Crime, conflict, and peace : violent non-state groups and crop substitution in the Colombia-Ecuador borderland (2017-2021)

Abstract

Colombia faces a historical struggle related to crime and conflict. The country has endured a long history of internal power disputes, in which the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and other violent non-state groups (VNSGs) have controlled significant parts of the territory and were wise enough to withstand, over time, government efforts to crush them. In addition to - and often because of - such threats, Colombia stands as the top cocaine production country, the most produced and consumed drug in the world. In 2016, the comprehensive Peace Deal signed between the Colombian government and FARC-EP aimed primarily to end the cycle of violence and numerous violations of human rights the guerrilla and state security forces perpetrated. The document, a result of four years of intense negotiations, is divided into six parts: (i) Comprehensive rural reform; (ii) Political participation; (iii) End of conflict; (iv) Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problem; (v) Victims; and (vi) Implementation and verification mechanisms. Inserted in Point 4’s overall goal of undermining criminal and violent dynamics derived from the drug problem, the Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos (PNIS) promotes voluntary substitution of crops for illicit use through programs and projects dedicated to overcoming conditions of violence, poverty, inequality, and marginalization of families. The Program is an immediate response to national and transnational problems, such as the chronic weak institutional presence and the financing of drug-related VNSGs. Nonetheless, the clear purpose and the coordination tools available were not enough to boost PNIS early implementation in Colombia: part of this insufficiency derives from top-down governance challenges, but local security dynamics have proven themselves a considerable obstacle as well. Since the armed conflict is known to have affected differently the regions, leading to major security concerns for rural and border areas in comparison to urban centers, my focus rests on the Colombia-Ecuador borderland in order to address the magnifying effect on security dynamics the transnational character of borderlands adds to the case study. Therefore, this research investigates how local security dynamics derived from VNSGs action can spoil the implementation of PNIS in Nariño and Putumayo, Colombian departments located in the Colombia-Ecuador borderland. I argue that VNSGs undermine the PNIS implementation by fueling high-profiting illegal economies, fomenting state-crime collusion and keeping communities under a rule of fear, insecurity, and uncertainty. As a consequence of these actions, VNSGs affect the core aspects of PNIS of territorial ownership and socioeconomic empowerment of communities, hence undermining the Program’s implementation. VNSGs illegal actions challenge the state monopoly of violence and, in contrast with state governance based on the rule of law, creates a parallel standard of governance, based on violence. To understand such complex phenomena within their context, my “how” research question is best answered with an in-depth qualitative case study. The case study analysis focuses on building the causal paths of PNIS in Nariño and Putumayo in the first five years of peacebuilding in Colombia (2017-2021), identifying occurrences in which VNSGs’ action spoiled the Program’s implementation in both departments. To achieve the intended results, I rely on a bottom-up epistemological perspective which considers the agency of VNSGs in marginalized regions. Through the critical approach, I remain attentive to invisible power dynamics that affect borderland communities and, therefore, adequate methodological choices and methods of data collection and analysis to shed light on security dynamics that transcend the traditional conflict-peace binary.