necessity of their mutual harmony as the indispensable condition for their present life and further development.

I am convinced that this awareness of harmony and unity will make it possible for Serbia not only to function as a state but to function as a successful state. Therefore I think that it makes sense to say this here in Kosovo, where that disunity once upon a time tragically pushed back Serbia for centuries and endangered it, and where renewed unity may advance it and may return dignity to it. Such an awareness about mutual relations constitutes an elementary necessity for Yugoslavia, too, for its fate is in the joined hands of all its peoples. The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our creativity for 6 centuries, and has been feeding our pride and does not allow us to forget that at one time we were an army great, brave, and proud, one of the few that remained undefeated when losing.

Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without resolve, bravery, and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle now concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people will live in the 21st century. For this battle, we certainly need heroism, of course of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which nothing serious and great can be achieved remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary.

Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and European society in general. Therefore today it appears not only unjust but even unhistorical and completely absurd to talk about Serbia's belonging to Europe. Serbia has been a part of Europe incessantly, now just as much as it was in the past, of course, in its own way,

but in a way that in the historical sense never deprived it of dignity. In this spirit we now endeavor to build a society, rich and democratic, and thus to contribute to the prosperity of this beautiful country, this unjustly suffering country, but also to contribute to the efforts of all the progressive people of our age that they make for a better and happier world.

Let the memory of Kosovo heroism live forever!

Long live Serbia!

Long live Yugoslavia!

Long live peace and brotherhood among peoples!

ANEXO B.3 – Slobodan Milosevic's Closing Statement at the First SPS Congress.¹²⁵

Comrades,

The crisis facing Yugoslavia, which is exposed to the pressure of conservative and disintegrating forces, as well as the presence of such forces in Serbia herself, have made it necessary and justified to bring together socialist, i.e. left-wing forces, ideas and people in order to preserve peace and secure progress and social development. Peace and economic and cultural progress, the fruits of which will be equally enjoyed by all citizens, are the essence of our new party's commitment at this moment. Our longer-term commitment is to create a society without economic exploitation and without political hierarchy. Hence, the existing programme reflects both permanent and current concerns. For this reason it will be adjusted to the changes in our society and our present-day world. In other words, it is expected to provide answers, in tune with our lasting commitments, to the current economic, political and cultural conditions prevailing in our age and in the Yugoslav society.

I wish to say that we decided to translate the idea of pooling left-wing forces into practice deeply convinced that with its programme, organisation and personnel the new Party would contribute to a truly peaceful, just and successful development of our society. Having said this, I do not contest the objections that this decision was taken too fast or too slowly, that the explanations given for this unification were incorrect, nor many other objections and warnings concerning the programme, organisation, personnel and even the idea as a whole. A party which is from the very beginning unwilling to hear and take note of the opinions of well-meaning, educated and respectable people doesn't have nor could have any future. It applies to our new Party in particular as it has to base its ideas and its activity on creativity, criticism, humaneness and determination which should be the qualities of our struggle for a free and just society and of its proponents.

If there is anything in our political behaviour and hitherto habits that we should get rid of, then it is certainly the narrow-mindedness and vindictiveness which often characterised socialist and communist leaderships when dealing with any opinion that was at variance with current policy and the activities of politicians in power.

This Party will be able to contribute to the progress of our society if it recognises the opinions and criticism voiced by workers, farmers and the intelligentsia, those voiced by our Universities of which many, like for instance the ideas of the University of Belgrade, have long

¹²⁵ Discurso proferido durante o encerramento do primeiro congresso do Partido Socialista Sérvio. em 16-18 Julho de 1990. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/sps1.htm>>.

been the most progressive, although the most critical part of our general public opinion. This Party will seek to promote and develop all progressive ideas which have emerged in the world, in our country and in Serbia, and all the achievements made by the workers' movement in the development of socialism in the world and in Yugoslavia.

Today we also have the task to avoid all the phenomena that brought about the crisis and slowed down our social development: bureaucratic arbitrariness, equalisation of the state and the party, violence, economic inertia, cultural isolation, aggressive intolerance of a different political opinion, long-standing hostility towards educated people and the new blindness for the concerns of workers and farmers, inclination to nurture the personality cult at all levels, cruel political hierarchy and cowardice.

The Socialist Party will further build its identity on the demands of our modern age and the times to come. The idea of socialism and the practice of socialism came into being at a certain time which had its relevant economic, political, cultural and social characteristics. The time we are living in today differs both in economic, political, cultural and social terms. While we remain committed to a society without economic exploitation and other injustices, we have to build this new socialism in accordance with major changes taking place at this point of time, but also in tune with the future.

Impressive technological and economic development of a considerable part of mankind, expansion of political freedoms, major economic and political changes in the status of workers worldwide, availability of education and culture to the broad strata of the population, positive changes in the size and structure of leisure, increasingly developed economic, political and cultural ties between states, nations and people in general, the conspicuous role played by science in the development of society, etc. all these facts have changed the face of our present-day international community and both mandate and facilitate the creation of a new, more just and affluent world.

This Party is about to catch up on this world, and here in Serbia, it is being established with the desire to make its republic an equal and creative part of that more affluent and just world. In this context, left-wing forces should not fear that this Party will get closer to the right, just as right-wing forces should not hope that this Party will distance itself from the left. No one, except the extreme conservatives can contest the ideas such as economic, social, cultural, national and racial equality, freedom and dignity of each man. And these are the ideals of all left-wing parties, regardless of the fact that they differ among themselves, primarily by ways of achieving these ideals.

Our Republic has been making major efforts to overcome the economic crisis, to improve the standards of living, to enhance economic development, to revive industrial activity and agriculture, to wisely use the means and know-how of our people working both here and abroad. Our Party is eager to see the fruits of this economic and social prosperity being used by all citizens.

It is not our objective solely to have an affluent society, but also a just society. Many affluent nations have a large number of poor people and disenfranchised or politically passive citizens. We wish to build a rich society in which each individual will have equal conditions to prosper, to be politically free and active, to educate himself, to travel extensively and safely, and of course, to live in peace. These are our commitments today as we establish the Socialist Party of Serbia. Peace, economic prosperity, a free man and equal people are the values which the Socialist Party of Serbia is today putting forward as its commitment before its people and the citizens of Serbia.

These are the values which we will constantly have in mind in further developing our programme, organisation and leadership. If the programme fails to express the concerns of its members, if the organisation proves inefficient, if the leaderships become bureaucratised, we shall change them. The only lasting thing should be our commitment to a better, free and just life of man.

I hereby declare the First Congress of the Socialist Party of Serbia closed.

ANEXO B.4 – Slobodan Milosevic On The Future Of Yugoslavia.¹²⁶

Respected deputies, there is no citizen of Yugoslavia today who is not concerned for his own future and the future of his children. The country has been weakened by the deep and long economic crisis and the increasing national conflicts. We have been subjected to open foreign pressures and threats. Outside factors are already openly giving support to forces of disintegration in Yugoslavia. Such actions can no longer be concealed with statements about extending support for its unity.

Great outside pressure on Serbia has been present in the last few days. These pressures have so far been primarily political, but they are increasingly acquiring an economic character. Their aim is to influence the organisation of relations in Serbia and Yugoslavia. These relations should be organised according to a recipe written outside Serbia and outside Yugoslavia.

This is not the first time that we are faced with the aims of great and powerful forces and that, in relation to them, we are put into an extremely unequal and dependent position only because we are a small country and because we are not behaving in a way that they find appropriate. This will not be the first time that we resist these pressures. What hits us and what should disturb all peoples is the unique absurdity that at the present time of great democratic and humanist achievements, political violence is being applied, economic violence is being announced, and this does not discount physical violence, against peoples and people who care about their independence and autonomy.

We have been faced with an escalation of a change in the stand of some outside factors regarding the integrity of Yugoslavia, which has been visible for a long time already. This fact undoubtedly increases the difficulties in resolving the crisis.

I would like to be able to believe that US representatives in Yugoslavia have deceived their own government regarding facts about Yugoslavia and Serbia with the help of politicians from the north- west part of our country who have, under the guise of democracy, sold secessionism to them. However, even if this harmless, not to mention naive, explanation were acceptable, not even this would be justification for the crude interference by foreign countries in the internal affairs of an independent country, which goes as far as interference in the election of personalities to political posts. This particularly could not be a justification for support for Albanian separatists in Kosovo-Metohija.

¹²⁶ Discurso do presidente à assembleia nacional sérvia proferido em 30 de Maio de 1991 na Assembleia Sérvia. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic053091.htm>>.

The citizens of Serbia and the Serbian people have already responded to this because every child here knows the truth about Kosovo and Serbia. Precisely because of this, I do not have any need to speak about this, and I would say to those who think that there is a need that I will not speak about this because I will not agree to justify to anyone why the Republic of Serbia is not allowing the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo-Metohija to be killed again and why we are not willing to conduct dialogue on the possibility of creating an Albanian state on the territory of Serbia. So that there is no confusion, I want to openly say that everyone who demands a deviation from the stands on these issues can only achieve this by bringing down the present leadership of Serbia.

If the human rights of Albanians really were threatened in Kosovo-Metohija, we certainly would not hesitate to protect them. We are proud that Serbia is not conducting a nationalist policy and that no one in Serbia is discriminated against for being a Slovene, Croat, or a member of another people or national minority. No one in Serbia is or will be a second-class citizen, apart from Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo-Metohija if we accept the ultimatums and pressures that we have been subjected to.

Through the latest events and above all the serious conflicts and acts of state terror in Croatia, the state and political crisis in Yugoslavia, which has for a long time involved intra-national conflicts, has acquired the form of an armed showdown with elements of a civil war. The number of dead and injured is growing, as is the number of women and children who are refugees. Interruptions in traffic and supplies are increasing, too. Thus, apart from the already existing situation of the suspension, violation and blockages in the federal legal order and the work of the federal bodies, these occurrences show that the present political, legal and economic situation in Yugoslavia contains more and more danger of violence and anarchy.

Through conflicts and victims, through pressures and one-sided acts against the Yugoslav Constitution, attempts are being made to set up independent, autonomous and sovereign national and nationalist states from the existing Yugoslav republics. The nationalist aims of the leaders of these republics threaten the interests of the whole country, all Yugoslav peoples and all citizens of Yugoslavia. They particularly threaten the interests of the Serbian people because a third of the Serbian people live outside the present-day Republic of Serbia.

Historically superseded nationalist concepts of a state structure and the territorial pretensions characteristic of them are being manifested as, among other things, the denationalisation of other peoples or as their deprecation. Under these conditions, what is involved is the natural and legitimate self-defence of a people which stems from their historical dignity. Attempts to use a great and well-organised propaganda hullabaloo to portray this as

banditry and lawlessness are the best sign of the lack of constructiveness and impotence of a chauvinist and pro-fascist concept which has an impact on the popular interest and the dignity of people and peoples and their just struggle for civil and national equality. In this respect, the authors of the insults about banditry and lawlessness simply overlook the fact that one cannot be a bandit or outlaw in one's own back yard or on the threshold of one's home.

Under these conditions, the negotiations which we have held in an endeavour to secure peace and reach an agreement on the solution to the crisis have increased in significance and intensity virtually to the same extent that their results have been shown to be only differences.

The experiences of our history form the basis of the awareness that it is the right of all citizens, and therefore the citizens of Serbia too and the Serbian people, to refuse to be victims of the nationalist, political and personal interests of their supposed saviours and supposed fighters for democracy. Therefore, we have been constantly advocating that the conflicts and crisis be resolved as a whole in a peaceful and democratic way based on the Constitution.

We do not consider this to be weakness on our part, so we are therefore not setting up military formations or national guard units and we are not arming citizens and we are not banging at the doors of world capitals begging for political and material aid and to buy weapons and military equipment. Neither do we consider this weakness on our part because there is absolutely no doubt that we know how to protect our interests and to defend them from any violence, as we have done numerous times in the past.

Everyone knows that we in Serbia, both in all our documents and in our entire political life, have committed ourselves to the stand that Serbs must live in one state and, of course, we want that state to be a Yugoslavia in which Serbs should live together with other Yugoslav peoples who want the same thing. The public knows that the stand of Montenegro and the Montenegrin people is identical in this respect and that on this basis we are jointly conducting the incipient negotiations on the future of the Yugoslav Federation. Therefore no one can abolish it.

It is in our interest that Yugoslavia be a united, free, democratic federal state and that all peoples in it be on an equal footing and all citizens be equal. As is well known, this is not just our ideal but our political orientation, which expresses the spirit of changes in Europe and the world in general.

This is why all those people who are today holding scissors above the map of Yugoslavia should be aware of the fact that different peoples in nationally mixed states can preserve their identity and integrity only if this state ensures their national equality. Hence the efforts aimed at abolishing one state with a view to creating several nationalistic states or, to put it better,

mini-states, something that represents a serious contradiction of the modern trends in the world and expresses unhistorical and conservative views. Particularly in Europe in which borders are now disappearing even between states with 1,000 years of tradition, turning borders between the Yugoslav republics into state borders represents an absurd idea.

We are aware of the fact that Yugoslavia has so far not been set up in the best way, but consequences of, and particularly blame for this cannot be borne by the present generations. We know that changes are also necessary in its internal set-up in conformity with economic, technological, cultural and democratic achievements in the world, which is in the interest of our own development, but these changes should be made in a peaceful and legal way and through Yugoslav institutions. This is why we advocate that Yugoslavia be preserved and not abolished. It will certainly not become democratic and rich if it ceases to exist.

It is known that during the talks about the future of the country as concerns its constitutional set-up, we advocated the following principles First, Yugoslavia should be a democratic federation, that is, a federal state and not a confederation, that is, a union of states. A union of sovereign states would above all mean that Yugoslavia would disappear and be abolished as a joint state of equal Yugoslav peoples. The abolition of Yugoslavia would threaten the vital interests of the peoples living in it and particularly those peoples who are living in several present republics and have economic, political, national, cultural and historical interests in staying together.

Second, the federal state should be composed of peoples, republics and citizens who stand on a completely equal footing and are completely equal. Therefore, the state should be built upon the sovereignty of citizens which is an element of cohesion and upon the joining of republics which is an element of uniqueness as well as on special guarantees that national equality will be realised.

Third, the state would have to guarantee a market economy, a unified market, full freedom of movement of labour, goods and capital and a fully equal and free position of economic subjects. It would also have unified functions of defence, foreign affairs and defence of human and civil rights. This means that for the state to be democratic, modern and based on the rule of law, the Yugoslav bodies would have to have power when it comes to the spheres of market and economic operations, foreign affairs, civil freedoms and rights, defence and security.

Fourth, a joint state of Yugoslav peoples and republics implies that its bodies are formed and work in a democratic way, which implies that they are elected in direct and multi-party elections, that they work efficiently, which implies that they are acting in a timely fashion and

without the possibility of being blocked, and that they work in a constitutional and legal manner, that is, exclusively according to the law and Constitution and responsibly.

Fifth, the organisation of authority should be based on the distribution of power into legislative, executive and judicial power, because such an organisation makes it certain that the authority is democratic, legitimate and responsible. Legislative power should be executed by a bicameral assembly consisting of a chamber of citizens or a federal chamber elected directly according to the number of citizens and a chamber of republics, to which every republic will elect an equal number of members. The chambers should make decisions on an equal footing.

As is known, a proposal contrary to this one has been defined involving a union of sovereign states. This is in fact a proposal to abolish Yugoslavia and turn it into several sovereign states in the form of the present republics. Considering this, it was only natural and to be expected that the result of the present talks among the presidents of the republics would be to conclude that there is a need to hold a referendum, because nobody could openly oppose the simple request that the fate of Yugoslavia should be decided upon by the people living in it.

However, in the very first move towards carrying out a referendum, this result was undermined because of opposition involving artificial dilemmas, that is to say, issues that are not in the least bit debatable nor, in our opinion, could they be debatable. It has turned out that, in fact, there is no desire to decide about Yugoslavia on the basis of the interests of its peoples and on the basis of the principle of national equality, but on the basis of decisions that are made in advance and on the already existing nationalist confrontations, which have after all been shown to be the most effective means to destroy and abolish Yugoslavia. Therefore it is not surprising that the artificial dilemmas relating to different referendums in the republics and different procedures, the question of whether citizens or peoples vote, and the role of Yugoslav bodies, have been created.

I will briefly explain why I think that we are talking about artificial dilemmas and contrived issues. Firstly, for the referendum to have any meaning at all, it must produce results that can be compared for all republics, that is to say the voting must be organised with the same questions, on the same day, and according to the same procedure in all republics. If this is not so, from the point of view of the content of talks we have had, the achieved results would not have any value and they would in fact only represent confirmation of the stands that the representatives of certain republics have so far advocated.

Secondly, the dilemma over whether citizens or peoples vote is artificial because people vote on these issues both in their capacity as citizens and their capacity as members of a people, that is to say in their capacity as both. There is no contradiction in this respect. That is to say,

if the aim of continuing the union in Yugoslavia is discredited, then this issue must be voted on by the two basic factors of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav peoples and the republics. This proceeds directly from Article One of the Constitution of Yugoslavia which says, and I quote The SFRY is a federation of states of voluntarily unified peoples and their republics. End of quote.

The expression of the will of all Yugoslavs in their capacity as citizens and in their capacity as members of a people ensures that decisions are not made through national majority strength in the republics. That is to say, the right to self-determination of any of the Yugoslav peoples is not violated or denigrated. If there were no threat to the separation of parts of a people which live in several republics into an independent state, which undermines their interests and turns them into national minorities, there would be no justification for voting by peoples as well as citizens. That is to say, only citizens would vote on the form of the state for one state. However, in this case, every Yugoslav people as a whole and not in parts throughout the republics have the right to self-determination, which also means the right to vote.

The third dilemma, which is connected with the role and existence of the Federal Constitution and Federal bodies in the procedure for resolving the constitutional and political crisis, is artificial if a peaceful, democratic and legal solution to the crisis is desired because the talks and even agreements between the Presidents of the republics and the results of the referendum in the republics cannot be abolished or changed by the existing Constitution of Yugoslavia. We think therefore that even if the result of the referendum expresses the will of the peoples to leave Yugoslavia, this decision can be legally implemented only by changing the Constitution of Yugoslavia, and no-one will oppose and no-one will challenge such a decision if it is not to the detriment of other republics or another Yugoslav people.

For all these reasons, I think that the best thing is for a referendum to be scheduled by the Assembly of Yugoslavia, as the organ responsible for changing the Constitution of Yugoslavia, and on the basis of the provisions of this Constitution, for the sake of a preliminary vote on the issues in the Assembly's jurisdiction, as this is after all set down in Article 146 of the Yugoslav Constitution.

I therefore do not see one single reason for going the illegal way rather than the legal way, particularly if it is borne in mind that under the existing circumstances, the legal way is the only way to guarantee the resolution of the crisis peacefully. As far as we are concerned, the peoples who want to leave Yugoslavia can do so, but in a legal way and without violence. This is a way out that should be acceptable for everyone because in this way the danger of armed intra-national clashes and the outbreak of civil war can be avoided.

The question of the survival or the abolition of Yugoslavia as a common state is the essence of all disagreements in the talks so far, and all these disagreements can be reduced to this issue. Neither political pluralism nor the market economy are in dispute. This is a question of the struggle for the survival of the Yugoslav state on the one hand and separatist aspirations on the other. I think that the preservation of Yugoslavia represents our vital aim, and Serbia should use all means to help all those throughout Yugoslavia who want to maintain this aim, so that this aim is realised.

I am personally convinced that not one citizen who cares about Yugoslavia will allow his homeland to disappear just like that, both because of everything that has been put into Yugoslavia and because of the peace and freedom which Yugoslavia can, by existing, ensure for future generations. There can therefore be no formal agreement on the present secessionist demands because they are at variance with the Constitution of Yugoslavia and no actual agreement because the right of a people to self-determination has always been limited by the same equal rights of other peoples. Therefore, what is unacceptable in the present confrontations is that those people who are striving to preserve Yugoslavia are blamed for the crisis within it. Besides, I think that the orientation of the Serbian people towards preserving Yugoslavia together with other peoples who would wish to do so is not to the detriment of any of the Yugoslav peoples nor does it call into question the right of any of them to leave Yugoslavia.

It is an undisputable fact that the right of a people to self-determination in a multinational state cannot be territorially limited to existing administrative borders between republics. The borders between the republics within Yugoslavia have never been state borders. It is well-known that they were drawn in the past arbitrarily and without objective criteria that is, disregarding the ethnic composition of the population, the consequences of the genocide suffered by the Serbian people, or the norms of international law. Therefore, the right to self-determination cannot be reserved only for a majority people in a nationally-mixed republic. If that were so, the interests of those peoples who constitute a smaller number in a part of Yugoslav territory within the borders of individual republics would be violated on the pretext of civil democracy.

The Serbian people in general wish to continue life in Yugoslavia and have the right to advocate the realisation of this legitimate aim. Yugoslavia exists and we need nobody to consent to this fact. Yugoslavia simply cannot cease to exist because some Yugoslav peoples want to leave it, just as it would not cease to exist if some new peoples wanted to enter it. The question of borders is not an issue for the people who advocate Yugoslavia. This problem will have to

be confronted above all by those who want to leave Yugoslavia. It is only logical, and also just, that those who put forward a problem must make an effort to solve it, considering the fact that solutions cannot be sought or found to the detriment of others and can be both sought and found on the principles of respecting a people's will and right to self-determination.

Therefore, those people who wish to constitute new states should in their own interest and as soon as possible clearly realise the fact that entire sections of those Yugoslav peoples who favour the survival of Yugoslavia cannot be pulled by force into their future national states. This fact clearly points to numerous and serious difficulties that should be solved, but the burden of solving these difficulties and the consequences of tearing Yugoslavia apart, of unilateral acts, and of the failure to recognise the rights of other Yugoslav peoples must be borne by those people who decided to secede from Yugoslavia and not those who want to preserve it.

I am convinced that a way out of the crisis is possible if the freely expressed will of all Yugoslav peoples is respected. It is our stand that the fate of Yugoslavia can be decided upon only by the Yugoslav people directly and that as long as the SFRY Constitution is not changed, the legality and legitimacy of Yugoslav institutions must be respected. This is a condition for peace in the country. The Republic of Serbia guarantees peace for all the citizens and peoples who live in it, but it demands this from others too. We believe in peace and we are committed to a democratic solution. This means that Serbia and the Serbian people will respect the rights and freedoms of other peoples and respect their will.

Finally, in reply to the question of what kind of policy to proceed with and in which direction the negotiations should continue, I think that we should advocate the following quite specific proposals, I will present them briefly in five points

One, that all political institutions in the country and the JNA guarantee peace. This implies that the existence of any military formations should be prevented, apart from the JNA and the regular militia.

Two, that a constitutional law be adopted immediately which will determine the way to exercise the right of peoples to self-determination, in the same way for everyone, so that the peoples who want to separate and set up their own separate states be allowed to do this in a peaceful way without violence. The regulation of the way of exercising the right to self-determination through a constitutional law in the same way for everyone, avoids the danger of this right being abused and thus violating the equal rights of another people or other peoples.

Three, that a referendum be carried out on the basis of a decision by the SFRY Assembly in the same way, on the same day, and with the same questions, and that its results give a clear picture of the will of citizens and of the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

Four, that proceeding from the results of the referendum, the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia be realised in line with the adopted constitutional law, and the fixing of boundaries be carried out.

Five, that free, multi-party elections be scheduled and held for the SFRY Assembly.

Respected deputies, as many times before in the history of our people, its freedom has been threatened. This time, the strongest forces against us are among us. Perhaps, therefore, the battle for the freedom of Yugoslav peoples and particularly for the community of Yugoslav states is more difficult. However, it will certainly rally together the most progressive and humane people in our country.

The Serbian people and all citizens of Serbia should take part in this battle for Yugoslavia in line with their best traditions and most progressive achievements, bearing in mind their interests but also considering the interests of all others, that is to say, of those with whom we should share our life together. We are ready to offer the best that we have for the sake of Yugoslavia goodwill and the willingness to share good and evil together. Of course, in this respect we expect the same goodwill and willingness from others. Any other solution and particularly a solution which would be the result of selfishness and aggression could momentarily calm selfish and conceited politicians, but it would not bring peace and tranquillity, and it would not bring progress to the peoples and citizens of Yugoslavia. It would particularly not bring this for future generations. Therefore, all political decisions in our country, and thus in Serbia too, should be guided by these aims peace, tranquillity and progress for all people who live in Yugoslavia.

Thank you for your attention.

ANEXO B.5 – Serbian President Interviewed Denies Involvement In Croatian Conflict.¹²⁷

[Van Linden] Mr President, can we begin with a question about the EC mission? The EC has had four missions in Yugoslavia, the last one ending on Sunday [4th August]. They say that they have failed. They said that one side has not agreed to their proposals. After he returned to the Netherlands, the Dutch [Foreign] Minister said that the side to be blamed is Serbia. Are you to be blamed for the failure of the EC mission?

[Milosevic] No, not at all. My explanation is very clear, simple, and it seems to me, short. The morning that the mission arrived, the SFRY Presidency decided to issue an announcement on the cease-fire. At the same time it was to set up a state cease-fire commission, which means that the SFRY Presidency decided that the Yugoslav authorities have to implement the cease-fire. The Presidency made this decision almost unanimously, which means that Serbia, being only one member of the Presidency, cannot be blamed for the decision.

[Van Linden] What, in your opinion, are the reasons for the EC to accuse you?

[Milosevic] It is best to ask them to explain this to you, not me. We had very good, constructive, and long talks. They just asked me why I refused to receive them, and they know very well that we met three times in one day and had very open talks about all questions, without any problems.

[Van Linden] What is then, in your opinion, the reason for the failure of their mission? If you are not to be blamed, who is then?

[Milosevic] If you want me to try to explain my opinion, a sort of mis-step is involved. When they set off for Yugoslavia, they knew that there had been no decision on the cease-fire. However, that morning, the Presidency decided on the cease-fire. The Presidency had decided that we should set up our own, Yugoslav, control of the cease-fire. It was impossible to cancel the Presidency decision. We are an independent and sovereign country.

Also discussed was a kind of foreign military presence in Yugoslavia. We are a free and open country. You can travel anywhere as a journalist, politician, diplomat, tourist. All foreigners are very welcome in this country, but soldiers are not.

In the First World War we lost almost half our population, and almost the same happened in the Second World War, in the liberation struggle, so we do not like a foreign

¹²⁷ Entrevista a Arnot Van Linden para a Sky Television/Belgrade TV em 7 de agosto de 1991. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic080791.htm>>.

military presence in Yugoslavia, particularly when as you very well know yourself such a military presence is not in accordance with the independence of a state.

[Van Linden] The EC has stated that the truce is not a real one because one of the sides involved has not agreed to it, that it voted against it. In fact, one should have a real cease-fire, and the one proclaimed by the Federal Presidency is not that. My next question It seems now that Yugoslavia does not exist as a country, so how can federal authorities which would control the truce exist when the Yugoslavs are clashing with and fighting each other?

[Milosevic] I do not think that anyone from the outside could judge the Presidency's credibility or Yugoslav institutions. We alone must clean our own house.

[Van Linden] That means that, in your opinion, there is no longer any need for any European mediation or for any more European missions, because there is a possibility of Yugoslavs solving that problem among themselves.

[Milosevic] I hope that we will be capable of solving this situation. We want co-operation with the EC, but we do not want interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. We want this to be on the basis of equality. It is well-known that we all think that we have the same attitude towards the EC declaration, that the Yugoslav crisis must be solved by the Yugoslav people themselves. Therefore, they must solve this themselves and they are going to do so.

[Van Linden] Is this your answer to what Mr van den Broek said in Belgrade, that politicians here are more tuned to (the past) than to the future? How would you reply to the remarks he made here in Belgrade?

[Milosevic] It is not good if politicians think more about the past than about the future. I think that we all have to turn to the future in order to solve the crisis, but we have to respect experiences from the past because of the future. We must not repeat the tragic experiences that we had in this country 50 years ago. I think that people around the world are not aware of the fact that we are facing a kind of restoration of fascism in this country. (It is a fact, you know,) that this is the first example since the Second World War that someone armed his own party. It was in Croatia that someone started organising paramilitary formations and demonstrating his sovereignty by attacking all Serbian villages and towns in the republic. This is something that happened in this country 50 years ago as well, (for) you know that in the so-called Independent State of Croatia, during World War II, genocide was committed against Serbs. In one concentration camp alone, in Jasenovac, more than 700,000 Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and others were killed. We are now facing a very similar situation.

[Van Linden] But that is past. You were just talking about the past.

[Milosevic] Yes, but this exists in some aspects of the present. There lies the problem. We must be aware of that experience from the past in order to be able to do everything in our power to prevent that tragic experience from reoccurring. We can be a happy, good and successful country if we overcome this crisis of nationalism and nationalist confrontations. Everything in Yugoslavia started when nationalists in Croatia and Slovenia came to power, and the simple result of that was the decision on secession. Everything else followed.

[Van Linden] They say, however, that everything began in 1987 when you became President of Serbia on the basis of a nationalist policy.

[Milosevic] That was never a nationalist platform. Why do you not face the truth? Now as a journalist, you can see for yourself that here in Serbia we have more than 40,000 refugees (from) Croatia and there is not a single refugee from Serbia in Croatia. There is no pressure here, no broken windows. You can see that peace reigns on every inch of Serbian territory. We are not in conflict with Croatia. This is not a conflict between the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia. This is a conflict between the Croatian authorities and the Serbian people. This is a kind of state terrorism against the Serbian population in Croatia. They are incessantly attacking villages, shelling them with 120 mm grenades. They have started slaughtering people. They have slaughtered a peasant in the village of Mirkovci. I suppose you have been informed that a woman has been slaughtered in Krajina. Can you imagine something like that at the end of the 20th century?

[Van Linden] This is happening on both sides.

[Milosevic] No, you cannot put aggressor and victim in the same position. Peasants are only defending themselves in their villages, nothing else. Serbian villages are not on a flying carpet so that they can run after the Croatian paramilitary formations. You can prove this only in those regions in which Serbs are attacked. They are defending themselves using their right to self- defence. Conflicts are happening there. They are fighting, using their right to self- defence which belongs to every individual and every people. You can see ruins and the traces of war. On the basis of this evidence you can judge the possible reasons. Perhaps the Serbs are fighting among themselves, or are they being attacked by troops that had come to their villages and cities. What is the purpose of this?

[Van Linden] Are you saying that the Serbs are not responsible for a single attack?

[Milosevic] They are not. I think that they have always acted in self-defence and nothing else. They have never committed any aggression on the territory of Croatia. By the way, throughout our history, the Serbian people have never waged an aggressive, occupational war.

We have always defended ourselves and have done so very successfully. We have always won. I think that no one can defeat people who are defending their homes.

[Van Linden] Are you controlling the Serbian militia in Croatia?

[Milosevic] No.

[Van Linden] Do you have any connections with them?

[Milosevic] We are helping them in terms of food, medical equipment, medicines, money and the like. We (are doing) a lot for them, but they are defending their own homes and no one has organised groups on these territories.

[Van Linden] If [words indistinct] and if it depends on villages themselves, to what extent can you be sure that the present truce will continue?

[Milosevic] I know the spirit of this people. I know that they will keep their word.

[Van Linden] After the events of the last month, would you accept Croatia's independence?

[Milosevic] Well, this question needs to be explained better. We are living in the country of Yugoslavia. It is one country, one land. It is the only internationally recognised subject. We are not opposing the Croatian people's right to self-determination. If they want to establish their own independent, national state, there is no reason for us to oppose that. However, if they want to leave Yugoslavia, they cannot take a section of the Serbian people with them. This right to self-determination belongs to the Serbian people as well. I think that this is very logical.

We are living in this country. All people in Yugoslavia have equal rights to self-determination. The Serbian people do not want to leave Yugoslavia. They want to remain in Yugoslavia, to live together with all people who want to live in Yugoslavia and with Serbs, and that is all. I think that this is the only democratic and peaceful approach, respecting the will of the people. Let us check their will through a referendum and capacity to act in conformity with the will they express. Nothing will happen. There will be no conflicts, confrontations, bloodshed, or anything else, if no one wishes to hurt the interest of the other side.

[Van Linden] Let us return to what you just said one should hold a referendum and the people should decide for themselves whether they want to be part of Croatia or part of Yugoslavia. Krajina and its people want to be a part of Serbia. However, as far as I can understand, the Serbian Assembly has failed to officially accept their desire to be a part of Serbia.

[Milosevic] This is not a proper interpretation of the will of the Krajina people. The people of Krajina have, first of all, decided to remain within, that is, a part of Yugoslavia and that is all. The Republic of Serbia has no territorial pretensions. The Republic of Serbia wants

to (keep) the integrity of Yugoslavia and to keep together all those people who want to live together with us on an equal footing in our present country. That is all.

[Van Linden] Your opponents claim that you want a Greater Serbia. You claim that this is not so.

[Milosevic] No, it is not so. We want to keep Yugoslavia and that is all.

[Van Linden] However, if Croatia and Slovenia leave Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia will no longer exist.

[Milosevic] (Listen), why would I not be able to survive if somebody leaves me? In that case, Yugoslavia will be different, within a different framework, but it will continue existing as a state of equal peoples and equal republics. In that case, there will again be republics in Yugoslavia and people in Yugoslavia who want to live together.

[Van Linden] Yes, but for a (reintegration) one needs a referendum. Serbs in Croatia, Croats in Bosnia, all that is becoming very complicated. You have a problem in Serbia itself. If the people of Kosovo say that they want to be independent, how are you going to react?

[Milosevic] What part of the people? The Albanians? The Albanians are a national minority in Yugoslavia. You know very well that there are no international obligations, UN or CSCE obligations, or the like which determine the right of national minorities to establish their own state. What would happen in Texas if the Mexicans on the Mexican border, for instance, tried to take away a part of Texas and cede it to Mexico? Would they be allowed to do so?

[Van Linden] But the Serbs in Croatia are a minority.

[Milosevic] No, they are not. No Yugoslav people are a minority anywhere in Yugoslavia. We are living in Yugoslavia and we cannot be a national minority depending on the place we are living in. Croats are not a national minority in Bosnia, despite the fact that they are only 15%. They are a people. All Yugoslav peoples in Yugoslavia are equal and not one of them can be a national minority.

[Van Linden] But if you say that there should be the right to self-determination in Croatia -

[Milosevic] Of Croats, but not of administrative territories of the Republic of Croatia which has never been a state within these borders. We were not the side to open the problem of borders. The problem of borders was opened by the secessionists. Had they not done so, no one would have said a word about that. No one would have called these borders into question. If you want to change borders, to create an independent state, to secede, then you automatically create that problem.

ANEXO B.6 – Milosevic Says Of Vance's Un Plan” Not A Single Contentious Point”.¹²⁸

[Milosevic] I think I have good news for you regarding the talks that we held. I can say that there is not a single contentious point concerning Cyrus Vance's plan from the point of view of the policies of the Republic of Serbia. We think that this plan is very good and expect, on the basis of this plan, that the UN peace forces will protect the entire territories of the Krajinas and that this will help towards the Yugoslav crisis being resolved in a peaceful way.

This is not all. I think that this should facilitate the earliest possible return of the refugees to their homes. This means that people will be able to return to their normal lives without fear that they will be attacked or that they will again be exposed to the genocide to which, as we can see, they have been exposed in those regions for the third time in this century.

[Question] Could you tell us whether this is a new formula or a modification of the initial version for bringing in the blue helmets?

[Milosevic] This is in fact the consistent approach that the mission of Cyrus Vance has had right from the beginning. Of course, this approach has evolved and has adjusted itself to the existing situation as a whole. Therefore, I think at this moment such an approach offers guarantees that in fact no military formations or armed groups will be allowed to be present on the territories of the Krajinas, in which the citizens will therefore be able to feel completely safe and to decide freely on their fate, their political will, and their future.

However, I must also say - so that this does not sound like excessive optimism - that there is a big problem, namely the problem of observing the cease-fire. As you know, the problem with respecting the cease-fire is on the side of the Croatian formations that carried out very serious crimes against the population in Western Slavonia, particularly in the last few weeks. We indeed expect the international public and Cyrus Vance's mission to contribute towards having the Croatian side also observe the truce, that is to say, to create conditions for the final arrival of peace forces. There are no disagreements about this on our side. I think that we have resolved all contentious issues very successfully.

[Q] Was anything said about the proposal made in Brussels on recognising the independence of the Yugoslav republics?

[Milosevic] We discussed this. I cannot speak on behalf of Cyrus Vance, but I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in the international public, and in the statements of the Secretary- General, and Mr Vance himself, there was a very negative stand towards this

¹²⁸ Entrevista concedida à radio Belgrado em 31 de dezembro de 1991. Disponível em: < <http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic123191.htm>>.

prior and premature recognition before the Yugoslav crisis is resolved. I think that this stand is correct, that is to say, that this premature recognition of some republics by certain countries will certainly not contribute towards the denouement of the Yugoslav crisis. However, if Cyrus Vance's concept is carried out, I think that we will find ourselves in a completely new situation, in a situation in which peace is finally established so that we can finally, without pressure, resolve the crisis in a peaceful way and through negotiations.

ANEXO B.7 – Milosevic Interviewed on Pressures Facing Fry and Good Prospects For New State.¹²⁹

[Vucelic] Mr President, it seems that the pressures on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and Serbia have never been greater than in recent times. In the last few days, they have even intensified. What do you think these pressures are aimed at?

[Milosevic] These pressures are, above all, aimed at destabilising Yugoslavia, that is to say, at preventing it from being established and stabilised. The forces which, with the help of their Yugoslav branches, have succeeded in the last few years in finally breaking up Yugoslavia, had in mind the need, in line with their own interests, to create as many small states in this part of the Balkans as possible, that is to say, to reduce Serbia to the greatest degree possible. Therefore, it is quite logical that they are all very upset. This is why this pressure is so fierce. It is fierce just because such a plan was countered by the creation of a stable state, like the FRY, that has by European standards quite a potential.

Therefore, this plan stopped on the borders of the FRY, and without a doubt these people, both the citizens of Serbia and the citizens of Montenegro, have a right to this state of theirs and are orientated towards this and therefore they can set such a state up and successfully live in it.

[Vucelic] Do you think therefore that adherence to its own interests and independence in the policy of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro is in some way the main cause of this kind of pressure being exerted on us now?

[Milosevic] There is no doubt that with its 11m citizens in this central place in the Balkan peninsula, on this bridge between continents and with its potential, Yugoslavia is greater than Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal or the Netherlands. Therefore, regarding European criteria, it is a medium-sized country with great possibilities for development and with great possibilities to maintain its stability, independence and even its successful economic development as an independent state in both the political and military sense. It does not in any way suit the interests of those forces that wanted to destabilise and break up the whole of the region of what has up to now been Yugoslavia.

Therefore, it is obvious that were this not so important, the pressures would not be so great. One can measure what will happen best by the resistance that is offered to the processes of such an emerging state.

¹²⁹ Entrevista concedida a Mirolad Vucelic para a Radio Television Serbia em 28 de maio de 1992. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic052892.htm>>.

[Vucelic] Do you therefore think that if we had been applauded more, we would have met other people's interests more and the situation would have been considerably more favourable, at least regarding foreign policy pressure, but, regarding our own interests, it would have been much worse?

[Milosevic] It is a great question whether we could agree to even think about putting aside some of our vital interests. That is to say, I do not believe that the huge majority of the citizens of Serbia - and I believe Montenegro, too - could even think that one could discuss tomorrow demands that we give up Kosovo or northern Vojvodina or Novi Pazar Sandzak, or the Raska region, or any other part of Yugoslavia. There can be no talk of this. I am also referring to a part of Montenegro that has been mentioned.

Therefore, it is a great question whether one can even talk about meeting such demands and interests halfway, because I would like to remind you that pressure and sanctions against Serbia started at the moment we refused in The Hague to allow Yugoslavia to be wiped away with the stroke of a pen. At that point, the reason was our so-called non-cooperativeness, as if cooperativeness or non-cooperativeness can be measured by our agreeing or disagreeing to our one and only homeland being scrapped.

[Vucelic] It is usually said that we are in the difficult situation that we are in primarily because we have lost the media war. I fear that to some extent that idea could be true, but it neglects the fact that we have nevertheless been the target of some other people's interests and their aspirations and that this is nevertheless a more important part of the outcome, the part we are experiencing now.

[Milosevic] It is beyond doubt that the war is no longer being waged merely by conventional means, but rather that a fierce media war is being waged. It is evident from the information that we have received that it is very difficult to find an event represented to our advantage in the media of most of the EC countries and the United States. This is very well-financed and organised propaganda that is aimed at mobilising public opinion against Serbia.

As you know, from the very beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, Serbia particularly strived to preserve Yugoslavia and to resolve the crisis in a peaceful manner. Furthermore, at the very beginning Serbia took the stand according to which it in no way disputes other peoples' right to self-determination, so that, if these peoples so wish they can freely form their own national states, and finally we said that it is not our right to dispute such a right. However, the same right belongs to our people, that is to say, this same right also belongs to Serbia and Montenegro as well. Does it sound logical to you that the right to secession can be stronger than the right of

being devoted to one's country, stronger than the right to remain and live in one's own existing country?

[Vucelic] It seems to us, Mr President, that Serbia in its foreign political activities and in its international activities in general adhered for too long to the existing international law, legality and legitimacy, while the world in the meantime has obviously abandoned all this by recognising only de facto situations, regardless of how they were established.

[Milosevic] Well, the approach by which only de facto situations are recognised is very dangerous, not only in the particular case of Yugoslavia but, it seems to me, also as a precedent for the world. If only force and interests, but not justice and truth, prevail on the political scene then a serious question arises as to what this new world order that has been discussed so much will be like. Is this the order in which some countries or some nations are supposed to be servants and others masters, or is this the order that is supposed to represent a new way of democratisation and integration on a global scale?

There are enormous differences in the approach to this issue and one thing is clear to us. These people and this country were never servants to others, these people do not have a foreign master and they want to preserve their independence. I think that we have all the conditions necessary to preserve this independence by not taking anything that belongs to others and by not demanding anything that belongs to others because, from a historic perspective, taking away or usurping something that belongs to others may actually mean digging a grave for one's own grandchildren, as what has been taken by force and in a contested manner will certainly eventually be reopened by force and in a contested manner. It is known that in our entire history the Serbs and the Serbian people never waged wars of conquest but only defensive wars, and they succeeded in defending their freedom and their independence. We hope that we will not be forced to fight any other wars on these territories, as there have been plenty of wars and starvation here. We want peace.

The essence of the policy that Serbia is advocating at this very moment is reduced to only a couple of words, peace and economic recovery. I believe that we also meet plenty of conditions for economic recovery. And I believe that under stable circumstances in our region, which we would for this reason like to help in creating and stimulating, we can implement the economic revitalisation and raise the standard of living very rapidly. That is to say, we can ensure that our FRY becomes in all aspects a well-organised, economically developed and happy country.

[Vucelic] I believe that through the Constitution, through everything that will follow, the coming elections and so forth, we will reach stability and safety. This will facilitate the

creation of better foundations and a better future for the generations to come and for us who are living now.

[Milosevic] Well, it is hard to imagine, at least as regards the majority of the citizens of this country, how any of them could be bothered by the formation of Yugoslavia. The formation of Yugoslavia can only bother our enemies and those who wish this country to be their servant. It is certainly in the interest of the residents of this country, the residents of Serbia and Montenegro, that this country be well and efficiently organised. The bottom line is that if we created the country then, naturally, this country should also function. If we formed the country then this country should have its parliament and government in order to function, and the latter two are constituted at elections. Therefore, it is evident that in the process of constituting the FRY time is a very important factor, I would even say a key factor. Furthermore, I believe that after the elections some of the, shall I say, pronounced tendencies of great pressure will have to subside, especially when it becomes apparent to what degree the residents of this country cherish their country and to what degree they want the actual constitution of this country and the creation of the economic, political and other circumstances that would facilitate successful development.

[Vucelic] An unavoidable topic in all these talks that have been conducted, the topic that serves as the motive and the cause for foreign intervention, foreign interference, or foreign pressure, is the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although you have presented your view on several occasions, although your view is known, I would like to ask you to state what you think about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and possible solutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the ones that you are promoting, the ones that Serbia and the FRY are promoting.

[Milosevic] The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that many who are exerting pressure regarding the whole situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina simply do not understand the problems of Yugoslavia or the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This lack of understanding has pushed the peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina into this bloody conflict. This conflict represents a tragedy for all its citizens regardless of their nationality. Our view about this, as known, was very clear. It was even formulated in our Assembly, as you remember, at the beginning of March. This took place much earlier, before any clashes broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In our opinion, this view was in fact the only possible principled view, and I hold the same view today, considering that Bosnia-Herzegovina is made up of three equal nations, three constituent, three constitution-making nations. By definition, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been such a state from its very creation. If Bosnia-Herzegovina were an island in the ocean, if it did not have

Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, or any other country around it, this principle of equal treatment of interests of all three nations would still have to be applied.

Therefore, I would like to remind you that from the very beginning we have been striving for the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and relations in it to be regulated on the basis of consensus and equality of all three nations. We even said before all this that to help such a process and such a principled approach we would respect any solution that these three peoples reached on an equal footing. This is the beginning and the end. I do not see any other solution. I do not see any other solution to this agony in Bosnia-Herzegovina other than for hostilities to stop immediately and for the conference that was in fact based on this principle of equality and consensus of the three constituent nations to resume immediately.

The destabilisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina arose just because this very delicate balance and this principle were not respected. On the one hand the EC endorsed this principle, the principle of tripartite consensus, as the starting basis and as the main and only principle of the conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, while on the other hand, in parallel, it embarked on a completely opposite process involving a truncated referendum and premature recognition. In brief, these moves had to endanger the principle that the community itself opted for. In this way they produced destabilisation and conflicts. Now, those who produced this are looking for culprits for this. They are finding them in Serbia, even though it is known that neither Serbia nor the FRY are at war there. After all, if they were at war, this could easily be proved. (If we were the ones who carried out some kind of invasion in Bosnia-Herzegovina, could anyone hide this in Serbia? How could we at all carry out a secret invasion of Bosnia-Herzegovina? It appears to me that this is understood by every one of our citizens, but, unfortunately, it is very difficult to penetrate the foreign media and this message is not reaching their consciousness, that is to say, the establishment of a view on Yugoslavia.

However, I think that in this respect there have recently been some indicators, at least some articles or programmes are sporadically appearing in Western Europe and the United States and are presenting the true events in Yugoslavia. This is only an indication that in this case the truth will surface after all, probably with some delay, a break, which is the result of such a great media blockade, but the truth cannot be hidden. The truth must come out in the end and it will triumph. If we did not believe in this outcome, would we believe that we can achieve success, bearing in mind that our aims are just and solutions honest regarding all our neighbours?

[Vucelic] Mr President, is there anything that the international community and international organisations like the CSCE, EC and the like have demanded from us, something

that is principled, that is to say, have they presented a demand to Serbia and the FRY that was scrupulous, principled, that concerned the principles of humanism and that Serbia may not have responded to so far, or may not have complied with so far?

[Milosevic] No, nothing. Certainly nothing that would concern the principles of humanitarianism, especially if one bears in mind that from the very beginning we opposed any sort of armed clashes through our words, work, stance and behaviour. However, there were political demands. The main pressure was that we accept the so-called Carrington document from The Hague. We simply could not accept this document because it contained a decree, implications that abolished our country. We even suggested then that, departing from the principles from which the [EC] conference [on Yugoslavia] in The Hague had departed, we retain what was written in the document about sovereign and independent states for those who want it, but that the document also equally consider our choice, which is a common state of those who want it. Therefore, in both cases the document would contain the wishes of all sides. What could be more just than to establish, organise and bring to a status of normal function a state in accordance with a wish that was, naturally, expressed in a democratic manner?

Therefore, owing to such a one-sided approach we could not accept this document. It is hard to imagine that any patriot could have accepted it.

[Vucelic] In this context -

[Milosevic, interrupting] Without these corrections, of course. Without these corrections and amendments upon which we insisted and that were completely clearly this can always be verified as these are documents that will be kept they were perfectly clearly and evidently such that they did not threaten anybody else's interests, but were merely facilitating those who wished to continue to live in their own existing state and to naturally reorganise this state in accordance with their interests.

[Vucelic] Another issue that also arises is the issue of ethnic minorities in the FRY, with a special emphasis on Kosovo.

[Milosevic] It seems to me that our answer was very principled here. We guarantee to ethnic minorities all rights that the CSCE countries guarantee, we grant them all rights that are granted or that exist in the EC countries. They cannot ask us to guarantee something other than the countries who are making this demand guarantee their own ethnic minorities.

The idea that Kosovo should be given some kind of special status is another indication of the lack of knowledge about the whole situation in Serbia. The problem in Kosovo is not that the human rights of Albanians are being trampled on, but a problem involving a clash with a separatist Albanian movement whose only aim, which it has finally openly proclaimed, is to

separate Kosovo from Serbia and join it to neighbouring Albania. This is an issue that concerns our integrity.

Kosovo is not merely another part of Serbia, although Serbia does not have parts to give away, anyway. Kosovo is the heart of Serbia; our entire history lies there. Finally, even today there is an enormous number, several hundred thousand[changes thought] that is to say, not only Albanians but also Serbs, Montenegrins and others. In the end, Kosovo never was an Albanian autonomous region. Kosovo became an autonomous region because of the specific structure of its population, for specific reasons, regardless of whether this was justified or not.

Therefore, Kosovo has never belonged, not even as an autonomous region, to the Albanian ethnic minority and it never in history belonged to Albania. True enough, a part of it belonged to Mussolini's Greater Albania, that is, it was under fascist rule. However, neither before nor after, never in history did Kosovo belong to Albania. Kosovo will remain a part of Serbia and this really cannot be discussed under any circumstances.

It is another thing that there are instances of violations of human rights in Kosovo. This has to be eliminated. However, this cannot be either a cause or a reason for anyone to demand that Kosovo be given a special status in which the Albanian minority would enjoy virtual state powers and in this way realise integration with neighbouring Albania to the detriment of Serbia. This is out of the question.

[Vucelic] Mr President, it is often said that because of a lack of foreign policy Serbia has lost allies and that at present it has neither friends nor allies in the world. Considering that you have been very intensively contacting foreign officials you have such contacts every day to what extent do you consider this impression justified and correct?

[Milosevic] I do not think that this impression is correct. We have neither lost friends nor allies, despite the fact that at this hot stage of huge pressures and in this situation of a disturbed balance in the world, some forces are undoubtedly dictating solutions and dictating the attitudes towards us. I do not believe that this can last a long time. It can last only for a very short time, because the relations that have so far been established on an equal basis were not established by force but because of the interests of Yugoslavia and other states that have entered into these relations with it.

The interests are alive, they still exist, and there is no doubt that they will be preserved even after the wave of these mostly unfounded accusations and pressures on our country has gone.

[Vucelic] Frequent targets of criticism are the domestic policy of Serbia, the FRY and you, as President, as allegedly being an undemocratic policy, a policy that contains elements of

Bolshevism, communism and similar things that are a part of the collection of things that have become (odious). Could you say something about these objections?

[Milosevic] According to, I think, a Russian proverb that is often used in our country, one is not too choosy about a stick in a fight. Many things have been said at the expense of Serbia, at the expense of the ruling party and at my expense. However, one should have discussions and appreciate what is in fact happening in this country. This country has held free, multi-party elections. Neither foreign forces nor their domestic branches can determine or elect who will be sitting in the assembly or the government in a democratic country. This is the right of the people. The people realised this right in free elections.

We are in fact just about to hold free elections during which everyone will be able to freely express their wish, as our citizens know. There is nothing more rational for those who believe that they enjoy the support of the people than to take part in the elections, nominate themselves as candidates and obtain this support. They should have their beliefs confirmed in the correctness of the views and policies that they are advocating.

[Vucelic] Mr President, in your opinion, does a policy, policies, or aspirations that definitely exist on the political scene and that would like to restore divisions from a civil war in Serbia stand any chance of success, or do you believe that this is not possible in Serbia in present times and in this crisis and complex situation in which we live?

[Milosevic] Nothing is impossible, and because they believe that this is possible, numerous forces are trying hard to make Serbs start killing each other. Well, a successful outcome of these efforts would be tragic for Serbia and I am convinced that such an outcome will not occur in Serbia. These people want to live in peace, to assume successful economic development and not to kill each other, as finally, in who else's interest could this be but that of our enemies? It is nevertheless the end of the 20th century and in Europe, where we live, it is not possible to assume that a justified interest and aspiration of either individuals or groups, if they are any good and if democratic support can be won for them, could not come to prominence through the democratic mechanism that has been established in this country. I do not believe that anyone with good intentions in this country could claim this.

[Vucelic] Mr President, it is usually believed that economic prosperity and revitalisation, which you have just mentioned, in a crisis situation are not possible without foreign aid. Therefore, there are some doubts that we [changes thought] that it would not be possible for the FRY to achieve an anti-inflation programme and a stable economic situation that would facilitate not only stability but also prosperity by merely relying on its own resources and potential.

[Milosevic] Even so far we have not been receiving foreign aid, that is to say, I suppose Yugoslavia was receiving foreign aid a few decades ago. However, entire decades have passed not in receiving aid but in paying off the enormous interest rates on loans that were taken for what was needed and for what was not needed.

I believe that Yugoslavia stands extremely good chances in the circumstances of a reasonable economy. I believe that there is not one country among the East European bloc countries - in which we are unjustly included, although we were never a part of that bloc - that could experience an economic recovery faster than Yugoslavia.

Therefore, we are not considering the closing of Yugoslavia here, but on the contrary, its opening in all directions and aspects in an economic sense. The co-operation with partners in foreign markets has no perspective if we have to count on somebody's aid. We can count on somebody's economic interest. Foreign businessmen will invest in numerous economic projects in which they are interested if they will benefit from it and so will our businessmen. Therefore, here we are talking about mobilisation of foreign capital on good and attractive projects in which both sides will find a corresponding benefit.

Today, we have numerous large[changes thought] I can say there are a considerable number, a significant number of large projects for which there is obviously great interest among the developed countries. Precisely because of the attractiveness of these projects we are one of the countries that do not need to search for investors. Therefore, it is in our interest that the political situation in the region stabilise as quickly as possible. On the other hand, however, it must be clear that the creation of Yugoslavia, its survival and its continuity are factors for stabilisation and peace in the region.

In this sense, in a stable political situation, which we need, there are numerous conditions for a speedy economic recovery. We expect that we shall very quickly realise major investment projects - above all in the economic infrastructure; this means motorways, railways, the unification of forces within the framework of the new state, including transport enterprises, port authorities, telecommunication systems - that is, everything that is part of the economic infrastructure. The fact is we now produce more than half of all electricity of the former Yugoslavia, and that apart from France, we are the only country in Europe with a surplus of electrical power.

So with such a state of affairs in the electricity industry, with such big investment projects and communications at the international level, and, on the other hand, with a comprehensive opening for new investments, private investments, joint ventures and long-term industrial co-operation, it is beyond doubt that this country has exceptionally great development

potential, not to mention that its biggest development potential lies in the enormous number of highly educated workers, engineers, technicians and all types of experts who can be mobilised for almost any technological process currently used in the modern world.

The fact is we have reduced our foreign debt in the past few years. Serbia owes only 4bn dollars. It is, as you can see, about 400 dollars per person. This is incomparably less than almost all surrounding countries, and in a normal situation we could very quickly activate our participation in the world financial markets, and the stock market and internal financial market, integrated with external markets, could start operating here so that economic life, in the full sense, would be orientated towards economic expansion, which undoubtedly is bound to succeed.

[Vucelic] Mr President, will this Yugoslavia avoid inheriting some of the bad features of the preceding Yugoslavia, especially in its last phase? Namely, numerous elements of the confederal system, a lot of power to republics that did not recognise federal bodies - in which, of course, Serbia and Montenegro were the last - which later boomeranged on them, but nevertheless these tendencies to reduce authority from the federal to the republican level did affect them. In what way do you think that the future authorities, the future system, will be organised in order to avoid the destructive tendencies which destroyed the former Yugoslavia?

[Milosevic] If we are not to avoid those tendencies, then we would be not be on the right track. That is certain. We approached the creation of this federation with the aim of creating a real federation, and not a confederation. If we make one or three states out of two[changes thought] if the latter then it is better not even to start creating them. We have created - in accordance with how it is defined in the Constitution - a modern federation that meets every condition to function efficiently. I hope that in the course of the implementation of the concept defined by the Constitution, everything that does not need to be at the republican level will be done in one place and the federation will function efficiently.

For instance, regarding economic issues, we used to have nine central banks, nine national banks, one federal and eight republican and provincial banks. We will not have three banks, but one. There is only one currency, one monetary system, which means one issuing bank and not one Yugoslav and two republican issuing banks. All those were nonsensical features of Yugoslav confederalism, and, in fact, a reason for Yugoslavia's disintegration. Because of that, Yugoslavia did not have the grounds and conditions to survive in the economic sense, because destructive mechanisms were built into the system. Now we have tried to avoid such mechanisms. So one monetary system with one central bank, one fiscal system with one

system of economic relations with foreign countries all this defines a single market, which must be defined as a single economic space so that it can function as a single market.

On defence, why do we need defence ministries in the republics and in Yugoslavia? If there is one defence system, one Yugoslav Army, why do we need three ministries? And why do we need a series of parallel bodies for functions that we said in the Constitution belong to the federal state? My firm belief that Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, will be able to function as an efficient and modern federation, is based on this and on the institutions of the system.

[Vucelic] That federation, of course, remains open for co-operation, as you have already said, with all former subjects, former republics of Yugoslavia co-operation based, naturally, on equality and remains open not just for co-operation, but also for the possibility that a state can join other states if it is in its interests. Does this leave some opportunity for us to look after the Serbian people living in neighbouring republics and in the former republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, barring interference in the internal affairs of these neighbouring countries?

[Milosevic] And what opportunities! Independent of institutional solutions, it is beyond doubt at this moment that there are no opportunities to disintegrate the Serbian nation and to erect among it barriers that would stem the flow of vital issues that link it together. In the final analysis, regarding all those political, social, cultural, educational and all other links, I do not think that at this moment anyone thinks that someone could divide [the Serbian nation]. In all respects, whatever institutional solutions are adopted in resolving the crisis in Bosnia and regarding the issue of the Krajinas and other issues the relations and links, interests and concerns of the entire Serbian nation cannot be brought into question.

Regarding relations with the former Yugoslav republics, there are very considerable interests, both ours and I am convinced of all the republics, to re-establish, first of all, intensive economic and then many other types of relations. I am convinced that when this fever of nationalistic confrontation, this fever of bloody conflict, wanes, links will be re-established in the mutual interests of all those living in those parts of the former Yugoslavia, because both they and we have such interests, there is no doubt about it.

[Vucelic] All in all, it can be concluded that the FRY will also in the future take care of the concept of the spiritual unity and integrity of the Serbian people and the Serbian nation. Not to the detriment of others, of course, but above all respecting all its own interests and the interests of its people.

[Milosevic] Naturally, I am sure that, bearing in mind what you said about us never having intended to do anything to this effect, to the detriment of others, I see no reason why others should have anything against the fact that we care for our own interests and the interests of our own people.

[Vucelic] You were the exponent of one of two national strategies when you appeared on the political scene, on the big political scene. Some time has passed. What do you think, Mr President? Would a national strategy be possible in Serbia today that would take less care of the interests of the entire Serbian people, whether it would have legality and legitimacy among the Serbian people?

[Milosevic] No strategy, no policy, in Serbia can be successful if it neglects the interests of the people. It must be based on these basic interests, and I think that in this process of Yugoslavia's disintegration every Serbian citizen today understands what would have happened to Serbia had it not been reunited in 1989, and how its various parts would have behaved now under these dramatic conditions. I can freely say that had it not happened the question would have arisen whether the Serbian people would have had a homeland.

Therefore, it is beyond doubt that oscillations are possible, deviations from one side or another, more or less, but the main orientation of the overall interests of Serbia, its citizens and the Serbian people cannot be subject to negotiation, trade and, least of all, to rotten compromising. Therefore, in these circumstances we have to endure and preserve our interests. We are obliged to do so not only for this people, for citizens who now live in Serbia and Yugoslavia, but also for future generations.

[Vucelic] A while ago you spoke about the economic situation giving rise to a certain optimism and faith in a better future, for some hope. But in light of the situation in the world and our surroundings and pressures to which we have been exposed, undoubtedly we have reason to be apprehensive. Do you think there are reasons for fear, or should we only remain apprehensive and somewhat concerned?

[Milosevic] I do not believe there is a single citizen of Serbia who is not worried today. There are many reasons for concern. In the final analysis, civil war is raging around us. We are exposed to enormous pressures and threats. But I think there are no reasons for fear for the simple reason that we are doing nothing that is detrimental to the interests of others. We are trying to organise our country in a way best suited to its citizens, and I think there is nothing else, there could be no other choice, than to hold our destiny in our own hands while acting honestly towards the surrounding environment and while also not letting others determine our fate; that is, letting others determine how we shall act and how we shall organise our country.

[Vucelic] Mr President -

[Milosevic, interrupting] So there are no, no reasons for fear. Certainly there are reasons for concern. It can be said that anyone who is not concerned today is irresponsible.

[Vucelic] What do you think is the best way to get out of this mood of concern and fear[Vucelic corrects himself] concern and disquiet? What should the citizens, all of us together, all political subjects in Serbia, and finally all citizens do so that we can get out of this situation in which we find ourselves at the moment as soon as possible?

[Milosevic] The stabilisation of our state should help everyone as soon as possible. So, starting from the Constitution (?and) its institutions, after six years we shall in a few days have one, I hope, reciprocal federal government that will not be split by mutual quarrels, that will be orientated to resolving vital problems of this country. So, to establish as soon as possible the entire system of institutions in this country; to contribute towards everyone working as well as possible at their workplaces in their own interests, in the interest of their families and in the interests of their nation [sentence as heard] . There is no another way for successful economic development, cultural development and general social development.

We will, I hope, very quickly end this chaos in our economy, where citizens rightly protest that they are facing corruption, speculation and enrichment on the basis of this speculation and corruption and not on the basis of work. We must try to have a rich society, but a rich society where people live off the fruits of their labour and not corruption and speculation. I hope that with the establishment of the institutions of the FRY, with the election of its Assembly, with the election of its government and with the speedy adoption on the basis of tasks that are already under way in Serbia and Montenegro of an efficient programme of economic stabilisation and the curbing of inflation, we will be able to build a basis on which a turnaround will be made with respect to the current economic chaos in the country, on which it will be possible to create a stimulating economic atmosphere in which productivity and, especially, economic efficiency can be raised as well as individual and social standards.

ANEXO B.8 – Milosevic: Election Turnout Was The People's Answer To Foreign Interference.¹³⁰

[Boskovic] A news conference at which journalists were informed about the results of yesterday's elections in Serbia and Montenegro has just ended. Judging by what we heard, the turnout was surprising. Mr President Milosevic, could you comment on this?

[Milosevic] The elections have clearly shown the people's view that they themselves should decide how they want to organise their state. At the same time, they represent a response to foreign interference and a domestic reaction to this interference, particularly to the anti-election campaign, which ended up in a fiasco with such a turnout by the people.

The political forces that are against the unity of Serbia and Yugoslavia have been politically defeated. Regardless of the support that they have received with this unprecedented pressure from outside, the people showed with the elections that they want to hold their fate firmly in their own hands and not to give it to any one else. All those who voted gave their vote for Serbia and Yugoslavia, regardless of the party or individual they voted for. Just because of that, these elections are of enormous importance for our country, for democratic processes, because we will have both a ruling party or parties, if a coalition is formed, which does not matter, and an opposition. They will all be orientated towards Serbia and Yugoslavia.

[Boskovic] President Milosevic, does this mean that one could expect a multi-party government?

[Milosevic] It is quite possible, although we still do not know the outcome of the elections. As we all know, the government is decided on by a parliamentary majority. In any case, my view is that it would be good if all the parties that enter the Assembly are invited to offer their best candidates for the government. All patriotic forces in the country should be united and elect the most able people to the government.

[Boskovic] One more answer please. Does the world really believe that Serbia has carried out aggressions against Bosnia-Hercegovina?

[Milosevic] The world believes what it is told. Those who are making decisions know very well that we did not carry out any aggression against Bosnia-Hercegovina, that there is a civil war there.

[Boskovic] Who is currently taking care in Serbia to overcome the effects of the sanctions?

¹³⁰ Entrevista concedida a Momcilo Boskovic para a Radio Belgrade em 1 junho de 1992. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic060192.htm>>.

[Milosevic] There is no doubt that we are all taking care about this, but above all the government and business community. However, the most important thing for us is that the truth reaches the world, because only in this way can the false accusations about aggression against Bosnia- Hercegovina be refuted, and thus the sanctions fail, too.

[Boskovic] Thank you very much

ANEXO B.9 – Milosevic on military intervention, Kosovo, Macedonia, confederation with Greece.¹³¹

[Panayiotopoulos] ...Mr President, most of the international public considers you responsible for the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia. Of course, the public in Greece does not hold the same view. Why have you not managed to convince other countries that you are right?

[Milosevic] Because neither truth nor justice are on the scene at present, but force and interests. It is otherwise logical that the public in Greece has a different view in relation to the public views that have been created with a long, well-organised and well-paid media war concerning the real state of affairs in Yugoslavia. The public in Greece, our next-door neighbour, knows very well what is happening here.

It is well-known that the public's memory, especially at times of crisis, is very short, but everything that happened took place in a short period of time. I therefore hope that the facts and everything that happened in Yugoslavia, all the stages that Yugoslavia went through in the process of disintegration, with all the attempts by strong and formidable interests to take control of this region, will not be erased from the public's memory just like that.

Therefore, bear in mind the facts. How did the clashes in Yugoslavia begin? They began with unilateral and violent acts by the republics that opted for secession. Our stand, our position, has been from the very beginning not to deny any Yugoslav people the right to self-determination. However, we think that this right should be affirmed peacefully, legally and by respecting the same right of other peoples who live in Yugoslavia.

[Q] Allow me to ask you another question, Mr President. Why are you not succeeding in convincing the international public?

[A] Just because there are very strong interests in the total disintegration of Yugoslavia, and because a media war is being waged for the interests. This war is making it difficult for a small country such as the present day Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or Serbia, to penetrate the world with truth in the right way. However, I consider this situation to be only temporary, because no one can hide the truth. I am convinced that it will not be long before the real background of everything that has been happening in Yugoslavia in the last few years is seen.

Let me add to this answer a question. How was it possible, for instance, that before the sanctions were introduced against Yugoslavia, the well-known report by the UN Secretary-

¹³¹ Entrevista concedida a Panos Panayiotopoulos para a Belgrade TV em 27 de junho de 92. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic062792.htm>>

General was late? The answer to this question is probably much easier than to the question why we are not successful in the media war in which we are obviously not succeeding in any respect. Or, how is it possible that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or Serbia, is accused of aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina without having a single soldier on the territory of the country that it is accused of carrying out aggression against? Or, how is it possible that Serbia is sending hundreds of tons of food and aid to the citizens of Sarajevo with humanitarian convoys, aid that is distributed equally there to the Muslims, Croats and Serbs, and that this has never been mentioned once in the Western press, which is not favourable to us. Or, how is it possible that tens of thousands of Muslims are fleeing Bosnia to Serbia, knowing for sure that they will be treated here like all other citizens and that they will receive all the necessary help? Has anyone ever seen the victims of aggression fleeing to and looking for shelter with the aggressor? Or, for instance, if Serbia had carried out aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, would it be possible to hide this fact from the 10 million of its citizens who would have at least some connections with these phantom forces sent by Serbia outside its territory?

[Q] We are not talking about any particular interests, which do exist. They certainly do. The question is Why do you not make the slightest attempt to change public opinion? At least this is what it looks like from outside. For example, why do you not denounce the leaders of the irregular Serbian units that have been active in Bosnia-Herzegovina during this period?

[A] I think that for anyone who is well-intentioned, we are taking all steps in all our acts not only for the sake of persuading the international public but also for the sake of stopping this tragic war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to help to ensure that it stops. We are not helping any irregular groups at all. On the contrary, paramilitary groups are banned in Serbia. If your observers were attentive, they could have recently seen that the government of the Republic of Serbia has discussed a report in which it can be seen that some 1,300 I can no longer remember the exact number, but it was between 1,300 and 1,400 citizens who for various reasons had weapons and were located near the border were sent to court. In other words, the appropriate measures were taken against all such cases quite legally.

Therefore we definitely do not help paramilitary groups, but of course we are helping the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are helping others in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but our help is quite legal and in conformity with all international principles. This involves above all material aid, food, clothes, medicines and all those basic foodstuffs and fuel. In other words, everything that is necessary to ensure that people live there. Is it for example logical to you that various countries in Europe, for example, Austria and Hungary, help the Croats and Muslims and for the Serbs not to help Serbs?

[Q] If you allow me to insist on clearing something up. I see that other people, intellectuals like Mr Bruckner Pascal, who was in Serbia some time ago I read what he wrote in 'L'Observateur' magazine he also had the impression, as much of the international public after all, that Slobodan Milosevic stands behind the Chetniks and the well-known Captain Arkan. It is claimed that you are supplying them with fuel and arms and that you are supporting them morally. Why do you not arrest all those people when they accuse you of all this? Why do you not disarm the paramilitary groups?

[A] The idea of any paramilitary groups in Serbia was born when tensions emerged in Yugoslavia. It was born in the wing of some opposition parties. The authorities in Serbia reacted to this by the government proposing a law in parliament strictly banning paramilitary groups. No paramilitary groups can be in the service of a normal and regular government.

[Q] It is known that the United States does not like you personally. Nevertheless, it has been reported and we know that you personally know the current Deputy Secretary of State, Mr Eagleburger. Mr Eagleburger met you once, in 1988, if I am not wrong. What has happened since? Your relations have soured.

[A] I met Mr Eagleburger during his mission in Yugoslavia. He was US Ambassador in Belgrade for several years. At that time I was President of the Bank of Belgrade. We were not very close friends but co-operated very well. He extended great support to the development of economic relations between Yugoslavia and the United States. I think that in this respect he played a very positive role. Regarding the meeting that you mentioned, the last meeting in here in Belgrade, nothing spectacular happened, nothing that would spoil these relations, nor were there any personal reasons for these relations to be spoiled. Therefore, I could not link the change in the relations with any personal background, if this is what you are suggesting.

As regards respectable US politicians who engaged themselves in one way or another in the Yugoslav crisis, I would like to say that I highly appreciate the role that was played by Cyrus Vance, not as a representative of the United States, but as a special envoy of the UN Secretary-General. He is virtually the only prominent US politician who has recently dealt with the Yugoslav crisis systematically and for an extended period of time. Therefore, there is no doubt that the fact that he dealt with the Yugoslav crisis systematically and for an extended period of time is directly correlated with the fact that he displayed the greatest possible degree of objectivity in his views on the Yugoslav crisis.

I am sure that if someone starts dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, he will not be able to draw different conclusions and that objectivity and truth will certainly outweigh the current picture which is grossly distorted and, I would say, unjust with regard to the position of Serbia

and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Fortunately, this distorted picture cannot remain as such for a long time. I am convinced that after a while the truth must break through all these artificial barriers and that the correct picture will emerge before the international public.

[Q] Mr President, what would you do today for the embargo to be lifted. Are you also expecting a naval blockade?

[A] I hope that when the correct facts about the Yugoslav crisis become available to the international public, this embargo will be lifted by those who introduced it. We do not hold the view that we should confront the United Nations. On the contrary, through co-operation with the United Nations, and by offering our claims to be inspected, to be verified on the spot, we can correct this picture and convince people that there are no real grounds for such an embargo.

[Q] Do you see the possibility of a military intervention in Yugoslavia? Is a military intervention by the Western powers probable?

[A] I could not indeed find one single reason for such an intervention. We are not at war with anyone. If there is a doubt that certain points, which are constantly being mentioned as possible places for military intervention, are being used for some secret operations, is it not simpler to invite as guests those who have these doubts and let them spend some time at these points and to see for themselves that any intervention with force would be superfluous, that it would be extremely unjust, and that finally it could represent an act of aggression against a small and independent country and not an act of putting things that have been disturbed in order?

Let those who have doubts be our guests. Let them see it for themselves. They should not believe what we say, let them believe their own eyes.

[Q] My next question is What do you think Greece should do to prevent the intervention of the Western powers?

[A] I believe that Greece, not only as a neighbour but also as a friendly country that has the obligation to be objective, should help the real truth about the situation in its neighbourhood to reach the international public as clearly and as comprehensively as possible. It should therefore be on the side of justice and truth.

[Q] Nevertheless, Mr President, despite the fact that Greece has been supporting Serbia, Serbia and you, as its leader, have shown considerable restraint in supporting our country, Greece, in its problem with Skopje. Do you believe that the people of Skopje are Macedonians?

[A] I would like to say that our view has been the same from the very beginning. As regards Greece's stand, we have constantly stressed that we absolutely understand Greece's sensitivity about this problem that has arisen. We have also been saying that the Greeks have

not invented the problem. This is a real problem, a problem that exists, a problem that should be recognised.

[Q] Who should be blamed for this?

[A] I think that the partners in Macedonia and in Skopje, with whom this should have been discussed, did not understand this problem, this danger in time, that is to say, they did not try to overcome this problem with Greece at the right time. However, it is certain that in the interests of good relations in the region the problem should be resolved peacefully, so that the interests of all sides are protected to the maximum and not spoiled at the expense of one side.

[Q] But Mr President, you did not tell me whether you believe that the people of Skopje are Macedonians?

[A] In a historical sense I heard a statement by their President I think he made it in Rome that they certainly do not regard themselves to be the descendants of Alexander the Great. Therefore, this political problem was created, it was created under heightened circumstances in the region, and I think that a proper solution should be found for it between the authorities in Skopje and the authorities in Athens.

[Q] Do you think that they should talk directly, that Athens, that is to say, Mr Mitsotakis should talk to Mr Gligorov?

[A] Why not? I think that everything that contributes to the settlement of the problems that exist in this region should be done. In other words, one should not avoid any talks that could lead to a solution.

[Q] Mr President, 'Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung' recently wrote that during your meeting with Mr Mitsotakis you discussed, that is to say, proposed the idea of a simultaneous military action by Serbia and Greece on the territory of Skopje and the opening of two corridors with the military means of Serbia and Greece. Is this true?

[A] Of course not. You can also ask President Mitsotakis about this. He would not be able to give you any different answer than the one I gave you. Why would someone be doing something by force at all if this can be achieved quite peacefully? On the contrary, our government, the government in Belgrade, has made a protocol with the government in Skopje in which the Serbian side insisted on its great interest in free communications with Greece, not only because of our historical and long friendship, but also because of our present and long-term interests.

Therefore, this communication between Greece and Serbia has been fully assured in both directions and accepted without any restrictions.

[Q] Mr President, let us now talk a bit about Kosovo-Metohija. There have been some incidents in Pristina recently and at present. The Albanian side has unofficially said that you have refused to give Albanians self-rule and the right to self-determination. Will you do that?

[A] There is a big misunderstanding about Kosovo. The only problem that exists, which we will not, of course, solve in the way desired by some Albanian parties, is the problem of separatism. All members of the Albanian minority living in Serbia are equal citizens of Serbia. They are protected by the Constitution of Serbia in the same way as all other citizens of Serbia are. We cannot offer them anything but equality. In other words, we cannot offer them anything more than equality. Albanians in Kosovo are being dragged into difficulties by some of their politicians who have clearly declared one and only one aim, namely the separation of Kosovo from Serbia and its joining neighbouring Albania. This is, of course, out of the question.

As regards autonomy, Kosovo-Metohija is an autonomous province in Serbia. Kosovo-Metohija has never been an autonomous region of Albania. This is an autonomous region in Serbia, because of the specific structure of the population and for many cultural and other reasons. Kosovo-Metohija has never belonged to Albania, except one part of it belonging to the so-called Great Albania during Mussolini's time. It has never belonged, nor will it ever belong to Albania, in history.

[Q] Mr President, if the Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija after all do not want to live with Serbs, what should be done?

[A] Everyone has the right to live with whom he wants. I am talking about the fact that the territorial integrity of Serbia cannot be endangered in any way. Kosovo is not just any simple territory of Yugoslavia or Serbia. Kosovo is the very heart of Serbia. Our entire history is tied to Kosovo. Only the people who do not know anything about Serbia or the Serbian people, nor about their culture and history, can assume that we could give Kosovo to somebody. This is out of the question.

Human and civil rights are another matter. All rights that are envisaged by the CSCE documents, particularly the Final Act, are absolutely guaranteed to all citizens in Serbia and to all members of national minorities, and thus to all Albanians.

You know very well that according to any international agreement or document, the rights of a national minority do not include the right to form one's own state on the territory of the state where this minority lives.

[Q] If they nevertheless insist on it, and if they resort to an armed struggle, what will you do?

[A] I hope that the adventure-orientated politicians will not lead them into an armed struggle. Such an armed struggle would represent an attack on the constitutional order and the territorial integrity of Serbia, and the authorities would be absolutely against it. This is why I hope that there are no such adventurists in the political life there, even among the extreme separatists, who would pull the Albanian minority into bloodshed. It is difficult to believe that the Albanians we are talking about over a million people would follow such demands, that they would die for someone's mad political ambitions.

[Q] Mr President, let us now talk a bit about the situation in Yugoslavia and Serbia. Some people from the opposition in Belgrade are saying that if Slobodan Milosevic tenders his resignation, the whole international climate will change and the opponents of Yugoslavia and Serbia will become their supporters.

[A] I could not attach such a great importance to myself. If the attitudes towards Serbia and Yugoslavia depended on one person, then indeed there would be no explanation for everything that is happening now. Be assured that everything that is currently happening on our political scene also has its very constructive aspects and its democratic aspects.

After all, the role of the opposition has always been to criticise the government and the authorities. Let this criticism, which is heard here loudly and has been heard for a long time, be a sign of the major democratic changes on the path that social life in Serbia has embarked on.

However, there is no government that would survive in Serbia for a longer period of time if it did not respect the real and vital interest of this republic and these people.

[Q] Do you not think that the critical situation that the Serbian people live in imposes a need for the opposition to enter the government?

[A] I would say that this is the duty of the opposition, but even before these crisis conditions. After the elections that were held less than two years ago I suggested to some opposition leaders that, despite our victory, they should propose certain people for the government. This is good for the mental health of democracy in Serbia. I was then given the answer that they would always support the national interests of Serbia, but that they did not want to take part in the government. They wanted to criticise the government in every respect, that is to say, they wanted to work against the government.

I did not think this was clever then, nor do I think this is clever now. The door has always been open for this kind of co-operation. Therefore, the authorities in Serbia can hardly be blamed for such a lack of understanding about good proposals. One could talk more about a lack of understanding about the gravity of the historical situation in which these people have found themselves, a situation in which they have completely unjustifiably been subjected to

enormous pressure caused by the breaking up of the country, enormous pressure from outside, and the enormous outside interests in this country being broken up. One could talk about the wish, the need and the vital aims of these people to retain and preserve their interests, their dignity and their independence, that is to say, to ensure that in the future they develop as a successful and progressive country in every respect.

[Q] Are you still offering the opposition a place in the government?

[A] This is a matter for the head of the government to decide. He has a very clear stand on this. He has an open invitation for all people, regardless of their party affiliation, to be proposed to him. Among other things, I would like to point out that the current government includes several members who are not members of the ruling party, that is to say, several people who are not members of any political party.

[Q] Do you not think that calling general elections under conditions with which the opposition would agree would be a solution, and that this would change the picture of Serbia in the world?

[A] This should be decided by the citizens. There are no obstacles whatsoever. I have even recently suggested to the representatives of the ruling party to ask the opposition when they want the elections to be held. Therefore, we should resolve contentious issues and establish a general consensus in terms of national interests not, of course, in terms of all those various marginal parties that today exist in Serbia for any significant political event and thus elections.

Therefore, one thing is quite clear. It is only the question of whether under the conditions of enormous foreign pressure and sanctions to which we have been exposed, whether these conditions are favourable for this kind of activity, for elections, or whether we should talk about elections only when sanctions have been lifted and when the citizens are freed from such an unprecedented outside pressure to which they are currently being subjected.

It is not surprising that because of the great interests of the powers who wanted Yugoslavia to be broken up, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been subjected to such fierce pressure. What is surprising is that here within it there are forces that instead of acting towards unity, towards the general interest, towards resisting this pressure without losing any important interests of these people and this country, instead of that, they are siding with this pressure to which this country is exposed. I hope that these are transitional stages from which we will emerge successfully.

[Q] If the opposition asked you to do that now, would this lead to a reduction in tensions and pressure against Serbia? In other words, if the opposition asked you to do that now, would you hold elections?

[A] This is up to the parliament, but anything that can improve the position of Yugoslavia, including elections, should certainly be considered. Therefore, one should not refrain from any move, any decision that, as you said, could help the settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia and improve Serbia's position. There is nothing more important than this.

[Q] ...We in Greece firmly believe that Turkey has expansionist aspirations towards our country and the Balkans. Do you share my view? Do you believe in it? If not, tell us how you see Turkey's role in the Balkans in relation to the well-known Islamic axis.

[A] It is very difficult at the time of this crisis for someone not to harbour expansionist aspirations towards Yugoslavia. We witnessed this ourselves during all those years, particularly months, of Yugoslavia being broken up. However, I hope that the problem that has emerged here in Europe and this region will be quickly resolved, that peace will quickly be established, which is the first condition for the elimination of everyone's expansionist aspirations. I therefore hope that the presence of these aspirations will not produce some serious consequences.

However, if our own interests are endangered by anyone's aspirations, we will have to defend these interests.

[Q] You have not told us anything specific about Turkey.

[A] We have tried to foster good relations and co-operation with Turkey. Serbia and Turkey sorted out their differences in 1912. As the head of the Serbian government of that time said, after this we should only be friends. As far as we are concerned, we have been trying to behave in this way. It appears to me that certain forces in Turkey are taken in by the gross lies that are coming from the current authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that their, I would say, extremely negative stand towards everything that is happening in Serbia and Yugoslavia is the result of such lies which have in fact pulled Bosnia-Herzegovina into this tragic war. I hope and believe that the Turkish leadership will display much more wisdom than has been done by their friends in the body of the Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina in the last few months.

[Q] Mr President, some people in Belgrade who have a very healthy imagination told me that in case a major crisis broke out in the Balkans, our two friendly peoples, Serbs and Greeks, could perhaps set up a confederation. What are your views about this idea, which is perhaps unrealistic?

[A] For me, this idea is not [word indistinct] at all. I am even convinced that such a Greek- Yugoslav confederation would be, I am sure, a factor of great stability in the region and would surely be in the interests of both the Greek and the Serbian people.

We are not only tied by historical and traditionally friendly relations, but also major currently topical interests. The existence of such a state in the Balkans, in this part of Europe,

would undoubtedly also in political, economic, military and every other respect represent a factor of stability in this part of the planet.

[Q] Why do not you propose this to Mr Mitsotakis?

[A] Who says I did not propose this to him?

[Q] What was his answer?

[A] Well, you must talk to Mitsotakis about this. We discussed numerous issues. With all due respect, I rate Prime Minister Mitsotakis very highly, he is a true friend of Serbia and the Serbian nation, but I nevertheless do not wish to assume or interpret his opinion on any issue. We certainly do not differ as regards certain aims and interests. However, we probably differ in our views of the right moment or specific circumstances for certain political solutions.

[Q] In any case, Mr Mitsotakis did not rule out such a possibility. Did I understand correctly?

[A] Well, I do not believe that any politician, be it Greek or Serbian, could dismiss such an idea.

[Q] When you say a confederation, do you assume a joint military command as well?

[A] These are matters that should definitely be discussed further but, as far as I am concerned, it naturally assumes a joint military command. At the end of the day, this would not be contrary to our tradition. We always fought together shoulder to shoulder and never one against the other. [Q] Where does Skopje, which is between us, fit into all this?

[A] I am convinced that neither we nor you would resolve this problem by aggression. When a perfectly logical integration is proposed, an integration in an economic, cultural and any other aspect, I am convinced that the authorities in Skopje would not object to the maximum level of integration that would be achieved in this way.

[Q] Would [Macedonian President] Mr Gligorov want this? Do you know anything about this?

[A] Well, I am not convinced that he could be against this.

[Q] This might perhaps be a solution to the problems in our region. Do you believe that this could resolve the problems as regards Greece?

[A] New solutions always exist, but the sides involved must decide equally on them regardless of whether they are large or small. If I were in Greece's place I would never dismiss such solutions, and if I were in the place of the authorities in Skopje's I also would not dismiss such solutions because, as you can see, we here in Belgrade consider them quite a feasible development of affairs for some sort of future relations in this region...

ANEXO B.10 – Milosevic comments on London conference, Bosnian situation, chances for peace.¹³²

[Reporter] [Word indistinct] travelling for Belgrade, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic gave an exclusive interview to our TV station. I asked him whether he accepts the essence and the spirit of the London conference, that is to say, returning to the prewar borders.

[Milosevic] Always, not now or a year ago, but much earlier, we made the Serbian stance on this issue very clear, namely, that we do not have any territorial pretensions. This is on the record and in the last two years, before all these clashes started, nobody who is honourable could say that we were striving for the creation of a Greater Serbia or something similar. I am glad that we have now started to join forces in our efforts to stop all these bloody events, and everything that is absolutely bad, and this unjust war.

[Reporter] You know that some people believe that you are striving for a Greater Serbia. Many terrible things have happened in the last few months. Parts of Bosnia, where the Serbia population is in a majority, are occupied, and all non-Serbs have been forced to leave. This resembles territorial conquests and seizure of territories.

[Milosevic] Although there are some who advocate such a type of ethnic cleansing, we in Serbia believe that this is a criminal action.

[Reporter] Why did you not prevent this?

[Milosevic] We made it officially known and stressed very clearly that such things must not happen and that all those who are committing such acts must be subject to criminal persecution. However, there is a civil war there. Nobody understands what is going on there. There are no innocent sides and no winners in a civil war, only victims.

[Reporter] But you know of some people who are doing such things, some of the warlords who approved this type of action?

[Milosevic] The people that I know, and I am speaking of the Serbian leadership in Bosnia- Hercegovina, assured me categorically that they are opposed to this, and only insane people can believe that such a sort of ethnic cleansing could be something good. This is a crime that cannot be accepted or justified, regardless of the side.

[Reporter] But you know that people believe that you can pull the strings and influence the Bosnian Serbs.

¹³² Entrevista concedida à Belgrade TV em 28 de agosto de 1992. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic082892.htm>>.

[Milosevic] Can you really believe that somebody would have such power to be able to pull strings in a republic in which he was not even elected?

[Reporter] But you are brothers with the Serbs in Bosnia.

[Milosevic] It is clear that certain links with them exist and that one can take advantage of these links to influence them. I used all my influence to stop the war. I would like to remind you, as perhaps you are not informed, that we, by the official statements of the government, in a most clear and resolute manner condemned the bombardment of Sarajevo, for example. We insist that those who perpetrate such actions must be prosecuted. However, in a civil war there is no formula for a solution. I believe that some of the other interested sides were resisting the conference for this reason.

[Reporter] How do you see the progress so far?

[Milosevic] I believe that it is positive.

[Reporter] Will you pull out from the occupied territories?

[Milosevic] Serbia has not occupied anything. Serbs in Bosnia have said categorically that they are ready to hand over some of the territory they control to the Muslims and close all the prisoner-of-war camps. I was astonished when I heard information that such camps existed there. I spoke to them and asked them if that was possible, and I got a reply from them that those were prisons where only war prisoners were held. I cannot say that there is nothing there. I can absolutely not state something like that; I cannot be sure. I cannot even be sure that those who inform me about it have the right information. However, whenever such an activity exists, it is a crime. But, let these camps be placed under the control of the Red Cross. What could be better than that? What could be better than that is if they were completely closed, and all those people released.

[Reporter] What if the local Serbian leaders refuse to implement these agreements; how will you force them to do so?

[Milosevic] I hope that their leadership will arrest such people and put them in prison.

[Reporter] What leadership is that?

[Milosevic] Well, Mr Karadzic, Koljevic, and others that were present at the conference, and who signed that they would do exactly that. I believe that they have to stick to their promise. No excuse should be accepted for any kind of failure in that sense. One should keep in mind that these are very important humanitarian problems. We do not want to support any different behaviour.

[Reporter] To solve all this, and when all this is over, what will your position be in Yugoslavia? What position will Serbia take?

[Milosevic] Bear in mind that, at the conference, I received a suggestion, and I am glad that your Prime Minister Major accepted that suggestion, which I made, and that is that all the sides in the conflict must accept the presence of UN officers in each and every unit. If they do so, then we will finish that bloody war in a few days. Simply, that is all the time it takes to do that. However, I am sure that only those who do not want the truth to surface will oppose the realisation of this plan. If UN officers, who will be placed with every army unit, see what kind of units these are, and see if they are violating the cease-fire, after all, they will see that there are 50,000 regular Croatian troops, and not one from Serbia. There is so much pressure on that issue, and why can anyone not catch at least one Serbian soldier and put him in front of television cameras, and say, see now how those liars from Belgrade say that there are no Serbian soldiers there, and here he is.

[Reporter] This has been President Milosevic of Serbia, talking to [word indistinct] before flying off to Belgrade.

ANEXO B.11– Milosevic on Federal Republic, Sanctions, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Elections.¹³³

[Question] Mr President, there is a widespread view that your public appearances and speeches are too rare. Do you share this view, and could you tell us why you do not make public appearances? Why are your appearances not more frequent? Do you think that this is correct, or is this simply the way you understand your state duty and the role of a statesman?

[Answer] One cannot say that I am not making public appearances. I am here. Ask me whatever you want. I think my public appearances are sufficiently frequent. I also think that excessive appearance on television by politicians is even impolite. I think that it is uncivil to appear every day and brainwash people with what they think. Therefore, I believe that I appear sufficiently.

[CREATION OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA]

[Q] Respecting your belief and your intention to answer the questions that we are going to ask you, I would like to start this conversation with the following question Many of your political opponents claim that your crucial contribution to the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] is not a particular success. This is allegedly something that would have occurred anyway. The question is Why is the world, or the overwhelming part of it, working so hard to destroy this alleged creation, and why is the creation of this state being denied with so much political and physical pressure? How can we overcome the difficulties that accompany this denial parallel to the great pressure on Serbs in the Krajinas and the Serbian Republic [in Bosnia-Herzegovina]?

[A] Your question is long. There are perhaps several questions in it, but let us start with the end. I think that we can overcome difficulties only if we insist on the policy that we have been conducting, the policy with which, despite enormous external pressure and very strong opposition at home to the survival of Yugoslavia, we succeeded in preserving Yugoslavia, in preserving its continuity and, parallel to this you spoke about the Serbian Krajinas and Bosnia-Herzegovinahelp, succeed in helping the Serbian people in the Krajinas and Bosnia to be a negotiator on an equal footing, to have their legitimate representatives in the talks on their future, to feel safe and protected on the basis of the plan drafted by the United Nations, and as regards Bosnia, as we can all see, to even lead a successful initiative at the conference that has

¹³³ Entrevista concedida a Mirolad Vucelic para a Radio Television Serbia/Belgrade TV em 9 de outubro de 1992. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic100992.htm>>

finally assumed a regular course and in which all primary aims of the Bosnian Serbs could be presented successfully. Therefore, we are talking about Bosnia, the Krajinas, and the FRY. The FRY represents the only support they have; the FRY is the only thing they can rely on and, in the affirmation of their basic human, national, and all other interests, count on.

It is obvious, therefore, that those who deny that only this path, which is taking into consideration the affirmation of the new Yugoslavia and the affirmation of the regulation of the position of the Serbian Krajinas and Bosnia, offers ultimate solutions, because under the horrific pressure of the interests of the powerful and greedy and the revanchism of those defeated in some former wars, we simply found ourselves in circumstances under which it looked as if nothing of that would succeed.

Yugoslavia was created, however, and the status of the Krajinas and Bosnia is going through legitimate international negotiations, which is why we have, in fact, found ourselves under such strong pressure. We found ourselves under such strong pressure because we succeeded. Who would exert pressure on those who failed, on those who lost and those who no longer matter? This is yet another indicator of the reasons why this is being done. Therefore, a precise answer is that the way out of the situation in which we have found ourselves lies in our insistence on the primary aims of this policy and the policy itself at this stage of normal and peaceful international negotiations.

[Q] You refused to sign the erasure of Yugoslavia from the map and international life in The Hague on 18th October last year. Since then you have been the target of numerous accusations. You and your policy have been subjected to a real demonisation. Was this a wrong move? To what extent was your behaviour in The Hague a consequence of a rational and well-considered policy, and to what extent was this a matter of honour, of not only one man but also the entire nation?

[A] This is not only a question of honour, not even the honour of the entire nation, but of the honour and vital interests of that nation. If we had agreed to Yugoslavia being simply erased, if we had agreed to separate in the way suggested, we would have not achieved what has been accomplished in terms of protecting the interests of the Serbian people outside Serbia. We found ourselves in the situation of having over two million people being simply cut off and prevented from enjoying the kind of true support they have found in the new FRY. After all, would it have been logical for us to ask for voluntary partition under the circumstances in which it was clear that the aspirations of the seceding republics did not reflect the same interests and the same position of Serbia, Montenegro and many people throughout Yugoslavia? I simply think that if the situation were to repeat itself, I am sure I would act in the same way.

[Q] You also mentioned honour. You have not only mentioned interests. There are many people, including some federal ministers, who claim that honour is something that belongs to the times of mediaeval knights and that this is not exactly a commodity that can be traded in these days.

[A] I only agree that honour is not a commodity that can be sold.

[CONTINUITY OF YUGOSLAVIA]

[Q] Another question that is perhaps a continuation of what you have already said Why did you insist so strongly on the continuity of Yugoslavia? Or, to be more precise, why are you still insisting so much on it when it is obvious or at least it appears to be obvious that the international community is not willing to recognise and respect this continuity? Do you think that we can continue to adhere to this view? What are the real reasons for this insistence? Have we perhaps gambled away or lost the chance of preserving and carrying on with the continuity of Yugoslavia because of the Federal government or something else?

[A] Again, you have asked me many questions, but I will tell you that in my view we should insist on this position. Second, I think that the Federal government is in no position to gamble away our continuity because it is not empowered to do so by our Constitution. You must know, and I am sure that the citizens of Serbia know, what the view of the Federal Assembly is. This position is founded on the Yugoslav Constitution, which contains provisions on continuity, and on the declaration that was adopted by the Yugoslav Assembly on the day the Constitution was promulgated. This declaration also contains provisions on continuity. There are many reasons for this.

I cannot mention all the reasons here tonight, but it is clear, not only because of history, that no one sensible would throw out 120 years of state continuity. Not just because Serbia and Montenegro, as the only recognised countries in this area before the creation of Yugoslavia, had fully enjoyed this continuity, but also because of the present and future. We would lose the right to invoke the thousands of international obligations and agreements in whose creation we participated as a state, lose the right to fall back on membership in international organisations and lose a series of vital benefits arising from the continuity of one country. Let us not mention all the reasons why we should not place ourselves in the same position as the republics that wanted to secede, and why we should go all the way to the beginning just because they began to exist independently for the first time.

There are indeed no reasons for that, and I think that one should absolutely stick to this position. Allow me to add another very practical argument. Much is being said about whether

we will be recognised or not. We are practically recognised. Dozens of countries have publicly said so. After all, how many embassies are there here in Belgrade and to which country are they accredited if our country is not recognised, if it does not exist, and with whom are they therefore maintaining relations?

Let us not talk about all the other conditions and reasons why it would be completely senseless to opt for discontinuity. Choosing discontinuity only serves the interests of the forces that were breaking up Yugoslavia, both external and internal forces. I am referring to the republics that decided to secede. It is in our interest to preserve what belongs to us and this is continuity. We do not have a single reason to abandon it.

[PREVLAKA]

[Q] Let us briefly return to The Hague. Momir Bulatovic [President of Montenegro] agreed to the EC demands. As is known, he accepted Carrington's document and the republican borders. Was this the real reason, the true reason or cause for the current state of Prevlaka?

[A] The answer to this should be somewhat more complex. First of all, Carrington's document, as a political document that was supposed to solve, among other things, the issue of borders, cannot be without influence on politics or political solutions, and thus on the current position of Prevlaka. For the sake of the truth, however, I must say that on that occasion, or on several occasions when he stressed at plenary sessions of The Hague conference that Montenegro had accepted the document in principle, Momir Bulatovic was always expressing reservations concerning the border on Prevlaka.

Therefore, he always singled out this issue and always had reservations about it. This should certainly be stated on his behalf. By expressing reservations and by singling out this issue as a special one, on the other hand, he was at the same time informing the conference that Montenegro and Croatia were in the process of negotiations aimed at resolving the issue through bilateral relations. This is therefore where, I would say, a mistake in tactics arose, because the issue was pushed to the margins of the political process of resolving the Yugoslav crisis. Because of this, one could not deal with this issue through some other political activities or deal with it in a way parts of other territories in Yugoslavia were treated in Vance's plan, and so forth.

As I said, this must be stressed and one should know this for the sake of the truth. The Montenegrin leadership continues to raise the question of Prevlaka, regardless of the handicap that arose from the fact that by accepting the political document that was in fact defining these issues, they placed issues in a relatively unstable stage.

[YUGOSLAVIA VERSUS SERBIA]

[Q] You staked much of your political reputation and authority on the creation of the FRY. You still speak with full commitment about the continuity of that state, its existence and its value. Our impression today is that the Federal authorities and Federal organs are in many ways not doing what they should if this state is to function successfully. The Federal government is behaving as if it is in opposition to Serbia and the ruling party.

[A] You see, we are speaking of brief experience. The Federal government has been functioning for about a couple of months. This is machinery that has been functioning for decades in the way we thought would not repeat itself. I hope that the way in which it is functioning will be eliminated in the future, because, as you know very well, over many decades all those who found themselves at the helm of Yugoslavia were bothered by a strong Serbia. For a long time Yugoslavia was a means for controlling Serbia.

This Yugoslavia has not created Serbia, just as the previous one did not do so. However, a certain situation I would describe as stable was created on the basis of balance, conflicts and the principle of divide and rule. Therefore, such a Yugoslavia created out of Serbia and Montenegro must function in the interest of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro, of course. Therefore, it cannot function in any kind of confrontation. I expect our Federal state and all its institutions to function in the same way. I mean here not only the government, I also mean all other institutions, the central bank and other state institutions because, objectively speaking, in such a joint state there is no longer any basis or, I would say, possibilities either, for the Federal top leadership to dictate a political position to Serbia, to solve properly the problems of some of its provinces; for example, problems in Kosovo and some other problems and many other things that were being solved in such a way for many years. I think that this should be relinquished to the past and that our Federation should be achieving a new and fully constructive practice. After all, really, how can a federation confront 95% of its own body, which is what the Republic of Serbia represents? What would that look like?

[Q] This is, of course, rather clear, but there are obviously certain tendencies. You would claim, of course, that they are not long-lasting and that they are not principled, but that they are something [word indistinct] .

[Milosevic, interrupting] They may be such. Let us call them personal inclinations. Let it be an expression of certain personal inclinations. Inclinations of individuals, but certainly not something at an institutional level. That is not possible.

[Q] Your policy is still accused and (I insist that) this is where a point of disagreement with Federal organs and Federal ministers lies of being the policy of Greater Serbia. A member of Milan Panic's Federal government, Ljubisa Rakic, Minister without portfolio, said that the policy of Greater Serbia has been given up. Have you and the authorities in Serbia really ever favoured, been inclined towards, and advocated the concept and strategy of creating a Greater Serbia?

[A] Perhaps they had this idea and this concept and are now informing the public about the fact that they have given that up. The official policy pursued by Serbia has never had this idea of Greater Serbia and, as is known, we have stressed this publicly on several occasions and in the most official way possible. I know that the memory of political events tends to be short, particularly in times of crisis, but it must not be so short as to ignore the fact that it was official Serbian politicians who insisted very categorically that this approach never existed, either as a concept or as a policy we advocated. Those people who have given up this policy have the right to do so. Only, they had no influence on the policy in Serbia, so their acceptance or abandoning of this policy has no significance for us.

[Q] Speaking of a short memory, it is too often stressed that the policy of the new Federal government, or generally, the policy of some new political factors is the policy of peace and that, being such, it represents a radical break with the previous policy. I have the impression that one of the more significant aspects of continuity of your policy was that very continuity of peace and that Serbia, along with you yourself and the Serbian leadership, has never advocated a war option.

[A] I am glad to hear that you are reminding the citizens of Serbia about that. It would perhaps be good if you made a review I have seen some very successful ones that could refresh even this short memory of the last year and a half with the real order of political facts and events. Not only did Serbia support a policy of peace, but I hope that it is evident that Serbia did not support the break-up of Yugoslavia, that Serbia fought for its preservation and that, when the crisis began, we ourselves said and pointed out that Serbs and Serbia have never waged a war of aggression, but that they have waged wars of defence and that they will know how to defend themselves, something that, after all, they have already demonstrated.

Simply, in that country in which some people wanted to go away, to secede and to create those small nationalist states of theirs, we supported continuity. Serbs in fact supported peace. However, in these regions where they were subject to genocide for the second time in this century, they could not accept dying to achieve peace. If somebody expected that of them, or if

somebody expects that or something similar of them in the future, he can be sure that they will not accept preserving peace under this condition.

Therefore, the basic right that everyone should enjoy is the right to defend himself, to protect his country and to protect his people. Everything that we have been insisting on was only aimed at a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. After all, a few days ago, I saw an interview in a foreign newspaper with the former chairman of the conference, Lord Carrington. This interview confirms that the first mistake was that the Yugoslav crisis was approached from outside, that it was internationalised before an agreement was reached.

You must remember very well, I am sure that our citizens remember well that during our talks with the Slovene delegation and with the Croatian, Bosnian and Macedonian delegations we clearly spelled out our political position that we do not deny any people the right to self-determination, and that therefore we would not set up obstacles to peoples wanting to leave Yugoslavia and set up their own independent states. We insisted that in order to facilitate this solution we amend the Yugoslav Constitution and regulate the people's right to self-determination in the same way for all Yugoslav peoples so that the crisis could be resolved peacefully rather than violently. What our position assumed is still logical today, and that is that this right to self-determination, which belonged to and was brandished by the Slovenes and then the Croats, should also be enjoyed by the Serbian people.

From a very early age, from the start of primary school, we were all taught that Yugoslavia was a state of first five and then six equal peoples and that the Serbs were among them. There was never any doubt about that. Therefore the problem was in the fact that such an approach, which profoundly showed that Serbia and the Serbian people were in favour of peace, simply did not fit in the plans and interests of those who wanted to take what did not belong to them. This is why we initially had those unilateral acts and these unilateral acts were not the unilateral acts of Serbia but of Slovenia and Croatia then the use of force in order to secede and all the other causes that the whole world recognised at that time as the causes of the hostility, clashes and bloodshed in Yugoslavia.

Therefore, a turn in the current policy of peace, towards peace, is something I cannot understand, because it is evident that we have done everything to preserve peace and settle the Yugoslav crisis in a peaceful way.

[NEGOTIATIONS]

[Q] You are obviously being accused of being a hard negotiator, as we hear, because of these views. At the same time some of our people, above all those who support the opposition,

and other countries are stressing the values and advantages of the so-called soft negotiators. What in your view is the difference between soft and hard negotiators? Does this perhaps mean that you have rejected everything, and that the soft negotiators have agreed to everything in advance, or are ready to accept everything in advance?

[A] This does not imply either of these two things. I have not rejected everything and they have not accepted everything. I have always been prepared to accept what does not threaten our state and national interests. Compromises that do not threaten our state and national interests are possible. Compromises that can endanger state and national interests, in my view, are not possible and I could never accept them.

Some negotiators perhaps think that all this is provisional, that all this is without any significance. I heard someone say recently that Tsar Lazar made a mistake in fighting the Turks 600 years ago. Correcting history in retrospect could devalue or ridicule many things.

[Q] Actually, Murat was on our side, but Tsar Lazar, it appears, did not understand this, and the clash occurred because of this misunderstanding.

[A] I do not know what they had in mind when they made these claims. In any case, if softness means going beyond the bounds of national and state interests, then this is not softness but the betrayal of national and state interests. Therefore, things should be called by their true names. One cannot talk about being soft or hard but about the limits to which one may go in political negotiations.

[Q] Since we are already talking about rigidity, may I ask you whether you expected or whether you could have anticipated that Yeltsin's Russia would have such a rigid attitude towards us? I would say it is unsatisfactory and at times even hostile towards Serbia and Yugoslavia.

[A] I would not say that they have a hard position towards us. They have a soft position towards the big superpower. This is what is happening. For reasons known to them and the international public, we, I, and I believe others feel almost embarrassed to see how conditions are being dictated to a country that until yesterday was proud and large, and how its foreign policy is being conducted outside it. This is not a case of their hard position towards us, but their attitudes towards others. I am convinced that this policy, however, especially the policy on relations with Serbia and Yugoslavia, does not reflect the views of the Russian people. On the contrary, I am convinced that the position of the Russian people is to support Serbia and Yugoslavia.

[SANCTIONS]

[Q] Mr President, until recently we thought that we all knew why the sanctions were introduced against the FRY. Because of various manipulations, increasingly fierce and inconsistent pressure, blackmail and many other things, we appear today not to know really why the embargo was introduced. It would be good if you could tell us what, in your view, led to the introduction of the sanctions, to explain us the formal and real reasons for the introduction of embargo and sanctions.

[A] I think that we started off with this question. The external pressure aimed at dismembering Yugoslavia is presently concentrated on the Serbian people. One can see with the naked eye that it is not true that the sanctions are directed against the regime and not against the people, because pressure is, in a way, also exerted on Serbian Krajina, Serbian Bosnia, the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro.

There is shooting and killing there, but there was no excuse for introducing them here. Yet the sanctions were applied. It is obvious that it is the Serbian regions and Serbs that have found themselves under this negative pressure. If the international community, perhaps even correctly, wanted to intervene in the clash among the Yugoslav peoples and in this drastic way teach them a lesson or convey a message to stop fighting, then it would have been logical for the sanctions to be applied against all. What we see now is the attempt to prevent Serbia from showing solidarity with the Serbs outside Serbia through the blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, and to weaken it so that it does not survive the pressure and demands for the fragmentation of its own territory on the one hand, and the violation of the UN embargo on importing weapons and the UN decisions banning mercenary armies that are conducting the most brutal crimes against the Serbian civilian population, on the other.

One cannot help thinking that this is further pressure, in another form and with different means, aimed at finishing what had been begun to totally break up the former Yugoslavia and make the Republic of Serbia a weak state by reducing its authority [Serbo-Croat relativizirati] in parts of its territories and reducing its sovereignty in, for instance, Kosovo, Sandzak, Vojvodina and various other demands, which were we to list them would most certainly be infinite.

Therefore, the reason why sanctions were introduced is clear. Not even children in Serbia believe that the sanctions were introduced because Serbia has carried out aggression against Bosnia- Hercegovina. Everyone now clearly sees that there is no aggression there on the part of Serbia. This cannot be even denied by all these official representatives of the United Nations, EC, CSCE and hundreds of other organisations that are daily roaming this country.

Therefore, it is obvious that pressure is being stepped up because such a state of affairs cannot last a long time, because the truth is gradually penetrating the barriers of the blockade that have hitherto been impenetrable. The picture is gradually beginning to be more balanced. The general situation in Yugoslavia is becoming clearer. Therefore, it will not be long, and the current picture cannot be kept in front of their own people for a long time, nor can the attempts be prevented to remedy this picture with the elements of truth and objectivity in all this matter. Thus, the internationalisation has in a way had a very bad influence on Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it has in fact made an opening for the flow of information that will destroy the artificially created, unjust and politically and morally untenable pressure against Serbia and Yugoslavia.

[Q] Although you have partially already answered this question, I will nevertheless insist upon it. Namely, it is increasingly rumoured that the real reasons for the introduction of the sanctions are precisely in Serbia and that the Serbian authorities and your policy are to be blamed for them.

[A] Well, it is obvious that after the contradictory behaviour of the international community and individual countries they were at first opposed to unilateral actions and later favoured unilateral actions, were first against the use of force and secession and later in favour of secession, they not only recognised but also rewarded these republics with a speedy and premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the international community. Even Lord Carrington, former chairman of the conference on Yugoslavia, admitted that this was a mistake in the statement that I have mentioned. Therefore, when such mistakes are made and when pressure that is breaking up a free country that is a UN member is applied, and for which there were no reasons except for the interests of the mighty, of course the pressure from outside and by their supporters in Yugoslaviathen it is logical to look elsewhere, to try to put the blame on someone else rather than on themselves.

Those who expect that the EC will accept this blame, despite the fact that the chairman of the conference referred to the enormous mistakes to which we have been pointing all this time and had rejected, not only abroad but also by some of our opposition parties precisely on those issues where the chairman of the conference on Yugoslavia now says the mistakes were made well, you probably do not expect that they will say yes, we have made a mistake by breaking up Yugoslavia, we did not know that these were our interests and aims, and so forth [sentence as heard] . Somebody else must be found to be the scapegoat. However, even more absurd, those who were struggling for the preservation and integrity of Yugoslavia are now declared responsible for its break-up. Neither the Serbs nor Serbia wanted the break-up of Yugoslavia; on the contrary, they fought to preserve it. Why then and how can it sound logical

that those who fought for Yugoslavia are now being held responsible for its break-up? Those who wanted to resolve the Yugoslav crisis through peaceful measures are now being held responsible for the fact that those who wanted its break-up used force to achieve this. These claims are so contradictory that no rational person could believe them or accept them as valid arguments.

[SUPPORT FOR SERBS]

[Q] Mr President, it sometimes seems that one of the conditions to overcome the sanctions that might be worth complying with and that some superpowers perhaps want is to stop helping naturally, in a humanitarian and any other manner, I mean, taking care of that which is our constitutional duty that is, to stop looking after the Serbs in Krajina and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is such a political turnabout possible in Serbia while you are President of the Republic and while the current government is running Serbia?

[A] This is absolutely out of the question. They have nobody else to rely on but us. If we had even reduced the aid to them they would have found themselves in a very difficult situation. We do not have the right to do such a thing. These people are a part of our nation whom we are absolutely obliged to help. All these stories that some individuals are telling, namely that we can live well and happily and what concern of ours is it what is happening over there well, if a nation is destroyed, then there is no freedom, prosperity or anything else for an individual either. All in all, we know to which individuals freedom, prosperity and other benefits might have applied, while they used to apply to the nations that were being destroyed or a subject of aggression, and they found an excuse for the aggression and for not offering resistance and for treason not to use this overtly exploited word of our political vocabulary therefore, I really do not see how this could be possible in Serbia. I believe that not a single government in Serbia should even think about it if it has even the slightest idea about state and national interests.

[Q] In any case, it is certain that while you are the President of the Republic this cannot happen and while there are the current authorities in Serbia, this change, the betrayal of the Serbian people in the neighbouring -

[Milosevic, interrupting] I do not believe that anybody would even think of it. Furthermore, if you would allow me to say so, I think the question is too sharp.

[Q] Of course. We have recently heard that the bombing of Belgrade was also ordered, just as if it were an (opera) performance. Do you know anything about this, or was this a secret that was hidden from you?

[A] I really know nothing about it. It is obvious that it was ordered in the same manner in which it was cancelled. This whole story does not seem very plausible to me.

[SERBIAN-CROATIAN RELATIONS]

[Q] It seems that all the important political protagonists in the world agree that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the central problem of the Yugoslav crisis and a direct reason for the introduction of the sanctions. Suddenly, the problem has been transferred to Serbian-Croatian relations, that is, the relations between Serbia, that is, the FRY, and Croatia. Is the insistence upon Croatia's recognition and resolving this conflict the beginning of the creation of conditions after which all those reasons that you have already mentioned would follow Kosovo, Sandzak and so forth? What is the reason for the shift of focus of attention to Serbian-Croatian relations?

[A] You see, the focus of attention in the Yugoslav crisis is constantly shifted from one issue to another. When those who want the continuation of war conclude that conditions exist for the war to die down, they immediately open some other issue. This has been demonstrated in numerous examples in Bosnia. Whenever it appeared that the war would die down several other, secondary issues were opened to maintain the crisis until the realisation of the final aims, presenting new demands and exerting pressures. Therefore, the answer to this question cannot be black and white, one or the other. It is the one and the other, and the third, and the 10th reasons. I even believe that if we remain soft in the sense of one of your previous questions and accept something that goes beyond the border drawn by our state and national interests, we will face the situation that the list of demands will become endless, and that as soon as some of the demands are fulfilled new ones will follow immediately, and all this for as long as we have some significance as a country and any sort of control over the issues where it is desired that control falls into somebody else's hands. Regarding Vance and Owen, my impression is that they are men of personal integrity, men who want to be objective and who want to help resolve the Yugoslav crisis in a constructive manner. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the UN measures and what depends upon them, I expect some positive changes in this respect. I hope that I will not be wrong in this expectation of mine.

[Q] Mr President, in all former diplomatic negotiations you favoured the stance that the Serbs in Krajina and in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, now in the Serbian Republic to be precise, are the only ones who can decide about their future and that it is their right to decide with whom they will live and how. Is Yugoslav diplomacy now stepping back from this stance,

and if so, on what basis and why? Do you have any major objections to the Cosic-Tudjman agreement that was reached in Geneva?

[A] Well, I believe that there cannot be any discussion about whether the Serbs in Krajina or in Bosnia are the sole negotiators on their future. Who else but their legitimate representatives should negotiate their future? How else could these people feel certain that their interests will not be betrayed but by depending on their legitimate representatives? Naturally, this is one of the elements. The other element is that international guarantees must be given for what their legitimate negotiators will negotiate. They have explained thousands of times that they do not have any trust in Croatia. How could they trust the current authorities that first erased them from the constitution, then exposed them to genocide for the second time in this century, and then for the irony to be even greater declared that they will give amnesty to the Serbs who did not participate in the war? Why give amnesty to those who did not participate in the war, except just for being Serbs? What can the Serbs expect from a government like this?

Regarding the question whether I have any major objections to the declaration that was signed by President Cosic and Tudjman, yes I have, but I expressed them to President Cosic.

[Q] What are they, if you could -

[Milosevic, interrupting] Well, I would not enumerate them now. I stated them to President Cosic.

[Q] Then answer this question I would like you to say whether you would have signed this document.

[A] No, I would not.

[Q] Do you have an explanation?

[A] Well, if you really insist. I have one very serious reservation. There cannot be a document between Yugoslavia, or Serbia, and Croatia that would leave out the issue you have just raised, that is, the solution for Serbian Krajina. Only they can negotiate their future and destiny, and the international guarantees must be secured for the result of these talks. I believe that the Croatian side, of course, maliciously omitted this from the document and the Serbs are mentioned in the document exclusively as refugees. We know very well what position Serbian Krajina is in, and we also know that we expect, and we have already reached this level in our talks, that the definition you have used at the beginning of your question that only the representatives of the Krajina residents, their legitimate representatives, can be the sole negotiators about their future must be acknowledged.

[Q] Mr President, a general impression is that we are recently becoming increasingly more skilful in diplomacy and that we are scoring more spectacular successes, everything is

being done in a much more attractive manner, with acclamations and applause, but it seems that the results are getting worse. It seems that we, not all of us, have forgotten what the game is all about and where one should apply the skill. They forgot about the aims around which the political skill is being developed. Do you share this impression?

[A] Well, to answer briefly, I do. We discussed the reasons for which the sanctions have been abolished [as heard]. It is definite that the lack of doors we knocked on worldwide is not one of the reasons. Therefore, the sanctions definitely will not be overcome by knocking on the doors in all sorts of countries but primarily by resolving the problems in our country and, I would say, through affirmation of our country, the FRY, regarding its internal peace and stability, and only later by the effects of foreign affairs, which are as a matter of rule always an expression of the internal situation in a country.

[BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA]

[Q] You have already stated this on several occasions, but I insist that you say it again. How do you see the resolution of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and how do you see the possibility of stopping this truly horrific war that is going on there?

[A] My personal position, and the position of the Republic of Serbia on this, are unchanged. I would like to remind you that we, before the clashes broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, here across the road in the National Assembly, took a very clear stand regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our stand at that time was that the Bosnian crisis must be solved peacefully and that not only will we respect, but also support all solutions that the three equal peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina agree on. They have entered the phase of their mutual negotiations. Unfortunately, it seems to me that I cannot judge to what degree the internal and outside pressures motivated Izetbegovic's leadership for secession.

But one thing is sure, the interests of the Muslim people were not the motive for this secession. I also drew attention to the fact that Muslims live in Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia. Therefore, if we talk about the interests of the Muslims, I do not see one single reason for Bosnia-Herzegovina to leave Yugoslavia and for the Muslims to live in four different countries, instead of one. This could in no way serve their interests. However, it was in the interest of those forces that were breaking up Yugoslavia and that motivated the Bosnian Muslims to create a new state at the expense of the others and in the conditions and circumstances in which Bosnia was known for decades as little Yugoslavia, and anybody who thought logically had to ask himself what would happen to little Yugoslavia if the greater Yugoslavia was broken up. It must have been obvious to anybody, even to the politicians around

Izetbegovic and to him also, that the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina would inevitably trigger major upheavals. Therefore, it seems to me that the real reasons for resolving the problems lay in the understanding of these very major mistakes that were made at the very beginning. Then, it should be made possible to counter them from the outside, but not so that the world would help one side against the other, as such aid escalating the war clash, but so that we would all encourage all three sides to sit at the negotiating table and together resolve the key issues of a mutual agreement, which must equally acknowledge the interests of all three constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Therefore, I believe that some of the reasons that motivated Vance and Owen to concentrate on Serbian-Croatian relations, the Yugoslav-Croatian relations I owe you this answer from the last, or the penultimate question they were led by good intentions and the belief that if they resolved this conflict between the Serbs and the Croats it would have an adequate positive reflection on the Serbian-Croatian relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and facilitate the solution of the entire Serbian-Croatian-Muslim crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Well, in any case there is no other solution but this one. This is the only peaceful solution. We insisted upon it long before the clashes, and we are very sorry that our insistence was not acknowledged and that the conference and Carrington has recently called this the biggest mistake recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina in the conditions in which one did not know where and what this country is that does not have an assembly, government, presidency, or clearly defined territory, or any other attribute of statehood, which are, I would say, sort of elementary conditions for the recognition of states.

In practice, this premature recognition was also used as a reason to fight among the Yugoslav nations. We have seen how one very prominent German diplomat, the former German Ambassador to Yugoslavia, I believe he was called Horst Graber, recently said that premature recognition was used as a weapon in the fighting between the Yugoslav nations. Therefore, this is becoming obvious and apparent even to objective and benevolent Western politicians. This confirms me in my belief that such a different, distorted, or wrong vision cannot persist in resolving the conflict in Bosnia, either. There is no other solution for the clashes in Bosnia but to stop the fighting immediately and to reach immediately a final solution at the conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina based on the principle of equal acknowledgement of all three nations. I cannot see any other solution.

[KOSOVO]

[Q] Two options exist about Kosovo-Metohija that are relatively recent—namely, that the problem of the Albanians in Kosovo can be resolved by restoring to them the rights of the 1974 constitution, and the other opinion, on which I would like you to comment, about the partition of Kosovo. Certain political circles believe that the partition of Kosovo would perhaps be a far-reaching solution that would prevent the spread of the Albanian population throughout Kosovo. Do you believe that the partition of Kosovo is something that is at all feasible?

[A] What partition are you referring to, in Kosovo-Metohija, or what?

[Q] That Kosovo be divided between the Serbs and the Albanians. That a part of Kosovo leave Yugoslavia and be left to the Albanians.

[A] This is out of the question. This is absolutely out of the question. I could never support such an approach and such an idea.

[Q] What about restoring to the Albanians the rights of the 1974 constitution, as mentioned in the EC, the CSCE and some commissions?

[A] The 1974 constitution was the recipe for the break-up of Serbia. We changed this constitution in the most legal possible manner, without any pressure, force or violence, legally and peacefully. We would never accept this constitution, which at the time caused a real ethnic cleansing, when 40,000 Serbs fled because of the violence that was undertaken on the basis of this so-called constitutional independence of the Province of Kosovo, as it was called at that time. Besides these 40,000 Serbian refugees, crimes were committed based on the authorities' power to implement such a constitution under what was in this country a well-known slogan of an ethnically pure Kosovo. We heard it for the first time then and wondered how somebody could come to such insane, nationalist and chauvinist ideas.

I think that anybody who ponders the reasons for which this constitution had to be changed, the catastrophic consequences that this constitution might have had and did have, especially concerning Kosovo and Serbia, will not continue to advocate that the provisions of this constitution be reapplied. It is also out of the question to reapply the decrees of this constitution. Somebody has served up this idea from their separatist kitchen, and this idea appeared attractive and they embraced it probably in the absence of any other ideas. However, this is out of the question.

Finally, this is Serbia's internal matter. The residents of Serbia will decide about the Serbian constitution. No conference, be it London or Geneva, can decide about it or will decide about it. Human rights are another matter. This is not merely an internal matter, as these are universal rights, and we accepted in the CSCE that we will guarantee the highest CSCE

standards. This cannot be debated or disputed. However, all other issues are absolutely Serbia's internal issues, and they will not be resolved anywhere other than in Serbia.

[Q] I would say that this view of yours had until recently sounded completely natural and normal, and it seemed easy to agree with. However, I have the impression that an atmosphere has been created recently and that a feeling and readiness are being formed in certain political structures that to take orders issued by foreign states and even foreign services is legitimate, something that is a matter of demonstrating our good-will, and that all that represents interference into one's internal affairs, even a constitutional set-up of a republic, well, something that, well, can come as an order from outside.

[A] We unfortunately do not share such a view, so we are not going to accept such orders from abroad.

[SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO WITHIN FEDERATION]

[Q] Serbia and Montenegro have entered the Yugoslav federation with an agreement on the continuity of Yugoslavia. Can this agreement be violated, and how can that happen? How can it be violated from the Serbian side, and how can it be violated from the Montenegrin side and particularly now when this continuity is being denied at the international level?

[A] Serbia and Montenegro have not created the FRY through an agreement, but, as I would put it, on the basis of a fully clear interest of the two republics and the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples in having a joint state. Therefore, I do not see a serious possibility for this agreement to be violated, either from the Serbian nor the Montenegrin side. Only individual politicians can have possibilities to violate this agreement or have ideas about violating and disrupting this agreement. There are politicians in Montenegro and Serbia who would do such a thing. However, I am sure that the people both in Serbia and in Montenegro would not allow ideas of such politicians to be realised as a kind of plan that could pass either in Serbia or in Montenegro. Therefore, tremors of that kind on the political stage of entertainers are possible, but it seems to me that in the historical sense they are impossible. That is, I am convinced that they are impossible.

[Q] You think that separatist parties in Montenegro and those who support an independent and autonomous Serbia cannot win the people's confidence, and that this interest is nevertheless stronger and more powerful?

[A] I think that they cannot do so, and this is why I said not on the political stage, but on the political stage of entertainers.

[Q] While we are speaking about the political stage, rumour has it that the Cosic-Panic tandem represents a pair and that you are rowing in a single boat. Is that a pair without a coxswain, and how do you feel in a single boat?

[A] First, I do not think that they are a pair. Regarding the coxswain, one of them claims that his coxswain is in Washington. As for the other, we will see. I hope that he does not have one. Regarding the question of how I feel in the single boat, first, I do not think at all that I am in a single. This what I am doing, and I am making an effort to do it in such a way that I deem to be in the interest of the citizens of Serbia and our people; therefore, it cannot be a single boat, as it has many rowers.

[MILOSEVICA LEGALIST OR VOLUNTARIST?]

[Q] President, one acquires an impression that in your activity in general you are too much of a legalist. You have a reputation and your political opponents have stressed this many times of being also inclined towards voluntarism, while at the same time the greatest democrats and leaders of the opposition are constantly invoking extraordinary circumstances because of which one should deviate from the letter of the law and constitution. Or they publicly state that they are not going to obey laws. How do you explain this paradox and inversion, and are they really an inversion and a paradox?

[A] You have again asked many questions, but I will try to answer some of them. First, my opponents will have to decide whether I am a legalist or a voluntarist. It is impossible to be accused of being both. Since we are talking about accusations, second, it does not seem reasonable to me that you quote the stands of individual leaders of the opposition, because it does not seem to me that on the basis of their stands in the last year and a half one can establish with certainty what any of them thinks. That is, they have so frequently changed their views about the same things that only if one introduced a rule of taking their last view about a thing as their real view can one possibly establish their views. Therefore, there are many unknown quantities, and one thing is completely clear everybody doing this work I am doing, everybody who is occupying the post of President of the Republic would have to be a legalist, for how could one realise the policy and aims of a state based on the rule of law; how could this country function on the basis of rule of law if its top officials do not obey the laws and the Constitution?

[Q] Here is, for instance, one example, the last example. The referendum path to elections is being criticised. It is claimed that because of the extraordinary circumstances, the elections could have been agreed on through some more flexible or arbitrary or some other

interpretation of the constitution, that there was a need to organise the referendum [sentence as heard]. This is one of the objections to the excessively legalistic form.

[A] I have heard various claims, and much fuss has been raised about it. I even heard the claim [changes thought] someone raised the question of who had invented this referendum now. It is not that this referendum has been invented now or this year. The citizens know very well that the referendum was decided upon when we were drafting the constitution. The constitution states that the constitution can only be changed through a referendum.

The constitution envisages the length of the term of office of people's deputies and the President of the Republic. It did not envisage early elections. Therefore, we have to amend the constitution if we want to hold early elections. The constitution cannot be amended without a referendum. So, no one had to invent it, nor could anyone bypass it. The claims by some politicians that changing the constitution through a referendum is not good as a constitutional solution are, in my view, unfounded; in other words, I would never be able to agree with such views, because if we want to have a democratic society, then we must proceed from the fact the citizens of Serbia must be consulted about the constitution and its amendments.

How can anyone say that he is a democrat and yet be opposed to the citizens of Serbia being asked to express their view on their highest act, the constitution? What is more democratic, to consult the citizens, or not? How could those who advocate the view that the citizens should not be consulted about the alteration of the constitution be considered democrats in comparison with those who are in favour of respecting the constitution?

In all this fuss I would say people are most confused by the possible outcome of the referendum. I think that in the heat and temper of the political discussion various party leaders are forgetting that neither their parties nor they themselves are the most important thing in the world, that the world does not revolve around them, and that the citizens of Serbia are more important than all of them.

After the last elections we heard some of those who lost in the elections saying that the people disappointed them. Now, before the referendum is held, we hear concerns about whether the people will make a mistake, and yet we do not know in what sense the people could make a mistake. In my view it is logical that things should follow their course the Assembly has said what it had to say; the parties have said what they had to say; everyone has agreed on that, and now when things are presented at the referendum, this is beyond any discussion. We are talking about the will of the people.

What the citizens decide must be respected. That is all. That is why I indeed do not see why all this fuss was necessary and why it was necessary for anyone to question the

constitutionality of the referendum, or to wonder whether the people will make a mistake, or whether the citizens will make a mistake or not. Citizens will decide the way they decide. This is their right. They are asked to decide, and no one can impose any solution on them. I think this is quite outside the actual discussion.

Regarding the question of whether constitutionally valid elections could have taken place without the constitution having been amended, of course they could have. However, this would have taken place in circumstances in which the provisions of the constitution would have virtually been abused.

Early elections could take place if the President of the Republic, in this case me, dismisses the Assembly. According to the constitution, I have to do that at the proposal of the government if the Assembly is unable to function, or if the Assembly finds itself in some kind of a stalemate position. It has always been thought that if this is proposed by the government, which is in fact a result of the Assembly majority, this means that the Assembly is unable to function. If we did that, we would in fact abuse a constitutional provision, which was not made for fabricating elections when parties agree among themselves to do that. It was made to prevent the possibility of the state mechanism being blocked. The head of the government would be performing his duties in an extremely dishonest and incorrect way, if I may say so, if he proposed to the President of the Republic to dismiss the Assembly for those reasons, just as it would be incorrect for the President of the Republic, in exercising his constitutional powers, to dismiss the Assembly so that early elections could be held.

Finally, I would like to draw your attention to another notorious fact. I think that in the heat of their mutual discussions and confrontations, the political parties completely forgot about the citizens and the entire electoral body and the fact that 80% of the citizens are not members of any party. Political parties cannot assume the right to decide on what belongs to all the citizens of the republic, regardless of whether they are members of political parties or not.

If we are to have a democratic society, we cannot divide our citizens on those who are members of political parties and those who are not, so that those who are members of political parties enjoy greater political rights than those who have not been politically active in terms of membership or leadership in political parties, but only as people, citizens that are choosing programmes and politicians that these parties represent. I think that this is the most important aspect of the question you raised.

[Q] As President of Serbia you agreed to early elections and you will go into elections before your term of office expires if, of course, this was decided by the people at the referendum. Was your decision connected with the embargo with which Serbia was punished?

[A] It has no connection with the embargo, nor would we accept such political decisions. We are not a banana republic that decides to call elections in agreement with foreign agents because it is being sent a message to do so or because embargos are introduced against it. We discussed elections because there was a prevailing feeling early elections were necessary. After all, as my memory serves me, the Serbian Assembly had discussed elections as one of the possibilities long before the introduction of the embargo.

[Q] Therefore, this does not, of course, have any connection with the embargo.

[RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS]

[Q] Your opponents claim that you frequently make errors in the cadre policy and that your choice of associates is very poor. Your political supporters and the politically like-minded people also criticise you for errors in the cadre policy and for major cadre mistakes. Do you consider yourself guilty regarding these issues, or do you think that those who are criticising you are wrong?

[A] Well, I can tell you that they are more or less right.

[Q] Mr President, it is also noticeable that you rarely, no, not rarely, but never respond to attacks by your opponents and their often serious accusations and insults. At the same time, they accuse you of not doing this because you are arrogant. What are the real reasons for your reluctance to respond?

[A] Certainly not arrogance. You know very well how many absurd accusations have been levied at my expense in the last three or two or, let us say, five years. If I had responded to all of those accusations I would have simply had no time to do anything else. On the other hand, the bulk of these accusations was so absurd that they were self-explanatory and clear by themselves. Life itself, if I may say so, provided answers to these accusations, and there was no need for me to do so. Why should I?

It is difficult to cheat citizens. You can cheat a group of people, you can cheat some organization, in some way, but I think that under the present circumstances of our crisis, when political life is under the constant and intense attention of the citizens, those politicians and speculators who think that they can deceive people with fabricated tricks and accusationsthis is very difficult to do.

[Q] Do you honestly believe that the people always distinguish between justice and injustice, and between truth and lies?

[A] Not always, of course. They cannot. These things are difficult to establish, but in the historical sense, yes. In the historical sense, yes, I am convinced of that.

[Q] Mr President, do you think that the Serbian reporters and media have done enough for the benefit of Serbian truth and justice, or not?

[A] I have a view on this, a very firm view on this. Unfortunately, they have not. Some of them, in fact, did many things against Serbian truth and justice. However, this is a question for your profession, for your moral code and, I would say, your when I said your, I mean your reporters' patriotic feelings.

[CONCLUSION]

All in all, the situation today appears to suit most those who have catastrophic predictions. It appears that everything is against us and that we can only rely on truth and justice. The truth is coming to the surface but with a great deal of difficulties. Justice is, as people say, always slow. Some people also add that Russia is far away. What should we, in your view, rely upon and lean on, and where should we look for the reasons for self-confidence?

[A] First, I would say establishing peace and stability in our country. We have enough strength for this and we can accomplish this. In such circumstances everything else can be directed in a logical and constructive way.

[Q] Finally, Mr President, some statesmen in the East have dismembered their countries to the applause of the big powers. To what extent do you miss the applause and recognition of other countries? Do you perhaps intend to achieve this in the future?

[A] I have not been involved in the dismembering of states, but I have invested all my energy in uniting Serbia and preserving our state. Therefore I could have not been a candidate for this kind of applause.

[Q] Thank you, Mr President, for the interview on behalf of Serbian Radio and Television.

[A] Thank you.

ANEXO B.12 – Closing Statement at the Second SPS Congress.¹³⁴

Comrades,

The assertion of the permanent political commitments of our party which has characterised this Congress, as well as the fierce criticism of the weaknesses in the achievement of our objectives which have been in evidence in the past two years testify to the vitality of the Socialist Party of Serbia and its capability to respond to the challenges of our time and the difficulties we are facing. Both with its hitherto activity and with this Congress, this Party has shown that it has no other interests at heart, but those of its country and its people. This Party pursues its policy (applause) in the interest of peace, freedom, independence, economic and cultural development and cooperation on an equal footing with all those who respect these values and wish for such cooperation. Although the crisis we are facing is not only the result of developments in Serbia, but largely the consequence of international interests and the policy pursued in keeping with those interests, we here in Serbia are obliged to do our best in order to weather the crisis as soon as possible. I here have first of all in mind the sanctions and believe that before long the factors behind these sanctions will start explaining how and what mistakes they have made just as now they are trying to say that they were wrong to prematurely recognise the former Yugoslav republics as this triggered bloodshed and outbreak of war. But, as far as the need to alleviate the pressure of sanctions is concerned, we bear huge responsibility because we have to secure the operation of the economy and normal life for our citizens through our economic and social policy programme under these conditions. The Government has undertaken a number of measures to mitigate the difficulties facing the Republic and our citizens. One of the most important among these measures is the assistance to the Serbian people in the war-afflicted areas. As is well known, Serbia has shown maximum solidarity with the Serbian people in the war-torn areas and particularly with the refugees who have come to Serbia from those parts. This assistance has been invaluable and has encumbered to a considerable extent our country exposed to economic sanctions. We have consciously undertaken to shoulder this burden and have to do it to the end. At the same time, however, we must address the common plight of the Serbian people. For example, we must take steps to ensure that the largest possible number of refugees who have come to Serbia return to their homes, particularly those capable of giving assistance and joining the citizens who are already there.

¹³⁴ Discurso proferido durante o encerramento do segundo congresso do Partido Socialista Sérvio em 23 e 24 de outubro de 1992. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/sps2.htm>>.

Of course, stopping the war will be of greatest assistance to the Serbian people in war-torn areas, as well as in the resolution of their problems in general. This contribution, i.e. the contribution to halting the war and establishing durable and just peace must be made by Serbia in every possible manner. This means that the Socialist Party of Serbia, as the ruling party, through all the institutions of government administration should pursue a policy conducive to restoring peace in the areas of the former Yugoslavia where war is now waged and a policy of economic, social and cultural development which will facilitate life in the conditions of sanctions and enable rapid recovery after they are lifted. At the same time, while addressing these current and serious difficulties imposed from outside, which we have to face every day, the Socialist Party of Serbia must seek to uphold its principle commitments on a lasting basis. These commitments reflect the progressive ideas of workers and the socialist movement in Serbia and Yugoslavia, as well as the most progressive economic and political ideas of our modern world and left-wing movement. These commitments are based, of course, on all the positive achievements which have emancipated the individual and ensured progress of our society to date. The largest number of our members are ready to subscribe to such commitments of the Socialist Party and act in accordance with them. I think that the SPS leadership which we elected this evening should encourage this general feeling of our membership in its future work much more than before, not only because this is the prevailing feeling among our members, but also because left-wing ideas are progressive and in the interest of the majority in our society, because they have a future, because this is the road which modern civilisation has opted for.

I find it necessary to stress this particularly because in the past two years some SPS members showed an inclination to deviate from the Party programme. While I do not wish to analyse the reasons for all this, let me only say that some were principled and others quite the opposite. In the future it will be necessary to reduce such deviations to the minimum.

Occasionally, the Socialist Party or, to be more precise, certain leaderships and individuals within it, acted sycophantically towards the opposition parties and one could get the impression that they wanted to please and to appease them. This may be (applause) the remnant of our recent past when there existed only one party which, being the only one, wanted to rally and bring together mutually opposing ideas and people. In a multi-party system, however, the ruling party is always exposed to criticism on the part of the opposition. True, this criticism is probably somewhat more principled, less aggressive and more humane than is the case in this country, but such criticism is, all the same, unavoidable. This Party has no reason why to avoid or shirk from such criticism.

Therefore, it is not the task of the ruling party to make unprincipled concessions to opposition parties, nor to determine its programme, organisation and personnel policy according to the criteria set by its political adversaries. It should, instead, act in line with its own policy, seeking to make its activities serve the interests of the society, of all citizens and each individual. In my opinion, this should be the responsibility of both the party leadership and its members, and is of paramount importance for its unity. For, there are many opposition, civil parties on Serbia's political scene. And whoever finds their political orientation close to his own opinions has no place in the Socialist Party of Serbia (applause).

I call on all delegates to this Congress, and on all party members to demonstrate unity and join forces to help us weather this crisis. Current statistics show that both as a Republic and as a people, we are fending for ourselves in the circumstances imposed from outside much better than expected by those who have imposed them in the first place. But, in our Party (applause), as well as in our people there is an additional strength to surmount difficulties, to defeat the enemy and overcome troubles. This is why major efforts in the future should bring us even closer together, encourage us, mobilise us to get out of isolation, preserve peace, avoid poverty, defeat hatred and chauvinism, secure life and work in peace for our citizens and good-quality education and a happier future for our children and youth. These are the tasks which the Socialist Party of Serbia has the ways and means to accomplish. These tasks will remain with us for several generations to come. But, since we are living in turbulent and unstable times, we have to carry out most of them by ourselves and we have to do it fast. Time is running out. The tasks are daunting. But, there are many of us who are willing to grapple with current problems, and if we remain united we shall win in the end (applause).

In the name of such commitments and beliefs, I greet once again all participants in this Congress. I wish you all better, peaceful and more prosperous days. On behalf of all of us elected to the bodies of the Socialist Party of Serbia, I wish to thank you for the trust you have placed in us.

Thank you (applause).

ANEXO B.13 – International Mediation; Milosevic, Mitterrand, Vance And Owen Hold Paris Talks On Bosnia Settlement.¹³⁵

[Passage omitted: question and answer on significance of continuation of evening's talks with Vance, Owen and Mitterrand]

[Komrakov] The dinner [attended by the four negotiators] has been announced as a working one. However, can you tell us what issues you expect to be raised tonight?

[Milosevic] I think I have already told you that the basic issue that is preoccupying, with good reason, the two co-chairmen is forcing the final agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. You know that our country, all of us, have sincerely supported the principles of the Vance-Owen plan, both the constitutional principles, and the military arrangement that is, all those things that could bring about peace. However, it is also well known that we are not a party to that conflict. We can help with our efforts and our influence to bring about peace, and in accordance with the principles laid down by the two co-chairmen, the final solution has to be reached through a consensus of the representatives of the three peoples. We cannot enter the discussion on the maps. That is an internal question which has to be discussed by the three peoples who are directly involved. It would be in extremely bad taste if we were to take a concrete attitude towards that. We have a principled attitude that it is a factual issue, that facts have to be respected and, based on the facts, the interests of all three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina have to be respected.

[Komrakov] We have learned that you were very determined in the attitude that sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro should be lifted as soon as possible as one of the main conditions for the solving of the Yugoslav crisis and the situation in general.

[Milosevic] It is completely logical that in these talks we have a situation that the co-chairmen see what is the most difficult problem in the conference on Bosnia, that is, the end of the agreement [sentence as heard]. It is logical that we, for our part, place priority on the things that affect us most, and that is the continuation of these totally unfounded sanctions which, while causing a lot of damage to our country, are not bringing closer the solution to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The question simply arises as to why Serbia and Yugoslavia have to be hostages of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if the international community wanted to send a message to the Yugoslavs, to warn them to stop fighting, it would have been logical if it had warned all the sides, and not only one side, and particularly not the side that, even according

¹³⁵ Entrevista concedida a Mirolav Komrakov para a Serbian TV em 11 de março de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic031193.htm>>.

to official UN representatives, does not have a single soldier on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That creates the impression that this is not a question of an objective approach, but an approach that has sided with one party to the conflict.

We respect, and I have supported that attitude with arguments, I hope with arguments, in talks with President Mitterrand, in the talks we had before this plenary meeting, and in plenary talks with President Mitterrand, David Owen and Cyrus Vance, that all the conditions in our view have been met for the sanctions to be finally lifted. I hope that this drawing nearer to an objective picture of the events in Yugoslavia will contribute to the lifting of the sanctions.

[Komrakov] At the end of this interview, allow me to ask, you have probably answered this question several times today, but it does interest the international community: were there any pressures exerted on you?

[Milosevic] Well, you see, the events are what are exerting the pressure. I personally have good relations with Vance and Owen. I think that they are men who are trying to take an objective stand. They are men who want peace, who want to help bring peace about in the Yugoslav region, so I could not call it unprincipled pressure. In any case, there is also great pressure on them, since it is pressure, I would say, by the Europeans and to some degree the American and world public, which has been poisoned by an avalanche of misinformation about the situation in Yugoslavia. If our citizens were to watch on their television every evening the accusations and untruths that are shown to people in Europe and the United States, they would only conclude that the Serbs are a wild nation, a nation of murderers, a nation that has to be stopped, and not people like all other people who only want to achieve their own interests without affecting anybody else's interests. The media war that has been waged against us has poisoned the public, which is putting on great pressure for military intervention, for many unprincipled moves, but there is no doubt that it is the duty of the politicians who know the situation, who know that all these things are not true, not to fall prey to these pressures, but to behave in an objective way.

I hope that the involvement in the talks of French President Mitterrand, a respected world politician, one of the most significant politicians in this century, will contribute to spreading an objective picture and an objective approach to the solution of the Yugoslav crisis more fully than would have been done without his participation and the participation of France.

[Komrakov] Thank you for this interview, Mr President.

[Milosevic] Thank you.

ANEXO B.14 – International Mediation; Milosevic Interviewed By French Tv: Not Serbia's Strategy To Export War.¹³⁶

Before participating in the dinner at the Foreign Ministry [this evening] in the company of the two UN mediators, and perhaps, as I was telling you, of Francois Mitterrand, the Serbian President granted an exclusive interview to Jacques Merlino for France-2. As you will hear, the Serbian Number One does not close all the doors completely:

[Milosevic] External pressure just spoils the atmosphere for a solution, because the solution to the crisis is not support for just one side, the solution is to help all three sides to find a joint solution.

[Merlino] Mr President, you are in a city where not very long ago, on the walls of Paris, there were posters showing you next to a dictator, next to Hitler. How do you react to this kind of poster?

[Milosevic] In this city there have been so many good things throughout history that I cannot assess this city on the basis of these nasty little things which may appear here.

[Merlino] As a man how do you react when you see the pictures of people suffering in Sarajevo?

[Milosevic] If I had seen, as any other citizen has, what is conveyed by the media I would very likely be in favour of intervention against the Serbs, but unfortunately your media very often broadcast lies. I would like to tell the French people that it is not true, it is not fair, it is not accurate, and that very likely the protagonists of such a policy will be the object of scorn on the part of their descendants when the truth becomes known to the public.

[Merlino] A last question: Mr President, is it true that the military strategy of Serbia would be to export the war in the event of Western military intervention?

[Milosevic] From all that we have seen, from all that has happened, one can conclude by looking at the facts that from the beginning Serbia has always been the champion of a peaceful solution in Bosnia-Hercegovina and many times has entered into a unilateral cease-fire, and the side which would really like to bring about foreign military intervention is the side of Mr Izetbegovic, the Muslims. The Muslims have now launched a big offensive in eastern Bosnia in order to prevent the Geneva conference.

¹³⁶ Entrevista concedida a Jacques Merlino para a France-2 TV em 11 de março de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic031193b.htm>>.

ANEXO B.15 – The Athens Conference on Bosnia; Milosevic Assesses Results of Talks: Security of Bosnian Serb Territory Assured.¹³⁷

[Vucelic] President Milosevic, how do you assess the work and the results of the work of the Athens conference?

[Milosevic] The result is obviously so great that it perhaps does not even need comment. It would not be enough to say that the result is major or big. It would be more appropriate to label it the decisive step for finally achieving peace in the Balkans and not just any peace but a lasting and just peace. I am sure that the decisions of the Athens conference will have an enormous significance for the interests of our entire nation.

[Vucelic] Do you believe that the assembly of the Serbian republic will ratify the Vance-Owen plan at (its session scheduled for 5th May)?

[Milosevic] I think that the assembly of the Serbian republic cannot make a decision that is against the interests of the Serbian people. Therefore, I am convinced that the assembly of the Serbian republic can and should accept this plan. What is probably needed is to analyse all elements of the plan and the significance of the results achieved in the recent negotiations. I am referring to the talks held in Belgrade last week, as well as these in Athens, (?contained) after all in the statement by the co-chairmen and finally in the results of the documents of the conference itself.

Since this is a very serious question on which the further course of things depend, I would also like to stress some important elements and reasons as to why this is necessary and justified. In short, I would say that there are three aspects of the issue that one should bear in mind: territorial, state and security aspects.

I would like to say something about each one of these important elements. First, regarding territory, it is quite clear that according to this plan, according to the letter of this plan, the Serbs get 45% of the territory. On the other hand, there are no circumstances whatsoever that could prevent links between the Serbian provinces, which is the most important thing. Therefore, from the point of view of this territorial aspect, no one who is objective could make any significant objections, especially if one bears in mind the fact that the document, which was signed today by the three co-chairmen, as there are three of them now, together with the president of the Serbian republic, the question of the provisional borders is still open. This question will be settled through the mechanism envisaged by the plan and in a way, I hope, that

¹³⁷ Entrevista concedida a Miodrag Vucelic para a Serbian Radio em 2 de maio de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic050293.htm>>.

will fully affirm the interests of all three peoples and thus the Serbian people. Therefore, considering prospects and the course of things, I do not see any major reasons from this territorial point of view, and of course, considering open demands and the need for [words indistinct].

The other aspect of things, I would say, is the state or political aspect. The Serbian people have regained the status of an equal constituent nation. When they were virtually deprived of this status with the so-called referendum, which was illegal and illegitimate, big clashes broke out. Simply, there was no one prepared to accept such a usurpation of the rights of the Serbian people.

We are not only talking about a declarative return of this status of equal, constituent nation but also the whole mechanism that will ensure that all major issues are solved by consensus. Therefore, there is absolutely no danger of a decision being made against interests that will be maintained by the representatives of the Serbian people in this tripartite presidency that should appear on the political scene and perform its duties.

Third, but in my view the most important aspect, is the security aspect. During the talks in Belgrade and which were continued here and confirmed in the official documents of the conference in Athens, in addition to the territories that were included in the Serbian provinces, neither the Croatian Defence Council nor the Green Berets [Bosnian Muslim forces] will be allowed access to all other territories outside the Serbian provinces where the Serbs live but rather only UN forces. In practice, this means that there is absolutely no reason for the Serbs who find themselves even in this transitional arrangement before the borders are fixed, and they are referred to as provisional borders that are yet to be discussed, outside the borders of the Serbian provinces, have no reason to leave their hearths and homes because the enemy army will not be able to come to these territories.

I think that this is a key question for the understanding of the entire plan and I believe that this is a very stable guarantee for the successful settlement of the remaining outstanding questions.

To sum up, when territorial, political-state and security aspects are borne in mind, as well as the size of the remaining outstanding questions, then everyone should understand that the time has come for the outstanding issues, which are incomparably smaller in relation to what has so far been resolved and regained, to be solved through the mechanism of the plan itself and not by war or on the battlefield.

Therefore, it is obvious that the best way to resolve the remaining issues, the remaining issues to be resolved at the conference table and not further confrontation and bloodshed, is

more than anything else in the interests of all three peoples and thus the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If sacrifices are made, then they are made in someone's interests. When these interests have been achieved, then unnecessary victims can only be big mistakes.

Therefore, I am convinced that the remaining outstanding issues can be successfully resolved through the negotiating mechanism envisaged by the plan. You should also bear in mind the fact that in the last few months, the representatives of the Serbian republic justifiably insisted on direct contacts with the Croatian and Muslim sides so as to continue negotiations on the final solution concerning maps. What more direct way of talks can you have than a tripartite presidency, which represents a continuous, direct, and institutionalised form of the direct harmonisation of mutual interests?

No side should deny the right of other sides to the interests that do not affect its interests. I am sure that in this process good solutions could be found for the remaining outstanding issues.

[Vucelic] [Words indistinct] that is facing us. What would you give priority to? To what issues, problems and points of arguments that you (?mentioned) would you give priority?

[Milosevic] There is no doubt that at this moment the strict observance of the cease-fire is the number one priority. I must say that those who fail to understand that a failure to observe the cease-fire is the crudest attack on the interests of their own people, and that such people must be prevented from violating the cease-fire. The strict observance of the cease-fire is the absolute priority and the first step.

I hope that the assembly of the Serbian republic will carefully analyse all these arguments and pay considerable attention to the observance of the cease-fire and the creation of conditions for the plan to be realised. I hope that the assembly of the Serbian republic, in pursuing the interests of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and I am sure that it knows that the people are fed up with the war and that they want peace will behave in this way. This means that the assembly of the Serbian republic should try to simply reject the views that we heard from some responsible leaders. Let me be completely open. If someone can say that six million Serbs can die but that there will still be six million more Serbs who will survive, then people who make such statements and people who generally think along such lines, if their place is not in hospital, then they should probably, and I am in fact sure, be banned from public life. The problems and interests of this nation cannot be resolved with such ideas.

I am sure that the assembly and the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina can recognise what their real interests are and what are not and what the expression of patriotism in a way that contradicts the real and historical national interests of their people are. I am sure that among

these interests the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina will recognise peace as one of their prime interests. I hope and expect the assembly of the Serbian republic, in the spirit of historical interests of the Serbian people, now that we are talking about a just peace and not just any peace, will adopt a decision that we all expect it to make it the decision that is, after all, expected of it by all Serbia and Yugoslavia.

[Vucelic] Finally, Mr President, we cannot but mention the role of Greece as the host of this meeting in Athens and the role of Prime Minister Mitsotakis.

[Milosevic] I would like to take this opportunity to particularly thank the friendly Greek people, the Greek state and government, and Prime Minister Mitsotakis. They made a great contribution to the success of this conference. This is perhaps, in a way, a fact that symbolises our friendship. No one could have expected something unfavourable to happen to the Serbian people here in the heart of Greece, in Athens.

I believe that they will be aware of our gratitude for everything they extended to us.

ANEXO B.16 – Belgrade Assembly of Five Assemblies; Milosevic Praises Work of Joint Session of Yugoslav Assemblies.¹³⁸

[Jevdjovic] After the assembly session attended by representatives of virtually all Serbian parliaments concluded, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to tell us, first about your impressions, Mr President, and second, to comment on the fact we all watched that some of the deputies failed to agree, and some walked out. How would you comment on all this?

[Milosevic] First of all, this joint gathering of people's deputies should not be treated as a formal legal action. One can rather say that what is involved is an extremely significant political act or, even more precisely, a moral act. It is above all doubt, it is my firm conviction, that the text of the declaration adopted at the end of the session expresses the interests of the huge majority of the Serbian people, who are orientated towards peace, expresses the opinion and interests of the huge majority of the citizens of Serbia who are orientated towards peace. It is my firm conviction that everyone in the Serbian Republic [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] is orientated towards peace. I think that such an orientation and an interest expressed so strongly has great significance, and that no one should neglect it in the decisions that are to follow.

I believe that we are moving towards the final goal, towards attaining a just peace, and I am certain that in this respect today's session also represented a very, very large and a very significant step. I believe in peace, and am sure that there is no alternative to peace.

[Jevdjovic] Would you please tell us one more thing. We have seen that a number of deputies failed to accept the arguments. In your opinion, is everyone aware of the danger looming over virtually all Serbs, not just the Serbs in Bosnia? Does that have to be accepted as the decisive factor when deciding on adoption or non-adoption of plans which, it is clear, may justify all kinds of remarks, but the basic things must be adopted [sentence as heard]?

[Milosevic] This is not a question of, as you have put it, of all kinds of modalities of the plan. This is the question of a decision in favour of peace. I am convinced that if those deputies who decided to walk out of the joint session of all deputies had stayed, the results would have been the same, because it is beyond all doubt that the huge majority which, in my opinion, authentically expresses the interests of the entire people, and all citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia, is orientated towards peace. This is, after all, the only way to manage to preserve what the Serbian people in Bosnia- Herzegovina won with our tremendous solidarity, and that

¹³⁸ Entrevista concedida a Zoran Jevdjovic para a Serbian TV em 14 de maio de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic051493.htm>>

is security and freedom, equality and freedom, and to achieve the remaining demands and settle the remaining questions under peaceful conditions and not bloodshed.

It is completely clear that it makes sense to give one's life if the cause is freedom, but when that freedom is ensured, when peace is ensured, when people's safety is ensured, it is that turning point for one to turn back to negotiations, and by no means to continue confrontation and bloodshed.

Therefore I am certain that not much time will pass until that decision is formally made. I am going to advocate it unreservedly. It is in the interest of the entire Serbian people. It is in the interest of all citizens of Serbia and, I am sure, of all citizens of the Serbian Republic as well. At the moment, many things are not sufficiently clear, but I hope that many things will become much clearer in the coming days and it will be seen that, just as we have always supported the interests of Serbia and the Serbian people in general, this position of advocating peace is in the best interest of the Serbian people at this moment. I am certain that this position will win. It must win. It opens a perspective. Any other position closes perspectives and excludes the Serbian people from further peace processes in which it can win on an equal footing what is left to be won.

I believe that this will have great influence, and that it will contribute to attaining the final goal.

[Jevdjovic] Thank you, Mr President.

ANEXO B.17 – Russian Envoy in Yugoslavia; Milosevic on Border Observers: No Foreign Presence in Internal Matters.¹³⁹

[Jevdjovic] Mr President, let us first hear your impressions, after the talks with Vitaliy Churkin, special Russian envoy to the talks on solving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Russian deputy foreign minister. As far as we know, Mr Churkin has come with, how shall I put it, reports on the results of the Washington meeting of the five foreign ministers.

[Milosevic] Well, let me be very brief. I think that the meeting of the five ministers is very significant, and I think that the most important parts of all the elements contained in the result of this meeting should be derived from it. The most important thing is the following: namely, the Washington meeting, with a choice between continuing the peace process and a possible military intervention, opted for the peace process.

This is a great step towards removing the danger of war in these areas, the danger of the war escalating, and undoubtedly a step that will prompt and speed up the peace process. However, bearing this in mind, I think it would be irresponsible if anyone should find, in this, reasons for great self-satisfaction. The real answer to this proposed option, which is the only right one, is, precisely, to have every one of the political factors that are participating in solving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina do everything to ensure that peace is finally achieved, and that the negotiations are finally speeded up, and a solution is found that will protect the interests of all three sides equally.

Such an approach is the only responsible one. Therefore, one should activate the continuation of the work on the peace plan and bring the peace process to a successful end. I am sure, and this is, after all, confirmed by everything about which we talked last week with our interlocutors here in Belgrade, that there is no alternative to peace, that is, that any foreign military interference into this civil war would only lead to the deepening of the crisis and an escalation of the war, and that only peace negotiations can bring a final, just and reliable solution to this crisis.

[Jevdjovic] There is also the new Russian role. Where do you see the further (efforts) of Russian diplomacy?

[Milosevic] Well, it is clear that the Russian role in this was very constructive. I hope that, among the five ministers, this role will continue to be constructive.

¹³⁹ Entrevista concedida a Zoran Jevdjovic para a Serbian TV em 25 de maio de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic052593.htm>>.

[Jevdjovic] Tell us just one more thing. There is a question that is topical in the wake of these Washington proposals: observers along the borders between Bosnia and Yugoslavia and, some people say, possibly along the borders between Bosnia and Croatia.

[Milosevic] We have a principled stance here and this stance of ours is known: we want cooperation with the international community, but are of the opinion that successful cooperation between our country and the international community and all other countries, if we really want it to be successful, can be so only if it is founded on an equal basis. That means that we must solve our internal questions by ourselves alone. That means that a foreign presence cannot, by any means, help solve our internal political questions. Thus, our stance here is completely exact and completely clear.

[Jevdjovic] Thank you, Mr President.

[Milosevic] Not at all.

ANEXO B.18 – Geneva Talks on Bosnia-Hercegovina; Geneva Talks Open: Izetbegovic, Milosevic, Karadzic Guardedly Optimistic.¹⁴⁰

[Milosevic] We held talks as the heads of delegations; therefore, talks in which Presidents Tudjman, Izetbegovic, Karadzic, Bulatovic, Boban and I participated, apart from the co-chairmen. We discussed the essence of the issue. This was the first time in a long time that there were no attempts to avoid discussion on the essence of the issue and, regardless of the fact that, at the moment, we cannot speak about solutions, the great change can be best illustrated by the fact that this was the first time since the outbreak of the war that Presidents Karadzic and Izetbegovic talked to each other at the same table. They not only attended talks, as used to be the case at some plenary sessions, but also spoke to each other directly and exchanged views and proposals. I believe that this is a fact that marks a very, very significant change in the quality of the talks.

I told you this morning what I consider to be the essential issue. That is the question of maps and the talks are supposed to resume tomorrow. As for your question as to whether we can expect the final solution tomorrow, I think that it is hard to say now whether that is possible. It is probably better to say that it is impossible to expect the final solution tomorrow since these are very complex issues, but it is obvious that the talks are going in the direction of reaching a solution and that the approach that has been supported by all sides has been accepted and that is to find a just solution for all three sides, therefore to continue work in that direction and reach an agreement as soon as possible.

[Unidentified correspondent] That is what the Serbian side has been committed to from the very start, to solve all the problems through direct negotiations and that nobody is victimized in that [sentence as heard]. The solution should be reached through the agreement of all three peoples in Bosnia-Hercegovina. So there is a return to the position that Belgrade supported from the outbreak of the conflict.

[Milosevic] That is perfectly logical. There is no other solution, nor can anyone other than the three conflicting sides find a solution. If a just solution that would equally protect the interests of the three sides is not found, and we are on the way to define it, then it would not be the grounds for a lasting and just peace, but would probably mean a temporary cooling of the situation with potential tensions that could always explode [sentence as heard]. We are all

¹⁴⁰ Entrevista concedida a Serbian Radio em 27 de julho de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic072793.htm>>.

committed to reaching a solution that would be final and lasting. I hope that tomorrow's talks will continue in that direction.

[Unidentified correspondent] And just one more thing. The position of the representatives of the international community, and this time special envoys Churkin and Bartholomew were present[changes thought] are they really mediators this time or, as occasionally before, do they impose solutions?

[Milosevic] As for the position of the international community, there were no proposals that would be seen as the imposition of a solution. As far as the co-chairmen present at the session are concerned, I think that their role was very, very constructive.

ANEXO B.19 – Geneva Talks on Bosnia-Hercegovina; Milosevic Says Geneva Agreement Means Serbia's “Self-Denial” Has Been Worthwhile.¹⁴¹

[Jevdjovic] After two plenary sessions between the delegation heads, held today at the conference on the future of Bosnia-Hercegovina here in the Palais des Nations in Geneva, it is clear that we can be satisfied. Mr President, can you tell us first-hand what has been adopted, what kind of agreement has actually been reached and whether we can be satisfied with it?

[Milosevic] I believe that we can very satisfied with the result of the talks that we have conducted these past three days in Geneva. I am very pleased with what our public will be informed about this moment, that we have achieved full accord on the constitutional agreement of the three republics of the former Bosnia-Hercegovina: the Serbian Republic, the Republic of Herceg-Bosna and the Republic of Bosnia.

We have been coordinating this concept for a very long time and what we have here is not an acceptance of constitutional principles. It is a much greater result. We have here the acceptance of the entire constitutional agreement by the three republics, a constitutional agreement about a union of Bosnia-Hercegovina republics. The three we are currently discussing.

Simply, at the moment, we can say that we have gone a very long way in order to achieve this accord. Every letter, every word, has been coordinated. All three sides are in accord. What remains is that we talk about the remaining issues concerning the maps. However, we can say that the greater part has been agreed upon.

[Jevdjovic] What does this mean, practically? Can you clarify this, three republics within the framework of a union in Bosnia-Hercegovina? Does that actually mean that the Serbian Republic and the other national entities are retaining their territories and some kind of sovereignty on their territory?

[Milosevic] Certainly that is so. In this way the Serbian Republic is fully affirming its identity. As far as territory is concerned, that will be the subject of negotiations that still have to be held here. Today, all of us together assessed, when we concluded the greater part of the job, that we have achieved a new quality in mutual coordination of the three sides. They are now complete, they are in direct contact, so President Tudjman and myself, together with the co-chairmen, have assessed that a phase of their [the three sides'] mutual, direct coordination is now at hand.

¹⁴¹ Entrevista concedida a Zoran Jevdjovic (Serbian TV) em 30 de julho de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic073093.htm>>.

Therefore, we can say that we have concluded our part of the business. Of course, we are ready, once again, directly to participate in the negotiations, should all three sides and the conference co-chairmen assess that this is necessary. However, I hope that the remaining issues will be most successfully and directly resolved in direct negotiations with the delegations, headed by Izetbegovic, Karadzic and Boban, here in Geneva.

We have made a suggestion and it has been accepted that the talks, negotiations that is, should not be discontinued, but rather that the three delegations headed by Karadzic, Izetbegovic and Boban should resume as early as tomorrow, so that they can go on coordinating the remaining issues which concern certain annexes to the constitutional agreement and the remaining open issues of the maps. I wish to stress that, in my opinion, even these issues have been directed towards a successful solution.

[Jevdjovic] Can we say that, at the conclusion of these negotiations, we have reached standpoints that Serbia has been advocating practically from the very beginning of this tragic conflict?

[Milosevic] I believe that it is quite logical that there could not have been any other, realistic, serious, just approach to the solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, other than the approach that will secure the affirmation of interests of all three peoples, the affirmation of the interests of all three sides in the conflict, because only an honest agreement, which has not been drawn up to the disadvantage of any one side, can form the basis of a lasting peace.

If this agreement is not entirely just, then it cannot be a basis for a lasting peace. I expect that this agreement, along with the resolution of the remaining issues in the direction of which I have spoken earlier, will truly be a basis for a lasting peace.

[Jevdjovic] One more thing. Does this mean that there is no more danger of a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina can sleep serenely after this constitutional agreement?

[Milosevic] I think that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or better yet, in the Serbian Republic, can sleep quite serenely after this constitutional agreement. Simply, this constitutional agreement affirms the Serbian Republic, but of course, in the same way in which it affirms the Republic of Bosnia and the Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Moreover, in their relations they will now negotiate, themselves, about what they want to cooperate on and aid each other in. In the same way, they will be able to decide which things they should do independently. In any case, I would venture to say that this is a status of three truly independent republics which will form the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina republics.

[Jevdjovic] I believe that this will initiate a more hopeful outlook for the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Can we hope that this will remove an enormous burden from the shoulders of our state?

[Milosevic] Every single one of our citizens is aware just how great a burden was shouldered by the Republic of Serbia, helping, expressing its solidarity with our people outside Serbia. It is now evident that this effort, the self-denial, that all this that we have had to go through in these past few years, was worthwhile. It deserved this help, this self-denial. I hope that we are now facing a process of complete normalization and I hope that even the toughest protagonists in the imposing and maintaining of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will now lose their arguments for maintaining them further.

I believe that this will be achieved very soon and I believe, I expect, that the remaining part of the talks in Geneva will confirm this.

[Jevdjovic] To put it in nutshell, better days are in store for us?

[Milosevic] Certainly.

[Jevdjovic] Thank you.

ANEXO B.20 – Geneva Talks; Milosevic: The Entire Agreement, Including the Maps, Should Be Accepted.¹⁴²

[Cukic] Mr President: Strenuous talks have taken place here in Geneva for the second day. You hardly ever had a break. However, little information reached the public as to what was discussed. We know about the division of territory and the creation of three new republics within the former Bosnia-Hercegovina

[Milosevic] The talks have been completed. We now have a complete package: the constitutional agreement, the maps, the military agreement, everything, therefore, that constituted the contents of a complete, overall solution for Bosnia-Hercegovina. I will not speak of the details now.

We expect (changes thought)it has been agreed at the meeting that has just ended that the map be published in the course of the day so that our citizens will be able to see what proposals are being put forward. They are already familiar with some parts of the document, but we expect it to be published entirely in the next few hours. For this reason I will not dwell on the details. All three sides, which now have the complete package of the overall solution for Bosnia-Hercegovina, have undertaken to go to their parliaments and decide there on acceptance or possible objections to the solutions offered, so that the final agreement could be reached in Geneva on 30th August and the matter finally and formally brought to an end.

[Cukic] During the last few days, weeks and months there have been numerous [word indistinct]. Even the delegation of [changes thought]I must say this as we have reported it on several occasionsMate Boban criticized Alija Izetbegovic extremely openly in front of the reporters for stalling the talks. Could another such stalling element exist in this phase?

[Milosevic] Regarding the obstacles, there are definitely some, always, since it is evident that powerful outside factors exist that do not wish this major crisis zone in the Balkans to be finally closed. However, I am convinced that this reasonable, honourable, fair and just compromise that has been achieved in the talks so far, represents a firm and solid basis for finally reaching an agreement and that the residents, and also the assemblies, I believe, will embrace this compromise as a way towards peace and a way that will reaffirm the interests of all three nations in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

[Cukic] Mr President, does it stem from all this, can I conclude, that you are satisfied with this, I would say, the final round of the talks on the former Bosnia-Hercegovina?

¹⁴² Entrevista concedida a Dusan Cukic (Serbian Radio) em 20 de agosto de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic082093.htm>>.

[Milosevic] Doubtless, the entire talks can be assessed as successful. Since you have asked, I can state that I believe that the entire agreement, that is, its contents as a whole, including the constitutional agreement and the maps, should be accepted.

[Cukic] Thank you.

ANEXO 21 – Milosevic and Owen Confident of “Successful” End to Talks.¹⁴³

[Jevdjovic, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croat translation] Mr Owen, did Mr Milosevic cooperate with your plan? If not, what was the problem, and if yes, do you intend to relax some of these terrible sanctions against Serbia?

[Owen, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croat translation] I have worked now for over a year with Mr Milosevic. We did not always agree, but the will to resolve not only the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina but the absolutely crucial question for the entire region, Serbo-Croat relations, relations between Belgrade and Zagreb. [Sentence as heard]. I think we have had a very serious and instructive relationship that should be crowned with some success.

[Jevdjovic] Are you planning to help Mr Milosevic relax the sanctions?

[Owen] The sanctions were introduced with a certain purpose in mind. In most cases, they are implemented because of the danger to peace in an entire region. For example, an arms embargo was imposed on all of Yugoslavia. Also, sanctions that were imposed because of a threat to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once a peaceful solution is achieved, the only question that remains is how quickly they will be lifted. My opinion has always been that when the Bosnian Serb forces withdraw behind the agreed borders in this case behind the borders of their republic I believe that most reasonable people will believe that peace is no longer threatened. We must also admit that once you launch a peace agreement, you cannot implement it without the cooperation of the neighbouring states. You also need the goodwill of the three constituent nations the Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe the whole thing will look different once we start implementing the peace agreement.

[Jevdjovic] Mr Milosevic, did you suggest to Mr Karadzic to make some concessions to the Muslim side if this is aimed at achieving peace?

[Milosevic] This was precisely the topic of these long negotiations in Geneva, and you could see for yourself that the representatives of the Serbian Republic [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] exhibited great flexibility in this respect. You could also see how large according to the maps that have been published is the territory from which the Serbian forces must withdraw; in this respect, I believe that we can conclude that the Serbian side has exhibited the greatest possible flexibility. There is truly no reason to doubt that the Serbian side will maintain this constructive attitude until the successful conclusion of the conference.

¹⁴³ Entrevista a Zoran Jevdjovic (Serbian TV) em 18 de setembro de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic091893.htm>>.

[Jevdjovic] I have another question. Could you answer in English, please? Are you more optimistic today after this meeting?

[Milosevic] Yes, I feel that the cochairmen are intensifying their efforts and talking to all the participants of the conference in order to ensure a successful conclusion, which is very near. There is only a narrow margin of differences in the stances of the warring factions. I believe we are nearing a successful end to the conference . That is why I am optimistic.

[Jevdjovic] In two years' time, this plan practically allows[changes thought] it is to be expected that the Serbian Republic and Herceg-Bosna will join their mother countries. How will this affect future relations in the region and the solution of the Krajina problem?

[Milosevic] All the things you have mentioned depend on the will of the people. I believe that the people who live in Bosnia-Herzegovina will have the opportunity to make these decisions in a democratic way . In any case, by respecting the wishes and the will of the people, we will have the possibility of solving our problems the problems between different states in the Balkans. Crucial relations in this area are the relations between Serbs and Croats. We wish to support this positive evolution in the search for a final solution to Serb-Croat relations in this region. That is why we have supported the negotiations between the representatives of the Krajina and the Republic of Croatia. However, as you know, they were significantly tainted by this Croat offensive against the Krajina, against areas under UN control. However, I hope that this problem will be solved with the help of the international community and that the negotiations will resume as soon as possible with all our support and goodwill.

ANEXO B.22 – Milosevic Questioned by Belgrade Media Chiefs on All Aspects of Policy.¹⁴⁴

Summary: Milosevic fields questions on second peace conference and Croatian President Tudjman's peace proposals; Serbia and its relations with the world; possible conflict in Kosovo; Serbia and Montenegro; relations with Croatia and his relations with Tudjman; the character of Serbian people and rejection of foreign masters; the objectives of foreign powers in the Balkans; the sanctions against Yugoslavia; Serbia's internal situation, including crime; Greater Serbia; the media and the elections; financial and monetary policy; the situation of the middle class; political control of the media; the return of socialist parties in other countries; the Belgrade transport system

[Unidentified studio announcer] Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic held talks today in Belgrade with the chief editors of the main Serbian media. This meeting was arranged on Tanjug's initiative, as it is celebrating its 50th anniversary. President Milosevic responded to the request of the chief editors to reply to the current internal and foreign political issues that are of vital interest to the citizens of Serbia.

President Milosevic held talks with Slobodan Jovanovic, director of the Tanjug agency, Dusan Zupan, chief editor, Zivorad Minovic and Hadzi Dragan Antic from 'Politika', Mile Kordic from 'Ekspres politika', Rade Brajovic from 'Vecernje novosti', Slavko Curuvija from 'Borba', Dragoljub Milanovic from Belgrade Television, Momir Brkic from Belgrade Radio, Dragan Kojadinovic from NTV Studio B [independent television] and Aleksandar Tijanic from Television Politika.

[Milosevic] Well, fine, I am glad to see you on such an important anniversary, 50 years of Tanjug. Yes, please?

[Jovanovic] As you know, Tanjug is marking half a century of existence, 50 years since this national agency was formed. On this occasion, we have asked President Slobodan Milosevic for an interview . In its form, this interview might be a bit unusual. We have invited our colleagues, chief editors of all the media, all the most prominent and influential media in Belgrade, in Serbia, in Yugoslavia . They are here. I would first like to thank President Milosevic for coming, and I would also like to thank our colleagues for taking part in this

¹⁴⁴ Entrevista a editores das principais mídias de Belgrado em comemoração aos 50 anos da agência de notícias estatal (Tanjug). Realizada em 3 de novembro de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic110393.htm>>.

interview. We will all be equal in this. I, as the host, or a kind of host, will have the advantage of asking the first question.

Peace conference and Tudjman plan

Mr President, this week, the most topical issue is the issue of the peace conference on the former Yugoslavia. We have been informed, we have read in the press, that you have set conditions for this conference in your talks with Mr Stoltenberg. Could you tell us more about these conditions?

[Milosevic] Two conditions are involved. Namely, you know very well that the FRY and the Republic of Serbia have tried to make a constructive contribution to establishing peace in Yugoslavia. In principle, we think that the peace conference with a sort of global approach that is being mentioned now may be a useful road towards solving the Yugoslav crisis on the whole.

However, in our opinion, and from our point of view, there are two conditions for this conference. The first is to respect the principle of the equality of the participants, which is, after all, a basic principle of international relations. This means that if this principle is not respected, the Serbian side will not take part in such a conference. So, the implication is that it would not be acceptable and, I hope, not logical either, for the Serbian side to go to the conference with sanctions and the Croatian side with privileges. So this first principle, the principle of equality, I believe should not only be understood, but also respected by everyone in the international community.

The second condition is that this international conference cannot discuss our internal questions. It cannot deal with our internal questions. Every country deals with its own internal questions. So an international conference whose agenda might include proposals to solve the questions of Kosovo or, as they also add, those of Sandzak and Vojvodina and some other things is, in our view, an unacceptable approach. I think that these conditions are perfectly logical, and that they are conditions understood by all our citizens, conditions that every citizen of ours would set himself.

However, there is another thing here, which you have not asked me about, but which I would like to say. Setting a global approach at the moment when, according to the statement of Stoltenberg himself, it is only a matter of 2.7% of the package, is practically an excuse for the international community to avoid completing the work on the peace agreement on Bosnia, which has been 97%, or whatever, completed. It is illogical to abandon this work when 97.5% according to them has been finalized, in order to beat about the bush now with some kind

of global approach. It would be logical first to complete this job. That is why we believe that the international community should not avoid becoming directly involved in this job and exerting, if it so wishes, positive pressure on those who are attempting to continue the war and avoid peace on the territory of the former Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Jovanovic] Mr Stoltenberg said in Oslo, pardon me, in Stockholm, today that he rejected Mr Tudjman's initiative, that it was unrealistic to hold the conference this year, and he set five conditions for holding the conference. The first is that it should be well prepared; second, that the platform and concept are established; third, that part of it involves the lifting of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, that is, Yugoslavia; third, [as heard] that economic aid should be given to all the former Yugoslav republics; and five, that a way is established to help Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the humanitarian sense.

How would you comment on his conditions?

[Milosevic] The essence lies in relation to the broad proposal put forward by President Tudjman, which has only one novelty in comparison to former stances of the Republic of Croatia, and that is the idea of broadening the circle of outside participants. I do not think that this is a good approach or that the Yugoslav crisis can be solved by broadening the circle of outside participants. It could be solved sooner and more efficiently by reducing the circle of outside participants. After all, the crisis would not have flared up in this way had it not been for some of the many outside participants who brought about the crisis, the war and the escalation of the war.

[Milovanovic] Mr President, if I may: Can you tell us what is the greatest obstacle to concluding the peace negotiations on Bosnia?

[Milosevic] The greatest obstacle is undoubtedly the position which I would no longer call the Muslim position, since, regarding the Muslims' approach to the settlement of the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem, you have seen that there are different approaches of a section of their leadership, that is, the leadership under President Izetbegovic . They believed for many months, I would say, that they would provoke military intervention, foreign military intervention with their behaviour. They needed to find a way for someone to come from outside to win the war that they had lost. Now that it is realized that there is to be no intervention, since no one is willing to wage a war for them that they have lost, they are hoping that they will soften the Serbs by prolonging and dragging things out, by exhausting Yugoslavia, on which the Serbian people in Krajina and Bosnia rely.

They are simply trying to prolong this situation in which they could still provoke a more serious intervention, a more serious move by outside elements, who could turn things in their

favour. While doing so, however and as you know, this is not solely my opinion; it is evident that many foreign papers have been reporting on this they are completely disregarding the position of the Muslim people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They simply do not care about the suffering of this people. They have this obsessive idea that they have to establish this state in Europe, and they simply do not care for victims, they do not consider the price to be paid.

I hope that the processes that have been initiated and we have seen this in the case of Western Bosnia, and there are signs in many other parts of this Muslim republic that are obviously in favour of peace will help them to a much better position, that is, a position that will enable them to overcome these war options that, I hope, will be represented by an ever-decreasing circle of extremists in future months [sentence as heard]. I am certain not only in the case of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in the case of the Muslims and the Croats that an overwhelming majority of Muslims, Serbs and Croats want peace. I believe that precisely this option will prevail among the Muslim people and in the policy that they will conduct.

[Unidentified reporter interjects] May I [does not finish sentence]

[Milosevic] Wait your turn.

Serbia and the world

[Antic] What is in your opinion Serbia's current position in relation to the outside world?

[Milosevic] I would say that this is a very general question. The outside world is not homogeneous. The outside world cannot be qualified as a unified entity that has a unified policy towards us. I suppose that you have in mind the international community's, the Security Council's and the European Community's policies towards us.

My impression is that our position is improving day by day with the same speed with which it is being realized that Serbia and Yugoslavia, and the Serbian people in the former Yugoslavia in general, are not the factor perpetuating the military clashes, but, above all, as the recent months have demonstrated, a factor that is working towards peace.

I am certain that the arguments given for imposing the sanctions on our country are losing their credibility, even in those countries that were the fiercest advocates of imposing the sanctions, and, I would venture to say, the greatest manufacturers of untruths regarding the situation in our country, and the main protagonists of those already known and admitted errors that the international community committed in the course of the entire Yugoslav crisis, starting with the abandonment of the Hague conference principles, to the premature recognition of first Slovenia, Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina; you remember that Carrington himself who

chaired the conference said, as soon as he left this post, that the greatest error was actually the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina; that this was what caused the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, a whole series of these arguments that were fabricated are now crumbling according to the domino principle.

I am certain that although a number of countries in whose interest it was to break up Yugoslavia will insist on keeping the sanctions in place in order to cripple us they will continue to lose ground for persisting with them. The world will have to face the truth sooner or later when it comes to Yugoslavia. Of course, it would suit us better if this were sooner, but this sooner or later is not such a relative term, and it does not involve a long time. We believe that at the moment there is an increasing trend towards correcting the attitude that has been taken towards our country.

Kosovo

[Kordic] Many mass media in the West are predicting that the war in Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina will spread to Kosovo and Metohija. How realistic is the danger of that happening? How do you see the solution to the crisis, particularly in Kosovo and Metohija?

[Milosevic] This danger is not very realistic. Not because those who are predicting it do not want it to happen. They very much want it to happen. This danger is not very realistic because the extremists in Sandzak, of whom I must say there are not many, are not strong enough to do it. Similarly, the separatist movement in Kosovo is not able to do it either without substantial support from outside, about which I am doubtful, because such outside support would also be a very, very risky operation for anyone who would venture into it. They would know that we are not giving up our country. So what you said is more of a public declaration of what they wish to see than a prediction of what will happen in Sandzak and Kosovo. I do not of course rule out the possibility of someone trying to cause an incident, even a major incident, but the chances of such moves succeeding are non-existent.

Serbian-Montenegrin relations

[Brajovic] As I am from a paper that is primarily concerned with internal political issues, I would like to turn to that. The relations between Montenegro and Serbia are frequently not on a par with common wishes and commitments. The differences that appear between the ruling political parties sometimes cannot be considered usual. There are sometimes sharp differences between the deputies of these two parties, between the deputies of the parties from the two republics in the Yugoslav Assembly. There are sharp differences, as we have seen these days,

within the church. The events at the border, blockages of trade, traffic and so on, all this is cause for concern. In any case, the consequences are clear, and one of them is the spread of Montenegrin separatism.

[Milosevic] I believe that the differences between Serbia and Montenegro are exaggerated when it comes to the attitude to the common state, the FRY. I am certain that the citizens of Montenegro are as interested as the citizens of Serbia in preserving Yugoslavia. I am also certain that the Montenegrin leadership shares that view, and expresses that will of the citizens of Montenegro. There are of course a number of factors on the political scene that are working in a different direction, some of them are justified and founded long ago you are aware of these divisions some of them have aspirations rooted in the ideas of those who broke up Yugoslavia which was best described in that Hague document we rejected for those very reasons, as it implied the implementation of that plan to liquidate any kind of serious and independent state in the Balkans. [sentence as heard]

Some of these factors lie in the problems that stem from this serious economic crisis. However, not to elaborate at great length on all these elements including the latest scandal with the so-called quasi-priest [Serbo-Croat: raspop] that was appointed there these are still marginal issues from the point of view of the long-term historical interests of both the Serbian and the Montenegrin people and their common state. I am certain that, for both the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro and their leaderships, there are no significant differences when it comes to the attitude towards our common state.

Serbian-Croatian relations

[Brkic] Mr President, I would first like to thank you on behalf of Radio Belgrade for receiving us. I would also like to thank the colleagues from Tanjug, congratulate them on their anniversary, and to inform you that the cooperation between Radio Belgrade and Tanjug is in our opinion extremely good, that the fact that Radio Belgrade is current, informative, in the right place at the right moment, is due to many Tanjug journalists, primarily the correspondents abroad. Now allow me ask one question. We are discussing internal relations: how do you assess present Serbian-Croatian relations, is the normalization of these relations in sight, and what are the main obstacles to a speedier normalization of these relations?

[Milosevic] First of all, the main issue, the issue of the normalization of Serbian-Croatian relations in the Balkans is the key issue for stability in the Balkans. Relations between the Serbs and the Croats in the Balkans are, I would say, the key relations for the stability in the Balkans. Thus, in a historical sense, if I may say so, every serious Croatian politician, and every

serious Serbian politician who thinks about the future of his country and his people, should try to strive for the normalization of Serbian-Croatian relations.

However, there are many obstacles to this normalization and they are very great at this moment. They primarily lie in the fact that, as a consequence of the third consecutive attempt to carry out genocide on the Serbian people in Croatia, a war of fluctuating intensity is still going on there. There will be no solution unless we return to the basic principle of the equality of peoples and the right of all peoples to self-determination. So I think that the direction and path along which the settlement of these relations in practice and the current war between Krajina and Croatia should be moving is first to find an agreement on a general end to hostilities. After that, they should establish and solve, on an equal footing, some concrete problems concerning transportation, infrastructure, oil pipelines, long-distance communication lines, energy supplies and so forth. After that, in a state of peace, conditions would be created for the main problems concerning a political settlement to be discussed.

As you have seen, this process that has been starting and then withering, that has been starting and withering from the very beginning of the implementation of the Vance plan, this process has been being pushed back to its initial position. This was primarily due to Croatian policy and the Croatian Army with the offensive that took place on 22nd January, then in the Maslenica region and Peruca, before that on the Miljevac plateau, and recently in September in the Medak pocket, where, as had been the case in the previous offensive, they carried out a real massacre of civilians. It would be senseless to talk about some other approach in these circumstances, other than an approach that will first ensure the end of hostilities and then all the other conditions, so as to arrive at a position at which a final political solution can be discussed.

This is why we have supported the negotiations between Knin and Zagreb from the very beginning. You will remember that several months ago in Geneva, Tudjman and I jointly supported the agreed Erdut Agreement, which specified that the Croatian forces should withdraw from the territory in the vicinity of Maslenica, the Miljevac Plateau, and the Peruca dam, that the Serbian police should enter Islam Grcki, Kasici and Smokovic in the western part, and that normal traffic should be established for the Croatian side over the Maslenica bridge, because it connects the central part of Croatia with Dalmatia, and that they should not be forced to remain in this position where Dalmatia is like an island.

However, although both Tudjman and I supported this agreement, although the Serbs implemented this agreement entirely, the Croatian side did not implement it. Simply, after several days of procrastinating with the implementation, they announced that it was no longer

valid. So they have to go back to this type of agreement, and after that, they have to make sure that these agreements are observed. Only then will they achieve an atmosphere in which they can discuss further steps. Before that, it is very difficult to say more about this.

[Tijanic] Mister President, it is nice to be able to meet on this jubilee as, otherwise, we from the smaller television stations would not have the opportunity to put some questions to you personally. My question to you would be: Would you assess the relations between yourself and General [as heard] Tudjman as better than the political relations between Serbia and Croatia, that is to say, to what extent can Mr Tudjman be trusted in the talks?

[Milosevic] Well, I could not separate the relations between Serbia and Croatia and the relations between President Tudjman and myself. In the numerous talks that we have had, I have gained the impression that he is also interested and determined to finally start resolving these issues in peace. Also, you have seen that, regarding our engagement in the resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, we have reached, I would say, not to use this word, almost full agreement on this plan that, as you know, the Serbian and Croatian sides have accepted.

At this moment I cannot judge how much everything that has changed in the political structure of Croatia has strengthened this option with President Tudjman, namely, to resolve the existing problem primarily between Krajina and Croatia, and how much the military option is still on the agenda. The military option would be a fatal and tragic mistake, which has been proved by the few recent offensives, which have shown that each of them made peace more remote and returned the process to the starting point.

I would like to believe that Tudjman, as a realistic politician, is determined to resolve this in a peaceful manner. If this determination is confirmed by the behavior of the Croatian side, then our side will try to use all our influence over the Krajina leadership to embrace peace negotiations and a peaceful resolution. If we, again, speak of trust that can be betrayed in the way it was betrayed at the beginning of January or in September 1993, then we will face the same problems again and return to the very beginning. In any case, I want to believe that a determination for peace exists, until events prove the contrary.

[Tijanic] Thank you, Mr President.

Serbs have never tolerated foreign master

[Curuvija] For the first time during these six years of your term of office, 'Borba' now has the opportunity to ask you a question directly. Thank you for this possibility. I personally believe that you would help the Serbian citizens very much in overcoming this dramatic crisis in which they are and the increasingly dangerous international isolation, if you did three things:

Give the opposition a mandate to form the government, irrespective of the election results; suggest to the Serbs in Croatia that they find a stately form of coexistence with Croatia; and prosecute all those Serbian citizens who, during the war years, committed crimes in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Are you willing to do this?

[Milosevic] Naturally, I am not. I am not, on the basis of principle. How can you actually say that a political decision should be made regardless of the election results, may I ask? Do you think that the citizens of Serbia wonder or not, express their will or not, or, as you suggest, we must do what foreign countries tell us to do regardless of their will? You must realize one thing, namely, that this people will never accept slavery. These people want to elect their authorities themselves and not have foreign countries elect them for them. Regardless of what these authorities are, the people will elect them and the people will change them. It will not be the Germans, the English, the Americans, or anyone else, that will elect their authorities.

This people, you see, has no master in Europe, in contrast to some other nations of former Yugoslavia, and has never tolerated one. Even when this people did have masters temporarily, they did everything possible to see the back of them and, by God, none of them lasted. I am sure that there can be no talk of taking such key decisions regardless of the will of the Serbian citizens.

I must tell you that I am sometimes worried when major decisions depend on politicians. However, when major decisions depend on the citizens I sleep soundly, because I am sure that the citizens do not make mistakes, despite whatever uncertainties, pressures and persuasions, they do not make mistakes.

Regarding the other question referring to a mode of coexistence, well, we have just been talking about that. The peace process and an agreement must be embraced. We all live in the Balkans, and so will our children and our grandchildren. We must do everything so that there is no more war here. However, it must be clear to everyone that there can be no agreement on unequal terms, and there can be no peace by force. Peace can take place through mutual consensus and protection of the interests on both sides.

Regarding the criminal responsibility of the Serbian citizens who have perpetrated criminal acts, this is a part of our firmly determined policy, and there is no reason to discuss this at all. It goes without saying that, so far as the Serbian citizens who have perpetrated criminal acts are concerned, sooner or later, depending on the evidence that will be available to the prosecution organs, they will have to account for it. There is no argument about that.

[Kojadinovic] Mr President, I would like to thank you that Studio B, as a representative of the alternative media, so to speak, is also taking part in this interview. It is the first time for us, too, and I hope that it will become a new practice.

Naturally, in the light of what you have been saying, numerous questions arise. I believe that a great majority of the people, on all three sides, is already saturated with war, that everybody has had enough of war. Numerous people legitimately wonder to what extent peace is in the hands of any of the warring sides or the leaders of those warring sides. This, therefore, gives rise to a question of international factors and the global interests of the superpowers.

Several opinions that are very debatable and perhaps more topical than some others exist on this. For example, in the talks with some officials at my level, I have sensed that no type of Muslim state in Europe and in the Balkans would suit the West. We have often witnessed times when everybody was saying how we were only a step away from peace, while threats were coming from all sides and, instead of peace, the clashes actually escalated. Naturally these threats were always aimed against the Serbs. So, to what extent is peace in the hands of the three warring sides, how much is it dependent on the will of the peoples and the leaders of the warring peoples, and how great and crucial is the influence of the West, because it is obvious that the crisis zone in Bosnia is primarily a potential encouragement for all other possible crisis zones that numerous people in this country do not wish at all? So, the fear continues to be just as great as the desire to restore peace as soon as possible.

To ask another question, to what extent are the people who are coming to see you the envoys of peace, or are they perhaps also the envoys of unrest?

Foreign powers and the Balkans

[Milosevic] As regards the other question about the extent to which peace is in the hands of the three sides, the key answer is that there will be peace to the extent to which it is in the hands of the three sides. There will be no peace if it is in the hands of people abroad. Let me try to explain that very simply: The powers who wanted to break up Yugoslavia and who caused its break-up, who committed a crime against a UN member country, violating all the norms of international law, have the same aims today as they had at the time that they began the disintegration of Yugoslavia with all these moves of theirs, some of which I listed at the beginning.

This aim is to create a large number of small countries in the Balkans, which will have puppet governments formed under the influence of foreign factors, so that these powers may

freely use the region of the Balkans which has huge significance for the development of the European economy, and therefore, great political significance as well.

We are practically the only land bridge between two continents. The most important communications routes run through this territory. It has great energy potential. Just take the example of the Danube: billions of German marks have been invested in the Rhine-Main-North Sea-Danube canal, but what does it all mean without control over the main and most important section of this communication, of over 500 kilometers running through our country? Not to speak of the Morava-Vardar valley and communications routes over which kingdoms have warred for centuries for the same interests for which the Balkans continue to be very attractive.

Therefore, these forces do not want a single independent and autonomous country here, that is its own master and a serious military and political factor in the Balkans. And we are the greatest military and political factor in the Balkans. So this concept of breaking Yugoslavia into several statelets that will be ruled by some puppet governments was established at the very beginning and is still in force.

For those who could read, this option was clearly contained in Carrington's document and that is why I rejected that plan. Just remember, first the six states and then the partitioning of SerbiaKosovo, Sandzak, Vojvodina, and so forth. So the partitioning of Yugoslavia into tiny bits that could then be manipulated. What does this mean? From the standpoint of the historic interests of the Serbian nation, this means a total massacre and disintegration into so many countries that it will never be able to unite again. Therefore, here our interests are colliding with the interests of those who wanted to break up our country, disintegrate Yugoslavia, and who, even nowadays, work on the same scenario they have worked on since the very beginning.

Therefore, we have brought the peace process in Bosnia to an end. With great effort, but successfully, we have defined in this peace package that the sanctions must be eased simultaneously, that means the UN Security Council, at the same time it acknowledges the peace agreement on Bosnia, should pass a decision on lifting the sanctions parallel to the implementation of the peace agreement.

So far as the military paper is concerned, we know that the implementation is going very quickly. So the process of lifting the sanctions according to this agreement should have gone very quickly, but, of course, this does not suit the forces I am talking about. That is precisely why pressures, messages and suggestions have been made to the Muslim side to wait longer.

However, they got caught in a political trap that they will not be able to explain. They must now show, before the entire world, that they care more about the sanctions against Yugoslavia than the peace in Bosnia. This hypocrisy must be made clear to the world now. All

their concern for peace in Bosnia has simply been a backdrop to continue with pressures upon our country. Just as they have had completely wrong assessments since the beginning of this crisis, they now also have wrong expectations that we will, due to the pressures and economic difficulties in which we have found ourselves, sell our state and national interests and leave it to be washed away in the muddy Morava River.

So, to return to the beginning of my answer, peace will be established very soon to the extent to which the issue of peace is really in the hands of the three sides and in the interests of the peoples of the three sides. Peace will be established very soon. The more that peace is in the hands of the foreign element or the exponents of the foreign elements in the three sides, it will be harder to reach. I am an optimist in this respect, I am convinced that peace can be reached in Bosnia much faster than is now expected, but we will see. Time will tell.

Sanctions against Yugoslavia

[Jovanovic] Since we are talking about the sanctions, they are unfortunately our reality—uncivilized, inhuman and deeply unjust, but still our reality. We think about them, we talk about them, we listen to talk about them, we live with them, but some questions still remain. For example, what are the conditions for the sanctions to be lifted? What are the real conditions for the lifting of the sanctions? Are there any new factors there? How do you see the package of these conditions for the lifting of the sanctions? Connected with that, would you dare predict when the sanctions will be lifted? How do you see the development of this country that has been, I would say, looted by the sanctions, after the sanctions?

[Milosevic] The real condition for the sanctions to be lifted—as regards the position of those who were the first and real protagonists of their imposition—is that we persevere in the defence of our state and national policy; they are living under the illusion that they are going to break up this nation with the sanctions and that, because of the sanctions, this nation is going to leave its state to the mercy of foreign factors, and as long as they think this, they will try to prolong the sanctions. This peace agreement should remove the sanctions. All the important political factors that have been communicating with us on behalf of the international community have given us assurances to that effect.

However, what is written on paper is one thing, and what the real aim is, is another. We have just exchanged a few words about that. It must become clear that we have no alternative to this policy of preserving our state and national interests, regardless of the pressure to which we are exposed, and regardless of the continued exertion of the pressure. Since they can see

that they cannot break up this solidarity just like that, that is why they are attempting to create some internal confusion.

Why are we in a difficult economic situation? They now constantly stress the social problems. Why are there queues? Why is there poverty? All of you, I suppose, have families. All of you should ask yourselves: What would happen if, for example, you took in two more families to support when, for example [word indistinct]? Can the wife and children ask tomorrow: why can't we go on holiday, why can't we buy new shoes, and so on, under these circumstances?

The same applies to the country. Our entire people and the citizens of Serbia in general have decided on solidarity with the Serbian people on the other side of the Drina. We have the difficulties simply because of that and have the sanctions on top of that. Plus, we have refugees from those two countries, from the republic of Serbian Krajina and the Serb republic, that is, from the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. So you as the people dealing with the public word must not allow a constant replacement of these. [Sentence as heard] Involved here are state and national interests that we are talking about, not an issue of this or that measure of economic policy, which can be criticized as much as you like. There are many such wrong economic measures, but that is marginal when it comes to the main issue, the situation that we are in. However, everyone has to go back to the main issue: will we abandon our state and national interests and place them in the hands of the foreign factor in order to avoid this situation? Do the people want to accept such a price for abandoning their state and national interests? I am convinced that nobody wants this even today, despite the fact that it is difficult and that there is a crisis and particularly so when it is clear that these aims have made real, real progress in their realization.

[Milosevic] After all, no one will ever be able to abolish the Serbian Republic, regardless whether the negotiations are returned to the beginning or of the various empty games by various political factors from Europe and the world. Not to mention all the other things that come with this. So we must not allow stances to be substituted and to be sold a pig in a poke; every citizen is clear on this point, and it should be clear to all the media people.

Serbia's internal situation

[Milanovic] Without Serbia's internal stability, the people would certainly not withstand the sanctions and such pressures. What, in your opinion, is of decisive significance in maintaining this internal stability?

[Milosevic] I believe that, when talking about our economic potential, we are now at a level at which we can stabilize very quickly, halt further deterioration, stabilize the economy, and even start initiating certain positive trends, because the time of that first organizing and reorganizing due to these pressures and sanctions has passed. Conditions are being created for doing many things much better. However, this economic body, this economic sector, is extremely sensitive and has to be elaborated separately. That is why I wish to say, briefly, that our economic conditions and our economic potential allow when supported by clever measures of both the federal and the republican governments a normalization and stabilization.

The sanctions have removed our incompetent leaderships and incompetent managers; all this has been erased by the fact that everyone has gained the right to say: it's the sanctions; just take a look at public transport in Belgrade, what an embarrassment; what does it resemble? what does this have to do with the sanctions?; trams and trolleys do not need fuel to be able to run; it just so happens that I know that the republic has secured all of the diesel fuel for public transport; the ones that come in a group of ten, all at once, and then they are nowhere to be seen for the next couple of hours, they too, use fuel, I suppose.

This is an embarrassment, and it is quite obvious that this is extreme incompetence on the part of those authorities whose duty it is to deal with this. Therefore, there must be a lot more responsibility for the duties carried out by people at all levels. It is truly shameful that someone should justify the humiliation that the Belgrade citizens are exposed to with the sanctions imposed on our country. And so forth. So, let us put this sector aside; a lot can be done on it and a lot of explaining can be done.

The other sector the political one is important. What is the condition for stability? The condition for stability is that Serbia must show, among other things, at these coming elections, that it is not vacillating as regards the policy of protecting its state and national interests. This is the best way to deter outside pressures and the aspirations on which these pressures are based.

[Antic] Mr President, you have mentioned the unfavourable economic situation that, understandably, results in crime. I have the impression that the action aimed at fighting crime which is taking on increasing proportions has faltered somewhat, precisely because of the situation. What do you think, and what is the Serbian state going to undertake in fighting open crime and looting in society?

[Milosevic] First of all, this action must not falter, it must gain momentum. However, it calls for a better establishment of certain things in the state, several factors in the state.

At the moment, we are having extreme problems with the entire criminal law; had we been lucky, we would have had a much clearer criminal law that would have been much more

coordinated with the criminal law of European countries that everyone looks to and claims are examples to be followed. The situation here is, so that we can see and face the facts, that the police arrests a criminal who shot a citizen or a policeman for example, one day, only to arrest him again three days later, because, owing to these regulations, or weaknesses in the judiciary, he was free again.

Order has to be imposed in many such things, just as it has to be imposed on another, I would say, just as important sector of the issue regarding the looting of property owned by society that has been created by generation upon generation of workers in our country. Looting that is being carried out in an almost semi-legal fashion through the so-called purchase of companies. Some people call this privatization, but this is not privatization, it is looting; privatization is when you pay for what you are turning into private property; it is not privatization when you do not pay for it.

However, among other things, it is good that we are going to have elections and, I hope, a stable assembly and stable government. Experience has shown that, when the government proposed to stop this [the privatization process] for the duration of the sanctions and the current chaos, and when it proposed to pass a law, it could not pass it in the assembly, because none of the opposition parties were willing to vote for it. Neither the Radicals, nor the Democratic Movement of Serbia, nor any of those others whoever they may be. It simply could not get through.

Such things, putting a stop to the looting, must be solved both institutionally in a democratic manner, of course, through the parliament's decisions, which means passing laws that regulate this but also through the appropriate activities of the authorities and the police. You can rest assured that as far as this action, fighting crime, is concerned, it has not faltered, and it will most certainly be intensified. We want present and future generations to live in a free and safe country; we do not want people, citizens, even children to be exposed to violence or any type of humiliation. So the state will despite the war, the circumstance, the enormous number of refugees, the grave economic situation that (?predictably) gives rise to crime, and many other social-economic and other elements have to fulfill its role, successfully and without any wavering, I hope.

[Antic] Thank you.

[Kordic] Mr President, there has recently been much talk about humanitarian corridors for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia and Yugoslavia have offered corridors from Belgrade to Sarajevo and from Bar to Sarajevo. But, as one Tanjug correspondent said, Europe is avoiding that, as it thinks that it would mean the backdoor recognition of Greater Serbia. Why is Europe

so afraid of Great Serbia when there is Great Britain and Great Germany, and other great countries? What, in your opinion, is the role of the Vatican in all this?

[Milosevic] I hope that I explained a while ago that it is not a question of Europe being afraid of Greater Serbia in the sense that a Greater Serbia will attack someone. I would not describe that Europe as unified in its approach towards Serbia and Yugoslavia. Europe consists of Greece and Great Britain, but also Germany, and, in a way, Turkey. So this is a question of the strategic interests not of Europe but of those powers that wanted to control this region and use it as they please, the powers that came up with that Carrington plan to break up Yugoslavia into bits and pieces, and then break up Serbia in the next phase in order to establish, through various puppet authorities, a situation in which there would be no serious, independent, free and militarily significant state in this region. That is the reason, and not because they are afraid that we will attack them. They know that this nation has never waged a war of conquest. It has always fought defensive wars. But they also know that, in all these defensive wars, this nation has always emerged victorious.

So, from your question, it is clear that the humanitarian dimension is not primary here, but rather the political one. When they think about it, they think more about the political dimension than about those about whom they are supposedly concerned, those who have no medicine, no food, who allegedly need help. After all, please, does anybody have the right? I would say that the politicians who imposed sanctions on this country, who imposed sanctions that represent an act of genocide against this nation, who wage war against our children, against three million children in the FRY they have lost every moral right to speak of humanitarian reasons, of humanitarian projects. Interests and politics are in play here, not humanitarian reasons. This minor example of an offer of a safe corridor that is being discussed as if it is something that might explode in their hands if they touch it, this example shows that best.

The elections and the media

[Brajovic] In their attempts to show that the conditions at the coming elections will be unfair, the opposition party leaders and some analysts, some colleagues, are using the element of your personality, your charisma, your influence with the voters, and your function in your party that, as head of state, you have put on ice, and so on. Other elements are also used, for example, unfair conditions for using the state television, and so on. What is this all about? Will the conditions be equal for all, and will this be a democratic contest?

[Milosevic] Well, believe me, I think this question is superfluous. Equal conditions absolutely must be ensured in the presentation of all the parties that will participate in the

elections. I simply do not see the way after all, you have all these television stations, Television Serbia, Politika, Studio B [changes thought]. I hope that they will have the same approach to the elections. It would be not only rude, but dirty if an equal amount of time was not provided for all the parties to present themselves in an adequate way.

Now that you have mentioned the activities of the parties, we are in an economic crisis, I even think it would be indecent if the parties were to spend a lot of money on the presentation of video spots and advertisements, and to scrounge from various companies, regardless of whether they are state or private companies. If they have extra resources, I would suggest and I will say it on this occasion that they give it to the social funds, for medicine, for the refugees, instead of again inundating us with all that bad taste that can be crammed into those advertising spots.

If everybody does the same, everybody will have equal conditions, and they can use the time equally, I am committed to that and I believe that the government will do so, and the state television, they will make sure that everyone gets the same amount of time. Then, within that time, they can say whatever they want on the behalf of their party, their programmes, they can address their voters and give them the explanations that they think are needed. I think that, under the conditions of the economic crisis, these political parties should behave in a more modest, more rational way, and not throw away money on massive advertising and campaigning. This can all be done if they all agree on an equal treatment, which I am sure will be completely indiscriminate, on the state television.

[Unidentified journalist] Mr President -

[Milosevic] Pardon.

[Brajovic] Your role as the head of state and the influence on the mood of the voters, which is often used as an element -

[Milosevic] In what sense? Do you think that I should go to agitate -

[Brajovic] As an element of the automatic advantage of the ruling party?

[Milosevic] Well, I am a member of the Socialist Party. I cannot say that I am not. I am. I am stating facts.

[Antic] But you cannot head the candidates list, as you tried to interpret it, wrongly.

[Milosevic] This is my political right. I hope that this question has completely been removed from the agenda, considering that there is a constitutional provision according to which the president of the republic does not have the right to perform other public functions. For that reason, the congress of the Socialist Party of Serbia has made a decision that the function of the president of the party be performed by the general secretary of the party.

Therefore, the function of the president of the Socialist Party is performed by the general secretary.

However, this does not rescind my political right as a member of the Socialist Party of Serbia and its president.

You jumped the queue [Milosevic addresses one of the correspondents present]

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr President -

[Milosevic] I am not being careful enough, because I am too much of a parliamentarian, which is my fault.

Financial and monetary policy

[Brkic] Mr President, can we return to some topical economic issues that the outcome of the December elections and our future depend on to a great extent. One of these issues is financial-monetary policy. Who is, in fact, in charge of financial-monetary policy in Serbia at the moment? The impression is that policy has left the government's institutions and is on the streets. The national currency is being rapidly debased. The German mark has become the measure of value. What is being done to stop this process, to bring this policy back to the government and other relevant institutions?

And just one more sub-question. Criticism is heard that the funds from the primary issue of money are not being used sufficiently to finance production projects and are used more for financial manipulations and transactions.

[Milosevic] We would need a lot of time to explain this issue, but you have hit on the most painful point of our economy. This point is the monetary system and monetary policy.

We had several handicaps. Two weeks after he had been appointed, the governor [of the national bank] fell ill and was hospitalized. This put a stop to a job that had been started. But that apart, simply some order must be introduced in the entire monetary sphere by consistently implementing the law on the national bank, by eliminating all places for issuing money, unauthorized places for issuing money, of which there are many, except the issuing central bank. You saw that we pursued the idea that the republics would not have national banks. There would be one National Bank of Yugoslavia that would be in charge of issuing money and act as a monetary authority.

This monetary authority should start performing its duties. As far as I know, the most responsible people from the republican and the federal governments, the current acting governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, that is the deputy governor, and the board of governors are in fact working on this. I hope that, in the next few weeks, they will be able to finally devise a method of work of the monetary authorities as a whole, and at the same time

put together this fairly simple model of a foreign currency market; a unified foreign currency market in the National Bank of Yugoslavia, which will abolish this nonsense of having such a great discrepancy between the so-called official rate of exchange and the black market exchange rate, make it possible for the transactions on this unified foreign currency market, and, on the basis of these transactions, establish a rate of exchange that should fluctuate and absolutely push the black market to the margins.

The chaos, the 95% of the transactions that are causing the chaos, pass through the banks. Only 5% of these transactions are made out on the streets. Once the chaos that is created in the banks is impaired by the efficient work of the monetary authorities, the situation facilitating the black market for foreign currency will marginalize itself and become unimportant.

This would then indeed become a job for the police. However, this institutionalized work of the monetary authorities cannot be solved by the police regardless of how efficient they were in dealing with such activities on the streets. These activities are growing like mushrooms, not by themselves, but just because of the problems in the functioning and a lack of efficiency of the monetary authorities in the central bank, which I hope will finally stand on its legs and start functioning. The republican, both republican governments and the federal government, as well, as I mentioned, as the board of governors, are making efforts in this direction.

The handicaps that appear quite marginal I know, of course, that not much can depend on individuals were the factor that postponed the settlement of some issues, for several issues. This is very significant in these conditions. Sometimes several weeks, even several days, is a very long time in such conditions.

I hope that they will succeed, because the concept that they drafted is contained in the Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia. This concept is well proven by competent, expert people and I think that this concept can establish a usable system, within all the constraints. This cannot eliminate inflation completely, of course. This cannot stop this grave economic situation, but can introduce much more order and slow down the negative trends in this sphere. That is certain.

The middle class

[Tijanic] Mr President, you are at the head of a state in which the middle class has been killed off.

[Milosevic] I do not understand you. Killed? Who has killed what?

[Tijanic] The middle class.

[Milosevic] Yes.

[Tijanic] I would like to find out from you the reasons for the extinction of the middle class, bearing in mind that I consider the following question to be valid: Can Serbia create a democratic and civil society without honest and industrious doctors, lecturers, teachers and clerks who can no longer provide for their families, while simultaneously there is an ideal personality role-model being created and propagated everywhere which looks boastful, rich and armed. Good hosts, teachers, doctors and lecturers are no longer the ideals for our children, but rather the other role-models. What shall we do to preserve the class of middle-class citizens as the basis for tomorrow's Serbia?

[Milosevic] For our country to function, and for all of you, and others who are not present here right now, really to help this country to function in the best possible way, everybody in Serbia must take a little portion of the burden and responsibility on his shoulders in order to contribute towards the functioning of his country and his state.

I can assure you that such role-models will not be typical for long. Once this state starts to function normally in the circumstances in which other countries and more lucky societies live, these role-models will no longer have currency, but the very models that you have singled out and which were an ideal to my generation, numerous generations before mine, and, I hope, will also be an ideal to numerous generations after me.

A role-model of a criminal cannot be formed as a role-model personality towards which any sort of decent personality would aspire, regardless of the difficult situation in which this country has found itself. However, this involves everyone striving to fulfil his share of responsibility in this respect, even with the smallest contributions.

[Curuvija] Your dissolution of the Serbian Assembly was the subject of debate and criticism, primarily from the opposition. However, even your biggest and most merciless critics abroad have admitted that this was a masterly move. I agree with them, however, I am still interested in why you did not allow the confidence debate in the government to end? Secondly, in the explanation that you gave on television, you expressed hope that the Serbian citizens and the Serbian people would have a more united assembly. How should this united assembly look and how can we achieve it?

[Milosevic] Do not push me into election campaigning, as I do not want to be biased, however, it is certain that in the coming elections the citizens are going to meet the challenge that these difficult times are imposing on them. They must express their orientation at the elections as well, and I believe that this orientation is to oppose fascism, violence and crime, so they are not, I am sure, going to support the advocates of darkness, fascism, violence and crime.

I am sure that, for the sake of the present and future generations, they will turn to those options that will safeguard the policy that defends this country's state and national interests, freedom and the development of democracy in this country.

I think that this is the fundamental task that the citizens are faced with before the elections and I do not doubt that the Serbian citizens are mature enough to meet this task and this challenge.

[Curuvija] Excuse me, but the first part of the question was why you did not allow the confidence debate in the government to be concluded?

[Milosevic] It was quite impossible to see when this debate would be concluded. The previous two weeks of torture of the assembly and the Serbian citizens had promised nothing of the kind. Also, I really cannot recreate for you the extent to which the atmosphere that accompanied all this was sharper in its qualifications than the qualifications that I have used. I tried to use polite language about the situation that had emerged in the Assembly. As you might have seen, the citizens supported this. At the end of the day, they are the best judge, and it makes no sense to indulge in intellectual speculation as to what would have happened if something had happened. It has evidently won the support of the citizens and I am sure that speculations along the lines of what would have happened had something else taken place is pointless.

Control of the media

[Kojadinovic] Your decision about the elections is naturally enigmatic in numerous aspects. However, I will only single out one: Numerous people expected, and others wished that perhaps on this occasion you would take a stance and use these elections as president of everybody in Serbia, that is, use them to distance yourself from the party that has nurtured you. Many people believe that you have repaid any moral debt you had towards this party, if one can speak of this at all, in the previous elections.

We now realize that you perhaps do not think so and that you will not act like this. We would like to know how you would assess the chances of the Socialist Party of Serbia if you were to take the option of being the president of everybody in Serbia.

Second, the long-announced demand of some opposition parties, primarily Depos, which you have either received today, or it has been dispatched to you today, that, in order to make the elections as honest as possible, a breakthrough should be allowed to certain alternative media, primarily electronic, throughout Serbia. One demand refers to the duration on the state

television while the other speaks primarily about the territorial coverage of information and electoral programmes. Studio B and Television Politika are primarily mentioned.

Many of those who decide on this often imply that you are the one who makes the decisions regarding this, so we would like to know what the mood is, since Studio B has nothing against being broadcast throughout Serbia, even if this means that Television Politika will also be broadcast [throughout Serbia]. Technically this is very simple and much more natural. For example, why should we in Studio B negotiate with satellite companies to broadcast via satellitewhich, besides being unnatural is also very expensivein order to reach our potential viewers in some parts of Serbia where Studio B cannot be seen right now.

Our intention is to cover these elections honestly, to introduce the candidates from both sides, the position and the opposition. Here I would also add that Studio B is encountering a big practical difficulty when it comes to being the host of the representatives of the Socialist Party of Serbia on Studio B; they are very reluctant over deciding to come to us, and that is precisely why Studio B, which truly wishes to be independent and is independent, is gaining the epithet of being an opposition television. Some of the people we have invited, but who never came, claim that without your approval they are not allowed to do so; that there are very few people who could come without your approval. I do not believe that this is the case; I think that they are avoiding Studio B for reasons of their own.

Therefore, I would like to know whether there is at least a hypothetical chance, that is to say, are you at all thinking of meeting this demand of the opposition, not so much a demand as a possibility for ensuring that these elections are quality elections, not to say honest?

[Milosevic] As regards the first part of your question, I have been in this post for quite some time now, and I believe that nobody can find any reason to remark that I have given any advantage to anybody or that I have not behaved as the president of all the citizens of Serbia in my every gesture, regardless of whether we are discussing those that voted for me, or the others who did not. With my election, I became the president of all the citizens, by majority vote and the will of the voters, and I consider it my moral obligation to behave as such, and I am convinced that I do. There is nowhere in the world, in the democracies which I suppose are an example to Studio B, not a single politician, president of the republic, or prime minister, who does not head or represent a political party which participates in political life. I do not see why Serbia should be any different from the rest of the world in this respect.

As for the fact that I am asked to grant permissionyou yourself laughed at thisfor someone to appear on Studio B, there is absolutely no sense in me even commenting on this. As for people's reluctance to appear on Studio B, if I were in your place as director or editor-

in-chief of Studio B, I would think about why people are reluctant. In addition, when you mentioned that you are considered as an opposition station, I believe they not only consider you an opposition station, there are much worse descriptions, but, if I were in your shoes, I would also think about why the citizens think this when they watch a programme where it is evident from a long way away what the political orientation is in many of these cases on your television [sentence as heard]. However, this is something that you and your viewers should consider, not something that I [changes thought] By following your question, I can really only casually comment on this. [Sentence as heard]

I have not received, I do not know which of the opposition's demands you are talking about. I read a few days ago that the opposition was demanding actually, not the opposition, but the Democratic Movement of Serbia, there are a lot of opposition parties to enjoy equal conditions and so forth. If you say that I am the one to decide whether parties at elections will have equal conditions, if I can say so, then I appeal to those who make this decision to ensure that the political parties are treated completely equally on state television, radio and other media.

I also appeal to you at Studio B and TV Politika to try the same scheme, so that you are not in a position to be accused of discriminating between the parties or individuals that appear. As for whether you are going to use someone's network, please leave me out of this, or above this, if possible, I really do not know what this is all about, but there are authorities on television, in the Information and Communications Ministry, who can make decisions about this. One thing is certain: the parties will be treated equally in all the media over which the state has influence. There can be no discussion about that.

[Unidentified reporter interjects] The editor-in-chief says that if they pay, then there can [be discussions].

[Milosevic] Okay, you can discuss this among yourselves on some other occasion.

[Zupan] Can I from the second row ask something?

[Milosevic] Well, since you are from Tanjug. [Laughter among reporters]

[Zupan] Mr President, I would like to thank you Slobodan [Jovanovic, director of Tanjug] has probably already done so for finding the time to receive us on the occasion of our anniversary, and I would also like and I believe that I speak in the name of all my colleagues to pay tribute to the idea that you have actually used this anniversary to summon all the representatives of the Belgrade media to come here for this interview. For me, this means that maybe you share my opinion Tanjug has a kind of ecumenical role, so to speak, in our

information system. We wish to retain this role of being a service for all our press, and more than that, a service for the state and the economy.

Here is a question connected to this: How do you see the place and role of the media we have touched upon in the electoral process; however, I would like to broaden the question to include how you view the role of our media in the development of democracy in our country?

[Milosevic] The question is much too exhaustive for a very exhaustive answer. There can be no doubt that the role of the media is of paramount importance in the development of democratic relations. Everyone who is involved with the media knows this, and so does every citizen. In our concrete situation, I, unfortunately, if you allow me, and we are all here together, would not be able to give a very high mark to the role of the media in principle. When it comes to the Yugoslav crisis, the media particularly in some Western and overseas countries have been used in a real, dirty, well-paid and well-organized media war against our country. I believe that this will remain marked in the history of journalism as both a moral and professional lapse of your profession, because a part of the responsibility in the crime against a country which did not, and does not want anything else other than to solve its own affairs by itself, without having someone interfere, and that its citizens can have the right to govern their state precisely to the extent of citizens of those countries whose media have demonized Serbia.

As for our media, I have to say that in this case too, I would not be able to award a flattering and high mark, because my impression is regardless of how unilateral this is, but it is not possible for me to elaborate on many things which could be said about the media on this occasion that the media in our country have played quite an extensive warmongering role, not uniformly, and not all of them, but that, with certain oscillations, in many cases the effect has been the same. They not only played a warmongering role, but one that was a generally unprincipled confrontation, and I believe, one that was overly receptive to outside influence on its behavior, regardless of whether it was motivated by direct political, financial, or some other motive.

However, this should not tarnish the reputation and responsibility of the journalists' profession, which, I am convinced, the majority of journalists have defended with honour in these troubled times. Moreover, I hope that this shadow looming over the media, will, in this respect, which I have tried to describe in a few words, disappear with the shadows and phantoms of war from these territories, and that the media will increasingly contribute to the development of democratic relations in our country. Who is next?

[Unidentified reporter] I believe that TANJUG has exhausted its third question, so I propose that -

Return of socialism in Europe

[Milanovic, interrupting] Respected Mr President, how would you explain the return of the left-oriented and socialist forces on the political scene of Europe? I am particularly referring to the great election victories of the left in Poland and the Socialists in Greece?

[Milosevic] The pendulum is swinging back. Things went to extremes. The anticommunist wave that has been acting destructively cannot last long. After all, you do not have anywhere in the world a genuinely democratic country in whose parliament there are no communists. Only fascist countries ban left-oriented parties, communist parties. Simply, these are the countries that are at greatest variance with democracy, democratic values, the views of the people. These countries should not be a model to anyone, the countries that ban the left-oriented, above all, communist parties.

The wave denoting the creation of the basis for a new society is coming back. This society will certainly not be the old capitalist society nor the old socialist society. This society, I hope, will be a society based on the positive and most important values of capitalism and socialism that existed hitherto, because both societies, in their development, endowed mankind with many values, some less and some more, but in any case with values that mankind and society in development should not deprive themselves of.

I hope that this balance, which is beginning to be formed, will be established in the interests of a more rapid social development. I understand the phenomena you mentioned as harbingers of creating such a balance.

[Antic] One more question connected with the economic situation. As president of the Republic of Serbia and head of state, what can you do specifically and quickly for the life of people to be made easier to some extent?

[Milosevic] First of all, some things would have to happen quickly. The political situation in Serbia needs to be stabilized and one needs to have an efficient and honest state apparatus, competent in performing its functions. I hope that the conditions for this will be created within a couple of months.

On the other hand, if we create the conditions for a competent circle of responsible people to form the government and for the assembly deputies accountable to the people who voted for them to combine forces with a view to benefiting the development of the republic, many of these difficulties could perhaps be eliminated despite the fact that due to foreign

pressures and difficulties the room for manoeuvre has been considerably narrowed. Many things can be done in a much better, much better organized and much more efficient way and I hope that it is now clear to everybody that Serbia represents a motive, that Serbia, Serbia's interests, and the interests of its citizens represent a motive for uniting all these democratically oriented forces in making the changes in Serbia that will accelerate its development and make life better, happier, more democratic and safer both for the present and future generations.

These are the steps that must be taken. We must maintain our priorities. They are peace, economic development, and fighting crime. These are the priorities that this state has to keep in the very centre of its attention and its conduct.

Belgrade's transport system

[Kordic] Mr President, this evening you also mentioned the problem of the Belgrade city transport. We at 'Politika ekspres' have learned about some reports that what is involved is not only idleness, incompetence and sloppiness, but also an intention to create anxiety in Belgrade and in Serbia. What are these forces who are creating this anxiety?

[Milosevic] Well, I must tell you that I do not know the details and that I have not dealt with these details. I think that all competent city authorities can organize city transport in Belgrade. This is no great philosophy, one only has to make an effort.

If there are really some such political forces then it is a great shame that somebody is playing political games on the backs of these citizens who are suffering from this political crisis anyway by making problems in the city transport system, slowing it down and making it less efficient. And the city transport is a vital need. If there are such forces, such phenomena and such cases, then I think you will all have to make a big effort to try to make such phenomena known to the public, so that these Belgraders would face these additional reasons for their trouble and humiliation in the city transport system.

However, let me go back to the beginning: What else are the responsible and efficient authorities in the city supposed to be capable of doing if they are incapable of organizing the city's transport under the conditions in which there is no limit to the use of energy. This is a republican affair, this is what the republic must provide for them. However, the republic, the Sainovic government, certainly cannot draw the time table or discipline in such an enterprise. However, if such things really exist, you, as the most responsible people in the media, should make an effort to help citizens see and learn that. Then, if there are such really shameful things that can honour nobody, one should create the conditions to eliminate them.

[Brajovic] Why have, let me put it this way, the political cooks of the new world order decided to test their project exactly in this geopolitical and strategic region? Is this perhaps the result of a historical heritage, the assumption of the weakness of the state that used to exist here, or is something else involved outside interests exclusively?

[Milosevic] Well, I would say that from our point of view and from our perspective, it seems to you that they are testing that only here. Everybody exposed to some trouble thinks that it is happening to him alone. They have been testing that throughout the world. After all, your newspapers also write about that.

However, much more significant than this is the fact that this checking is unsuccessful in this region and I do not only hope, but I am certain that however much these people carry their tests, these people here will never endure being somebody's slave. Having this fact, these other people will have to understand that further experiments are only a waste of time and money and no way to attain certain aims in the territory of the former Yugoslavia populated by Serbs.

[Note: At this point the programme was briefly interrupted in accordance with satellite feed schedule]

[Brkic, Belgrade Radio] I would like to take the opportunity of this meeting and conversation with you to ask you a question referring to an exceptionally numerous and exceptionally important layer of our society your farmers who feed us. Under the economic sanctions, they too are faced with many and very difficult problems. Could you tell me, how do you see our village today, what is the republic doing, and what will it do to ease their life, to enable them to sow the fields and improve next year's harvest?

Agricultural policy

[Milosevic] The republic's priority in economic policy is agriculture. Regardless of the difficulties and the politization of certain measures, you have to admit that agriculture has been a priority even in these years of crisis. The latest reports say that the harvest has been completed on 90% [of fields].

Unfortunately, your media cried wolf: there is no fuel, the fields will not be harvested. To be honest, it was not the first time I had watched and listened to that. The same thing happened last spring, before the spring harvest, and last autumn. Every time this circle here broadcast, I would say, the expressions of hopelessness claiming that we would run out of food. We have not run out of food, we have not run out of energy; we have increased our production

of energy, we have even increased the production of coal for mass consumption, we have increased agricultural production during a season of drought.

Unfortunately, in many respects the farmer has found himself in a difficult situation due to, among other things, certain mistakes in economic policy, especially in the policy on the production of milk and certain cereals. Agriculture is reflected in the production of milk because there is no milk without large livestock, and there is no livestock without cereals that is the basis of it all. I myself could not understand, and I intervened I would almost say severely which I usually do not like in these issues which were so obvious and demanded appropriate intervention.

Let us not talk about these failures for the moment. Agriculture is one of the greatest comparative assets of our economy and it has to have priority. With such an agriculture and power industry, with such a transport system, with a considerable number of very successful enterprises that show that we have a strong basis for modern industrial development, we can surmount these difficulties very quickly. As you can see for yourselves, despite sanctions unprecedented in the history of the contemporary world, our economic situation is better than in some countries that are receiving lavish foreign aid to keep their economies afloat. Not only are they not suffering under sanctions, on the contrary they are in a privileged position in many ways. Let me make a digression in this direction. So, as far as the economy is concerned, it will remain, and must remain, a lasting priority of every government.

[Tijanic, TV Politika] I have two questions. One is for the president of the Socialist Party, the other for the president of the Republic. The first: is the impression wrong that you have often been unlucky with, or insensitive towards, the people you are surrounded with, that some of your people in responsible posts fail to stand the test of time and difficulties? The second question is for the president of the Socialist Party: who in the opposition do you think you could collaborate with in dealing with the parliament and in the implementation of policies geared towards building the Serbia we all need?

Socialist Party of Serbia, personnel questions

[Milosevic] As far as the first question goes, I can immediately give a positive reply. Yes, there have certainly been some personnel changes, very much so. This is no secret, and I also believe that it is perfectly logical for such things to happen in life. As for the second question, I believe that we should cooperate with all democratic forces, with all those working on the preservation of the state and national interests of our nation, the development of democracy in our country, the development of a sound market economy, national and social

security and equality, in other words, with all those turned towards the future. Certainly not with the forces of darkness, fascism, violence and crime. The demarcation line is right there. I cannot single out political parties because I do not wish to do that, you must have noticed that I avoided to qualify parties when answering your colleague's question, it would not be good for someone in my position to assess political parties.

[Curuvija, 'Borba'] Some indications, in a certain way plausible, suggest that the Socialists will lose the forthcoming elections and that the opposition, if it acts wisely, will come into power. Are you ready to face a situation in which you would be president of a state in which Mihajlo Markovic of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] would be the police chief, and say, Danica Draskovic the director of the state television?

[Milosevic] Well, I think that your question is not really a question, but a roundabout way of voicing your own wishes. Whether these wishes of yours are fulfilled or not that is a matter for the citizens of Serbia to decide. So let's not the two of us decide on their behalf. The decision is their right, so let them decide freely.

[Kojadinovic, Studio B] The situation is clear and very difficult for everyone. The question is not for how long we will be able to hold on ; the basic problem is, as many perceive it, that we are going back many years. Many people blame the Socialist Party of Serbia for that we will not debate now whether or not they are justified in doing that and many people are now, when we are approaching new elections, wondering what changes the SPS can offer the people who are in such a difficult situation that they are often, let us say it, hungry, and who cannot ensure normal life for future generations. Could you tell us which changes could inspire many people who are perhaps not even members of the SPS to hope that a better future will be here soon?

Of course, we know that the cadres are a problem. I hear very often from many people that one of your personal problems is that your associates are not good enough. We also know, at our level, that it is difficult to find good associates, which is possibly one of the general problems in Serbia, but many people would not like to see in the assembly certain faces which, they believe, do not represent well enough the people of Serbia. Therefore, are there new cadres and new promises, that is, new hopes which the SPS could offer?

[Milosevic] I do not wish to discuss party affairs, especially not now with the elections coming up, but I believe that you are returning to what I described as a substitution of causes. You should explain to your viewers, correctly not mistakenly, why exactly these lines are forming and why the economic situation is as difficult as it is. The people should know why. Certainly not because of the reasons you have mentioned but because of the sanctions, of

course. The sanctions were imposed because we refused to allow two million of our compatriots to be slaughtered there. So do not attempt to convince people that this was due to some mistaken economic policies. Much bigger countries, with much more developed economies the most developed Western European countries, for instance would certainly be much worse off under sanctions than we are.

Therefore, the way out of this situation lies in the preservation of policies aimed at protecting our national and state interests and, under such circumstances, in the rallying of forces that are genuinely patriotic, not pseudo-patriotic. Each and every one of us, in his own right, should make his contribution to this country and its unification. I hope that the upcoming political activities will make a contribution to this. It is now up to the citizens to make their decisive contribution. I also hope that they will do this regardless of whether or not this will be to the liking of someone outside or someone here whose heart is somewhere outside. I am truly optimistic in this respect and I hope that you will soon become convinced as well.

[End Milosevic; passage of thanks to Milosevic by editors omitted]

ANEXO B.23 – Milosevic Sees Positive Step in Discussion of Suspension of Sanctions¹⁴⁵.

Summary: Milosevic says European initiative has allowed continuation of talks which will accelerate final solution; another positive step is discussion of suspension of sanctions in such a comprehensive gathering; EC is now approaching the problem in more balanced and realistic way; Krajina is matter for discussion between Croatia and Krajina; Kosovo is internal matter for Serbia

[Jevdjovic] Mr President, the first day of the new round of Geneva talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina's future has ended, not exactly with an agreement, however, as we understood, nevertheless in an agreement to continue the talks. Therefore, although there has been no total accord, all sides display willingness to continue the negotiations?

[Milosevic] This is the main effect of the European initiative. It is well known that the talks of the three sides in Bosnia have been frozen for a long time. This initiative allowed the continuation of the talks. The continuation of the talks will accelerate a final solution. This is a positive step.

The second thing that could also be assessed as positive is that the issue of lifting that is to say, suspending sanctions has been discussed for the first time in such a comprehensive EC gathering. However, what is very important is that we have, I hope, clarified with each other perfectly well about this. Namely, the idea to suspend the sanctions can accelerate the lifting of them in a way because, as you know, the final document of the Geneva conference prior to its interruption clearly defines that with the restoration of peace in Bosnia the sanctions should finally be lifted. We reminded our partners in the talks of this. For this reason, one of the conclusions of this evening's plenary session is that the negotiations will continue where they have stopped, as was stated at the last meeting of the Geneva conference, when the lifting of sanctions was linked strictly to the restoration of peace in Bosnia.

This new category which has been introduced namely, the suspension gives the chance that sanctions might be eased a little bit earlier. This means that the sanctions could already be suspended on signing the final accord about the peace plan, while their final lifting would be formally realized during the implementation of the plan. I would say that these are the two most significant positive results of this meeting. Everything else depends on the course of

¹⁴⁵ Entrevista concedida a Zoran Jevdjovic para a Serbian TV em 29 de novembro de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic112993.htm>>.

negotiations which will be continued tonight and tomorrow morning between the Serbian and the Muslim side, and the Serbian and the Croatian side.

[Q] Does this mean that the relatively firm stance towards sanctions that the EC put forward at the beginning of today's talks was a sort of tactical move?

[A] The impression here is that on this occasion the Twelve and this has not been usual so far did not exert pressure on the negotiating sides of this conference. They tried to put forward a proposal for a just and quick solution, I would say, and to encourage and facilitate the continuation of the talks. This is primarily my impression of this meeting. You have had the opportunity to familiarize yourself with the stance that we supported at this conference. I believe that this was nevertheless a dialogue and that we were not in the situation in which they have frequently tried to put us from the Hague conference onward, when they tried to make us either accept or reject something, but rather that both sides strived for a constructive approach which would facilitate the final solution .

[Q] Therefore, the principled stance of Serbia actually made them listen to our opinion willy-nilly and also acknowledge it regardless of their position?

[A] I would not attribute us winning such a respect to our principled stance. Simply, the circumstances and the facts dictated the need to acknowledge the interests of all sides.

Generally speaking it can be said that regardless of the fact that their approach is still not perfectly balanced, that it is still not perfectly objective towards all sides, it does represent progress in the creation of conditions for objectivity. Namely, so far things have been exclusively black and white. The Serbian side was at fault, the Muslim side was right. Now, they are approaching all this from a much more balanced, and thus much more realistic, viewpoint. I believe that this approach creates conditions for accelerated progress in the overall talks.

[Q] Tell me just one more thing. In the introductory speech by Minister Claes the issue of Krajina and the issue of Kosovo were also mentioned. Have there been any attempts to link the issue of Krajina with Bosnia-Herzegovina, perhaps [words indistinct] Kosovo [words indistinct]?

[A] Yes, we discussed this at the afternoon session. The afternoon sessions were the meetings of the European Twelve with the Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian side separately.

Regarding Krajina, it is perfectly clear, and we reiterated our position, that the negotiations about relations between Croatia and Krajina must take place between Croatia and Krajina. This is the only competent level at which any solutions can be found. However, our principled stance regarding putting this approach into practice was embraced here.

Namely, we spoke of three phases. In the first phase we must strive to ensure that Knin and Zagreb sign an agreement on the cessation of hostilities which would enable the UN troops to step between the two sides and eliminate the possibility of further bloodshed.

In the second phase, talks about the normalization of communications, oil pipelines, transmission lines, railwaysgeneral infrastructurebetween the two will be continued.

These two phases practically comprise what the European Community has qualified as the so-called *modus vivendi*. In this way the third phase, that is, negotiations about a political solution, is being postponed until tensions subside and it is possible to guarantee a more or less normal and rational negotiating process.

However, the fundamental principle is that only the legitimate representatives of Krajina can hold authorized negotiations about Krajina's position towards the end of hostilities and normalization of communications. I would remind our citizens that this has been our position ever since the adoption of the Vance plan. We made great efforts for the adoption of the Vance plan, whereby peace has returned to Krajina. Everything following this must be resolved exclusively between the legitimate Krajina representatives and Zagreb . There is no other way.

Regarding your second question, it is true that the issue of Kosovo was raised. However, our stance regarding this is well known and we have repeated it. We consider Kosovo to be an internal matter for us. No internationalization of the issue of Kosovo is possible.

As regards human and minority rights we observe absolutely the highest CSCE standards. All other issues are our internal issues, and we shall resolve them in the way all sovereign countries do.

[Q] Thank you, Mr President.

ANEXO B.24 –Serbs and Croats Agree on concessions; Milosevic and Tudjman Comment.¹⁴⁶

[Milosevic] There is no doubt that today the complete delegations of the Serbian and Croatian sides have achieved, I would say, the biggest step towards peace so far. Namely, together we have established our joint proposal for the Muslims, which will affirm our earlier joint approach to equally protect the interests of the warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I would like to remind you that during these entire talks which we have conducted at the Geneva conference, the biggest progress was made precisely whenever the Serbian and the Croatian side came out with joint proposals. Today we held long negotiations, and in many ways very painful negotiations, bearing in mind the need to find a solution that demands certain concessions by both the Serbian and the Croatian sides in order to come up with a realistic, acceptable and totally rounded proposal for the Muslim side. However, finally, at the end of the day, as a result of the talks not only today's talks but also the many that preceded them we have achieved this result. I believe that this is the best result that could be achieved at today's meeting of the delegations of the Serbian and the Croatian side.

I believe that now all the conditions for securing acceptance of the peace plan have really been created and that the Muslim side simply does not have, actually loses every reason, for not accepting such an agreement. I also believe that the international community is losing all need to support any sort of additional demands by the Muslim side. I hope that this will be very significant for the final solution.

[Tudjman] I would also add that I held very long talks with President Izetbegovic last night in which we also discussed all issues of interest not only for the Croat and Muslim sides but, it goes without saying, also for the Serbian side. The agreement that we reached today about the principled issues and the territorial division has created prerequisites for a general normalization of relations, as I said, among all three sides, among all three peoples within Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also beyond, the normalization of relations between Serbia and Croatia on the whole. This is of interest not only for the Croatian and Serbian peoples, but also for the international community and its expectations concerning peace in this part of the world.

[Jevdjovic] Have the Serbian and Croatian sides done everything they could, and done so perhaps to their own detriment, in order to meet the Muslim demands and the demands by the European Union?

¹⁴⁶ Entrevista concedida a Zoran Jevdjovic para a Serbian Radio em 21 dezembro de 1993. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/milosevic122193.htm>>.

[Milosevic] There is no doubt that both the Serbian and Croatian sides have made an effort and given the maximum in the interest of peace, and not in the interest of anybody's demands. It was in the interest of peace and the interest of finding a comprehensive solution, of a general need, the greatest interest being for this war finally to end. I would like to agree with President Tudjman's assessment that this result of today's talks is also another major step in a better understanding and the normalization of relations between Serbia and Croatia. I hope that our relations will continue to develop in this direction.

[Jevdjovic] Mr Boban, can you confirm these words by the two presidents?

[Boban] Well, I think that the aim is to stop the war and establish a just peace. Greater courage and resolution are needed for ending a war than for declaring or waging a war. The Croatian delegation led by President Tudjman today showed great courage and accepted peace. It is up to others now.

[Jevdjovic] What is your comment, Mr Karadzic?

[Karadzic] Well, I think that this complete agreement between the Serbian and the Croatian sides, and their agreement about the solution to this crisis is of great value. Nobody can ignore this value. For instance, we agreed not to place Sarajevo and Mostar under the protection of the international community. We understand that the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna really needs Mostar, with its airport, and we accept that. There is also no need not to find a final solution for Sarajevo, and the Croatian delegation supported our stand there.

Therefore, there is agreement on a large number of issues, and it is certain that Serbs and Croats certainly still have to work persistently on solving all disputed questions between Serbs and Croats. However, now, that will be much easier because experience tells us that whenever two sides had a dispute or negotiations, everything went much easier than when there was a third side as well.

Conditions are now reached for the Muslim side to be satisfied. All the conditions are therethat can no longer be ignoredand the Serbs and the Croats will then find it much easier to stabilize their territories, solve all disputes, and become good neighbours once and for all.

[Jevdjovic] What are you in fact going to tell the European Twelve in Brussels tomorrow?

[Milosevic] Since we have reached such an agreement on a joint proposal there are fewer reasons to speak, but many more to put this proposal on the table and hear the response by the third side and the reply by the international community to what we finally managed to coordinate together. I hope that, considering the statements and approaches the international

community has made so far, that our joint proposal will be met with a positive reply and that our joint proposal may be a final basis for establishing a lasting peace and signing a peace plan.

[Jevdjovic] The same question to you: What will you say to the Twelve in Brussels tomorrow?

[Tudjman] What we have accomplished and discussed today is actually an answer to what the international community, the European Union, and the observersthe United States and Russiawho are taking part in the work of tomorrow's Brussels conference, expect from the participants of today's Geneva conference.

I believe that we have essentially satisfied the international community's demand that the Muslims be granted 33.3% of the territory, and that they gain access to the sea as we had proposed it earlier, that is, with a free zone in Ploce and with tourist facilities in Neum, or with a new proposal that we have been considering and that could be included in the plan of the final solution, namely, that they be given an outlet in Prevlaka. However, this is something that is still being examined and it is precisely the Muslim side, so it seems, that will not accept it. Therefore, what is left is the solution with a free zone in Ploce.

This is the answer to important issues that the European Union and the international community in general expect in order to end the war on this territory. The end to the war would truly be the best Christmas gift to all the nations whom this concerns and who have been bleeding unnecessarily in this evil.

[Jevdjovic] Are there conditions pointing to peace?

[Milosevic] As regards the Serbian and the Croatian side, unquestionably.

[Jevdjovic] Thank you, gentlemen, and best of luck in the further talks.

ANEXO B.25 – Interview of Slobodan Milosevic to Time Magazine.¹⁴⁷

TIME: Many say that if there is hope at all for finding a political solution to the Bosnian war, it can't be done without Milosevic.

MILOSEVIC: Maybe they are right. Maybe they are not. Who knows? I'm just an ordinary man who, by the circumstance of his position, can help by having a policy of peace, one that is honest and objective to all sides. We accepted the Contact Group plan [which proposed a 51-49 division of war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Bosnian-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs]. Before that, we accepted whatever plan was more or less evenhanded. We said from the beginning that there is only one solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina: one that will protect equally the interests of [the Serbs, the Muslims and the Croats].

TIME: How do you get there? You clearly had enough influence on [Bosnian Serb leader Radovan] Karadzic to get him to free the hostages but not enough to get him to accept the Contact Group plan.

MILOSEVIC: The taking of hostages was an immoral act. We had to do whatever we could just to eliminate that dirty story from the history of Serbs.

TIME: Why can't you do the same for the peace plan?

MILOSEVIC: Until sanctions end, [Bosnian President Alija] Izetbegovic will count on Serbia collapsing under sanctions. For the Muslims, it is not important if that happens in two years or 20. They dream of a situation in which we collapse and then they with all their allies achieve their goal of establishing a Muslim state in Europe. The other side, the Pale leadership, since we are under sanctions, is counting on us finally getting [involved] in that war, that finally we will be [involved] in that war. If sanctions are lifted and relations with that main factor of stability, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, are normalized, Izetbegovic and Karadzic must face each other and make peace arrangements without any further speculation on what could happen.

TIME: You talked about the humiliation of the hostage taking. Certainly it is no less humiliating for Serbs to have the Serbs in Bosnia using rape and detention camps in their prosecution of war. Couldn't you have called on Karadzic to stop it, especially when you had relations with him?

¹⁴⁷ Entrevista concedida a James R. Gaines, Karsten Prager, Massimo Calabresi e Marguerite Michaels para a Time Magazine, 1995. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/int-time95.htm>>.

MILOSEVIC: When we first heard via the foreign press that there were some detention camps and rapes, our first reaction was "What about that?" The [Bosnian Serb] leadership explained "It is absolutely not the truth, absolutely not." That was what was explained to us, and we then had a very deep confidence in what they were explaining. And I believed that just because of habit. One detail reported in the press: a Muslim girl who was pregnant by rape got shelter in a hospital in Switzerland. An abortion was not possible, and when the child was born, it happened to be Negro. No Serb was a Negro. Not one.

TIME: The CIA, not a particular lover of radical Muslims worldwide, has reported that 90% of the atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina were perpetrated by the ethnic Serb side.

MILOSEVIC: I don't have those kinds of figures. But it is absolutely unbelievable in that civil war.

TIME: How would you describe your relationship with the Bosnian Serb leaders?

MILOSEVIC: We cut off all our relations with all of them. We don't have relations.

TIME: But there's still significant contact with General Ratko Mladic, the commander of the Bosnian Serb army [who is under investigation as a potential war criminal].

MILOSEVIC: Oh, yes, he has his family here in Belgrade. And he is--how to say?--exempted from this treatment.

TIME: Are you having any kind of interchange with [Croatian President Franjo] Tudjman?

MILOSEVIC: Well, I'll tell you, I had some direct and some indirect contacts with Tudjman up to the first of May, when [fighting started in] western Slavonia. We are not [in contact].

TIME: Beginning in 1987 in Kosovo, you were talking about an ascendant Serbia, and people in Slovenia and Croatia and Bosnia feared living in your Yugoslavia.

MILOSEVIC: All my speeches up to '89 were published in my book. You can see that there was no nationalism in those speeches. We were explaining why we think it is good to preserve Yugoslavia for all Serbs, all Croats, all Muslims and all Slovenians as our joint country. Nothing else.

TIME: Yet your actions, at least, bespoke an interest in creating Greater Serbia.

MILOSEVIC: Bosnia and Herzegovina was illegally proclaimed as an independent state and recognized. That recognition was like when the Roman Emperor Caligula appointed his horse as a Senator: they recognized a state that never existed before. The Serbs there said "We want to stay within Yugoslavia. We don't want to be second-class citizens." And then the

conflicts were started by Muslims, no doubt. And the Serbs, in defending themselves, were always better fighters, no doubt. And they achieved results, no doubt. But please, we were insisting on peace. The international community gave premature recognition first of Slovenia and then of Croatia and supported the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on a totally irregular basis.

TIME: It supported independence in large part because arms were coming from Serbia, because paramilitaries came from here, and because the Yugoslav army supported the Serbs.

MILOSEVIC: Under the military doctrine of former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the central storage place for arms, ammunition and the military industry. We had absolutely no need to send anything [to the Serbs] there.

TIME: [Serbian paramilitary leader] Arkan was from Serbia. The paramilitaries came from Serbia.

MILOSEVIC: You know, all those kinds of paramilitary formations were totally marginal in that war. There never were more than a couple of thousand all together.

TIME: They did some appalling things.

MILOSEVIC: That is different; that is a different problem. It is clear that any paramilitary formation on the Serbian side, on the Muslim side, on other sides never had more than a couple of thousand.

TIME: Leaders involved in war on this scale have been known to feel haunted by the human cost. How have you felt being the leader of Serbia during this war?

MILOSEVIC: It is a very, very tough and very unpleasant position. No doubt. But I must tell you, personally, I'm calm with that, having in mind that all we were politically doing was oriented to peace, from the beginning of the crisis up to now.

ANEXO B.26 – Interview of Slobodan Milosevic to the Washington Post.¹⁴⁸

“My duty is to protect the interests of my people and my country”

The President of Yugoslavia answered 233 questions in a very dynamic two-hour conversation with the American journalist.

- We do not have a problem with any national community, and there is 26 of them, except with a part of Albanian national community in Kosovo, those who are engaged in a separatist movement. The nature of this movement Nazi.

- We shall never give away Kosovo.

- If we were to apply the rules according to which Krstic was arrested, half of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be arrested and sent to The Hague.

- The Serbs are the victims of the latest holocaust in this century. I think that we can have good relations with Germans. I think that Germany is through with Nazism. They are no longer a Nazi country. They are a developed country, with developed democracy.

- We considered that Yugoslavia was a good solution for the national interest of the Serbs, because in the former Yugoslavia all Serbs lived in one state.

- Albania is a factor of instability of the entire region.

- Albanian nacro-mafia gives money to foreign journalists and politicians for the media war against us and that money is blood money, paid by the lives of young people from Western Europe, America and Canada.

- But if America really wants to accelerate the process of economic reconstruction, democratization and everything else they scream about, it should lift all sanctions.

- USA believes it can resolve everything by force and that is the weakness of many great powers that perished in the past.

- The Balkans people should have a common goal to live in peace and affluence and not in poverty and war.

- We do not arrange our country in line with the interests of others, but according to our interests.

- The right to truth is one of the principles of freedom.

- When national interests are at stake, there is no difference between the authorities and the opposition.

¹⁴⁸ Entrevista concedida a Elizabeth Weymouth para o Washington Post em 16 de dezembro de 1998. Disponível em: <<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/int-WP98.htm>>.

Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic talked with Elizabeth Weymouth the editor of the Washington Post.

This two-hour conversation referred primarily to the issues of Kosovo and Metohija as well as to relations between Yugoslavia and the United States of America, civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, freedom of information in our country, University law, International War Crimes Tribunal, relations in the Yugoslav federation, Yugoslav Constitution, reasons for break up of former Yugoslavia, President Milosevic's family, almost everything that the American journalist wanted to ask.

How interesting was this conversation proves the fact that the Washington Post journalist asked 233 questions in a very dynamic tone.

The Politika presents hereunder the translation of the taped record of this conversation in the sequence it was led, without the systematisation of individual topics:

Question: Is there anything in particular that you want to say to the Western public?

- The entire western story of the Yugoslav crisis is false, particularly on Serbia. I think that this is the failure of journalism, moral failure of journalism. Western story is far from truth. It can be said that many things presented to the foreign public about this country are simply not true. I therefore hope that your visit will contribute to a true picture.

Q: What do you think about James Rubin's statement of last week?

- There were several statements.

Q: I think he said that you are "the problem"? What do you think about that? Do you have any response?

My duty is to protect the interest of my people and my country. If anyone has a problem with that, I can only tell you that I am proud of my role in defending and protecting the interests of my country and of my people.

Q: Do you think that the US changed its policy? There were some rumours on the CNN last week, that the US changed its policy and that now they are trying to oust you? Do you believe that?

This is not a question of a personal position of any individual. This is a question of a political approach to the problems in Yugoslavia and the problems in Kosmet. We consider Kosmet our internal affair and believe that this problem can be resolved only by agreement between the representatives of different national communities living there. I firmly believe that the problem cannot be resolved by outside solutions. People who live there should arrive at an agreement.

Q: So you are saying that you will not accept the US plan, as presented by Ambassador Hill?

- Each initiative directed at peaceful resolution is welcome as an initiative that can be taken into account. This is one side to it. But essentially, the problems in this country have to be resolved by people living in this country.

Q: As far as I understand, the problem is that the people from Kosovo, namely the Albanians living in Kosovo, who are the predominant population, seek independence. The Serbs in Serbia wish to keep Kosovo as a part of Serbia. Is compromise possible and if so, is Ambassador Hill's plan a possible compromise? What extent of autonomy will you give to the people of Kosovo?

- That question is not understood by many outside this country.

Q: You mean, it is not well understood between you and Holbrooke?

- Kosmet is primarily, a part of Serbia, which has always been a part of Serbia. Always, throughout history, for centuries.

Q: Always has been and always will be?

- Always has been and of course always will be. Why would it be any different in the future. Only in Kosmet, there are 1800 Serb, Christian churches, on Weber's list, a famous ecologist. This is where different national communities live Serbs and Montenegrins, Albanians, Muslims, Egyptians, Romanians, Turks. The approach of the Serb Government and all political parties and citizens of Serbia is that nationalities living there have to be equal. So, when we speak of the solution to the problem of Kosovo...

Q: You mean, you and Holbrooke?

-No, I do not mean only Holbrooke and me. Whenever we spoke with Holbrooke and Hill, with any foreign representatives and among ourselves, in general, we always thought that the problems can be resolved only on the basis of the principle of equality of all citizens living in Kosmet and all national communities living in Kosmet. So, if any national community, Albanian, Turkish, Muslim or any other, wishes to have self-governance there are not limitations in that.

Q: You mean independence?

- Not independence. Self-governance of national communities within limits.

Q: Is that appropriate?

-Absolutely. And if there are some limits, those are the rights of other national communities living in Kosmet. So, no national community living in Kosovo, among those I

mentioned, cannot rule over the others. All national communities have to be equal. They have to have equal rights.

Q: OK, but I see it like this. You probably know more but I understand that the KLA, as we call it, is much stronger than other Albanian forces, and that moderate forces lose power. The question is whether the cease-fire will hold. And, on the long term basis, the question is how will you come up with an arrangement that will satisfy the local Albanians great number of Albanians living there who wish independence. On the other hand, the Serb people wish to keep Kosovo within Serbia. Will you give them actual autonomy, the possibility to run their lives, their legislation, possibility to administer their towns as the Israeli gave the Palestinians the right to administer the towns on the West Bank?

- This is different from the Palestinian question. Simply, we never discussed, including in our talks with the representatives of the international community, Holbrooke and the others, any kind of independence. Independence implies the secession of a part of Serbia. Disintegration of Serbia. No one in Serbia can agree with secession of any part of its country.

Q: I understand. But the question is what level of autonomy would you accept within Serbia?

- I tried to explain to you that each national community living in Kosovo can have autonomy, in questions that concern them.

Q: Do you think that it would satisfy Albanians?

- It will not satisfy Albanians who seek independence. This is clear. We have no illusions about that. But it is a kind of compromise, which means that they can have their autonomy within Albanian community. But the same kind of self-governance has to be enabled to Muslims, Turks and others living in Kosovo and Metohija. So, all of them have to be treated equally. This is the difference. We never spoke of any possibility of independence of Albanians. In order to understand the situation in our country, you have to appreciate one fact there are 26 different national communities in Serbia. All of them are equal. Look, for example, at the Hungarians in the north. They are quite well integrated in Serbia. They have their own schools in Hungarian, their publishing houses, radio and TV programmes, papers, practically everything. We have no problems with them. No problems with Slovaks, Bulgarians, Ruthenians and others. The problem in Kosmet was not a problem with Albanian national minority as a whole. Albanians are good people and one of equal national minorities in Serbia. The problem in Kosmet is a problem of a separatist movement of one part of Albanian national minority. One part of Albanian national minority in Kosmet is manipulated by groups of Albanian politicians, who are Nazis. I will tell you why they are Nazis. Because their

proclaimed goal is an ethnically pure state. I do not know if there is any ethnically pure state anywhere in Europe.

Q: It is strange coming from you, because we in America are under the impression that that was the goal of Bosnian Serbs when they were killing in Bosnia.

- There was a civil war in Bosnia between the Muslims, Serbs and Croats. No one in Bosnia pursued a goal of an ethnically pure Bosnia. It would simply be impossible. But now that you mention Bosnia, the case of Bosnia was resolved in Dayton only because the formula was reached to equally protect the interests of all three peoples living there. That was our approach since the beginning of the crisis in Bosnia. You can see the papers from that period and see that. Since the beginning of crisis in Bosnia, our approach was that there is only one formula which can bring peace, and that is the formula which will equally protect the interests of all three peoples Serbs, Muslims and Croats. So, that was achieved in Dayton. Now, the Serbs have their institutions, the Croats and Bosniaks have theirs and they can live together. That is no longer a problem.

Q: But allegedly there was a connection between your Government and Bosnian Serbs, wasn't there?

- What connection?

Q: Allegedly, according to our Government, there was a strong connection between Bosnian Serbs and your Government.

- Between the Serbs in Serbia and the Serbs in Bosnia.

Q: Right.

- Is it not normal and logical that there are connections between the Serbs from both sides of one river. They lived in one country former Yugoslavia. All the time. Why would those connections be strange?

“Only civilians were innocent who suffered the consequences of the horrors of war”

Q: But, if the Serbs in Bosnia killed many people, than you can see the problem in the picture that the West has about you.

- In the war in Bosnia, the Muslims killed Serbs and Croats, Croats killed Muslims and Serbs, Serbs killed Muslims and Croats. It was a civil war. No one was innocent there. No side was innocent. Only civilians were innocent who suffered the consequences of the horrors of war.

Q: Did you read an article from the New York Times a week ago, in which it is said that you fired Chief of General Staff and Chief of the State Security. The journalist who wrote that

said that you were losing power, that your power is being weakened and that you never give interviews, which I am sure is not true.

- I gave a lot of interviews.

Q: But what do you think about her analysis?

- It is not good that she is not treating this country as all other countries in the world, the USA for example. How many Chiefs of General Staff changed in your country in the past 5 years. We changed one and you changed there Powell, Shalikashvili and now Shelton. It is normal in any democratic country. Why should it be normal for Yugoslavia too?

Q: I suppose what she said in her article, I am not sure, that you fired several high ranking officials at the same time Chief of General Staff, Chief of the State Security. Allegedly, there was a disagreement between you and the Chief of General Staff. Is that true?

- No, it was a regular change.

Q: But, changes in both cases. They say that you disagreed over Kosovo?

- I did not see any major disagreement with my associates over Kosovo.

Q: But the former Chief of General Staff said that firing was illegal. He made a statement in the press. Do you remember?

- Yes, I remember. Everyone who is fired has a right to be angry. It was a regular change and that is all. It cannot be said that it is illegal. It is my constitutional right as of any other president in the world.

Q: What is your reply to the general position of this journalist, who said that in the beginning you had a big country, and now Bosnia and Croatia left. She says that your power is diminishing. Is she right?

- She is absolutely not right.

Q: When I was in Russia, the Russians told me that she was not right.

- Of course, I was the President of Serbia and Serbia is the same as before. For the past year and a half I am President of Yugoslavia which was created in 1992. So, we did not change our country. She is not dealing with the facts. She only uses limited facts inappropriately. Let us go back to the explanation of the problem.

First of all, it is clear that we do not have a problem with any national community, and there is 26 of them, except with a part of Albanian national community in Kosovo, those who are engaged in a separatist movement. The problem is the drive for secession of Kosovo from Serbia and its unification with Albania. That is why I said that the nature of this movement Nazi. Because of its publicly proclaimed goal ethnically pure state. That cannot be a goal of any democracy. There is another historical continuity with what had happened in the Second World

War. In that war, Mussolini, a fascist leader of Italy, created the so called Greater Albania and placed within this so called Greater Albania parts of Kosmet, a part of Macedonia and a part of Greece. Only in two years of the war, a part of Kosmet was part of Greater Albania. Never before in the history and never after that. So, the separatist movement in Kosmet is the continuation of Mussolini's ideas from the Second World War. This is yet another proof of the Nazi nature of this movement. Our approach is totally opposite. We believe that people should live together regardless of their national origin. And if anyone should understand that, you Americans should. You live in a country with many Americans of different origin. You live together. And no one is trying to separate a part of the USA and create from it an ethnically pure state.

Q: But, I spoke to one American, who was in Kosovo, an American official. He said that in the past few years two different systems were created in Kosovo. In one system, Albanians send their children to their schools and the other system is for the Serbs. The conclusion is that those two groups inevitably have to collide. Do you think he was right?

- He was not right.

Q: Why?

- There was some sort of a parallel system created by the separatist movement. But that was marginal. In most parts of Kosmet Albanian children go to schools normally. All the time. In other public institutions, for example, health-care institutions, hospitals and other institutions. Albanians are present there. I would like you to understand that the problem in Kosmet is the problem of a separatist movement, not of Albanians in general. We make a clear distinction between them and Albanians as a people, who are our citizens with all their rights, we do not want them to be second-rate citizens. We want them to be equal citizens of this country. That is the difference between them and the bandit groups who killed, raped, kidnapped and undertook all terrorist activities.

Q: Do you think that you can reach an agreement with Rugova?

- I think we can.

Q: Have you ever talked to him?

- I did. Once.

Q: When?

- In May. Then we started some kind of a dialogue.

Q: And how was it?

- The dialogue was stopped by terrorist attacks which were followed by anti-terrorist police activity, which were totally legal. You cannot imagine how many people were abducted,

totally innocent people. For example, a miner, they took a miner to the woods. Many have not been heard from. Some have been killed.

Q: OK. Let's say this is all true. But you still have to find a solution for Kosmet. Are you willing to accept the American plan?

- I cannot talk about that plan in detail. But its major shortcoming is that the plan is favouring Albanians. Our approach is different. We think that no national community in Kosmet should be favoured. Each national community in Kosmet has to be equal with other national communities.

Q: Let's say you are right. Are you willing to withdraw your police and stop being so aggressive in Kosovo?

- Police in Kosmet has not been aggressive at all.

Q: That's what the USA said. I do not know, I have never been in Kosmet.

Police in Kosmet protects the citizens of Kosmet. The victims of terrorists are Albanians, not only Serbs. Police protected citizens, not Serbs. It means, the Serbs, Albanians, Turks, Romanians, all citizens.

Q: OK, let's suppose they are terrorists.

- They are terrorists.

Q: OK, but still there is a problem. You have your army there.

- As any other country in its territory. Where is your army in your country?

Q: But haven't you and Mr. Holbrooke agreed to keep only a limited number of soldiers?

- Those soldiers that had been there before the onset of the conflict and crisis, and the police at the level before, which means 10,021 police officers. That is the situation in Kosmet. Since the agreement between me and Holbrooke there has been no action by the police except when they were directly attacked by terrorists. You have to understand that the terrorists are defeated. They are no longer a military factor in Kosmet.

Q: Really?

- But in a certain way they are a danger to security. Because of the simple fact that they may, in groups that they currently have, kill someone from ambush.

Q: Do you think that Mr. Hills' approach leads to independence? Are you afraid of that?

- I would not go that far. He has a good will to arrive at a good solution, but that is the subject of talks between the State delegation. Therefore they take one step at a time in good direction. I expect that the principle of equality of national communities be respected. This is the only way to calm the situation in Kosmet. How can Kosmet be calm if more than 600.000 residents should feel like second-rate citizens, and only Albanians should be granted rights.

This is not possible. This is one of the things that are totally differently represented in the international press. I even saw in the international press that 90 % of Albanians live in Kosmet and 10 % of others.

Q: That is true.

-That is not true.

Q: What is true?

- I will tell you what is true. First of all, there are 240,000 Serbs and Montenegrins. More than 150,000 Muslims. More than 150,000 Romanians and Egyptians, Turkish national minority numbering 40-50 thousand. If we add the Albanians and their parties who participate in the joint Agreement, that is more than half of Kosmet population. We estimate that there is 800,000 Albanians in Kosmet. Hill will perhaps say 900,000. OK, we are not going to argue about that. What is our reply: to conduct a census under OSCE monitoring. What is more fair than to conduct a census, to establish accurate figures. Despite that, even if he were right about the 900 thousand figure, a the 600 figure is a fact, this is a 1:1.2 proportion not 1:1.9 which is a widely held view in the international community, which is not correct. All national communities have to be equal, that is the key for Kosmet. You should understand an essential fact. If national communities, like Turks for example, who are the smallest national community, between 40-50 thousand, are not equal with others, what is their position going to be. They have their papers, their radio and TV program, their schools in Turkish, etc. Why would they be second-rate citizens in an autonomous province ruled by Albanians? Joint agreement, reached by all national communities and ethnic groups and parties has a formula that there shall be an Assembly of Kosmet which will have two chambers: the chamber of citizens one citizen, one vote, and the chamber of national communities in which each national community should be represented by its delegation which will be equal to others. Then, they can make all their decisions, respecting the interests of each national community in Kosmet. That is a fair formula, which is good and which guarantees equality of all living there. In such situation, the Serbs cannot be masters of Albanians. But if the Albanians do not agree, the decision cannot be made. But Albanians cannot be masters of Serbs or Turks or Muslims. All of them have an equal right to live there.

Q: What about University?

- What is the problem there?

Q. People abroad say, and that is bad for your image, that you cracked down on University, on the press.

- These are total fabrications. The changes of the Law on University included the abolition of self-management in the University, which we once had as a system. No more self-government, so there can be no self-government in the University either.

Q: What do you mean there is no more self-government?

- We used to have self-government as a system in former Yugoslavia. You don't know that. The system could no longer stay only in the University. The state universities financed by the Government, all buildings and their equipment belong to the State and all professors receive salaries from the State. Who should then appoint the members of the Executive Board. The Government, of course, and that is all there is to it.

Q: I have a question from another area. I am interested in something else. For two days that I have been here, I could see how seriously people take the question of Kosovo. I wonder if you, as we in America say, have made a reasonable deal regarding Kosovo, regarding Interim arrangements. Will you meet resistance in your own country? From people who wish to keep Kosovo. Do you understand what I am saying?

- I suppose that you talk about a reasonable solution.

Q: No, whether you will from the political point of view be faced with resistance. If I were in New York, it would have not occurred to me at all. But here people sing songs about Kosovo. We in America cannot understand that. We think that you are acting irrationally. People talk about Kosovo all the time...

- It is logical that you in America cannot understand everything in Serbia. We in Serbia do not understand everything in America.

Q: No, I just wanted you to answer this question. Give me a straight answer. Would it be difficult, in case a reasonable solution is reached regarding Kosovo, would you be facing a lot of political resistance in your country, because emotions are running high regarding Kosovo.

- No one in Serbia would accept, and that is totally true, that Kosovo be outside Serbia.

Q: I understand that, but would you accept a reasonable deal?

- Autonomy on the basis of equal treatment of all national communities.

Q: Am I right that these are strong emotions that you will have to ...

- I think that everybody will accept a just solution in Kosmet. The one that will equally protect the rights of all national communities. We do not have such kind of fascists here.

Q: I didn't say they were fascists. I thought it was somewhat similar to Jerusalem, since this is an important city, emotionally.

- Kosovo is important for us emotionally. As a part of this country, this is the heart of the country. We shall never give away Kosovo.

Q: I understand that now.

- Do you know that geographically, the region is called Kosovo and Metohija. Do you know what the word Metohija means? This is a Greek word and it means "church property", something that belongs to the church. So half of Kosmet is the land that belonged to the Serb Orthodox Church. For every Serb, Kosovo is the heart of Serbia. I have already told you that Weber made a list of 1800 churches in Kosmet of international heritage. We come from there. How can anyone say: let's take this part of Serbia and give it to the Albanians to play with it. It is out of the question.

Q: If it is not like in Israel, we will never give Western Bank because Hebron is there, and it is very important for the Jews. But it is more important to reach a compromise and keep the city.

- It is a big difference, because of historical reasons. Kosmet was never a part of Albania. We did not commit invasion on the Northern part of Albania. Albanians who went there over the mountains may freely stay there. That is all right, but they cannot take a part of territory with them. Take for example the situation in Texas. You have a huge Mexican population there. What would happen if they were to say that they want to take a part of Texas and unite it with Mexico because they are majority there. Would you allow that? It is not the question of human rights and question of democracy. This is a question of separatism, separatist movement. This is an entirely different thing. It has nothing to do with democracy, with human rights. It has to do with separatism and separatist movement, which uses terrorism as means to an end. That is why we had to respond to terrorism and stop it. Nothing else.

Q: Is it the same as PKK in Turkey? This is a separatist Kurdish Movement.

- You can see that in Northern Ireland, on Corsica, Basque in Spain. As opposed to Northern Ireland, we did not occupy northern Albania. Kosovo is a part of Serbia.

Q: General Krstic who was recently arrested is it true that you assisted in some way in his arrest and what is your reaction?

- I think that it is very bad.

Q: I heard that you were very forthcoming.

- We have nothing to do with his arrest and we believe that it does not contribute to the normalisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was an active general in RS and was arrested in the street by SFOR. This is not all right. Such secret indictments do not help the normalisation of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in view of the fact that on any side - Serb, Muslim or Croatian you can find people who participated in the war, who commanded the troops, who were active and you could arrest them. If we were to apply the rules according

to which Krstic was arrested, half of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be arrested and sent to The Hague. But the war is over.

Q: The State Department claims that you provide protection for 4-7 people Serbs, who played a crucial role in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- That was not in Bosnia, that was in Croatia.

Q: But they say that Mladic is here.

No, that is not true. Mladic is not here.

Q: But aren't there any people that you could turn to the Tribunal?

I would like to explain something to you. If the wars in Bosnia and Croatia are over, and if there is no one else to convict except the generals of the former JNA, who were in Croatia when something happened there, how can you simply say, OK, take these people. This is strictly prohibited by our Constitution. By the Constitution, not the law. We cannot extradite our citizens. I do not know where they are. I think that one of those three is not a citizen of Yugoslavia. Two are citizens of Yugoslavia. We never intended to arrest them and turn them over to the Tribunal. There has never been any evidence that they are guilty. Our Ministry of Justice asked the Tribunal to provide evidence on their alleged crimes. They did not get any evidence. If you want to talk about that, you have to have evidence. If there had been any evidence, they would have been arrested and tried here. We had trials for war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But our citizens were tried in our state courts, in Sabac, on the basis of our law. War crimes are crimes under our law.

Q: I think that the idea of the Tribunal is to have them tried in the International Tribunal, not here. Do you have any interest in protecting them? Isn't that one of the conditions for the lifting of economic sanctions. What wouldn't you turn them in then?

- We consider that this Tribunal is not treating Serbs equally as others, that is a matter of principle. They accused primarily Serbs for all that happened there. This was a part of a distorted picture of what happened in the former Yugoslavia. Dayton is the best proof that it is not true. We were accused of aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After Dayton, it became clear that Yugoslavia did not commit aggression. That is confirmed by the creation of Republika Srpska in which Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina live, not from Yugoslavia. Even today they live in Republika Srpska, in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q: You are talking about Mladic and Karadzic.

- All of them, 1.2 million Serbs in Republika Srpska, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were in a civil war with the Muslims and Croats. That was not an invasion of Yugoslavia against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q: But you assisted them, you armed them, right?

- They were armed. All of them were armed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course, we helped them. How can we not help our people?

Q: But the fact is that the Bosnians were not armed, not in the beginning.

- They were armed in the beginning and in the end. Everybody was armed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. How could they start the war if they were not armed?

Q: But the Bosnia's were no match for the Serbs, in the beginning.

- It is true that they were not so strong, the Serbs have always been good warriors in history.

Q: But why didn't you call the fight off, but let it turn into thousands and thousands of victims?

- This is something that you do not understand. Serbia did not take part in this war, so it had nothing to call off. All the time Serbia advocated peace.

Q: Do you have any regrets?

- Ever since the beginning we advocated a peaceful solution. Our approach is that they should alone find a solution that would equally protect the interests of all three peoples.

Q: But you are a very powerful man. People say that you could have stopped it.

- We did everything to stop it.

Q: But you really could have stopped it.

- I am a modest man, but I have to tell you: if Serbia was not so engaged and if I had not been so engaged in the search of a peaceful solution, Dayton wouldn't have been possible.

Q: I am sure that's true.

- That was done with great efforts on our side. And it is clear to anyone.

Q: They are talking about an interim arrangement for Kosmet. They say that you had a very good relationship with Richard Holbrooke. Was that interim arrangement reached within 9 days because you and Richard Holbrooke have a good relationship or because you were afraid of NATO air strikes?

- No, we were not afraid of NATO air strikes. We had to preserve the unity of the country at any cost. But we were for a peaceful solution all the time. Perhaps you do not know, but our State delegation went to Kosovo before Holbrooke came, 14 times waiting for Albanians to arrive and negotiations to start. They came once, and after that they were called to the USA for some talks. When they came back, terrorist activities intensified. So, they stopped the dialogue for reasons they never explained in Serbia. Perhaps their interlocutors in USA know those reasons.

Q: Are you ready to continue dialogue with Mr. Holbrooke?

- I believe that we have achieved a very important goal and the agreement to reach the problems peacefully. Now we need a dialogue between representatives of all national communities living in Kosmet. It is up to them to now define joint platform for common life. Nobody else can do it for them. They have to do it alone.

Q: I know that your economic situation is difficult, that you are hard up for cash, that you do not have market economy. What are you going to do? You have sanctions again.

- Allow me to correct you. First of all, we have market economy. Our entire economic concept is based on market economy. Second, sanctions caused great harm to us in 1992. When they were introduced it was nothing tragic. In 1993, additional sanctions were introduced which totally isolated Yugoslavia in all respects. In 1993 the situation was really difficult. GNP fell and we had a high inflation rate. Extremely high inflation rate. In view of this, we decided to make our own economic programme to get rid of those negative tendencies. In the end of 1993, we completed our economic programme and started to implement it in the beginning of 1994, which was, despite the sanctions, the first year with positive growth rate of GNP. 1995 was even better, 1996 better still and 1997 and 1998 better still. So, in the past five years we have had positive tendencies. We shall continue with positive tendencies despite the sanctions. Of course, if there were no sanctions, the tendencies would be radically better. We had a rise in GNP, 5 %, 6 %, 7 % and this year 4 %. Throughout the five years since 1994 every year we had growth. We have the problems caused by the sanctions. Our goods are more expensive due to the lack of EU trade preferences, USA blockade, frozen assets in foreign banks. So there are many obstacles. But if you compare our economy to those of Bulgaria or Romania, which did not have sanctions, did not have a war, did not have million refugees or anything like that, our economy is much better.

Q: But you do not have foreign exchange reserves. They say that you are out of reserves and that there is no growth.

- We never had big reserves.

Q: America is demanding changes from you, to democratise. Are you willing to introduce changes, so that sanctions may be lifted, to become a part of the world.

- Of course, but we do not wish to pay the price they ask us to. If the price is to give up Kosovo, we will not give Kosovo. As for democratisation, that is an artificial story. We are the most democratic country in the region. We had six multi-party elections since 1990. Look at the Assembly of Serbia or Yugoslavia. No party has majority, there are 7-8 parties in the Assembly and no party has majority.

Q: When did you last talk to Mladic?

- A few years ago. We spoke for a long time before Dayton, here in Belgrade when Holbrooke and his associates were here. We talked about how to stop bombing and how to create a climate for cease-fire, so that Dayton can start. That was in the end of summer in 1995. And then we did it, we achieved that goal and in November we came to the negotiations.

Q: Will you turn Mladic over to the Tribunal?

- No. Again, he lives in Republika Srpska, not in Yugoslavia.

Q: So, you cannot. Is the same true for Karadzic?

- The same for Karadzic.

Q: He lives in Republika Srpska?

- Yes, I believe he lives there, if he is not somewhere else, I do not know. I did not follow his trace. He had a deal with Holbrooke to withdraw from public life. He respected that. He withdrew from public life. But, that is no longer relevant for political life in Bosnia and Republika Srpska.

Q: But it is important for International Crimes Tribunal.

- You said that. I do not believe that Tribunal was very helpful. If that were so, it would treat all crimes in the world equally, and not hold trials for Serbs only.

Q: So you think that the Serbs are treated differently, that they were not treated fairly?

- Absolutely. The Serbs are the victims of the latest holocaust in this century, there is no doubt about that. It is a long story. The history will prove it. The Serbs were treated unfairly. The Serbs were always under pressures, Serbs were exposed to sanctions, pressures no matter that in Bosnia there was a civil war. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was isolated, instead of being treated normally as any other sovereign country, which was a factor of peace and stability in this region, all the time, throughout the crisis.

Q: Why was that, what do you think?

- Because of the interests of great powers which wanted to take over control over some parts of former Yugoslavia.

Q: Such as?

- Those which were involved.

Q: What did they want?

- To take control over Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia...

Q: Why?

- For the same reasons that big countries enslaved small ones. As always in the history, big countries want to control the small ones.

Q: You think that the reason is quest for power, for resources?

- We are in the centre of the Balkans. Serbia is a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, at the crossroads. This is a territory over which many empires fought. This is a link between Europe and Asia Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, India. All roads go through Serbia. We live on the bridge between Europe and Asia.

Q: But, Yugoslavia was a good ally of America during the Second World War.

- During the First one as well.

Q: Do you think that Germans are your enemies?

- I think that we can have good relations with Germans. I think that Germany is through with Nazism. They are no longer a Nazi country. They are a developed country, with developed democracy.

Q: Because of the new Government?

- I do not see any difference.

Q: Since Social-Democrats came to power.

- They said that would not change anything in connection with their foreign policy.

Q: Really?

- I believe we shall find a way for good co-operation. We have had good co-operation with Germany in the past. We had a lot of ties and big German companies were always present in Yugoslav economy.

Q: When did it stop?

- With the start of the Yugoslav crisis, in the nineties.

Q: Germany supported Croatia when it fought for the break-up of Yugoslavia and for its independence?

- True.

Q: Why?

- Why don't you ask them. A tragic mistake was premature recognition of independence. For example, the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state on the basis of a rump referendum. In any referendum in Bosnia you have to have participation of all three peoples, not two. It triggered the civil war.

Q: People say that you had a vision of Greater Serbia. In 1989 you had this speech when you called upon the Serbs to rise and that was the beginning...

- That is not true.

Q: I read that somewhere.

- You are not well informed. I have never made a speech inviting the Serbs to rise. On the contrary. In 1989 I was also for greater Yugoslavia.

Q: You never had the programme of Greater Serbia in mind?

- No. We advocated that Yugoslavia should be preserved and still believe, as I believed then, that South Slavs should have been happy with Yugoslavia instead of separating into five different states. But it was their right to decide and there is no use to be sorry now. We considered that Yugoslavia was a good solution for the national interest of the Serbs, because in the former Yugoslavia all Serbs lived in one state in different republics. But they were in one state. The Muslims were also in one state in former Yugoslavia. The Croats were in one state and Macedonians and others. That was the interest of all, not only of the Serbs.

Q: When you think about America, since it is not clear to me, do you think that America changed its attitude towards Yugoslavia. After Dayton, you should have become a partner of America and now as though something has changed. Now they are asking for democratisation, for this and that.

- These are just excuses. You know full well that we are a democratic country.

Q: What excuses?

- I will tell you. When we finished Dayton it was agreed that the sanctions be lifted.

Q: Yes, that's what I thought.

- But after Dayton, more precisely after Paris, since the Dayton agreement was signed in Paris, you, of course not you personally, you put an outer wall of sanctions. That was not fair.

Q: Madeleine Albright is responsible for that.

- I do not know who is responsible, but when I spoke to some Americans and asked them why they did it, they said it was their insurance policy, since they were allegedly not sure whether we will honour our obligations from Dayton. That was not fair. I believe that it was a huge mistake, we could have been good partners. The pressures now continue, particularly regarding Kosovo, although no country supports terrorism. The fact is that terrorism was supported by different foreign factors. We did not have any choice but to defend our citizens and our state.

Q: When you say foreign factors, do you mean Albania? I know that they are in the process of disintegration.

- They had implosion over there. A year before Kosovo, at our borders. You should know that we took from terrorist groups more than 26,000 pieces of different weapons, which was stolen and smuggled in Serbia from Albania. They destroyed their country. They looted

their military warehouses. Their army is practically gone and they live in chaos. When Holbrooke was here he told me that after he visited Tirana, he realised that the Albanian Government controlled only one block around the Government building. The rest of Albania is in total chaos. Anyone who has arms is controlling his part of the territory. Albania is undoubtedly a factor of instability of the entire region, because there is not a single terrorist organisation which does not have its base in Albania. Albanian narco-mafia is well-known. You can discuss it with some services in the USA and they can tell you how powerful it is. The media war against us and the distorted picture created about us is based partially on various criminal factors of that Albanian organisation. I also want to tell you that the money they give to foreign journalists and politicians is blood money, paid by the lives of young people from Western Europe, America and Canada.

Q: What journalists, what politicians, give me some names.

Nomina sunt odiosa, if you know that Latin sentence.

Q: As far as I understood, you are very tough towards your neighbour, Montenegro.

Montenegro is not a neighbour of Yugoslavia, it is a part of Yugoslavia.

Q: To the gentleman that won the elections.

What is the problem?

Q: That he wants to leave, that Montenegro wants to secede?

I don't think so. The people does not want that. It does not depend on one man or a group of people.

Q: Do you think that America changed its policy, that they considered you a partner.

Now you know that Clinton on Saturday announced six months of new sanctions.

What sanctions?

Q: Those that already exist. That's what they say.

That is nothing new. But if America really wants to accelerate the process of economic reconstruction, democratisation and everything else they scream about, it should lift all sanctions and create normal situation for co-operation. This is absolutely clear. This is what I told them so many times why don't you try to change your approach from negative to positive and have normal co-operation. That would be more efficient for development of all good things which you say you want to see. This rigid position with sanctions and pressures does not produce good results. It only slows down the recovery and does not bring anything good. As the greatest world power, you have one weakness. Your weakness is that you believe that you can resolve everything by force. That was the weakness of many great powers that perished in the past.

Q: But in this region we did not use force.

You bombed Serbs in Bosnia. Bombing in Republika Srpska which could have been avoided produced many negative consequences, which are certainly not helpful in the implementation of Dayton.

Q: But why didn't you stop helping Bosnian Serbs?

Would you stop helping your relatives if it was vitally important to them. We helped our people.

Q: Yes, but this is how the entire thing with accusations of genocide started. That is the heart of the matter of Serbia, not Dayton.

We do not believe that the Serbs in Bosnia behaved any worse than Muslims and Croats.

Q: But it does not make it right.

The conflicts were not right, from any side and against anyone.

Q: Why didn't you stop it?

We tried, as much as we could, and in Dayton it was stopped.

Q. They stopped after bombing.

Bombing was not in the function of Dayton at all. We agreed all principles before the bombing. Several days ago I saw a statement of General Rose, British general who was a commander in Bosnia. He also said that bombing was counter-productive. It is a totally distorted picture, if anyone should think that bombing helped Dayton. The situation is quite contrary. As you see, even a British general is saying what I am saying, and he was the commander of international force in Bosnia. You can see that in an interview he gave a while ago. I read it in our press.

Q: And if we bombed Serbia, as we threatened, when Holbrooke was here, were you ready. Do you have powerful air-force?

- I have to say that we do not have any other choice but to preserve our country and we could not accept anything that would lead to Kosovo being taken out from Serbia. We shall never accept any solution which would take Kosovo out of Serbia. That is clear. That is the worst possible spot in the world for any threats, because of its sensitivity, Kosovo is a sensitive spot in the heart of any Serb. Not only in Serbia, but Serbs in Bosnia, Serbs in America. There is a million of Serbs who are now Americans. I do not believe that anyone will tell you anything differently regarding Kosovo.

Q: Will you give the people of Kosovo the level of autonomy they had before 1989?

- If you again think of Albanians the system that was before was not appropriate because they abused the power they had to terrorise the rest of the population. Under the pressure of

separatists in the beginning of the eighties, 40,000 Serbs left Kosmet. They were killing them, raping them, razed their cemeteries, destroyed monasteries. They abused the power they had. We stopped that violence.

Q: When you abolished autonomy?

- We did not. Kosovo and Metohija is an autonomous province in accordance with the Constitution of Serbia.

Q: I thought you abolished their autonomy in 1989.

- You were wrong. In 1989 a change did happen.

Q: What change?

- Albanians were no longer allowed to be masters over other population in the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija.

Q. But the Serbs, for which we say that are 10 % of the population, control the army, police. The Serbs started controlling everything.

- That is entirely untrue. The problem is media. A distorted picture was created. For example, many Albanians have been and still are represented in administration and different levels of power. I think that we currently have around 600 Albanians in the police in Kosovo, who are armed. This is the police of the Republic of Serbia. Kosovo is Serbia. In addition to that, there is more Serbs in Kosovo than 10 per cent.

Q: But you know as well as I do that it does not satisfy the Albanian community in Kosovo.

- We have to draw a line between what can satisfy them as equal citizens and what would represent their majorization. Except that, the satisfaction of Albanian community is not the highest principle of life in Kosovo. There is satisfaction of Serb community, Muslim community...

Q: But the thing is that they are not equal.

- They can have everything which makes them equal. But they cannot again be the masters of the rest of the population. That is the line.

Q: Will you allow decisions to be made in Kosovo on everyday life, not in Belgrade.

- Yes, of course, they can have it on the basis of the Agreement reached by all national communities in Kosovo. They can no longer ask more rights than others in Kosovo.

Q: The fact is that the Serbs who have a small percentage of population in Kosovo rule in Kosovo. The question is what are you going to do if they want independence. You know that it is your problem. What will you do to keep Kosovo in Serbia, and at the same time satisfy their request for autonomy?

- Both. We will let them run their affairs but that right has to be given to Turks, Muslims, Serbs and others.

Q: But the Serbs are in charge.

- Serbs in Kosovo will continue to have the right to exercise control over their inalienable interests.

Q: Will the laws in Kosovo be equal for Serbs and all others?

- All laws in Kosovo are equally valid for all.

Q: So, according to you, local regulations will not be in place for them?

- No local regulations.

Q: Regardless who wins the elections?

- You obviously do not understand well. You have to understand something. If you read this joint agreement, you will understand. Albanian national community will be able to run its affairs. The same will be for Serbs, Turks, Muslims and others. But for Kosovo as a whole, they will have to make decisions together on common issues. As for special issues they will be able to make their own decisions.

Q. In addition to security, will they be able to make decisions on everyday business. Except for security, I do not see why it would not be possible. As long as they are not independent, as long as it is within autonomy, I do not see any problem in that. But you have to withdraw your police from there and stop being aggressive. I understand that the KLA attacks the police, I understand that they are not perfect, I have no illusions about that, but you are smart enough to draw conclusions.

- You should not ignore a simple fact. Police in Kosovo is from Kosovo. And Kosovo is Serbia.

Q: No, they are from Serbia.

- They are not from other parts of Serbia. Even if they were, Kosovo is part of Serbia.

Q: But they are Serbs.

- Serbs, and others. Why wouldn't they be Serbs. This is Serbia.

Q: Will you let the people there to have police?

- Members of police are people living there. Now, it is a process. Nothing can be solved overnight. Currently in 112 villages in Kosovo and Metohija there is local police, elected from local residents. These are all Albanian police officers. They take care of their everyday security. When we started this process it was one village, two, three, five and now it is more than 110. We believe that it can go further. Everywhere, in Serb villages it is Serbs, in Albanian it is

Albanians, who take care of security. But they cannot use force against members of other national communities.

Q. Aren't the Serbs doing just that? Now they have power in their hands and they are using it against the others?

- I am telling you about our idea concerning the evolution of local police, once it becomes fully developed.

Q: Will you withdraw your police?

- All police in Serbia is ours. There is no other way. This is the police from Kosmet, it is ours, of the Republic of Serbia.

Q: But it is Serb police. Are there any paramilitary units?

-No, there are not. Never have been.

Q: Are there any troops in Kosovo?

- Of course, army is there.

Q. Are the soldiers from Serbia?

- Of course, some are from Montenegro, some are from northern Serbia, from entire Yugoslavia, as any other army.

Q: Will you keep your army there?

- Of course, why would army leave Kosovo. This is a part of Yugoslavia. Where would an army be if not on its territory.

Q: Will you withdraw it from towns and let the residents run their affairs.

- The army is not running the towns.

Q: Are the barracks in towns?

It depends. Sometimes they are in towns and it is nothing strange for any county. Army is in the entire territory of FRY and its task is to be everywhere. It is its constitutional duty. We were exposed to attacks of various armed groups from Albania who tried to infiltrate into the territory of FRY, almost every day. It is a legitimate right of every state to defend its borders. That right cannot be disputed by anyone, not even your fellow nationals.

Q: Tell me something about the extraction force in Albania. Media yesterday wrote that you and Holbrooke agreed on the deployment of these forces for the protection of international observers.

- International observers do not need any protection. We guarantee their protection.

Q: So you do not like the extraction forces.

- Absolutely not. I do not like their presence at all.

Q. But media say that you and Holbrooke agreed on extraction force?

- No, we did not agree on the presence of any foreign soldiers on the FRY territory. If they want to have their forces in territories of other states, that is their problem. We cannot forbid NATO to place their force where they want. But on our territory, we do not wish to have any foreign troops.

Q: What happens if they come to Kosovo to save international observers?

- There is no need for them to come.

Q: But if they come nevertheless.

- If they come to our territory we shall consider it an act of aggression.

Q: And you will fight them?

- This is a legitimate duty of our army, which cannot allow any foreign troops to come to our territory.

Q: That is why Mr. Holbrooke and you did not agree on extraction force which would be deployed in Macedonia?

- If it is in Macedonia, it is not our affair.

Q: But they are in Macedonia to protect the observers.

- Holbrooke knows well that we protect anyone in our territory.

Q: But I thought that they hoped that you will withdraw your police and army from Kosovo and enable Hill and his mediating team to bring both sides to negotiating table.

- We never discussed police and army of Yugoslavia leaving Kosovo.

Q: I thought that there should be less of them and that they should not respond to KLA attacks.

- If KLA attacks, the police will certainly respond. Can you think that some group in the USA attacks someone and your police does not react.

Q: This is not what they are asking you to do. Does your mandate expire in 2001?

Yes, I was elected in 1987 and my mandate expires in 2001.

Q: You can be President of Yugoslavia for one term only?

Yes, in accordance with the Constitution of FRY.

Q: Are you going to change the Constitution and enable another mandate. You are still young.

- I have no intention of doing that.

Q: You said once that you will not allow the internationalisation of Kosovo.

- Of course, that is our internal affair.

Q: But you allowed NATO to fly over your territory and 2000 OSCE observers.

- Yes, we allowed OSCE to verify what is true over there, this is good for us, we have nothing to hide.

Q: You do not think that this is a change in your policy?

- No, they will not be authorised to manage the situation in Kosmet, they can only verify the situation and report on it. They do not have the mandate to act in place of legitimate authorities.

Q: What will happen when American troops leave Bosnia?

- It will depend on what the international community will achieve before that. If the international community supports the development of normal democratic life and allows the authorities elected by the people to carry out their tasks, nothing will happen when they withdraw. I believe that they will recognise their common interest to manage their own future, and not to renew conflicts. Quite contrary, to restore their ties, to live normally, to co-operate, to develop economy which will satisfy their everyday needs, without special assistance from abroad.

Q: I have always asked myself if the state will be able to survive without outside help, or will it be eventually be divided between Serbia and Croatia.

- It will depend on what is done in the meantime. We have no need to unite Republika Srpska with Yugoslavia. Everything is calm now. The same people that lives on both sides of the river Drona can be well integrated, even if they live in two sates. If today there are no barriers between Germans and French, why should there be between Serbs and Serbs living on either side of the same river.

Q: Since you know so much about that region, can you tell me your opinion whether Bosnia can survive, whether in the long run it will be divided between Serbia and Croatia?

- If they are well integrated in the region, they will have normal conditions to develop their country. My political approach was to eliminate all barriers in economy in the entire region, as we did two years ago with Macedonia. We abolished customs duties, which was followed by a radical rise of trade exchange between FRY and Macedonia. That has nothing to do with integration among states. They are Macedonia, we are Yugoslavia. Practically, if borders are totally open, people can move freely, trade is free, no customs at all. What is more logical than benefits for both countries. The same is the case with Bosnia and Herzegovina. If we create all conditions for co-operation, the question where is the border will not be so important. We even started talks on the abolishment of duties with Bulgaria. We never intended to unite with Bulgaria. But we can abolish duties, if we open up, in market economy each enterprise will have more space to take advantage of market economy. We have to work a lot

to be regionally integrated, that our economies be integrated. That will be followed by infrastructure, new roads, new railways, new communications and other things, but people have a common goal to live in peace and affluence. Not to live in poverty and war. That will be the vision of the Balkans. That is why the international community should encourage co-operation between the countries of the region. This is something that strengthens peace and motivates people not to be isolated or confined to small territory. If everything is free and open, without barriers, then borders are not important.

Q: When I go home and people ask me what is the most important thing that President Milosevic had to say, whether you in any way changed your policy, whether you recently decided to introduce any changes. Did you change something that people do not understand. For example, do you think that you can really reach an agreement on Kosovo?

- We can reach an agreement.

Q: It is said in the media that your wife plays an important role.

- She is a university professor and author of a number of books. You can read them, they are even translated in English. I even saw that one of them was translated in pharcy, in Teheran. On the cover is a photo of a woman without a scarf, which is something you have to have there. Her books are printed in China, India, Canada, Russia, Mexico. They have been translated in more than 20 languages. She is very active in public life, but she never tried to influence me concerning my State affairs. She does not want to be an influential wife. She has her own public life.

Q: But people say that she did not like the Head of State Security.

- That is not true. On the contrary. She has been in cordial relations with him for years.

Q: So your wife does not have a lot of power?

- The party she is in, has ministers in federal and Republican government, deputies in the federal and republican parliament.

Q: But an agreement that would really be fair, the one Americans would like.

- Really fair. Something which is not fair to one part, cannot be fair to another. So, fair for everybody. But we in Serbia and Yugoslavia are trying to reach an agreement which the citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia would like. That of course includes all citizens, Albanians. It would be nice if the agreement were to be liked by others, Americans for example, but we do not arrange our country in line with the interests of others, but according to our interests.

Q: Frankly, do you think you can really satisfy Albanians?

- Of course, we cannot satisfy those who seek independence. This is the line we cannot cross.

Q: When you met Rugova, did you agree with him?

- I think that we understood each other well. We said, and that was even in our press release that the solution has to be based on full respect of equality of citizens and national communities in Kosmet. It cannot be avoided. Full respect of citizens and national communities is key for Kosovo. There is no other key for Kosmet, any imposed solution cannot work. Solutions are like machines. They may be beautiful before they start working. They when you try to make it work, it is still beautiful but it does not work.

Q: Have you seen the text of Dick Lugar in the Washington Post, in which he said that Washington is making a mistake for co-operating with you at all, and that democratic opposition should be built in Serbia and oust the regime in Serbia?

- Democracy excludes interference into internal affairs. Your president Wilson had great ideas after the First World War, but that kind of democracy cannot be imposed by tanks and bombing. I believe that senator Lugar is not well informed of the situation here and I do not know what we can talk about. You can talk with someone when he has facts, without that you cannot talk. I think that it is not in the spirit of American democracy to reserve the right to bring other countries to order. This is something that nobody can swallow.

Q: You must have been very angry when you read the text.

- No, I was not angry at all. I read worse things than that. In the past ten years I saw a lot of things and experienced many things. I am not sensitive to such messages. Only the people that is well and sound can be angry if they are preparing a government for it abroad.

Q: But I heard from your opposition that you are a very foxy strategist and that the opposition is very weak.

No, it is not weak. When national interests are at stake, there is no difference between the authorities and the opposition. You have democrats and republicans who fight each other. But when national interests of America are at stake, then there is no conflict. Then all of them stand together. It is the same in our country. We have opposition in Parliament, major opposition party is that of Mr. Draskovic, SPO. But when it comes to Kosovo they are on the same track.

Q: They are not asking for more freedom in Serbia? More papers, freedom of the university, freedom of expression?

- Serbia is one of the most democratic states in Europe. Since multi-party system was introduced, there were three federal and four republican elections. In the republican and federal parliament there are representatives of several parties, left and right. Freedom of the media is such that a Law had to be adopted to introduce a category of responsibility for what is publicly

said in order to protect the citizens from fundamental untruths. There is 2500 media in Serbia, most of which are privately owned.

Q: But they are controlled by the State?

- Only the state television. In Great Britain the BBC is controlled by the state.

Q: But in our country, private persons own TV stations.

- The state has control only over the state TV, but it has no control whatsoever over any private TV network.

Q: How many private TV stations are there?

- I don't know their exact number, but there are many of them. For instance, one of the biggest stations in Belgrade Studio B is controlled by the Opposition, that is by Mr Draskovic. The ruling party and the Government exercise no influence over that station. There is also BK Television, Pink Television, TV Palma. They are all privately run and have a large audience, as well as many other TV stations throughout Serbia.

Q: You are a very articulate man, you are in control. Why do you close down daily papers and why don't you let the professors to teach in your capital.

- We have never closed down papers in this country.

Q: You closed down some recently.

- That is not true.

Q: Mr. Miles said that.

- Mr. Miles perhaps explained that some of the papers or journalists were fined for publishing lies.

Q: But why do you do that? You used to let people write freely. Why did you change?

- We use western solutions. We are using your democracy as a model.

Q: They are not free if they are punished for writing something that one official does not like. If I was fined for what I had written so far, I would have gone bankrupt.

- This is obviously lack of understanding. They are not punished for their political or other views, but for falsehoods. What is in our Information law you can find in the French information law.

Q: We do not have an Information law.

- This is your problem. This is the law of Serbia.

Q: But I know that you personally granted more freedom before.

- Press is totally free in this country.

Q: That is not true.

- According to that law, the press is totally free. But you are held accountable if you publish a lie. For example, I am a journalist who claims that you stole a million dollars from a bank yesterday. If you say before the court that it is not true, I shall be fined, considerably less than for example in France. There is no prison term, or closing down of media.

Q: But why can you not allow people to write what they want. Why can't this be a freer country?

- People have to be protected from lies. The right to truth is one of the principles of freedom. By protecting citizens from lies and violence, we protect the most important interests of the citizens. Our country is free.

Q: I do not think so. I think that you are not free if you have to pay fines. I think that you are able to protect your interests and that you do not need any assistance in that respect. I think that you can articulate your positions well.

- I would like you to explain to me why someone is not free if the only prohibition is against publishing a lie.

Q: But if you do not have enough money?

- If you do not have such protection, how can you protect people exposed to lies. The lack of money to pay a fine is no excuse to forgive a lie, to ignore it.

Q: I come from a very wealthy family. I was personally attacked many times and that is very unpleasant. I fully agree with you, but in America it is part of the game, part of life. You have to learn to live with it.

- Madam, you talk about your family. I can tell you about my family. For the past ten years I was attacked countless times, as well as my family. I never denied anything. I never sent anyone to jail. I never closed down a paper.

Q: That's what I heard.

- This goes on for ten years.

Q: But why did you change that?

- Nothing changed regarding the freedom of the press. The Republic of Serbia only protects its citizens from lies. Papers are not closed down, fines are introduced if a shameless lie is published.

Q: Will you allow that TV stations be opened?

- They are open. They were not closed at all.

Q: So, you will not allow the citizens to publish what they want?

- What do you mean, what they want?

Q: Is it true, I have heard that one of your official said that Osama bin Laden is influential in Kosovo and that it seems that he is there himself?

- We possess information that Osama bin Laden visited Albania and not Kosovo.

Q: Why did he go to Albania?

- Why? We have heard that he blew up your embassies.

Q: Are his training camps situated in Albania, rather than in Afghanistan?

- I don't know where he is and I don't know where his camps are located. I believe that the United States knows better his present whereabouts than I do. We understand that he visited Albania and that this visit lasted several weeks.

Q: Do think that Albania is going to become a fundamentalist and terrorist state?

- Not a fundamentalist one, but surely they are in a state of disarray. I deeply deplore the situation in Albania. We would like to see it in a state of order rather than in a state of disorder and disarray.

Q: Can you visualise Bosnia as a fundamentalist state?

- Not really.

Q: Does that mean that you do not perceive any danger coming from fundamentalism in the region?

- Some Mujahidin have come to Kosovo and many of them, of course, had come to Bosnia.

Q: Did they help the Bosnians?

- Yes, they did. Your agencies know this very well. They know that they ran training camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but when I speak of people in Bosnia, the Bosnian Muslims, I believe that they are not fundamentalist-oriented.

Q: Does it mean that Mujahidin helped in Bosnia?

- Not only them but also the Saudis and other Muslim countries, which assisted them because they thought they were in danger as they were Muslims. That was not true. We have Muslims here in Yugoslavia and they have not for one moment felt threatened in any way. Quite the contrary. More than 150.000 Muslims of Kosovo are equal in their rights with the Serbs and they are on a collision course with the Albanian separatist movement there. This is something that the international public does not know or understand.

Q: Don't you think that the KLA is growing stronger every day?

- They grew stronger this summer, however they were defeated.

Q: Will the fighting be re-ignited or will the cease-fire hold?

- For all those living in Kosovo and Metohija, a peaceful political settlement should be a priority. As for terrorists or murderers and kidnappers, we hope that they will not be able to recover. Even if they do, and if they resume fighting, they will be routed. This is something which is not in doubt.

Q: So, you are not concerned that there might be another spring bout of fighting?

- No, I am not because they are no longer a military factor, nor will we ever again allow them to become one. They, however, still pose a security threat, because they may ambush and kill people. And this is what they do. They may abduct people. They killed an Albanian doctor in front of his home simply because he worked for a state medical facility in Pec. They then wounded a mother driving her three children in a car, even though they saw that she was alone with children. There is an endless list of their misdeeds.

Q: Last night, I read that a Kosovo Albanian may be put in the dock just because he stood guard outside his home.

- I don't know the details of that case.

Q: This is a very important detail. If you and I were to stand outside our homes holding weapons, that would not constitute a crime. Why are then Albanian put on trial? The article says that he only guarded his home.

- Even your country does not allow civilians to hold guns. To be able to do that in this country too, one has to have a police licence. Because of the situations brought about the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, our police are not allowed to issue civilians with licences for holding long-barrelled guns. You may get a licence for a handgun, but not for an automatic weapon and to do with it whatever you like.

Q: This sounds to me pretty innocent. I don't see why it is a crime.

- It is not a crime, but it is not innocuous either, given the present conditions, especially in Kosovo.

Q: Don't you think that the biggest problem in the United States is that you are accused of some of the worst atrocities in this century?

- I believe that the biggest problem we have with the United States is a very bad propaganda and the media war that is being waged against us.

Q: What is the situation with facts?

- All facts are on our side. The problem is that the truth is not very popular.

Q: And what about the ethnic cleansing?

- If you are referring to Bosnia, all the warring parties there bear great responsibility. We have on numerous occasions condemned the practice of ethnic cleansing and we strongly opposed it, regardless of whether it was done by the Serbs, Muslims or Croats.

Q: People say that the top officials in your country were those who gave orders to commit ethnic cleansing?

- That is not true.

Q: This is why they want to arrest Mladic and Karadzic, isn't it?

- This is their justification, but Karadzic and Mladic did nothing that Izetbegovic and his Chief of Army Staff were not doing.

Q: But they did not slit throats to thousands of people?

- There is no evidence to support it.

Q: But I saw it on television?

- I also saw many things on television, including violence against the Serbs who were said to be Muslims, even when they wore distinctive boat-shaped caps, the so-called "sajkaca".

Q: I know that a long time ago you used be a banker.

- Yes, I was a banker until 1984.

Q: Were you born in Belgrade?

- No, I was not. I was born in Pozarevac, which is 73 kilometres Southeast of Belgrade.

Q: What was your father by profession?

A: He was a high school teacher and my mother was a primary school teacher.

Q: Were you their oldest child?

- No. I have an elder brother.

Q: So, they had two children. Did you attend school in that town?

- When I finished high school in Pozarevac, I came to Belgrade to study law at the University and I obtained my degree in 1964.

Q: Was Tito in power at that time?

- Yes, he was.

Q: Yugoslavia was a moderate communist country.

- We never belonged to the Eastern bloc, which criticised us for restoring capitalism. We were a very liberal country. I must say that as a banker in Tito's Yugoslavia I was free in doing my business. No one told me what to do and I was only accountable to my bank's founder members. We had an annual bank meeting and the Board of Directors and we had an excellent co-operation with many international banks. My bank used to have an income of 13 billion US dollars.

Q: Did you begin to work for your bank immediately after you graduated at the university?

After I graduated, I spent a few years working for the Belgrade City administration. I then did my one-year military service. When I completed it, I found a job in the industry. I was employed by Tehnogas, a company dealing in technical gases. I quickly rose through the ranks and became Deputy General Manager and later General Manager. As a company we were shareholders of Beogradska banka and I was on its Board of Directors. I was elected President of this bank in 1977. In 1979 I opened a branch of my bank on Madison Avenue in New York, just opposite the General Motors headquarters. I did not work there. With my friends, like John Magilicardi of Mantrust and Tony Tuke of Barclay's, I helped to establish the Anglo-Yugoslav (AY) Bank. In my offices in Belgrade we signed a document setting up the AY Bank which still operates in London. We also establish a Franco-Yugoslav bank in Paris and another bank in Frankfurt, Germany. We had many branch offices throughout the world. We were a very busy bank. At that time, the state did not influence the decisions made by banks. We operated in conditions of a market economy and explained that this was the only perspective of the economy to develop. The alternative was an unwieldy bureaucratic apparatus.

Q: Do you regret anything?

- All I did was to search for peace. In that search many errors were made and no one is immune to it. I regret nothing in particular and my conscience is clear.

Q: The stories which came from Bosnia were horrible, stories of thousands of people shot, and they all say that you had the power to stop it.

- True, I used my power to stop it.

Q: Haven't you controlled Karadzic and Mladic? When did you stop to control them?

- I have never controlled Karadzic and Mladic. I first met Karadzic when was president of his party and when he ran a third of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At that time, they believed that an agreement would be reached with the Muslims and Croats. I must say to you that they were well on the way of achieving it. A special conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina was arranged in Lisbon, chaired by Portuguese Ambassador Cutiliero. That was before the war escalated. I remember very well the meeting of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia in the Hague. The chair of the meeting was Lord Peter Carrington. At the outset of the conference, Ambassador Cutiliero briefed us all that tangible progress was made in the settlement of the problem between the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims. I remember what happened after Cutiliero had informed us about that positive development. Izetbegovic took the floor to ask that they be recognised as a state. I then warned that Ambassador Cutiliero had said that there

had been positive development. Why spoil this by an early recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina which would create chaos. I had in mind that Bosnia-Herzegovina was made up of three nations living there. The rump referendum was the basis for that request, which should not have been initiated in the first place and thus spoiled the positive progress. I asked that they be given more time to make further progress and not to go ahead with a premature recognition that would only resulted in negative consequences. There are records and sound recordings to prove all this. A few weeks later, Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised an independent state, in which the Bosnian Serbs did not want to be second-rate citizens. They told me: we want to remain within our previous state. And that is all.

Q: Do you see any difference between the Clinton and Bush administrations?

- I am not an expert on US internal affairs. As far as its foreign policy is concerned, I believe that the Bush Administration was more responsible. My impression is that the Bush Administration knew well that the problems in Kosovo arose from a separatist movement and not from the lack of human rights and democracy.

Q: Mr Eagleburger lived here for many years?

- Yes, he did and I knew him very well. After a while, he was not well informed about the situation in Yugoslavia. The United States was not involved at the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis. The Bush Administration maintained that Yugoslavia needed to be preserved. After that, faced with the failure of the Europeans to assist, they decided to join them.

Q: Because Germans essentially wanted Croatia to be independent?

- Yes, they wanted them to be independent and they effectively contributed to it.

Q: That was at the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia?

- That's right. They began with Slovenia. There are many articles in the papers on the preparations for it. You may take a look at those reports in the Western press. This is a rather long story and is not for this conversation.

Q: Do you believe that the Serbs living in Kosovo would be willing to live under the local law. You say no. They have to live in accordance with the Serbian law and to go to trial before Serbian courts, is this the right interpretation?

- All at the local level must be applied equally to all. The thing is that they must all participate on an equal basis. They will have their own laws while the legal system of Serbia will be applied in Kosovo. What is good to all Serbs, all Hungarians, all Slovaks, all Ruthenians, all Muslims and all others living in Serbia, why would it not be good for Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija as well. All that is applied in Serbia must be valid and applied to all its citizens.

Q: Do you think that takes into account the interests and aspirations of Kosovo Albanians?

The state fully takes into account their interests, excepts for the goals of the separatist movement to bring about secession.

Q: Do you think that the conditions of life there will improve in the foreseeable future?

- Conditions of life will improve through economic development. I believe that if we achieve something similar to the proposed Common Agreement, there will be no need to wage a war.

Q: Are you referring to the Serbian plan put forward at the end of last month?

- That is not a Serbian plan but the plan proposed by the Muslims, Romanies, Turks and all national communities of Kosovo and Metohija, including by representatives of two Albanian parties.

Q: According to my information, that plan is not satisfactory for major Albanian parties.

- That plan is not unacceptable for all Kosovo Albanians but only for some of their politicians who are leading the separatist movement, whose aim is to achieve independence for Kosovo and Metohija.

The President gave to his interlocutor a copy of the Joint agreement saying, recorded on tape:” Please read the text and if you find anything that is not in line with the highest standards of democracy, human and minority rights, you can write that it is no good.”