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dc.contributor.authorCarvalho, André Borges de-
dc.contributor.authorRibeiro, Pedro Floriano-
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-26T11:30:50Z-
dc.date.available2024-03-26T11:30:50Z-
dc.date.issued2021-10-20-
dc.identifier.citationBORGES, André; RIBEIRO, Pedro Floriano. Presidents, prime ministers and legislative behaviour : the conditional effect of presidential legislative powers on party unity. Government and Opposition, [S.l.], v. 58, n. 2, p. 227-248, 20 out. 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.45. Disponível em: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/presidents-prime-ministers-and-legislative-behaviour-the-conditional-effect-of-presidential-legislative-powers-on-party-unity/ABA0DE833FAC4D0F77A53D93F2D7D2B9#. Acesso em: 23 março 2024.pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorio2.unb.br/jspui/handle/10482/48032-
dc.language.isoengpt_BR
dc.publisherCambridge University Presspt_BR
dc.rightsAcesso Abertopt_BR
dc.titlePresidents, prime ministers and legislative behaviour : the conditional effect of presidential legislative powers on party unitypt_BR
dc.typeArtigopt_BR
dc.subject.keywordPresidencialismopt_BR
dc.subject.keywordPoder Executivopt_BR
dc.subject.keywordSemipresidencialismopt_BR
dc.subject.keywordPartidos políticospt_BR
dc.subject.keywordPoder Legislativopt_BR
dc.rights.license© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Limited. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creative commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.pt_BR
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.45pt_BR
dc.description.abstract1This article proposes a novel theoretical framework to account for the combined effects of regime type and patterns of executive authority on legislative party unity. We argue that broad presidential legislative powers favour coordination between the president and legislative parties under pure presidentialism, whereas under semi-presidentialism, strong presidents increase the potential for intra-executive conflict, submitting parties to crosscutting pressures. We expect higher levels of legislative authority to increase party unity under presidentialism but decrease under semi-presidentialism. Moreover, when presidents are endowed with limited legislative authority, semi-presidentialism produces higher levels of party unity than presidentialism, but for sufficiently high levels of legislative authority there should be no difference across regime types. Our analyses of 1,586 pooled observations for 72 democracies from all regions of the world using the V-Dem measure of party cohesion demonstrate that presidential legislative authority, in combination with regime type, is indeed a key predictor of party unity.pt_BR
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-2129-8091pt_BR
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Brasília, Department of Political Sciencept_BR
dc.contributor.affiliationFederal University of São Carlos, Department of Social Sciencespt_BR
dc.description.unidadeInstituto de Ciência Política (IPOL)pt_BR
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